A.5 INVESTIGATION INTERFACE WITH NASA

¶NASA mobilized hundreds of personnel to directly support the Boardʼs investigation on a full-time basis. Initially, as part of the Contingency Action Plan activated on February 1, the Mishap Investigation Team went to Barksdale Air Force Base to coordinate the search for debris. NASA then deployed a Mishap Response Team to begin an engineering analysis of the accident. These groups consisted of Space Shuttle Program personnel and outside experts from NASA and contractor facilities.

¶As prescribed by its charter, the Board coordinated its investigation with NASA through a NASA Task Force Team, later designated the Columbia Task Force. This group was the liaison between the Board and the Mishap Response Team. As the investigation progressed, NASA modified the organizational structure of the Mishap Response Team to more closely align with Board structure and investigative paths, and NASA renamed it the NASA Accident Investigation Team. This team supported the Boardʼs investigation, along with thousands of other NASA and contract personnel who worked in the fault tree teams described in Chapter 4 and on the debris search efforts described in Chapter 2.

¶Documents and Actions Requested From NASA

¶The close coordination of the NASA Investigation Team with the Boardʼs sub-groups required a system for tracking documents and actions requested by the investigation. The Board and the Columbia Task Force each appointed representatives to track documents and manage their configuration.

¶Board investigators submitted more than 600 requests for action or information from NASA. Requests were submitted in writing, on a standardized form,4 and signed by a Board member. Only Board members were authorized to sign such requests. Each request was given a priority and tracked in a database. Once answered by Columbia Task Force personnel, the Board member who submitted the request either noted by signature that the response was satisfactory or re- submitted the request for further action.

¶Reassignment of Certain NASA Personnel Involved in STS-107

¶On February 25, 2003, Chairman Gehman wrote to NASA Administrator OʼKeefe, asking that he "reassign the top level Space Shuttle Program management personnel who were involved in the preparation and operation of the flight of STS-107 back to their duties and remove them from directly managing or supporting the investigation."5 This letter expressed the Boardʼs desire to prevent actual or perceived conflicts of interest between NASA personnel and the investigation. In response, OʼKeefe reassigned several members of NASAʼs Columbia Task Force and Mishap Investigation Team and reorganized it along the same lines as the Boardʼs groups. Additionally, Bryan OʼConnor, an Ex-Officio Member to the Board, and Theron Bradley Jr., the Boardʼs Executive Secretary, returned to their respective duties as Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance and Chief Engineer, and were not replaced. After OʼConnorʼs departure, Colonel (Selectee) Michael J. Bloomfield, an active Shuttle Commander and the lead training astronaut, joined the Board as a representative from the Astronaut Office.

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¶Handling of Debris and Impounded Materials

¶To ensure that all material associated with Columbiaʼs mission was preserved as evidence in the investigation, NASA officials impounded data, software, hardware, and facilities at NASA and contractor sites. At the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, the door to the Mission Control Center was locked while flight control personnel created and archived backup copies of all original mission data and took statements from Mission Control personnel. At the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, mission facilities and related hardware, including Launch Pad Complex 39-A, were put under guard or stored in secure warehouses. Similar steps were taken at other key Shuttle facilities, including the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and the Michoud Assembly Facility near New Orleans, Louisiana. Impounded items and data were released only when the Board Chairman approved a formal request from the NASA Columbia Task Force.

¶Similarly, any testing performed on Shuttle debris was approved by the Board Chairman only after the Columbia Task Force provided a written request outlining the potential benefits of the testing and addressing any possible degradation of the debris that could affect the investigation. When testing of Shuttle debris or hardware occurred outside the secure debris hanger at the Kennedy Space Center, investigation personnel escorted the debris for the duration of the testing process or otherwise ensured the itemsʼ integrity and security.