Chapter 102: The London-wide response

Introduction

¶102.1 In this chapter we examine the response of the London Resilience Group, the London Resilience Partnership, London Gold, the Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority, concentrating in particular on their reactions to the fire and the arrangements available to support RBKC in leading the humanitarian response.

Notification of the fire to the London Resilience Group

¶102.2 The duty manager of the London Resilience Group is the person to be notified of an emergency and the person responsible for putting any strategic co-ordination arrangements into action.⁵⁴⁸⁵⁴⁸ London Resilience Group Duty Officers' Handbook v.1.3.1., March 2017 {LFB00061187/6} Figure 2.2; Hogan {LFB00119334/6} page 6, paragraph 21. On 14 June 2017 the duty manager was Matthew Hogan,⁵⁴⁹⁵⁴⁹ Hogan {LFB00119334/1} page 1, paragraph 4; Hogan {LFB00119334/6} page 6, paragraph 20. overseen by Toby Gould, a deputy head of London Resilience, who acted as the strategic advisor.⁵⁵⁰⁵⁵⁰ The London Resilience Strategic Advisor role is defined in the London Resilience Group Duty Officers' Handbook v.1.3.1, March 2017 {LFB00061187/6} paragraph 2.2, see also {LFB00061187/15-16}. John Hetherington, also a deputy head of London Resilience, took over at 08.30.⁵⁵¹⁵⁵¹ Gould {LFB00061268/3} page 3, paragraph 8.

¶102.3 Although a major incident⁵⁵²⁵⁵² A major incident is defined as an event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency: 'Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework', 2nd Edition, July 2016 {CAB00004642/8}. had been declared by the Metropolitan Police at 01.26,⁵⁵³⁵⁵³ Phase 1 Report Volume IV paragraph 30.38. Mr Hogan first became aware of the Grenfell Tower fire from a BBC news flash on his mobile phone at 02.30.⁵⁵⁴⁵⁵⁴ Hogan {LFB00119334/6} page 6, paragraph 22. The first official notification he received of the fire was in an email from Transport for London at 03.12.⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵ {LFB00119337}; Hogan {LFB00119334/7} page 7, paragraph 26. That was not how the London Resilience Group would normally expect to be notified.⁵⁵⁶⁵⁵⁶ Hetherington {Day277/182:2-15}. Mr Hogan should have been notified by the police themselves that they had declared a major incident.⁵⁵⁷⁵⁵⁷ Hetherington {Day277/182:2-15}. The London Resilience Partnership Strategic Co-ordination Protocol v.7.3, February 2017 (public facing) {GOL00001153/3} and Hogan {LFB00119334/7} page 7, paragraph 25 states, "any partner organisation experiencing or having knowledge of a potential disruptive, major incident or emergency should contact the LRG Duty Officer to jointly assess the situation to determine the level of strategic co-ordination required".Show full note At 03.18 Mr Hogan received a WhatsApp notification from Glenn Sebright, head of communications at the LFB, followed by an email at 03.20 stating that the LFB had also declared the fire a major incident.⁵⁵⁸⁵⁵⁸ Hogan {LFB00119334/8} page 8, paragraph 28; "40 pump fire, major incident, north Kensington". Glenn Sebright then emailed LRT Alerts and other London Resilience Partners at 03.21 stating that LFB had declared the fire a 'major incident' {LFB00119338}.

¶102.4 The London Resilience Partnership Strategic Co-ordination Protocol,⁵⁵⁹⁵⁵⁹ The London Resilience Partnership Strategic Co-ordination Protocol v.7.3, February 2017 (public facing) {GOL00001153}, the protocol is introduced in the Phase 1 Report Volume IV paragraphs 30.24 - 30.28. which sets out the arrangements for London's response to a major incident,⁵⁶⁰⁵⁶⁰ {CAB00004616/1}; {GOL00001153/10} paragraph 1.1.1. does not say when the London Resilience Group ought to be notified; Mr Hetherington said that he would expect it to be notified as soon as reasonably practicable.⁵⁶¹⁵⁶¹ Hetherington {Day277/182:17-25}. It is clear that there was a delay on the part of the police and the LFB in informing it of the fire.⁵⁶²⁵⁶² MPS at 01.26 although CAD said "critical incident", LFB at 02.06 and LAS at 02.26, Phase 1 Report Volume IV paragraph 30.38. As the Phase 1 report concluded, the declaration of a major incident is all but useless if it is not communicated to other Category 1 or 2 responders as soon as possible and that applies equally to communication to the London Resilience Group.⁵⁶³⁵⁶³ Phase 1 Report Volume IV paragraph 30.19.

The strategic co-ordinating group

¶102.5 In February 2017 the London Resilience Partnership published version 7.3 of its Strategic Co-ordination Protocol containing the procedures to be followed by its members in response to a major incident. The first step is to establish a strategic coordinating group,⁵⁶⁴⁵⁶⁴ {MET00023288}. the purpose of which is to enable the agencies responding to the incident to formulate a joint strategy, to agree on joint actions and share information⁵⁶⁵⁵⁶⁵ Emergency Response and Recovery {CAB00004519/20}, paragraph 2.6.1. in order to provide direction in the response.⁵⁶⁶⁵⁶⁶ {MET00023288/15-16} paragraphs 2.2.2- 2.2.7; Hetherington {LFB00061158/5} page 5, paragraph 14. A full strategic co-ordinating group consists of both Category 1 and 2 responders, as well as others, such as the voluntary and faith sectors.⁵⁶⁷⁵⁶⁷ {MET00023288/37} Appendix 2. Local authority attendance at the strategic co-ordinating group is at Gold Group level, which means that either the chief executive of the affected borough or its Gold Commander is expected to attend.⁵⁶⁸⁵⁶⁸ Hetherington {Day277/187:16-19}; {MET00023288/17} paragraph 2.2.12. states "Representatives at the Strategic Coordinating Group must have the level of knowledge, expertise and authority to identify and to commit the resources of their respective agency." That may also include the duty London Gold, whether or not he or she is involved in the response at that stage.⁵⁶⁹⁵⁶⁹ {MET00023288/37} Appendix 2. Mr Hetherington told us that if the duty Gold is available, he or she should attend meetings of the strategic co-ordinating group.⁵⁷⁰⁵⁷⁰ Hetherington {Day277/189:5-7}.

¶102.6 The duty Gold had two functions when attending a strategic co-ordinating group meeting following the Grenfell Tower fire. The first was to ensure that RBKC had everything it needed; the second was to assess whether there were implications for other London boroughs.⁵⁷¹⁵⁷¹ Hetherington {Day278/87:1-9}; Sawyer {Day278/89:23}-{Day278/90:1}. John Barradell told us that before the Gold Resolution had been formally activated the role of the duty London Gold was to attend the strategic co-ordinating group meetings to keep a watching brief.⁵⁷²⁵⁷² Barradell {Day 279/17:19}-{Day 279/19:9}. It was therefore a departure from the standard procedure that both the duty London Golds on the night of the fire, Andrew Blake-Herbert followed by Christopher Naylor, were absent from the initial strategic co-ordinating group meetings on the morning of 14 June 2017.⁵⁷³⁵⁷³ Barradell {Day279/29:15-25}; {MET00023288/33}.

¶102.7 Mr Sawyer, Chief Executive Liaison Officer (Resilience) for the City of London Corporation, said that it was not mandatory for London Gold to attend strategic coordinating group meetings,⁵⁷⁴⁵⁷⁴ Sawyer {Day278/86:10-17}. particularly in relation to an incident confined to a single borough. That had changed, however, when it became clear that RBKC was unable to discharge its responsibilities.⁵⁷⁵⁵⁷⁵ Sawyer {Day278/92:5-10}. Mr Barradell disagreed and admitted that he had been surprised that neither of the duty London Golds had attended a meeting of the strategic co-ordinating group.⁵⁷⁶⁵⁷⁶ Barradell {Day279/29:25}. It is therefore unclear why, after Mr Sawyer's attendance at the first meeting that took place at 05.00, the duty London Gold did not attend any of the subsequent four meetings on 14 June 2017⁵⁷⁷⁵⁷⁷ Strategic Coordinating Group meetings on 14 June 2017: 06.30 {LFB00028077}; 08.30 {LFB00003366}; 14.00 {LFB00003369}; 19.30 {LFB00119322}. or the meeting on 15 June 2017.⁵⁷⁸⁵⁷⁸ Strategic Coordinating Group meeting on 15 June 2017 at 11.00 {MOL00000047}. The first strategic co-ordinating group meeting attended by the duty London Gold was at 11.00 on 16 June 2017.⁵⁷⁹⁵⁷⁹ Minutes of the Strategic Coordinating Group Meeting on 16 June 2017 at 11.00 {MOL00000036}. Sawyer {Day278/87:11-20}; The LLAG also attended on 17 June 2017 at 14.00 and 22 June 2017 at 13.00. In our view, the prompt convening of a strategic co-ordinating group attended by people, including the duty London Gold, with the level of knowledge, expertise and authority to identify and commit the resources of their respective agencies, is essential to its proper functioning. Until the Gold resolution had been invoked, London Gold had no active part to play, but the presence of a duty London Gold could have provided a senior figure to assess and, if appropriate, challenge the information provided by RBKC.

Meetings of the strategic co-ordinating group

¶102.8 The first meeting of the strategic co-ordinating group was held at 05.00 on 14 June 2017.⁵⁸⁰⁵⁸⁰ Minutes of the 05.00 Strategic Coordinating Group Meeting on 14 June 2017 {MOL00000026}; Hetherington {Day277/187:3-5}. The LFB had asked for the meeting to be convened at 04.30, but the request was not made until 04.09 and Mr Gould and Mr Hogan did not think that there was enough time to organise a meeting by 04.30.⁵⁸¹⁵⁸¹ {LFB00119343}. The meeting therefore took place at 05.00.⁵⁸²⁵⁸² Hogan {LFB00119334/12} page 12, paragraph 43; Gould {LFB00061268/5} page 5, paragraph 12; {LFB00119343}. The lapse of time between the declaration of a major incident at 01.26 and the convening of a strategic co-ordinating group at 05.00 was caused in large part by a delay of almost two hours in telling the London Resilience Group of its occurrence. That in turn meant that the identification of potential difficulties and full coordination between the Category 1 and 2 responders did not formally begin until three and a half hours later.⁵⁸³⁵⁸³ "A key feature of leadership decision-making in crises and emergencies is the need for decisions to be made quickly…" {MET00023288/22} paragraph 2.7.5.

¶102.9 One of the responsibilities of the London Resilience Group duty manager is to ensure that London Gold is aware of the declaration of a major incident.⁵⁸⁴⁵⁸⁴ {MET00023288/14} paragraph 2.1.5; {LFB00061187/9}. Mr Hogan contacted the duty London Gold, Andrew Blake-Herbert, at 04.55.⁵⁸⁵⁵⁸⁵ At 04.38 Mr Hogan sent an email to Mr Naylor, the chief executive of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, and Paul Martin, the chief executive of Richmond and Wandsworth Council, to give them the sign-in details for the 05.00 Strategic Coordinating Group meeting as he wrongly thought that Mr Naylor was the duty Gold and Mr Martin the secondary Gold. Mr Hogan then tried calling Mr Naylor at 04.38, 04.39 and 04.41. {LFB00119351/1}; Hogan {LFB00119334/13} page 13, paragraph 50; Hogan {LFB00119334/17} page 17, paragraph 74.Show full note There is no guidance on how soon after being informed of a major incident the duty manager should notify London Gold, although as a matter of common sense it should be as soon as possible.⁵⁸⁶⁵⁸⁶ Hetherington {Day277/185:3}; {MET00023288/14} paragraph 2.1.5 states that the LRG manager will check that relevant organisations are aware including the duty LLAG. In this case, there was a delay of an hour and 43 minutes,⁵⁸⁷⁵⁸⁷ The period between the LRG being notified of the fire at 03.12 and Mr Blake-Herbert, duty Gold being notified by Mr Hogan at 04.55. which on any view was far longer than was reasonable. Mark Sawyer, who was copied into the notification, told us that he thought that there had been insufficient time to notify the duty London Gold of the first strategic co-ordinating group meeting, so he attended himself.⁵⁸⁸⁵⁸⁸ Sawyer {Day278/87:13}-{Day278/88:4}. Whether that affected the response of London Gold is difficult to tell, as, although Mr Sawyer did not take on the role of London Gold during the meeting, he was a representative of London Gold and had previous experience in dealing with major incidents.⁵⁸⁹⁵⁸⁹ Sawyer {GOL00001349/10} page 10, paragraph 49; Sawyer {Day278/87:11-20}. Even so, if the duty London Gold had been present, he might have provided a wider perspective as chief executive of a

¶London borough. That is all the more so given that RBKC's own chief executive did not attend until the group's third meeting at 08.30⁵⁹⁰⁵⁹⁰ {MOL00000014}. and the first London Gold did not attend a meeting until 11.00 on 16 June 2017.⁵⁹¹⁵⁹¹ {MOL00000036}.

Early consideration of the London Gold arrangements

¶102.10 The London Local Authority Gold Operating Procedure, produced by the LFB Emergency Planning department to guide London Gold and the support team,⁵⁹²⁵⁹² London Local Authority Gold Operating Procedure v.8. (January 2016) {LFB00061185/5} paragraph 1. describes the circumstances in which the Gold arrangements may be activated, when the duty Gold should be contacted in relation to an emergency and when circumstances with regional implications that require the support of Gold exist or are predicted.⁵⁹³⁵⁹³ London Local Authority Gold Operating Procedure v.8. (January 2016) {LFB00061185/5} paragraph 3. No express guidance is given to the duty Gold about when the Gold arrangements may be activated, but Mr Hetherington's view was that, given their experience and knowledge of running a local authority, chief executives are well-placed to judge whether there is a need for support.⁵⁹⁴⁵⁹⁴ Hetherington {Day277/196:4-15}.

¶102.11 At about 04.55 on 14 June 2017, Mr Hogan and Mr Blake-Herbert spoke to each other on the telephone.⁵⁹⁵⁵⁹⁵ Hogan {LFB00119334/14} page 14, paragraph 58. At that stage Mr Blake-Herbert was happy for RBKC to continue to take the lead.⁵⁹⁶⁵⁹⁶ {LFB00119359/1}; Gould {LFB00061268/7} page 7, paragraph 18. Mr Hetherington and Mr Gould discussed the activation of the Gold arrangements in a telephone call at 05.42.⁵⁹⁷⁵⁹⁷ Hetherington Incident Log Book {LFB00061216/6}. Mr Gould told Mr Hetherington that RBKC was dealing with the incident and that it did not require the arrangements to be activated.⁵⁹⁸⁵⁹⁸ Hetherington {LFB00061158/18} page 18, paragraph 54. In an email sent to Mr Hetherington at 05.58 Mr Hogan referred to his earlier telephone call to Mr Blake-Herbert and confirmed that he had been happy for RBKC to lead the response.⁵⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹ {LFB00119359/1}; Gould {LFB00061268/7} page 7, paragraph 18.

