5.6 A CHANGE IN NASA LEADERSHIP

¶Figure 5.5-4. Age of the Space Shuttle infrastructure. (Source: Con- nie Milton to Space Flight Advisory Council, 2000.

¶on certain launch pad areas being exposed to the elements. When rain falls on these areas, it carries away zinc, runs onto the leading edge of the Orbiterʼs wings, and causes pinholes in the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panels (see Chapter 3).

¶In 2000, NASA identified 100 infrastructure items that demanded immediate attention. NASA briefed the Space Flight Advisory Committee on this "Infrastructure Revitalization" initiative in November of that year. The Committee concluded that "deteriorating infrastructure is a serious, major problem," and, upon touring several Kennedy Space Center facilities, declared them "in deplorable condition."67 NASA subsequently submitted a request to the White House Office of Management and Budget during Fiscal Year 2002 budget deliberations for $600 million to fund the infrastructure initiative. No funding was approved.

¶In Fiscal Year 2002, Congress added $25 million to NASAʼs budget for Vehicle Assembly Building repairs. NASA has reallocated limited funds from the Shuttle budget to pressing infrastructure repairs, and intends to take an integrated look at infrastructure as part of its new Shuttle Service Life Extension Program. Nonetheless, like Space Shuttle upgrades, infrastructure revitalization has been mired by the uncertainty surrounding the Shuttle Programʼs lifetime. Considering that the Shuttle will likely be flying for many years to come, NASA, the White House, and Congress alike now face the specter of having to deal with years of infrastructure neglect.

¶Boxcar Offices

¶Daniel Goldin left NASA in November 2001 after more than nine years as Administrator. The White House chose Sean OʼKeefe, the Deputy Director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, as his replacement. OʼKeefe stated as he took office that he was not a "rocket scientist," but rather that his expertise was in the management of large government programs. His appointment was an explicit acknowledgement by the new Bush administration that NASAʼs primary problems were managerial and financial.

¶By the time OʼKeefe arrived, NASA managers had come to recognize that 1990s funding reductions for the Space Shuttle Program had resulted in an excessively fragile program, and also realized that a Space Shuttle replacement was not on the horizon. In 2002, with these issues in mind, OʼKeefe made a number of changes to the Space Shuttle Program. He transferred management of both the Space Shuttle Program and the International Space Station from Johnson Space Center to NASA Headquarters. OʼKeefe also began considering whether to expand the Space Flight Operations Contract to cover additional Space Shuttle elements, or to pursue "competitive sourcing," a Bush administration initiative that encouraged government agencies to compete with the private sector for management responsibilities of publicly funded activities. To research whether competitive sourcing would be a viable approach for the Space Shuttle Program, NASA chartered the Space Shuttle Competitive Sourcing Task Force through the RAND Corporation, a federally funded think tank. In its report, the Task Force recognized the many obstacles to transferring the Space Shuttle to non-NASA management, primarily NASAʼs reticence to relinquish control, but concluded that "NASA must pursue competitive sourcing in one form or another."68

¶NASA began a "Strategic Management of Human Capital" initiative to ensure the quality of the future NASA workforce. The goal is to address the various external and internal challenges that NASA faces as it tries to ensure an appropriate mix and depth of skills for future program requirements. A number of aspects to its Strategic Human Capital Plan require legislative approval and are currently before the Congress.

Roof
Siding
Doors

¶Figure 5.5-5 and 5.5-6. Examples of the seriously deteriorating infrastructure used to support the Space Shuttle Program. At left is Launch Complex 39A, and at right is the Vehicle Assembly building, both at the Kennedy Space Center.

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¶The new NASA leadership also began to compare Space Shuttle program practices with the practices of similar high-technology, high-risk enterprises. The Navy nuclear submarine program was the first enterprise selected for com- parative analysis. An interim report on this "benchmarking" effort was presented to NASA in December 2002.69

¶In November 2002, NASA made a fundamental change in strategy. In what was called the Integrated Space Transportation Plan (see Figure 5.6-1), NASA shifted money from the Space Launch Initiative to the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. The plan also introduced the Orbital Space Plane as a complement to the Shuttle for the immediate future. Under this strategy, the Shuttle is to fly through at least 2010, when a decision will be made on how long to extend Shuttle operations – possibly through 2020 or even beyond.

¶As a step in implementing the plan, NASA included $281.4 million in its Fiscal Year 2004 budget submission to begin a Shuttle Service Life Extension Program,70 which NASA describes as a "strategic and proactive program designed to keep the Space Shuttle flying safely and efficiently." The program includes "high priority projects for safety, support- ability, and infrastructure" in order to "combat obsolescence of vehicle, ground systems, and facilities."71

¶Figure 5.6-1. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan.