Chapter 103: The government's response

Introduction

¶103.1 A description of the part played by the government in the response to the Grenfell Tower fire must begin with a brief summary of the relevant legal and administrative arrangements in place at the time.

¶103.2 The government is not a responder under the Civil Contingencies Act.⁷⁴¹⁷⁴¹ Civil Contingencies Act 2004. It is, however, responsible for establishing the policy framework under which those who have a duty to respond to emergencies in England and Wales operate.⁷⁴²⁷⁴² Hammond {CAB00014764/3} page 3, paragraph 9. The formulation of that policy is the responsibility of the Cabinet Office, which, together with DCLG,⁷⁴³⁷⁴³ Now called the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. plays a non-statutory oversight role.⁷⁴⁴⁷⁴⁴ Hammond {CAB00014764/6} page 6, paragraph 21.

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat

¶103.3 Within the Cabinet Office, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat leads the work on emergency response and resilience. It is primarily a body that co-ordinates the work of others in the planning, response and recovery phases. It does not have a direct operational role in responding to emergencies.⁷⁴⁵⁷⁴⁵ Hammond {CAB00014764/9} page 9, paragraph 29.

¶103.4 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat is part of the National Security Secretariat. It reports to Cabinet Office ministers and provides advice directly to the Prime Minister on matters relating to civil contingencies.⁷⁴⁶⁷⁴⁶ Hammond {CAB00014764/10} page 10, paragraph 34. At the time of the fire, Katharine Hammond was Director of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

¶103.5 If an emergency occurs the Cabinet Office is responsible for notifying relevant government departments and agencies, ensuring a department has been identified to lead the response, providing staff to run the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms ("COBR") and any associated crisis facilities as appropriate, initiating the supporting structures for a central response and devising solutions to problems when necessary.⁷⁴⁷⁷⁴⁷ ConOps {CAB00000026/19-20} para 2.26(e)-(j).

¶103.6 If COBR has been activated, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, in consultation with the lead government department, decides which elements of the supporting arrangements should be activated and how they may best be used. It also provides secretariat support and ensures that business is managed effectively⁷⁴⁸⁷⁴⁸ ConOps {CAB00000026/22} paragraph 3.4. The COBR arrangements and the role of the lead government department role are explained below.

The Prime Minister's office

¶103.7 In consultation with the Prime Minister's office ("No.10") and the lead government department, the Cabinet Office decides whether to set in motion the central response mechanism,⁷⁴⁹⁷⁴⁹ ConOps {CAB00000026/19} paragraph 2.26(d). co-ordinating the activities of national, regional and local responders and deciding which departments need to be represented at COBR meetings and how often such meetings need to take place.⁷⁵⁰⁷⁵⁰ ConOps {CAB00000026/37} paragraph 3.53.

The Home Office

¶103.8 Responsibility for fire policy was transferred to the Home Office from DCLG on 1 April 2016.⁷⁵¹⁷⁵¹ {HOM00050060/5}. In the case of a sudden major incident,⁷⁵²⁷⁵² As opposed to a rising tide incident {HOM00050060/8}. such as the Grenfell Tower fire, the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, which was part of the Home Office, provided support for the government in the first 24 to 48 hours in the form of managing communications, providing information, briefing ministers for COBR meetings, monitoring the situation and co-ordinating action across the Home Office.⁷⁵³⁷⁵³ Edwards {HOM00050058/2} page 2, paragraph 6.1.

¶103.9 The Home Office did not have an operational role in responding to any major fire.⁷⁵⁴⁷⁵⁴ Lamberti {HOM00046095/4} page 4, paragraph 14. Its main function was to support the independent fire services through the provision of resources and to provide advice and information to ministers and civil servants.⁷⁵⁵⁷⁵⁵ Lamberti {HOM00046095/4} page 4, paragraph 14. However, it became the lead government department for the response in the period immediately following the Grenfell Tower fire because of the prominence of the emergency services and its responsibility for the fire and rescue services.⁷⁵⁶⁷⁵⁶ Edwards {HOM00050071/2-3} pages 2- 3, paragraph 9.

The Department for Communities and Local Government

¶103.10 The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) changed its name after the fire to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.⁷⁵⁷⁷⁵⁷ McManus {Day283/4:7-20}. At the time of the fire, Dame Melanie Dawes DCB was the Permanent Secretary.

¶103.11 The Resilience and Emergencies Division of DCLG (RED) was established in 2011.⁷⁵⁸⁷⁵⁸ Dowdican {CLG00030419/1} page 1, paragraph 3. The director general for local government and public services at the time of the fire was Dr Jo Farrar OBE, whose directorate included RED.⁷⁵⁹⁷⁵⁹ Farrar {Day284/5:13-17}. Jillian Kay, director of local government policy, was the director of RED; Katherine Richardson was the deputy director.⁷⁶⁰⁷⁶⁰ McManus {CLG10009725/4} page 4, paragraph 11. There was a head of emergencies management,⁷⁶¹⁷⁶¹ Mason {CLG00030435/2} page 2, paragraph 5. five heads of resilience⁷⁶²⁷⁶² McManus {CLG10009725/4} page 4, paragraph 11. and resilience advisors who had responsibility for particular geographic areas and particular types of risk.⁷⁶³⁷⁶³ Richardson {CLG00030412/6} page 6, paragraph 18.

¶103.12 RED had two functions: one was to produce advice and plans in preparation for the occurrence of identified risks; the other was to ensure effective communication between Category 1 and Category 2 responders and the government if an emergency were to occur.⁷⁶⁴⁷⁶⁴ Richardson {CLG00030412/2} paragraph 6. Part of its responsibility was to co-ordinate planning and ensure that Category

¶1 responders had the support they needed.⁷⁶⁵⁷⁶⁵ Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 2 {CAB00007027/59} paragraph 2.153. In addition, RED was a standing member of local resilience forums⁷⁶⁶⁷⁶⁶ Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 2 {CAB00007027/59} paragraphs 2.153-2.154. and was required to have a comprehensive understanding of their work.⁷⁶⁷⁷⁶⁷ Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 2 {CAB00007027/59} paragraph 2.154. That was a national responsibility. RED had offices in London, Leeds,

¶Birmingham and Bristol.⁷⁶⁸⁷⁶⁸ Richardson {CLG00030412/6} page 6, paragraph 18.

¶103.13 As part of its planning and advisory function, RED participated in exercises in London arranged by the London Resilience Forum. There was a small resilience advisor team that worked with the London Resilience Forum, including a head of resilience.⁷⁶⁹⁷⁶⁹ Richardson {CLG00030412/4} page 4, paragraph 12. The involvement of RED resilience advisors was intended to help the London Resilience Forum understand the role of central government in the emergency response and to assist it in revising and improving plans.

¶103.14 The London-wide plans, discussed earlier, were developed by working groups that included representatives of Category 1 responders, including the London boroughs. RED assisted the production of those plans primarily by sharing information.⁷⁷⁰⁷⁷⁰ McManus {Day283/25:20}-{Day283/26:9}. It was not the function of RED resilience advisors to approve any particular plan.⁷⁷¹⁷⁷¹ McManus {Day283/26:13-22}.

¶103.15 RED was not responsible for overseeing a local authority's response to an emergency.⁷⁷²⁷⁷² Farrar {Day284/135:23-24}. Its function during the response phase, as set out in Emergency Response and Recovery, was to take immediate steps to ensure that it could support the local response as necessary.⁷⁷³⁷⁷³ Emergency Response and Recovery {CAB00004624/154-55} paragraph 9.1.2. The guidance provided some indication of the form that that support should take, such as the collection and sharing of information,⁷⁷⁴⁷⁷⁴ Emergency Response and Recovery {CAB00004624/154-55} paragraph 9.1.2; McManus {CLG10009725/23} paragraph 95; Farrar {Day284/8:2-4} the DCLG RED was not responsible for supporting the local authority response. provision of strategic information and, if necessary, telling the responders where they could get wider help and support.⁷⁷⁵⁷⁷⁵ Emergency Response and Recovery {CAB00004624/154-55} paragraph 9.1.2; McManus {CLG10009725/23} paragraph 95.

¶103.16 When an incident occurred RED duty officers were the initial point of contact between DCLG, other organisations and the government generally. During a duty period, the duty Head of Resilience and two officers were normally on call 24 hours a day.⁷⁷⁶⁷⁷⁶ DCLG Emergency Response Plan, version 3.4, June 2017 {CLG00021013/6} paragraph 1.15. They were expected to join strategic co-ordinating group meetings as government liaison officers (GLO), to represent the government⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷ McManus {CLG10009725/3} page 3, paragraph 7(b) and (c); McManus {CLG10009725/23} page 23, paragraph 95, except for incidents, such as terrorism, or the release of chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear material, for which the Home Office would deploy a GLO and the DCLG RED would form part of the Government Liaison Team {CLG00021013/5} paragraph 1.13; {CAB00000026/39} paragraph 3.56; {CAB00000026/51} paragraph 6.2(ii); {CAB00004624/154} paragraph 9.1.2.Show full note and obtain relevant information to enable them to provide briefings for ministers and senior officials.⁷⁷⁸⁷⁷⁸ DCLG Emergency Response Plan, version 3.4, June 2017 {CLG00005657/44}. Any member of RED who undertook the role of duty officer would be regarded as suitable to take on the role of GLO.⁷⁷⁹⁷⁷⁹ McManus {Day283/53:17-20}.

¶103.17 In London, there were two heads of resilience. They worked with the London Resilience Forum and supported it with plans relating to London as a whole. They also took part in training events and themselves provided training to Category 1 responders.⁷⁸⁰⁷⁸⁰ Dowdican {CLG00030419/2-3} pages 2-3, paragraphs 9-10.

¶103.18 If an incident occurred, the head of resilience would decide what degree of involvement from RED might be required.⁷⁸¹⁷⁸¹ McManus {CLG10009725/23} page 23, paragraph 94. If the deputy director considered that the incident would place significant pressure on RED's resources, or if COBR had been activated, an emergency notice would be sent out.⁷⁸²⁷⁸² DCLG Emergency Response Plan, version 3.4, June 2017 {CLG00005657/11} paragraph 2.16; McManus {CLG10009725/23} page 23, paragraph 94. That would inform the department, as well as other departments and ministers across government, that an emergency response had been triggered and that their own arrangements might need to be put into operation⁷⁸³⁷⁸³ For instance, if they are a Lead Government Department, they may be required to release staff members to support the RED Operations, McManus {CLG10009725/23} page 23, paragraph 94; DCLG Emergency Response Plan, version 3.4, June 2017 {CLG00005657/11} paragraph 2.17.

¶103.19 The role of the lead government department was to organise other government departments, to take the lead on any governmental group and to be the first point of contact for government as a whole. It did not normally have any operational role.⁷⁸⁴⁷⁸⁴ Farrar {Day284/15:3-13}.

¶103.20 When the response reached the point at which the demands on the emergency services were reducing, a decision would be made locally to transfer responsibility for the incident from the strategic co-ordinating group to a recovery working group.⁷⁸⁵⁷⁸⁵ DCLG's Emergency Response Plan {CLG00005657/41}.

Responding to emergencies: the concept of operations ("ConOps")

¶103.21 The government's guidance on responding to emergencies was contained in a document entitled Responding to Emergencies in the form of a concept of operations,⁷⁸⁶⁷⁸⁶ {CAB00000026} First published by Civil Contingencies Secretariat in 2010 and revised in April 2013. known colloquially as "ConOps".⁷⁸⁷⁷⁸⁷ Tallantire {CAB00014769/3} page 3, paragraph 10. ConOps restated the principle of subsidiarity and confirmed that local responders were the basic building blocks of the response to an emergency in the UK.⁷⁸⁸⁷⁸⁸ ConOps {CAB00000026/7} paragraph 1.7. It identified three broad types of emergency likely to require the direct involvement of the government: level 1 significant emergencies, level 2 serious emergencies and level 3 catastrophic emergencies.⁷⁸⁹⁷⁸⁹ ConOps {CAB00000026/8-9} paragraph 1.8 sets out examples of each level and the type of direct central government engagement typical for each {CAB00000026/68}.

¶103.22 ConOps directed that a level 2 or level 3 emergency required the initiation of the government's crisis management facilities (i.e. COBR)⁷⁹⁰⁷⁹⁰ ConOps {CAB00000026/11} paragraph 2.2. in order to enable the rapid co-ordination of the government's response and effective decision-making.⁷⁹¹⁷⁹¹ ConOps {CAB00000026/11} paragraph 2.2.

¶103.23 The Cabinet Office was responsible for deciding whether the central response mechanism should be activated,⁷⁹²⁷⁹² The terminology of "central government response mechanism" and "COBR" are used throughout ConOps in some cases as equivalent terms: see ConOps {CAB00000026/8-9} paragraph 1.8; ConOps {CAB00000026/11} paragraph 2.2; ConOps {CAB00000026/19} paragraph 2.26(d); ConOps {CAB00000026/68}] and in others as distinct alternatives: ConOps {CAB00000026/36} paragraphs 3.50-3.51, ConOps {CAB00000026/45} paragraph 4.2 iii.Show full note consulting colleagues, the lead government department and the Prime Minister's Office as necessary.⁷⁹³⁷⁹³ ConOps {CAB00000026/19-20} para 2.26. Although ConOps identified different levels of emergency with the intention of helping users to determine the likely form of government engagement, the decision was not taken in that way.⁷⁹⁴⁷⁹⁴ Hammond {Day280/163:2-3}. The important question was whether to activate the government response mechanism.⁷⁹⁵⁷⁹⁵ Hammond {Day280/164:1-9}. See also Hammond {Day280/155:8-10}. The phrase "COBR meeting" appears to have been used in Whitehall at the time without distinguishing between meetings taking place in the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms and meetings taking place elsewhere in accordance with the COBR procedure.

¶103.24 "COBR" was sometimes used as shorthand for a decision-making body of senior politicians, civil servants and others convened in accordance with the COBR procedure. Such a body was supported by a number of separate groups called "cells"⁷⁹⁶⁷⁹⁶ It is not obvious that this referred to people rather than places, but it is the former. Para 2.26 of ConOps refers to the Cabinet Office's role in initiating the supporting structures for the central response such as the situation cell, the secretariat, and policy support and provide staff for the activation of those support mechanisms. and was designed to be flexible.⁷⁹⁷⁷⁹⁷ ConOps {CAB00000026/21} paragraph 3.2.

¶103.25 For all level 2 and level 3 emergencies, other than terrorist incidents, the senior decision-making body was the Civil Contingencies Committee.⁷⁹⁸⁷⁹⁸ A Cabinet Office construct bringing together ministers and officials from the key departments and agencies involved in the response and wider impact management along with other organisations as appropriate, see ConOps {CAB00000026/23} paragraph 3.7. A situation cell was established to ensure that there was a single, immediate, authoritative overview of the situation available to decision-makers.⁷⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹ ConOps {CAB00000026/23-24} paragraph 3.9. The situation cell developed and maintained a common recognised information picture ("CRIP") consisting of information relating both to the incident and its significant wider consequences and including the main developments and decisions.⁸⁰⁰⁸⁰⁰ ConOps {CAB00000026/24} paragraph 3.10.

¶103.26 ConOps indicated that, if there were uncertainty over the direction of the government's response to an emergency or the effectiveness of the local response in England and Wales, the Cabinet Office would convene a meeting (if appropriate in COBR)⁸⁰¹⁸⁰¹ The ConOps guidance did not make it clear whether the use of "COBR" here referred to activation of central government's crisis management facilities or a meeting held in the physical location of the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. to assess the situation and advise ministers as necessary.⁸⁰²⁸⁰² ConOps {CAB00000026/45} paragraph 4.2iii. It recommended that, in cases of doubt, it was generally better to activate the central response, even if it were subsequently stood down.⁸⁰³⁸⁰³ ConOps {CAB00000026/37} paragraph 3.52. ConOps advised that in practice, the level of government engagement may change over time (both up and down) as the demands of the emergency changed.⁸⁰⁴⁸⁰⁴ ConOps {CAB00000026/9} paragraph 1.10.

¶103.27 In the event of a catastrophic or serious emergency in England, the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary or other senior ministers nominated by the Prime Minister, would direct the central government response from COBR. In cases of doubt, the Home Secretary would at least initially, assume the chair in COBR.⁸⁰⁵⁸⁰⁵ ConOps {CAB00000026/45} paragraph 4.2iv.

Lead government departments

¶103.28 If an emergency occurred, the Cabinet Office was responsible for notifying relevant departments and agencies and ensuring that a lead government department was appointed.⁸⁰⁶⁸⁰⁶ ConOps {CAB00000026/19-20} paragraph 2.26(e)-(j); Hammond {CAB00014764/12} page 12, paragraph 38.

¶103.29 The lead government department normally took responsibility for assessing the situation, ensuring that its ministers and other relevant ministers were briefed, and providing support as necessary to local responders. Individual departments remained responsible for their particular policy areas.⁸⁰⁷⁸⁰⁷ ConOps {CAB00000026/13} paragraph 2.8; ConOps {CAB00000026/27} paragraph 3.24.

¶103.30 At the time of the Grenfell Tower fire the Cabinet Office maintained a list of departments' responsibilities for planning, response, and recovery from emergencies dated March 2009 which was intended to make clear in advance which department would lead on main potential challenges.⁸⁰⁸⁸⁰⁸ {HOM00013085}. The document included a reference to an emergency involving a fire. As the Home Office was responsible for fire and rescue services, it was the logical lead government department in the case of the Grenfell Tower fire.⁸⁰⁹⁸⁰⁹ Hammond {Day280/166:11-12}; Dawes {Day285/32:5}-{Day285/33:4}. DCLG was the department assigned for the recovery phase of an incident of that kind, which was likely to engage local authority responsibilities. DCLG was the lead government department for matters involving local authorities.⁸¹⁰⁸¹⁰ Hammond {Day280/170:2-6}. Dame Melanie Dawes did not think that the appointment of a lead government department occurred automatically and therefore put her department forward to undertake that role on the morning of 14 June 2017.⁸¹¹⁸¹¹ Dawes {Day285/20:5}-{Day285/21:2}. She did not recall the Home Office asking the DCLG to be the recovery partner.

¶103.31 In paragraphs 2.16 to 2.18, ConOps envisaged that different government departments might lead on the response and recovery phases, although it recognised that in such a case they would need to work together closely from the outset to ensure a smooth handover of responsibilities at the appropriate time and the integration of those two different activities.⁸¹²⁸¹² ConOps {CAB00000026/16} paragraph 2.17.

The response phase

¶103.32 The response phase encompasses the decisions and actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency, to protect life, contain and mitigate the effects of the emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality. It comprises two separate but closely related and often overlapping challenges: crisis management and consequence management.⁸¹³⁸¹³ ConOps {CAB00000026/6-7} paragraph 1.5 and ConOps {CAB00000026/27} paragraphs 3.22-3.23. Typically this phase lasts for a matter of hours or days.⁸¹⁴⁸¹⁴ Emergency Response and Recovery {CAB00004519/10} paragraph 1.3.2. It usually precedes the recovery phase.

¶103.33 In paragraph 2.16, ConOps set out the role of the lead government department for the response phase, which it undertook in consultation with other government departments and with support from the Cabinet Office as necessary, if COBR had been activated. The responsibilities were extensive, including producing a handling plan as soon as possible, acting as a focal point for communication between the government and strategic co-ordinating groups in the affected area, ensuring that responders and affected communities had access to the resources they needed to manage the emergency and ensuring that recovery is borne in mind throughout and that arrangements were in place to ensure a smooth transition to the recovery phase.⁸¹⁵⁸¹⁵ ConOps {CAB00000026/15-16} paragraph 2.16. The guidance was silent on whether the lead government department for response was expected to fulfil the same role where COBR had not been activated.

The recovery phase

¶103.34 The recovery phase is defined as the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency.⁸¹⁶⁸¹⁶ ConOps {CAB00000026/7} paragraph 1.6. It formally starts once the situation has been stabilised. However, preparation for the recovery phase should be considered alongside crisis and consequence management in the early stages of a response.⁸¹⁷⁸¹⁷ ConOps {CAB00000026/7} paragraph 1.6.

¶103.35 According to ConOps, in order to ensure that all departments and agencies were aware of the arrangements for handover from the response to recovery phase and its implications, leadership should formally be handed over from the lead government department for response to the lead government department for recovery.⁸¹⁸⁸¹⁸ ConOps {CAB00000026/43} paragraph 3.74. The timing of the formal handover from response to recovery was to be agreed between the two departments in consultation with the Cabinet Office. In some circumstances (e.g. flooding across a wide area), it is possible (and sometimes vital) for response and recovery activity to be undertaken at the same time.⁸¹⁹⁸¹⁹ ConOps {CAB00000026/43} paragraph 3.76; Hammond {Day281/86:19}-{Day281/87:1}.

¶103.36 The role of lead government department for the recovery phase included acting as the focal point for communications between the government and the recovery co-ordinating group at local level, together with many of the responsibilities of the lead government department for the response phase.⁸²⁰⁸²⁰ ConOps {CAB00000026/16-17} paragraph 2.18.

¶103.37 ConOps suggested that it was the activation of COBR that triggered responsibilities, particularly for the Cabinet Office and the lead government department for response. However, Ms Hammond told us that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's responsibilities arose in relation to any ministerial meeting convened to deal with a civil emergency, whether or not it was treated as a COBR meeting, and that the formal activation of COBR did not make a difference in practice.⁸²¹⁸²¹ Hammond {Day280/165:7-17}; {Day280/171:20}-{Day280/172:25}. Later in Ms Hammond's evidence, she told us that there would never be a formal activation of the COBR procedure {Day280/174:24}-(Day280/175:12}. The difference between what the guidance says and how things work in practice is unsatisfactory, given that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat is the author of ConOps, operates COBR and provides introductory training for civil servants in relation to COBR.⁸²²⁸²² MacFarlane {CAB00014794/7} page 7, paragraph 23, provided by Robert MacFarlane's team within the CCS.

Government training

¶103.38 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat provided training and support to local responders for a fee⁸²³⁸²³ EPC 2017 Training Course Programme {CAB00014795}. For example, in 2017, the cost per attendee for a 2-day training on 'Planning for Mass Fatalities' was £835 plus VAT. through the Emergency Planning College, which was operated by SERCO on behalf of the Cabinet Office. The courses⁸²⁴⁸²⁴ Titles included "Strategic emergency and crisis management", "Emergency Control Centre Operations", "Chief Executives: your role in civil protection", and "Webinar: planning for needs of vulnerable adults in emergencies" {CAB00014792} Cat 1 Responders, column C, rows 40, 52, 130 and 185. were not mandatory for government departments nor for Category 1 or 2 responders.⁸²⁵⁸²⁵ MacFarlane {CAB00014794/4-5} pages 4-5, paragraphs 14, 19.

¶103.39 The number of Emergency Planning College training courses undertaken by a responder is at best a crude measure of their level of training and expertise. Apart from anything else, it does not take into account the existing qualifications of staff or training that has been undertaken with another supplier.⁸²⁶⁸²⁶ {Day280/149:18}-{Day280/150:2}. However, in the three and a half years before the

¶Grenfell Tower fire the difference in the number of courses purchased by Westminster City

¶Council (88)⁸²⁷⁸²⁷ {CAB00014792} Cat 1 Responders, Row 51, columns F, G, H and I. and RBKC (3) is stark. Unlike Westminster, RBKC had taken no courses in civil protection.⁸²⁸⁸²⁸ {CAB00014792} Cat 1 Responders, Row 317, columns F, G, H and I.

¶103.40 There was no system within the Civil Contingencies Secretariat for monitoring training or notifying responders that were not undertaking a minimum level of training that they should be doing more.⁸²⁹⁸²⁹ Hammond {Day280/150:3-10}. As a result, central government was not aware of shortfalls in the training of local responders.

¶103.41 In the three and a half years before the Grenfell Tower fire, there were also significant differences between central government departments in the number of delegates attending Emergency Planning College training courses. Only four delegates from each of DCLG⁸³⁰⁸³⁰ {CAB00014793} Row 119, columns E, F, G and H. and the Home Office attended,⁸³¹⁸³¹ {CAB00014793} Row 202, columns E, F, G and H. as against 94 from the Cabinet Office.⁸³²⁸³² {CAB00014793} Row 7, columns E, F, G and H. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat had a relatively high turnover of staff,⁸³³⁸³³ Hammond {Day280/146:1-2}. all of whom attended the Emergency Planning College as part of the normal induction process,⁸³⁴⁸³⁴ Hammond {Day280/147:8-9}. but it was not part of its function to monitor training undertaken by other government departments and it did not know how many courses were expected to have been undertaken by the departments that would regularly be deputed to act as lead government department for response or recovery.⁸³⁵⁸³⁵ Hammond {Day280/145:2-12}.

¶103.42 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat itself also provided introductory training for civil servants whose roles were likely to require them to work with COBR.⁸³⁶⁸³⁶ MacFarlane {CAB00014794/7} page 7, paragraph 23. Ms Hammond did not think that training was mandatory for those with a direct role in COBR, but it was expected that they would undertake it.⁸³⁷⁸³⁷ Hammond {Day280/151:5-7}. It is not clear whether there was an expectation that ministers would receive training or an equivalent briefing.

¶103.43 RED conducted its own training led by Gill McManus, its acting head of London Resilience⁸³⁸⁸³⁸ Ms McManus had been temporarily promoted to head of resilience for the London area from within Robert Mason's team. Mason {CLG00030435/6} page 6, paragraph 16. She confirmed that she had not received any specific training before her appointment as a head of resilience {Day283/42:16-20}. and Lynne Dowdican. It included induction training, revision exercises and discussions following RED responses to reflect on what had been learnt.⁸³⁹⁸³⁹ McManus {Day283/35:11-15}; Dowdican {CLG00030419/2} page 2, paragraph 9. The department also held RED training days, ran a mentoring programme and held training sessions in team meetings.⁸⁴⁰⁸⁴⁰ Dowdican {CLG00030419/2} page 2, paragraph 9. Most RED team members took part in the Multi-Agency Gold Incident Command course led by the College of Policing.⁸⁴¹⁸⁴¹ Richardson {CLG00030412/15} page 15, paragraph 48. However, no training was provided specifically for duty officers.⁸⁴²⁸⁴² Welch {CLG00030737/3} page 3, paragraph 14; McManus {Day283/46:9-10} and {Day283/47:3-6}. Ms McManus accepted that that was inadequate⁸⁴³⁸⁴³ McManus {Day283/47:3-8} and RED has now introduced a specific training programme for duty officers.⁸⁴⁴⁸⁴⁴ McManus {Day283/46:19-21}.

¶103.44 RED reserves,⁸⁴⁵⁸⁴⁵ There were 51 RED reserves at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire, Richardson {CLG00030412/7} page 7, paragraph 22. who can be called upon by the department in an emergency response, had access to some training, but it was not mandatory⁸⁴⁶⁸⁴⁶ Richardson {CLG00030827/5} page 5, paragraph 9b. and apparently it was not unusual for a reserve to have received no training.⁸⁴⁷⁸⁴⁷ Doug Taylor, resilience advisor, had not received any RED reserve training. McManus {Day283/124:20}-{Day283/125:3}. Given the role the reserves may be called upon to play in response to an emergency, we consider that to be unsatisfactory.

¶103.45 Resilience advisors in RED took part in training exercises arranged by the London Resilience Forum that acted out various situations to check emergency preparedness, to help the London Resilience Forum partners to understand the role of the government in an emergency response and to assist them with revising and improving their plans.⁸⁴⁸⁸⁴⁸ Welch {CLG00030737/4} page 4, paragraph 15. They included the major exercise known as exercise Unified Response that took place from 29 February to 4 March 2016⁸⁴⁹⁸⁴⁹ McManus {CLG00030739/2} page 2, paragraph 8. and has been referred to earlier. The most recent resilience exercise involving local responders and the government before the Grenfell Tower fire had taken place on 17 May 2017.⁸⁵⁰⁸⁵⁰ Dowdican {CLG00030419/2} page 2, paragraph 7.