¶102.12 The London Resilience Group contacted RBKC to ensure that it had enough support. At 07.44 Mr Gould asked Nicholas Holgate to indicate whether the position of RBKC had changed and whether it required London Gold's assistance on any matters affecting London as a whole. Mr Gould said that he was not aware of any such matters, given that the incident was entirely within the borough. At 07.50 Mr Holgate told Mr Gould that, apart from a need for housing that might spill over borough boundaries, he did not think London Gold needed to prepare for action.⁶⁰⁰⁶⁰⁰ {LFB00061289/1}. That did not surprise Mr Hetherington.⁶⁰¹⁶⁰¹ Hetherington {Day277/196:24} – {Day277/197:1}.

¶102.13 It is clear to us that the London Resilience Group was working on the assumption that, as the incident was contained within one borough, the assistance of London Gold was unlikely to be required and that RBKC would take control unless other boroughs were affected.⁶⁰²⁶⁰² Mr Hetherington gave an example of 'overspill' in the case of a terror incident which, although confined to a single borough, may have ramifications as regards the monitoring of hate crime or preventing crime, in which case LLAG would oversee those aspects of the response, Hetherington {Day277/197:16}-{Day277/198:5}; Barradell {Day279/31:3-16}. Christopher Naylor, who became the duty Gold at 09.00 on 14 June 2017, said that the usual practice was that if the effect of an incident were confined to a single borough, that borough would retain control unless it invited outside support.⁶⁰³⁶⁰³ Naylor {GOL00001603/2} page 2, paragraph 4. The Gold Resolution⁶⁰⁴⁶⁰⁴ The Gold Resolution, July 2010 {GOL00001725}; Addendum to the Gold Resolution, July 2010 {GOL00001717}. did not provide for the duty Gold to intervene otherwise than in response to a request for assistance from the chief executive of the borough affected.⁶⁰⁵⁶⁰⁵ Naylor {GOL00001603/2} page 2, paragraph 4. Likewise, once the Gold Resolution had been activated it was the task of London Gold to support the chief executive of the affected borough, not to take control of the response.⁶⁰⁶⁶⁰⁶ Barradell {Day279/19:22}-{Day279/20:15}.

¶102.14 We were told that the primary purpose of the Gold Resolution was to provide a single command in response to an emergency affecting the whole or a wide area of London, such as "rising tide" incidents,⁶⁰⁷⁶⁰⁷ For example, flood, pandemic or a civil disturbance which develops over time; Naylor {GOL00001603/2} page 2, paragraph 5. or a roaming terrorist attack.⁶⁰⁸⁶⁰⁸ Naylor {GOL00001603/2} page 2, paragraphs 4-5. Before the Grenfell Tower fire, the London Resilience Group had expected that in the case of an incident confined to one location the relevant borough would take control of the response⁶⁰⁹⁶⁰⁹ Hetherington {Day277/197:16}-{Day277/198:5}. and that London Gold would not be involved. If a disaster occurred of such a scale and complexity that no one local authority could be reasonably expected to respond to it on its own, it was expected that London Gold might become involved, but only if the borough asked for assistance.⁶¹⁰⁶¹⁰ Hetherington {Day277/198:12}. That was based on the assumption that a borough knew its residents, resources and capacity best and could be expected to have an interest in leading the response to its residents.⁶¹¹⁶¹¹ Hetherington {Day277/198:12-19}.

¶102.15 At the time of the fire, London Gold could not intervene unilaterally in a borough's response if it had not been asked for assistance.⁶¹²⁶¹² Barradell {Day279/14:6-21}. It was easier to invoke the Gold Resolution if an incident had occurred affecting a wide area than if the effect of an incident were confined to a single borough.⁶¹³⁶¹³ Barradell {Day 279/14:16}-{Day 279/15:5}. Mr Barradell confirmed that he had no power to invoke the Gold Resolution and that Mr Holgate had to do that.⁶¹⁴⁶¹⁴ Barradell {Day279/58:15-16}. The government also acknowledged that there was no readily available means for London Gold to take control or to require a borough to act in a particular way.⁶¹⁵⁶¹⁵ Key points from the discussion between Peter Tallantire, a Deputy Director in the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office, and No.10 {CAB00014827} paragraph 1; Tallantire {CAB00014830/9} page 9, paragraph 27.6.

Training

¶102.16 Chief executives received little training to prepare them for taking on the role of London Gold. When Mr Naylor took over as London Gold at 09.00 on 14 June 2017 it was the first time he had acted in that capacity.⁶¹⁶⁶¹⁶ Gould {LFB00061268/9} page 9, paragraph 26. We were told that the only training a chief executive would receive from the London Resilience Group before being added to the

¶London Gold rota was an hour-long briefing from someone at the London Resilience Group or Mr Sawyer and a tour of the special operations room at Lambeth.⁶¹⁷⁶¹⁷ Hetherington {Day277/202:16}-{Day277/203:6}.

¶102.17 Local authorities took part in various training events delivered by the London Resilience Partnership,⁶¹⁸⁶¹⁸ Hetherington {LFB00061158/16} page 16, paragraph 48; London Resilience Partnership's training strategy and programme {LFB00061201} paragraphs 3.4, 3.13, 3.25, 3.26. but no training events specifically for chief executives who might be called upon to act as London Gold were held between March 2016 and November 2017.⁶¹⁹⁶¹⁹ Details of local authority training events delivered by the London Resilience Group from March 2016 - June 2017 {LFB00061215/3}. At the time of the fire the most recent training for members of the London Gold support team had taken place in Islington, Waltham Forest and Camden in early 2016.⁶²⁰⁶²⁰ {LFB00061215/3}. Its purpose was to provide an opportunity to acquire the individual and team skills needed to support London Gold and was not made available to local authority chief executives. RBKC did not receive any support team training in 2016 or in 2017 before the fire.⁶²¹⁶²¹ Hetherington {Day277/205:17}.

¶102.18 The Gold Resolution was not considered to be a matter of concern in 2016 and as such was not within the scope of the review of local authority emergency planning which in 2016 gave rise to the "EP2020" report.⁶²²⁶²² Sawyer {Day278/72:7-25}. Recommendations for Local Government Emergency Planning and Resilience for the 2020's ("EP2020"), report by Mark Sawyer, 3 October 2016 {GOL00001515/3} paragraph 2, 'The two elements excluded are; the London Local Authority Gold Resolution and the principle of all 33 chief executives participating in the London Local Authority Gold rota'. Mr Hetherington told us that it had been recognised before the Grenfell Tower fire that the training for chief executives needed to be improved. The process had begun before the fire, but the fire had caused the new training to be postponed.⁶²³⁶²³ Hetherington {Day277/204:5-16}. Mr Sawyer also said that there had been a need to improve training for chief executives.⁶²⁴⁶²⁴ Sawyer {Day278/187:1-3}. The second edition of the "EP2020" report published in 2019 recommended that all chief executives and their deputies attend training events and exercise programmes to prepare them to undertake the duties of London Gold.⁶²⁵⁶²⁵ EP2020 Enhancement Programme, July 2019 {INQ00015129/15} Recommendation 20.

