Part Three: A Look Ahead

Part Three: A Look Ahead

¶When itʼs dark, the stars come out … The same is true with people. When the tragedies of life turn a bright day into a frightening night, Godʼs stars come out and these stars are families who say although we grieve deeply as do the families of Apollo 1 and Challenger before us, the bold exploration of space must go on. These stars are the leaders in Government and in NASA who will not let the vision die. These stars are the next generation of astronauts, who like the prophets of old said,

¶"Here am I, send me."

– Brig. Gen. Charles Baldwin, STS-107 Memorial Ceremony at the National Cathedral, February 6, 2003

¶As this report ends, the Board wants to recognize the outstanding people in NASA. We have been impressed with their diligence, commitment, and professionalism as the agency has been working tirelessly to help the Board complete this report. While mistakes did lead to the accident, and we found that organizational and cultural constraints have worked against safety margins, the NASA family should nonetheless continue to take great pride in their legacy and ongoing accomplishments. As we look ahead, the Board sincerely hopes this report will aid NASA in safely getting back to human space flight.

¶In Part Three the Board presents its views and recommendations for the steps needed to achieve that goal, of continuing our exploration of space, in a manner with improved safety.

¶Chapter 9 discusses the near-term, mid-term and long-term implications for the future of human space flight. For the near term, NASA should submit to the Return-to-Flight Task Force a plan for implementing the return-to-flight recommendations. For the mid-term, the agency should focus on: the remaining Part One recommendations, the Part Two recommendations for organizational and cultural changes, and the Part Three recommendation for recertifying the Shuttle for use to 2020 or beyond. In setting the stage for a debate

¶on the long-term future of human space flight, the Board addresses the need for a national vision to direct the design of a new Space Transportation System.

¶Chapter 10 contains additional recommendations and the significant "look ahead" observations the Board made in the course of this investigation that were not directly related to the accident, but could be viewed as "weak signals" of future problems. The observations may be indications of serious future problems and must be addressed by NASA.

¶Chapter 11 contains the recommendations made in Parts One, Two and Three, all issued with the resolve to continue human space flight.

¶Columbia in the Vehicle Assembly Building at the Kennedy Space Center being readied for STS-107 in late 2002.