The impact of 9/11

¶46. The attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 changed perceptions about the severity and likelihood of the threat from international terrorism. They showed that attacks intended to cause large‑scale civilian casualties could be mounted anywhere in the world.

¶47. In response to that perception of a greater threat, governments felt a responsibility to act to anticipate and reduce risks before they turned into a threat. That was described to the Inquiry by a number of witnesses as a change to the "calculus of risk" after 9/11.

¶48. In the wake of the attacks, Mr Blair declared that the UK would stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the US to defeat and eradicate international terrorism.13

¶49. The JIC assessed on 18 September that the attacks on the US had "set a new benchmark for terrorist atrocity", and that terrorists seeking comparable impact might try to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear devices.14 Only Islamic extremists such as those who shared Usama Bin Laden's agenda had the motivation to pursue attacks with the deliberate aim of causing maximum casualties.

¶50. Throughout the autumn of 2001, Mr Blair took an active and leading role in building a coalition to act against that threat, including military action against Al Qaida and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. He also emphasised the potential risk of terrorists acquiring and using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and the dangers of inaction.

¶51. In November 2001, the JIC assessed that Iraq had played no role in the 9/11 attacks on the US and that practical co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was "unlikely".15 There was no "credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD‑related technology and expertise to terrorist groups". It was possible that Iraq might use WMD in terrorist attacks, but only if the regime was under serious and imminent threat of collapse.

¶52. The UK continued actively to pursue a strengthened policy of containing Iraq, through a revised and more targeted sanctions regime and seeking Iraq's agreement to the return of inspectors as required by resolution 1284 (1999).

¶53. The adoption on 29 November 2001 of resolution 1382 went some way towards that objective. But support for economic sanctions was eroding and whether Iraq would ever agree to re-admit weapons inspectors and allow them to operate without obstruction was in doubt.

¶54. Although there was no evidence of links between Iraq and Al Qaida, Mr Blair encouraged President Bush to address the issue of Iraq in the context of a wider strategy to confront terrorism after the attacks of 9/11. He sought to prevent precipitate military action by the US which he considered would undermine the success of the coalition which had been established for action against international terrorism.

¶55. President Bush's remarks16 on 26 November renewed UK concerns that US attention was turning towards military action in Iraq.

¶56. Following a discussion with President Bush on 3 December, Mr Blair sent him a paper on a second phase of the war against terrorism.17

¶57. On Iraq, Mr Blair suggested a strategy for regime change in Iraq. This would build over time until the point was reached where "military action could be taken if necessary", without losing international support.

¶58. The strategy was based on the premise that Iraq was a threat which had to be dealt with, and it had multiple diplomatic strands. It entailed renewed demands for Iraq to comply with the obligations imposed by the Security Council and for the re‑admission of weapons inspectors, and a readiness to respond firmly if Saddam Hussein failed to comply.

¶59. Mr Blair did not, at that stage, have a ground invasion of Iraq or immediate military action of any sort in mind. The strategy included mounting covert operations in support of those "with the ability to topple Saddam". But Mr Blair did state that, when a rebellion occurred, the US and UK should "back it militarily".

¶60. That was the first step towards a policy of possible intervention in Iraq.

¶61. A number of issues, including the legal basis for any military action, would need to be resolved as part of developing the strategy.

¶62. The UK Government does not appear to have had any knowledge at that stage that President Bush had asked General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief, US Central Command, to review the military options for removing Saddam Hussein, including options for a conventional ground invasion.

¶63. Mr Blair also emphasised the threat which Iraq might pose in the future. That remained a key part of his position in the months that followed.

¶64. In his annual State of the Union speech on 29 January 2002, President Bush described the regimes in North Korea and Iran as "sponsors of terrorism".18 He added that Iraq had continued to:

"... flaunt its hostility towards America and to support terror ... The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens ... This is a regime that agreed to international inspections – then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world."

¶65. President Bush stated:

"States like these [North Korea, Iran and Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction these regimes pose a grave and growing danger."

¶66. From late February 2002, Mr Blair and Mr Straw began publicly to argue that Iraq was a threat which had to be dealt with. Iraq needed to disarm or be disarmed.

¶67. The urgency and certainty with which the position was stated reflected the ingrained belief that Saddam Hussein's regime retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible enhance its capabilities, including at some point in the future a nuclear capability, and was pursuing an active policy of deception and concealment. It also reflected the wider context in which the policy was being discussed with the US.

¶68. On 26 February 2002, Sir Richard Dearlove, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, advised that the US Administration had concluded that containment would not work, was drawing up plans for a military campaign later in the year, and was considering presenting Saddam Hussein with an ultimatum for the return of inspectors while setting the bar "so high that Saddam Hussein would be unable to comply".19

¶69. The following day, the JIC assessed that Saddam Hussein feared a US military attack on the scale of the 1991 military campaign to liberate Kuwait but did not regard such an attack as inevitable; and that Iraqi opposition groups would not act without "visible and sustained US military support on the ground".20

¶70. At Cabinet on 7 March, Mr Blair and Mr Straw emphasised that no decisions to launch further military action had been taken and any action taken would be in accordance with international law.

¶71. The discussion in Cabinet was couched in terms of Iraq's need to comply with its obligations, and future choices by the international community on how to respond to the threat which Iraq represented.

¶72. Cabinet endorsed the conclusion that Iraq's WMD programmes posed a threat to peace, and endorsed a strategy of engaging closely with the US Government in order to shape policy and its presentation. It did not discuss how that might be achieved.

¶73. Mr Blair sought and was given information on a range of issues before his meeting with President Bush at Crawford on 5 and 6 April. But no formal and agreed analysis of the issues and options was sought or produced, and there was no collective consideration of such advice.

¶74. Mr Straw's advice of 25 March proposed that the US and UK should seek an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to re-admit weapons inspectors.21 That would provide a route for the UK to align itself with the US without adopting the US objective of regime change. This reflected advice that regime change would be unlawful.

¶75. At Crawford, Mr Blair offered President Bush a partnership in dealing urgently with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. He proposed that the UK and the US should pursue a strategy based on an ultimatum calling on Iraq to permit the return of weapons inspectors or face the consequences.22

¶76. President Bush agreed to consider the idea but there was no decision until September 2002.

¶77. In the subsequent press conference on 6 April, Mr Blair stated that "doing nothing" was not an option: the threat of WMD was real and had to be dealt with.23 The lesson of 11 September was to ensure that "groups" were not allowed to develop a capability they might use.

¶78. In his memoir, Mr Blair characterised the message that he and President Bush had delivered to Saddam Hussein as "change the regime attitude on WMD inspections or face the prospect of changing regime".24

¶79. Documents written between April and July 2002 reported that, in the discussion with President Bush at Crawford, Mr Blair had set out a number of considerations in relation to the development of policy on Iraq. These were variously described as:

The UN inspectors needed to be given every chance of success.

The US should take action within a multilateral framework with international support, not unilateral action.

A public information campaign should be mounted to explain the nature of Saddam Hussein's regime and the threat he posed.

Any military action would need to be within the framework of international law.

The military strategy would need to ensure Saddam Hussein could be removed quickly and successfully.

A convincing "blueprint" was needed for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq which would be acceptable to both Iraq's population and its neighbours.

The US should advance the Middle East Peace Process in order to improve the chances of gaining broad support in the Middle East for military action against Iraq; and to pre‑empt accusations of double standards.

Action should enhance rather than diminish regional stability.

Success would be needed in Afghanistan to demonstrate the benefits of regime change.

¶80. Mr Blair considered that he was seeking to influence US policy by describing the key elements for a successful strategy to secure international support for any military action against Iraq.

¶81. Key Ministers and some of their most senior advisers thought these were the conditions that would need to be met if the UK was to participate in US‑led military action.

¶82. By July, no progress had been made on the ultimatum strategy and Iraq was still refusing to admit weapons inspectors as required by resolution 1284 (1999).

¶83. The UK Government was concerned that the US Administration was contemplating military action in circumstances where it would be very difficult for the UK to participate in or, conceivably, to support that action.

¶84. To provide the basis for a discussion with the US, a Cabinet Office paper of 19 July, 'Iraq: Conditions for Military Action', identified the conditions which would be necessary before military action would be justified and the UK could participate in such action.25

¶85. The Cabinet Office paper stated that Mr Blair had said at Crawford:

"... that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain conditions were met:

efforts had been made to construct a coalition/shape public opinion,

the Israel‑Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and

the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted."

¶86. The Cabinet Office paper also identified the need to address the issue of whether the benefits of military action would outweigh the risks.

¶87. The potential mismatch between the timetable and work programme for UNMOVIC stipulated in resolution 1284 (1999) and the US plans for military action was recognised by officials during the preparation of the Cabinet Office paper.26

¶88. The issue was not addressed in the final paper submitted to Ministers on 19 July.27

¶89. Sir Richard Dearlove reported that he had been told that the US had already taken a decision on action – "the question was only how and when"; and that he had been told it intended to set the threshold on weapons inspections so high that Iraq would not be able to hold up US policy.28

¶90. Mr Blair's meeting with Ministerial colleagues and senior officials on 23 July was not seen by those involved as having taken decisions.29

¶91. Further advice and background material were commissioned, including on the possibility of a UN ultimatum to Iraq and the legal basis for action. The record stated:

"We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS [the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce] should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options."

¶92. Mr Blair was advised that there would be "formidable obstacles" to securing a new UN resolution incorporating an ultimatum without convincing evidence of a greatly increased threat from Iraq.30 A great deal more work would be needed to clarify what the UK was seeking and how its objective might best be achieved.

¶93. Mr Blair's Note to President Bush of 28 July sought to persuade President Bush to use the UN to build a coalition for action by seeking a partnership between the UK and the US and setting out a framework for action.31

¶94. The Note began:

"I will be with you, whatever. But this is the moment to assess bluntly the difficulties. The planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not Kosovo. This is not Afghanistan. It is not even the Gulf War.

"The military part of this is hazardous but I will concentrate mainly on the political context for success."

¶95. Mr Blair stated that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was:

"... the right thing to do. He is a potential threat. He could be contained. But containment ... is always risky. His departure would free up the region. And his regime is ... brutal and inhumane ..."

¶96. Mr Blair told President Bush that the UN was the simplest way to encapsulate a "casus belli" in some defining way, with an ultimatum to Iraq once military forces started to build up in October. That might be backed by a UN resolution.

¶97. Mr Blair thought it unlikely that Saddam Hussein intended to allow inspectors to return. If he did, the JIC had advised that Iraq would obstruct the work of the inspectors. That could result in a material breach of the obligations imposed by the UN.

¶98. A workable military plan to ensure the collapse of the regime would be required.

¶99. The Note reflected Mr Blair's own views. The proposals had not been discussed or agreed with his colleagues.