Early signs that RBKC was not coping

¶102.19 Jon-Paul Graham was duty officer at the GLA on the night of the fire.⁶²⁶⁶²⁶ Graham {GLA00000004/4} page 4, paragraph 18. He was first made aware of it at 03.09 on 14 June 2017 by the Commissioner of the LFB, Dany Cotton.⁶²⁷⁶²⁷ Graham {GLA00000004/4} page 4, paragraph 18. The Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, was subsequently notified between 03.20 and 03.30 by the head of his private office, Ali Picton.⁶²⁸⁶²⁸ Bellamy {MOL00000025/15} page 15, paragraph 68.

¶102.20 Mr Graham attended the first three strategic co-ordinating group meetings on 14 June 2017. Emma Strain, Assistant Director of External Relations at the GLA, attended all the other meetings of the group between 14 and 20 June 2017, except the meeting on 18 June 2017, which was attended by David Bellamy, the Mayor of London's chief of staff.⁶²⁹⁶²⁹ Strain {GLA00000009/1} page 1, paragraph 3; Bellamy {MOL00000025/13} page 13, paragraphs 60 and 63; Minutes 14/06/17 at 05.00 {MOL00000026/3}, 06.30 {MOL00000015/3}, 08.30 {MOL00000014/5}, 14.00 {LFB00003369/6}, 19.30 {LFB00119322/7}, 15/06/17 at 11.00 {MOL00000047/6}, 16/06/17 at 11.00 {MOL00000036}, 17/06/17 at 14.00 {LFB00119508}, 18/06/17 at 13.30 {MOL00000004}, 19/07/17 at 11.30 {MOL00000045}, 20/07/17 at 13.00 {MOL00000043}. The GLA is a standing member of the Strategic Coordinating Group, see {LFB00123769/7}.Show full note The Mayor's Gold Cell group is called together when a major incident has been declared. Its purpose is to ensure that the Mayor is kept well informed in order to enable him to carry out his role as spokesman for the capital and provide civic leadership and reassurance.⁶³⁰⁶³⁰ Mayor of London's Major Incident and Civil Contingencies Response Protocol - Gold Cell (November 2016) {MOL00000040/12} Section 4. It was convened by Mr Graham following the first strategic co-ordination group meeting at 05.00 on 14 June 2017.⁶³¹⁶³¹ Graham {GLA00000004/6} page 6, paragraph 32. Its first meeting was held at 08.00.⁶³²⁶³² Graham {GLA00000004/6} page 6, paragraph 32.

¶102.21 In his written evidence, Mr Graham said that, at the meeting of the strategic co-ordinating group at 06.30, he had been shocked to hear that RBKC had not yet held its own Gold Group meeting and was not intending to do so until 11.00, four and a half hours later.⁶³³⁶³³ Graham {GLA00000004/7} page 7, paragraph 35. He was concerned even at that early stage that RBKC might not be coping with the demands of the incident.⁶³⁴⁶³⁴ Graham {GLA00000004/7} page 7, paragraph 36, Mr Graham's kept a typed note which he used to brief colleagues in City Hall {GLA00000004/5} paragraph 26. That note {MOL00000039} did not refer to any concerns as set out in his statement. However, Mr Graham did not report his concerns to Mr Bellamy and Mr Bellamy did not recall their being raised at the first meeting of the Mayor's Gold Cell group.⁶³⁵⁶³⁵ Graham {GLA00000004/8} page 8, paragraph 39; Bellamy {Day282/30:23}-{Day282/31:5}. An opportunity for the GLA and the Mayor to raise concerns about RBKC's handling of the response may therefore have been missed, although, as we have said, there was no machinery by which either of them could take control of events.

¶102.22 Regrettably, a log was not kept of the action taken by the Mayor's Gold Cell group, nor were any minutes kept of its meetings in the days following the fire.⁶³⁶⁶³⁶ Bellamy {Day282/32:13-19}. That was contrary to the Mayor's own protocol, which expressly provided that maintaining a record of key events, actions and decisions together with their reasons was of paramount importance.⁶³⁷⁶³⁷ {MOL00000040/15} paragraph 4.4. Mr Bellamy explained that the absence of logs and minutes was due to the relatively recent introduction of the protocol in November 2016, which had meant that the training required to establish it had not taken place. In addition, the resources of the London Resilience Group were stretched, as they were dealing with a number of other serious incidents at the time.⁶³⁸⁶³⁸ Bellamy {Day282/33:7}-{Day282/35:13}. Be that as it may, the absence of records has made it difficult for us to tell when concerns were first raised by the Mayor's office about RBKC's handling of the response to the fire and when they were first communicated to others.

The London Resilience Group

¶102.23 Until the early afternoon of 14 June 2017, the London Resilience Group thought that RBKC was taking appropriate steps to ascertain the needs of those affected by the incident and provide accommodation and practical support. It is clear to us that by that stage the scale of the incident should have been clear to everyone, not least because it involved the mass displacement of residents.⁶³⁹⁶³⁹ {LFB00061223}. However, because it had failed to appreciate the scale of the incident and had not activated fully its Contingency Management Plan, RBKC was unable to cope on its own with the demands imposed on it. Mr Holgate was determined to retain control of the response and the mistaken understanding of the London Resilience Group, Mr Barradell and the London Gold that RBKC was able to keep up with the demands made the problem worse by delaying the introduction of experience and resources from across London.⁶⁴⁰⁶⁴⁰ Barradell {Day279/96:16-22}.

¶102.24 During the afternoon of 14 June 2017, Mr Sawyer was asked to arrange a conference call between a group which included Nicholas Holgate, Christopher Naylor (then London Gold), John Barradell, John Hetherington, Eleanor Kelly (chief executive of Southwark Council) and John O'Brien, (chief executive of London Councils).⁶⁴¹⁶⁴¹ Holgate {Day273/112:7-12}; Sawyer {GOL00001349/7} page 7, paragraph 34; Sawyer {GOL00001349/8-9} pages 8-9, paragraph 41. The purpose of the call was to understand the support that RBKC was likely to require and how it could best be provided by other boroughs. The intention was to provide strategic support to Mr Holgate.⁶⁴²⁶⁴² {GOL00000155}.

¶102.25 The call took place at 17.30 on 14 June 2017. Although RBKC insisted that it was keeping up with the demand for support from residents, it was agreed during the call that Mr Barradell and Ms Kelly would offer peer support to Mr Holgate the next day, 15 June 2017. In addition, it was agreed that two senior directors from Southwark Council would attend RBKC on 15 June 2017 to provide advice and assistance.⁶⁴³⁶⁴³ Kelly {GOL00000439/9} page 9, paragraph 31; Sawyer {GOL00001349/9-10} pages 9-10, paragraph 46; Email from Mr Hetherington to Mr Holgate, Mr Naylor, Mr Barradell, Mr O'Brien and Mr Sawyer at 18.58 on 14 June 2017 {LFB00061225}.

