A.4 BOARD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

¶Authorizing Investigators

¶To maintain control over the investigation process, the Chairman established a system of written authorizations specify- ing individuals who were sanctioned to interview witnesses or perform other functions on behalf of the Board.

¶Consideration of Federal Advisory Committee Act Statutes

¶Not long after its activation, and well before adding additional members, the Board considered the applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.3 This statute requires advisory committees established by the President or a federal agency to provide formal public notice of their meetings as well as public access to their deliberations. In contrast to most committees governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which meet a few times per year, the Board intended from the outset to conduct a full-time, fast-paced investigation, in which Board members themselves were active investigators who would shape the investigationʼs direction as it developed. The Board concluded that the formalities required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act are not compatible with the kind of investigation it was charged to complete. Nor did the Board find the Federal Advisory Committee Act statutes compatible with exercis- ing operational responsibility for more than a hundred staff and thousands of debris searchers.

¶Though the Federal Advisory Committee Act did not apply to the Boardʼs activities, the Board resolved to be faithful to the standards of openness the Act embodies. The Board held frequent press briefings and public hearings, released all significant findings immediately, and maintained a telephone hotline and a Web site, where users accessed Web pages more than 40,000,000 times. The Board also processed Freedom of Information Act requests according to procedures established in 14 C.F.R. Section 1206.

¶Board Members as Federal Employees

¶The possibility of litigation against Board members for their actions while on the Board, especially because the Space Flight Operations Contract would be a subject of investigation, made it necessary to bring Board Members within the protections that the Federal Tort Claims Act af- fords to federal employees. This and other considerations led the Board Chairman to determine that the Board should consist of full-time federal employees. As the Chairman named new Board members, the NASA Administrator hon- ored the Boardʼs determination and deemed them full-time federal employees.

¶Oversight of Board Activities

¶To ensure that the Board acted in an independent and unbi- ased manner in its investigation, the NASA Inspector General was admitted on request to any Board proceeding, except those involving privileged witness statements. The Board also allowed Congressional access to the Boardʼs databases and offices in Houston and Washington, D.C., with special restrictions that preserved the integrity and confidentiality of privileged witness statements.

234

¶Financial Independence

¶To ensure the Boardʼs financial independence, NASA established a separate operating budget for the Boardʼs activities. This fund provided for Board operating expenses, including extensive testing and analysis and the acquisition of services by support staff and technical experts. With the exception of Chairman Gehman, whose salary was paid by the Office of Personnel Management, and those Board members who were already federal government or military employees, Board members were compensated by Congressionally appropriated funds administered by NASA.

¶Board Staffing and Administrative Support

¶Through a Government Services Administration-supervised bidding process, Valador, Inc., a service-disabled-veteran- owned professional services contractor, was selected to provide the Boardʼs administrative and technical support. Under a Mission Operation and Business Improvement Systems contract, Valador arranged for the Boardʼs support staff, technical experts, and information technology needs, including the Board Web site, http://www.caib.us. Valador also supported the Boardʼs public hearings, press conferences, the public-input database, and the publication of the final report.

¶The Board was aided by public affairs officers; a budget manager; representatives from the National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice Civil Division, Office of Litigation Support; and Dr. James B. Bagian, an astronaut flight surgeon assigned from the Department of Veterans Affairs who worked with the NASA medical staff, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, and the local medical examiner. A complete list of staff and consultants appears in Appendix B.2 and B.3.

¶Public Inputs

¶The Board established a system for inputs from the public that included a 24-hour hotline, mailing address, and online comment form linked to the Boardʼs Web site. This enabled the submission of photographs, comments, technical papers, and other materials by the public, some of whom made submissions anonymously. Board staff logged every input into a database. To establish the relevance of every phone call, letter, e-mail, or online comment, investigators evaluated their significance and, if appropriate, followed up with the submitters. Of the 3,000 submissions the Board received, more than 750 resulted in actions by one of the Boardʼs four investigative sub-groups, the Independent Assessment Team, or other Board staff.

¶Office of Governmental Affairs

¶As inquiries from Congress grew and the need to keep the Executive and Legislative branches updated on the

¶investigationʼs progress became clear, the Board opened an Office of Governmental Affairs. Based in Washington, D.C., it served as the Boardʼs liaison to the White House, departments within the Executive Branch, Congressional Oversight Committees, and members of Congress and their staffs. The office conducted numerous briefings, responded to Congressional inquiries, and ensured that the investigation met the needs of the Congressional Oversight Committees that plan to use the Boardʼs report as the basis for a public policy debate on the future of the Space Shuttle Program.