Chapter 9: Implications for the Future of Human Space Flight

¶And while many memorials will be built to honor Co- speed. There is great risk in placing human beings atop a lumbiaʼs crew, their greatest memorial will be a vibrant machine that stores and then burns millions of pounds of space program with new missions carried out by a new dangerous propellants. Equally risky is having humans then generation of brave explorers. ride the machine back to Earth while it dissipates the orbital speed by converting the energy into heat, much like a meteor – Remarks by Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Memorial entering Earthʼs atmosphere. No alternatives to this pathway

Ceremony at the National Cathedral, February 6, 2003 to space are available or even on the horizon, so we must set our sights on managing this risky process using the most advanced and versatile techniques at our disposal.

¶The report up to this point has been a look backward: a single accident with multiple causes, both physical and organizational. In this chapter, the Board looks to the future. We take the insights gained in investigating the loss of Columbia and her crew and seek to apply them to this nationʼs continuing journey into space. We divide our discussion into three timeframes: 1) short-term, NASAʼs return to flight after the Columbia accident; 2) mid-term, what is needed to continue flying the Shuttle fleet until a replacement means for human access to space and for other Shuttle capabilities is available; and 3) long-term, future directions for the U.S. in space. The objective in each case is for this country to maintain a human presence in space, but with enhanced safety of flight.

¶In this report we have documented numerous indications that NASAʼs safety performance has been lacking. But even correcting all those shortcomings, it should be understood, will not eliminate risk. All flight entails some measure of risk, and this has been the case since before the days of the Wright Brothers. Furthermore, the risk is not distributed evenly over the course of the flight. It is greater by far at the beginning and end than during the middle.

¶This concentration of risk at the endpoints of flight is particularly true for crew-carrying space missions. The Shuttle Program has now suffered two accidents, one just over a minute after takeoff and the other about 16 minutes before landing. The laws of physics make it extraordinarily difficult to reach Earth orbit and return safely. Using existing technology, orbital flight is accomplished only by harnessing a chemical reaction that converts vast amounts of stored energy into Columbia launches as STS-107 on January 16, 2003.

208

¶Because of the dangers of ascent and re-entry, because of the hostility of the space environment, and because we are still relative newcomers to this realm, operation of the Shuttle and indeed all human spaceflight must be viewed as a developmental activity. It is still far from a routine, operational undertaking. Throughout the Columbia accident investigation, the Board has commented on the widespread but erroneous perception of the Space Shuttle as somehow comparable to civil or military air transport. They are not comparable; the inherent risks of spaceflight are vastly higher, and our experience level with spaceflight is vastly lower. If Shuttle operations came to be viewed as routine, it was, at least in part, thanks to the skill and dedication of those involved in the program. They have made it look easy, though in fact it never was. The Board urges NASA leadership, the architects of U.S. space policy, and the American people to adopt a realistic understanding of the risks and rewards of venturing into space.

9.1 Near-Term: Return to Flight

¶The Board supports return to flight for the Space Shuttle at the earliest date consistent with an overriding consideration: safety. The recognition of human spaceflight as a developmental activity requires a shift in focus from operations and meeting schedules to a concern for the risks involved. Necessary measures include:

Identifying risks by looking relentlessly for the next eroding O-ring, the next falling foam; obtaining better data, analyzing and spotting trends.
Mitigating risks by stopping the failure at its source; when a failure does occur, improving the ability to tolerate it; repairing the damage on a timely basis.
Decoupling unforeseen events from the loss of crew and vehicle.
Exploring all options for survival, such as provisions for crew escape systems and safe havens.
Barring unwarranted departures from design standards, and adjusting standards only under the most rigorous, safety-driven process.

¶The Board has recommended improvements that are needed before the Shuttle Program returns to flight, as well as other measures to be adopted over the longer term – what might be considered "continuing to fly" recommendations. To ensure implementation of these longer-term recommendations, the Board makes the following recommendation, which should be included in the requirements for return-to-flight:

¶R9.1-1 Prepare a detailed plan for defining, establishing, transitioning, and implementing an independent Technical Engineering Authority, independent safety program, and a reorganized Space Shuttle Integration Office as described in R7.5-1, R7.5- 2, and R7.5-3. In addition, NASA should submit annual reports to Congress, as part of the budget review process, on its implementation activities.

¶The complete list of the Boardʼs recommendations can be found in Chapter 11.