¶102.26 In addition to the offer of peer support, it was decided that Mr Sawyer would go to RBKC the following day to provide initial support and the benefit of his experience of previous major incidents.⁶⁴⁴⁶⁴⁴ {LFB00061225}; Barradell {Day279/68:14}-{Day279/69:11}. Mr Sawyer agreed that his aim should be to encourage and identify potential areas of improvement.⁶⁴⁵⁶⁴⁵ Sawyer {Day278/136:4-23}. It was rare for him to be asked to assist a local authority so soon after an incident;⁶⁴⁶⁶⁴⁶ Sawyer {Day278/108:7-23}; Sawyer {Day278/109:21-24}. his involvement reflected the size and complexity of the emergency.

¶102.27 There was no discussion during the call about invoking the Gold Resolution.⁶⁴⁷⁶⁴⁷ Holgate {Day273/118:11-22}. Hetherington {LFB00119130/30} page 30, paragraph 95. "The activation of LLAG was not discussed during this call, which focused on what immediate support was required by RBKC from other boroughs". Mr Holgate was aware of the possibility of doing so, but formed the view that none of those taking part thought that it was necessary for there to be a wider response by local government.⁶⁴⁸⁶⁴⁸ Holgate {RBK00035426/6} page 6, paragraph 32. No one told him that the incident was too big for one local authority to deal with. He therefore did not consider activating the Gold Resolution and gained the impression that the others taking part in the call thought that RBKC was coping adequately. Nevertheless, we are surprised that the Gold Resolution was not mentioned, particularly in view of the concern that Mr Naylor felt about RBKC's ability to respond to the needs of the wider community.⁶⁴⁹⁶⁴⁹ Naylor {GOL00001603/6} page 6, paragraph 13.

¶102.28 One reason for Mr Barradell's failure to intervene at that stage was that he assumed, based on what he was being told by RBKC, that RBKC had a capable group of officers who understood what to do in such circumstances.⁶⁵⁰⁶⁵⁰ Barradell {Day279/50:4-6}; Barradell {Day279/51:14-23}. Despite the fact that by the time of the call there was, as he put it, "rising concern" about RBKC's ability to manage the response,⁶⁵¹⁶⁵¹ Barradell {Day279/50:20-24}. he admitted that he had not challenged Mr Holgate's own view of the situation. By the time he gave evidence he had come to regret that he had accepted what he was being told at face value, although it was obviously wrong.⁶⁵²⁶⁵² Barradell {Day279/49:7-15}.

¶102.29 Among the matters discussed during the call were significant changes to the situation and the structures in place for co-ordinating support across London.⁶⁵³⁶⁵³ {LFB00061224/2}. That involved describing the groups that were being set up under the auspices of the strategic co-ordinating group, including those dealing with mass fatalities and humanitarian assistance, and generally giving those involved an understanding of the breadth of the structures being set up.⁶⁵⁴⁶⁵⁴ {LFB00061224/2}; Hetherington {Day277/218:6-23}. Mr Hetherington also told us that it was necessary to do that, even though the Gold Resolution had not been invoked, in order to give Mr Holgate an understanding of the wider response that could be made available if he wanted to make use of it.⁶⁵⁵⁶⁵⁵ Hetherington {Day277/218:1-12}.

¶102.30 Apart from Mr Holgate's initial reluctance to ask for assistance from London Gold, there was also a reluctance on the part of the London Resilience Group to be drawn into long-term support. In an email sent after the conference call late on 14 June 2017 John Hetherington expressed the hope and expectation that, once RBKC had support from the right people, it could be left to get on with it.⁶⁵⁶⁶⁵⁶ {LFB00061229}. Mr Sawyer told us that there was a general concern among the London Resilience Group at the time, unrelated to the Grenfell Tower fire, that individual boroughs needed to take more direct responsibility for responding to emergencies.⁶⁵⁷⁶⁵⁷ Sawyer {Day278/111:17}-{Day278/112:6}.

¶102.31 The reluctance of the London Resilience Group to become engaged in long-term support was due to its involvement at that time in the response to other incidents, in particular, the London Bridge attack in Southwark.⁶⁵⁸⁶⁵⁸ Hetherington {Day277/224:6-25}. That suggests a shortage of available resources across London at the time of the fire, but it was not the reason why more was not done sooner to assist RBKC.⁶⁵⁹⁶⁵⁹ Hetherington {Day277/224:6-25}. If RBKC had asked for assistance, we are confident that it would have been provided with alacrity.

Offers of assistance

¶102.32 In addition to the offer of peer support made during the conference call, RBKC was inundated throughout 14 June 2017 with general⁶⁶⁰⁶⁶⁰ {RBK00002651}; {RBK00009882}. and specific⁶⁶¹⁶⁶¹ {GOL00000326}; {RBK00060182}; {RBK00064677}. offers of help from various local authorities. They were, in the main, refused by RBKC, which did not wish to appear incapable of managing the situation but did not have sufficient regard to an objective analysis of its needs.⁶⁶²⁶⁶² Barradell {Day279/84:16-25}; Barradell {Day279/97:7-22}. In particular, it feared that invoking the Gold Resolution would be seen as a sign that its response had failed.⁶⁶³⁶⁶³ Barradell {Day279/85:11-17}.

¶102.33 In our view RBKC's decision to refuse external help was misguided and reflected a misplaced belief on the part of Mr Holgate that it could manage on its own. Mr Barradell was surprised that offers of support should have been turned down by any borough following an incident of that kind and would have expected a formal request for support.⁶⁶⁴⁶⁶⁴ Barradell {Day279/43:10-24}. That view was shared by Mr Sawyer,⁶⁶⁵⁶⁶⁵ Sawyer {Day278/115:5-16}. who thought that RBKC was overwhelmed and lacked strategic oversight.⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶ Sawyer {Day278/115:21}-{Day278/116:2}. When he gave evidence Mr Holgate accepted that his refusal to accept external assistance at an earlier stage of the response had been due to his misguided belief that the council was managing the response adequately.⁶⁶⁷⁶⁶⁷ Holgate {Day273/130:17-23}. However, we also think that he was blind to the obvious and regarded accepting assistance as an admission of defeat.

¶102.34 Mr Barradell said that at the meeting on 14 June 2017 he had not had concerns about the ability of RBKC to manage the response,⁶⁶⁸⁶⁶⁸ Barradell {Day279/48:5-9}. which suggests that he was relying on his previous positive view of RBKC.⁶⁶⁹⁶⁶⁹ Barradell {Day279/50:4-6}; Barradell {Day279/96:16-22}. As such, on 14 June 2017 he did not offer advice or express any concern to Mr Holgate about his leadership, despite perhaps having certain reservations.⁶⁷⁰⁶⁷⁰ Barradell {Day279/69:5-11}.

The Mayor of London's conversation with the Secretary of State

¶102.35 At 18.15 on 14 June 2017, the Mayor of London spoke to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP.⁶⁷¹⁶⁷¹ Khan {MOL00000189/8} page 8, paragraph 32. A summary of the call records that the Mayor said that he had been impressed with the government's response thus far and that they had discussed matters such as the re-housing of displaced persons and the provision of counselling for firefighters.⁶⁷²⁶⁷² {CLG00003011}. In his witness statement, however, the Mayor said that he had expressed a deep concern for the situation faced by the local community and that, having seen the chaos on the ground, he had expressed the need for a single point of contact and advice for the local community and for visible support from the local authority and the government.⁶⁷³⁶⁷³ Khan {MOL00000189/9} page 9, paragraph 33; {MOL00000182}.

¶102.36 Mr Bellamy told us that, although the Mayor himself had noticed certain things on his visit to the tower on 14 June 2017, he had not thought that he knew enough about RBKC's response to make a reliable assessment of it and could rely only on what he had been told after the strategic co-ordinating group meetings.⁶⁷⁴⁶⁷⁴ Bellamy {Day282/53:1-10}. The difference between the note of the Mayor's conversation with the Secretary of State and his subsequent recollection is not of importance and we agree with Mr Bellamy that it would have been helpful for those who were present at the strategic co-ordinating group meetings to have questioned Mr Holgate more closely about what he said was happening.⁶⁷⁵⁶⁷⁵ Bellamy {Day282/53:16-25}.

Questions from DCLG

¶102.37 By the morning of 15 June 2017, officials from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) were seeking information about how the response was going. Although the Resilience and Emergencies Division ("RED") was not responsible for supporting local authorities in an emergency and had no power to control their responses,⁶⁷⁶⁶⁷⁶ Farrar {Day284/135:23-24}. it did have a responsibility to collect and share information about an incident.⁶⁷⁷⁶⁷⁷ McManus {CLG10009725/23} page 23, paragraph 95; Farrar {Day284/8:2-4}.

¶102.38 On the morning of 15 June 2017, Lynne Dowdican, RED resilience advisor, spoke to the deputy head of the London Resilience Group,⁶⁷⁸⁶⁷⁸ Dowdican {CLG00030419/6} page 6, paragraph 27. who confirmed that RBKC was reasonably confident that it had found accommodation for all those who needed it and could deal with any shortage that might emerge.⁶⁷⁹⁶⁷⁹ {LFB00119653} Email forwarded to Hamish Cameron with Laura Johnson's (RBKC) response to the DCLG queries. At 09.24 she sent an email to the London Resilience

¶Group asking how many people had been accommodated in rest centres overnight, whether families with vulnerable people or children had been housed and if so, in what kind of accommodation. She also enquired about the support available to families, the telephone numbers of the rest centres, family support services, the casualty bureau and the family and friends centre.⁶⁸⁰⁶⁸⁰ {LFB00061311/1}. It appears that she was not prepared to take the assurances she had been given at face value. At 09.31 the London Resilience Group confirmed that answers were being sought from RBKC and the police. It provided a link to

¶RBKC's newsroom which gave out information about support lines, facilities, and telephone numbers that had been revised the evening before.⁶⁸¹⁶⁸¹ {LFB00061311/1}.

¶102.39 At 10.01 on 15 June 2017, Philip James, a government liaison officer with RED, told Mr Gould about concerns that had been raised by Nicholas Hurd, the Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service, some of which related to the adequacy of the sleeping facilities at the Westway Centre. He asked for confirmation that the Red Cross and the Samaritans were involved and that the sleeping conditions would be better that evening.⁶⁸²⁶⁸² {LFB00061313/1}. That message was passed on by Mr Gould to Mr Sawyer and Mr Holgate with a request for a positive response to the questions it contained. Mr Gould also asked whether Mr Holgate would like to appoint someone at RBKC to act as a point of contact for DCLG,⁶⁸³⁶⁸³ {LFB00061313/1}. but Mr Holgate did not choose to do so.⁶⁸⁴⁶⁸⁴ Hetherington {Day278/9:11}-{Day278/10:9}.

¶102.40 Mr Hetherington told us that he had not been made aware of the concerns that Mr Hurd had expressed about the sleeping facilities at the Westway Centre.⁶⁸⁵⁶⁸⁵ Hetherington {Day278/9:21}-{Day278/10:23}. They were important matters of which Mr Hetherington should have been made aware. The fact that a government minister felt it necessary to raise such matters should have sounded a warning to Mr Holgate and Mr Gould that there were problems with the response.

¶102.41 At 10.20 Jenny Shellens of RED sent Mr James an email asking him to clarify a number of matters when he attended a meeting of the strategic co-ordinating group later that morning. They included the number of those displaced and what arrangements had been made for temporary accommodation. At the end of her message she asked him whether they could be satisfied that RBKC had a grip on the emergency.⁶⁸⁶⁶⁸⁶ {CLG00003099/2}. Her question went unanswered.

¶102.42 A further sign that by the morning of 15 June 2017 DCLG was beginning to be concerned about the adequacy of RBKC's response was the suggestion that Mr James might be sent from the police special operations room to the RBKC Borough Emergency Control Centre.⁶⁸⁷⁶⁸⁷ {CLG00018936/3} email at 09.52 and {CLG00018936/2} email at 10.09. Mr Gould advised against it.⁶⁸⁸⁶⁸⁸ Email from Mr Gould to John Bentham 15 June 2017 at 10.09 {CLG00018936/2}. Mr Hetherington told us that there was no precedent for a government liaison officer to be deployed in a local authority's BECC.⁶⁸⁹⁶⁸⁹ Hetherington {Day278/7:19}-{Day278/8:8}. We think that it was more efficient for an official to be a standing member of the strategic co-ordinating group, thereby giving access to the information from all the agencies involved, rather than being present at the BECC.

The Mayor of London's concerns

¶102.43 The Mayor of London visited Grenfell Tower for the second time at 14.00 on 15 June 2017.⁶⁹⁰⁶⁹⁰ Khan {MOL00000189/10} page 10, paragraph 41. He described how the full scale of the tragedy was starting to become clear. During that visit some members of the community had been very upset and angry and wanted answers from someone in authority, so his attendance at the scene drew a large crowd. Someone threw a bottle of water at him.⁶⁹¹⁶⁹¹ Khan {MOL00000189/11} page 11, paragraph 46. He was advised by his security team to leave the Notting Hill Methodist Church by the back door but he felt strongly that it was his duty as Mayor to listen to the community's concerns, so he remained and spoke to those affected for another hour.⁶⁹²⁶⁹² Khan {MOL00000189/12} page 12, paragraph 48.

¶102.44 The news of what had happened during the Mayor's visit was relayed to Mr Hetherington by Commander Jerome, the police Gold, who told him that the Mayor had been mobbed during his visit. Consequently, and as a result of further concerns about civil unrest, Commander Jerome, as chairman of the strategic co-ordination group was no longer willing to move from the emergency response phase to the recovery phase on 16 June 2017,⁶⁹³⁶⁹³ Emergency Response and Recovery {CAB00004519/83}. since that would entail handing over management of the response to RBKC alone.⁶⁹⁴⁶⁹⁴ {LFB00061233}.

¶102.45 Mr Bellamy attended the second cross-government ministerial meeting at 15.30 on 15 June 2017,⁶⁹⁵⁶⁹⁵ Minutes of the Ministerial Meeting at 15.30 on 15 June 2017, {CAB00002720} and Actions, {CAB00001255}. which he said was the first time he had become aware that there was unease about RBKC's handling of the response.⁶⁹⁶⁶⁹⁶ Bellamy {Day282/58:17}-{Day282/59:10}. Following the meeting, he returned to City Hall, where he heard reports from a number of colleagues that RBKC was failing in its response.⁶⁹⁷⁶⁹⁷ Bellamy {Day282/61:8}-{Day282/61:10}; {Day282/62:6}; {GLA00000854/26} "Is there a way we can get across that RBKC are totally out of their depth". He was sufficiently concerned at its lack of progress to telephone Mr Barradell at 17.39 to discuss what action could be taken to improve it.⁶⁹⁸⁶⁹⁸ Bellamy {MOL00000025/16} page 16, paragraph 79; Bellamy {Day282/59:24} - {Day282/60:1}. It appears that that call took place shortly after the telephone conference between Mr Barradell and Mr Holgate at 17.00.

¶102.46 It was clear from Mr Bellamy's evidence that his intervention in contacting Mr Barradell on 15 June 2017 following the second ministerial meeting had been generated by his worries rather than a desire for the Gold arrangements to be set in motion. He said that at the time he had not known enough about those arrangements to consider that possibility.⁶⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹ Bellamy {Day 282/67:11-15}.

¶102.47 By the evening of 15 June 2017, the London Resilience Group, DCLG and City Hall had all expressed significant concern about the response.⁷⁰⁰⁷⁰⁰ {LFB00061238}. The performance of RBKC and London Resilience as a whole was under increasing scrutiny from both the government and the Mayor's office and the need for an improvement had become paramount. In that context it is difficult to understand why there was further delay between the decision to activate the Gold arrangements and the formal steps required to do so.

The first request for mutual aid

¶102.48 The first formal request by RBKC for assistance from other local authorities was not made until 17.03 on 15 June 2017.⁷⁰¹⁷⁰¹ Emergency Response and Recovery, non-statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, {CAB00004624/225}: Mutual aid is "An agreement between Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act, within the same sector or across sectors and across boundaries, to provide assistance with additional resource during an emergency". RBKC did receive assistance from Westminster City Council and the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham as part of the tri-borough agreement on 14 and 15 June 2017.Show full note It was prompted by an email sent by Gillian Maxwell on behalf of the London Local Authority Coordination Centre to RBKC at 16.34 asking it to give some serious thought to what assistance it was likely to need from other boroughs over the next 24 to 48 hours.⁷⁰²⁷⁰² {LFB00061234/2}. (Mr Hetherington confirmed that he considered that request for staff to have been the council's first request for mutual aid.)⁷⁰³⁷⁰³ Hetherington {Day278/29:10-14}; {LFB00061234/2}. RBKC responded at 17.03 to say that it was likely to need liaison officers, rest centre managers, rest centre teams and emergency planning staff and asked the London Local Authority Coordination Centre to arrange that on its behalf.⁷⁰⁴⁷⁰⁴ {LFB00061234/1}. The request for assistance was sent to other boroughs at 17.54 on 15 June 2017.⁷⁰⁵⁷⁰⁵ Hetherington {LFB00061158/23} page 23, paragraph 73. That was almost 36 hours after the last surviving occupant had left the tower. We think that RBKC should have asked for assistance far sooner. The London Local Authority Coordination Centre had been open and ready to help since 08.15 on 15 June 2017 in the expectation that the Gold arrangements would be activated or that assistance would be requested and there is no reasonable explanation why its services could not have been used a good deal earlier.⁷⁰⁶⁷⁰⁶ Hetherington {Day278/25:17}-{Day278/26:4}.

The operation of the Gold Resolution

¶102.49 Mr Barradell told us that communications with Mr Holgate on 14 and 15 June 2017 were designed gently to encourage him to operate the Gold Resolution, although he accepted that his approach had perhaps not been forceful enough.⁷⁰⁷⁷⁰⁷ Barradell {Day279/58:6-11}. We are satisfied that Mr Barradell did not expressly raise with Mr Holgate the desirability of invoking the Gold arrangements at any time before the meeting at 17.00 on 15 June 2017. In fact, he did the opposite. When on 14 June 2017 Christopher Naylor, the duty Gold, asked Mr Barradell if there was more he could be doing to support RBKC, Mr Barradell told him that the operation of the Gold Resolution was a matter for Mr Holgate and that unless RBKC's position changed he should remain on standby.⁷⁰⁸⁷⁰⁸ Naylor {GOL00001603/5} page 5, paragraph 11. John Barradell was right in his understanding that only Mr Holgate as chief executive of RBKC could operate the Gold Resolution, but that did not need to prevent senior figures in London Resilience from giving him clear and firm advice of the need to seek assistance from other boroughs. Mr Barradell accepted that he should have been more robust.⁷⁰⁹⁷⁰⁹ Barradell {Day279/207:5-6}. As it was, an opportunity to persuade Mr Holgate that RBKC needed help immediately was lost.

¶102.50 At 17.00 on 15 June 2017 a conference call was held between Mr Holgate, Mr Barradell and Mr Sawyer to discuss Mr Sawyer's fear that Mr Holgate and his senior management team were not fully aware of the scale and complexity of the task facing RBKC.⁷¹⁰⁷¹⁰ Sawyer {GOL00001349/11} page 11, paragraph 54.

¶Dissatisfaction with the response of RBKC was growing among senior members of

¶London Resilience and was being expressed in the media.⁷¹¹⁷¹¹ Kelly {GOL00000439/9} page 9, paragraph 32. It reflected the fact that the situation had not improved significantly during the day.⁷¹²⁷¹² Blackburn {Day270/181:6-8}.

¶102.51 The evidence about exactly when and how it was agreed that the Gold arrangements would be put into operation is unclear. No minutes of the meeting were kept. Mr Holgate recalled that he had made the decision during the conference call at 17.00.⁷¹³⁷¹³ Holgate {RBK00035426/7} page 7, paragraph 38; Holgate {Day273/170:24}-{Day273/171:25}. Ms Kelly referred to a series of later calls, during which Mr Holgate had asked for Mr Barradell's support from the following day.⁷¹⁴⁷¹⁴ Kelly {GOL00000439/9} page 9, paragraph 33. Mr Barradell said that at no point during the call at 17.00 had Mr Holgate asked for the Gold arrangements to be put into operation and that he had had further conversations with Mr Holgate later on to encourage him to do so.⁷¹⁵⁷¹⁵ Barradell {Day279/86:2-12}; Barradell {Day279/87:18}-{Day279/88:9}.

¶102.52 Despite the differences of recollection, the documents show that very soon after the conference call at 17.00, Mr Holgate decided to operate the Gold Resolution. At 18.39 Mr Hetherington recorded in his log a call from Mr Sawyer in which the reasons for the decision were described as being the increasing complexity of the incident, the recent request from RBKC for mutual aid and a number of other factors.⁷¹⁶⁷¹⁶ {LFB00061219/12}.

The delay in formal activation

¶102.53 Although the decision to put the Gold arrangements into operation had been made in the early evening of 15 June 2017, the formal steps required for that purpose were not taken until the afternoon of 16 June 2017.⁷¹⁷⁷¹⁷ Hetherington {LFB00061158/26} page 26, paragraph 88; Hetherington {LFB00119130/32} page 32, paragraph 101. The delay has never been satisfactorily explained. Mr Hetherington told us that he was unsure what had caused it.

¶102.54 In an email sent at 22.04 on 15 June 2017, Mr Hetherington told his colleagues in the London Resilience Group that the Gold arrangements were not likely to be activated before 13.00 the next day and that Mr Barradell would go to RBKC to see what he was taking on before he activated the Gold arrangements.⁷¹⁸⁷¹⁸ {LFB00061240/1}. Mr Hetherington suggested that that was necessary because it was possible that the situation had already moved beyond that which the Gold arrangements were designed for.⁷¹⁹⁷¹⁹ Hetherington {Day278/36:7-15}. He and Mr Barradell both described the situation as a unique set of circumstances which were close to reaching the limits of what those arrangements could respond to.⁷²⁰⁷²⁰ Barradell {Day279/22:7-21}; Hetherington {Day278/38:9-23}.

¶102.55 As the evidence progressed it became clear that there was (and may still be) some uncertainty in people's minds about the effect of operating the Gold arrangements. We described the Gold Resolution and the accompanying memorandum of understanding in Chapter 101. It did not provide for London Gold to take control of the management of the response, which remained in the hands of the chief executive of the borough affected by the emergency. It was no doubt possible for the chief executive to delegate to London Gold authority to act on behalf of the borough in certain respects, but that is another matter.

¶102.56 Mr Barradell assumed the position of London Gold during the early afternoon of 16 June 2017. Both Mr Sawyer and Mr Hetherington maintained that he had not taken over the response; rather that he had supported Mr Holgate and RBKC in the provision of humanitarian assistance.⁷²¹⁷²¹ Sawyer {Day278/149:20-24}; Hetherington {Day278/39:3-15}. We agree with Mr Sawyer that the Gold resolution did not give London Gold the power to take over the response to an incident.⁷²²⁷²² Sawyer {Day278/155:20}-{Day278/155:25}. Mr Hetherington said that before the fire, phrases such as "intervention" and "taking over" had not been part of the vocabulary of those who managed the London Gold arrangements; they had come to be used only after the fire.⁷²³⁷²³ Hetherington {Day277/56:13-19}. Mr Barradell's evidence was to a similar effect. He told us that London Gold stood by the borough and not in its shoes,⁷²⁴⁷²⁴ RBKC Module 4 Closing Submissions {RBK00068546/12} paragraph 34; Barradell {Day279/22:2-7}; Barradell {Day279/22:22}-{Day279/23:12}; Barradell {Day279/19:22}-{Day279/23:12}. and rejected the suggestion that he had taken over the response to the fire,⁷²⁵⁷²⁵ Barradell {Day279/83:3-17}. because he had no authority to do so.⁷²⁶⁷²⁶ Barradell {Day279/112:1-6}. He said that at that stage Mr Holgate had still been in charge.⁷²⁷⁷²⁷ Barradell {Day279/112:12-15}.

¶102.57 It is important, in our view, that the individual boroughs and London Resilience as a whole understands clearly the effect of the arrangements for co-operation in mounting an effective response to an emergency, particularly one that affects two or more boroughs concurrently. Whatever the terminology and niceties of the arrangements, however, it is clear that the activation of the Gold Resolution led to significant additional resources and greater experience being made available to RBKC, but not to a handover of control. In the event, the government in the form of Dr Jo Farrar, director general for local government and public services at DCLG, intervened during the afternoon of 16 June 2017 to bring about an agreement under which Mr Holgate ceded control of the response to Mr Barradell.⁷²⁸⁷²⁸ Holgate {RBK00035426/10} page 10, paragraph 51. From that moment Mr Holgate ceased to play any effective part in managing the response; he resigned as chief executive of RBKC on 21 June 2017.⁷²⁹⁷²⁹ Farrar {CLG00030414/16-17} pages 16-17, paragraphs 78-79; Barradell {Day279/113:13-25}; Barradell {Day279/121:21}-{Day279/123:4}. It is important to note, however, that the substitution of Mr Barradell as leader of the response did not reflect the working out of these complex arrangements. It represented nothing more or less than a pragmatic response to a terrible emergency which required the co-operation, or at least the acquiescence, of RBKC. It throws into sharp relief the absence of any mechanism for vesting in one person control over the response to a major disaster affecting more than one borough.

¶102.58 The London Gold arrangements for the provision of mutual aid finally came into effect at 14.00 on 16 June 2017,⁷³⁰⁷³⁰ Barradell {GOL00000244/10} page 10, paragraph 39. some 19 hours after the decision to operate them had been made. Mr Hetherington did not think at the time that the delay had had any adverse effect on the provision of emergency relief⁷³¹⁷³¹ Hetherington {Day278/40:5 -20}. and had seen no benefit in involving another chief executive in the early stages of the incident, given that whoever had been appointed would not have been familiar with the resources or capability of the borough or with its residents.⁷³²⁷³² Hetherington {Day277/198:12-19}. However, we do not altogether agree with that assessment. Although it is impossible to say what precise effect on the response the earlier operation of the London Gold arrangements would have had, it seems likely that if RBKC had had the benefit of Mr Barradell's experience sooner, the response would have benefited from improved strategic oversight. The response was faltering and a greater sense of urgency would have reinforced it. Instead, time was lost over the weekend of 17 and 18 June 2017 setting up the structures and identifying the needs of those affected by the fire.

¶102.59 Mr Sawyer thought that the London Gold arrangements should have been activated during the morning of 14 June 2017.⁷³³⁷³³ Sawyer {Day278/153:4-7}. Mr Kerry thought that they should have been activated early in the morning of 14 June 2017.⁷³⁴⁷³⁴ Kerry {Day273/222:19}-{Day273/223:1}. Mr Kerry may have been speaking with the benefit of hindsight, but on any view the scale of the incident was very substantial, involving the displacement of hundreds of people. As the day wore on it should have been increasingly obvious to RBKC that it did not have the capacity, skills or training required to lead the response on its own and should therefore have considered putting the London Gold arrangements into operation that day.

The response of London Gold

¶102.60 By the time the Gold resolution was activated on the afternoon 16 June 2017, RBKC had still not worked out what support it required.⁷³⁵⁷³⁵ Sawyer {Day278/151:12-17}. It had been unable to obtain accurate information about the number of those affected by the tragedy or to assess their individual needs. As a result, the Gold team spent a considerable amount of time assessing the situation in order to determine what humanitarian assistance was required and organise it appropriately.⁷³⁶⁷³⁶ Harpley {GOL00000441/4} page 4, paragraph 13.

¶102.61 During the afternoon of 18 June 2017 Mr Barradell asked DCLG to send a community expert to assist the response.⁷³⁷⁷³⁷ LLAG log book (entry no.12) at 11.36 on 18 June 2017 {GOL00001675/3}. Hilary Patel was asked to act in that capacity and a community engagement meeting was held on 20 June 2017.⁷³⁸⁷³⁸ Patel {CLG10009793/10} page 10, paragraphs 35-36; Gregory {HOM00046125/3} page 3, paragraph 7; Email from Rachael Wright-Turner on 21 June 2017 containing the notes of the Community Engagement meeting on 20 June 2017, {RBK00022888}. This is explored further at Chapter 106.

¶102.62 Later on 18 June 2017, a public statement was made by Ms Kelly, the deputy London Gold,⁷³⁹⁷³⁹ Email including the statement of Eleanor Kelly {CLG00005448}. on behalf of the newly established Grenfell Fire response team⁷⁴⁰⁷⁴⁰ Eleanor Kelly was also the Deputy Chair of the Local Authorities' Panel. Kelly {GOL00000439/3} page 3, paragraph 12. acknowledging that the initial response had simply not been good enough. Although many would regard that as self-evident, it was an important public recognition of the deficiencies in the response. The number of chief executives who by that time were assisting the response with the aim of bringing about positive change was an indication of the scale and complexity of the task. It also demonstrates why the Gold Resolution should have been activated at an earlier stage. Despite the considerable efforts across local government in London, it took a number of days for London Gold to steer the response in a more effective direction.