¶103.46 In October 2015, RED had issued a learning strategy⁸⁵¹⁸⁵¹ Resilience and Emergencies Division Training, Exercising and Organisational Learning Strategy 2015 – 2018, version 0.3, 2015 {CLG00030780}. which drew attention to the lack of structured monitoring of the lessons learnt from exercises and emergencies it had been involved in and the failure to link those lessons to training requirements.⁸⁵²⁸⁵² Resilience and Emergencies Division Training, Exercising and Organisational Learning Strategy 2015 – 2018, version 0.3, 2015 {CLG00030780/4} paragraph 3.2. The strategy also identified a lack of focus on training in the rest of the department.⁸⁵³⁸⁵³ Resilience and Emergencies Division Training, Exercising and Organisational Learning Strategy 2015 – 2018, version 0.3, 2015 {CLG00030780/4} paragraph 3.3. Ms McManus told us that since the Grenfell Tower fire DCLG has taken a much more professional and structured approach to training which is being developed further.⁸⁵⁴⁸⁵⁴ McManus {Day283/38:3-7}.

The government's understanding of responders' capability

¶103.47 From time to time the Civil Contingencies Secretariat organised a survey of the capability of local responders to respond to emergencies of various kinds. The results were collated in a national Resilience Capability Survey. Before the Grenfell Tower fire the Civil Contingencies Secretariat used the Resilience Capabilities Survey to help identify potential gaps in capability.⁸⁵⁵⁸⁵⁵ Hammond {CAB00014764/6} page 6, paragraph 21. A fresh survey had been carried out in the spring of 2017 but the results had not been analysed by the time of the Grenfell Tower fire and therefore the version currently in use was the 2014 survey.⁸⁵⁶⁸⁵⁶ Hargreaves {CAB00014871/4} page 4, paragraph 13; 2014 Resilience Capabilities Survey: Highlight Report {CAB00000094}. Participation in the 2014 survey had not been compulsory and 29% of Category 1 and 2 responders had not taken part.⁸⁵⁷⁸⁵⁷ 2014 Resilience Capabilities Survey: Highlight Report {CAB00000094/3}. Moreover, it had been based entirely on self-assessment by responders with no external verification of the results.⁸⁵⁸⁸⁵⁸ Workstream 3 of the National Security Capabilities Review {CAB00007083/4}. Responses to the survey were processed and aggregated by a third party; the Civil Contingencies Secretariat received only a high-level report based on aggregated data⁸⁵⁹⁸⁵⁹ Hargreaves {CAB00014871/5} page 5, paragraph 14. and was therefore unable to examine the responses of individual Category 1 and Category 2 responders.⁸⁶⁰⁸⁶⁰ Hargreaves {CAB00014871/5} page 5, paragraph 14. Before the Grenfell Tower fire the capability of RBKC to respond to an emergency had not caused concern, either as a result of the survey or as a result of any information reaching the government from other sources.⁸⁶¹⁸⁶¹ Workstream 3 of the National Security Capabilities Review {CAB00007083/4}. Central government thus had no means of effectively predicting the effectiveness of a local responder.

The days immediately following the fire

¶103.48 Over the course of the seven days following the Grenfell Tower fire the government itself was still in a state of flux following the general election held on 8 June 2017.⁸⁶²⁸⁶² Held on Thursday 8 June 2017 {CAB00014768/1} paragraph 1. It was already having to respond to a number of significant emergencies, including terrorist attacks at Manchester Arena and London Bridge, and on 19 June 2017 a further terrorist attack took place outside the Finsbury Park mosque.⁸⁶³⁸⁶³ That attack occurred in Finsbury Park, London, England, on 19 June 2017. Email at 10.46, 19.06.17 {CAB00005309} and Kay {CLG00030430/15} page 15, paragraph 62.

¶103.49 The National Security Secretariat watchkeepers (a small team of officials within the Civil Contingencies Secretariat who continuously monitor events) became aware of the Grenfell Tower fire at about 01.30 on 14 June 2017. The duty officer then notified Katharine Hammond, the senior civil servant on duty, of the fire at just after 03.00.⁸⁶⁴⁸⁶⁴ Hammond {CAB00014764/13} page 13, paragraph 42.

¶103.50 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat assumed that the fire was a major incident and that a meeting of a strategic co-ordinating group of local responders would be called.⁸⁶⁵⁸⁶⁵ Hammond {Day280/176:19}-{Day280/177:14}. The duty officer contacted DCLG RED so that it could provide a GLO to attend the meeting on behalf of the government.⁸⁶⁶⁸⁶⁶ Hammond {Day280/177:11-14}. We note that ConOps indicated that the GLO would normally be from the lead government department, ConOps {CAB00000026/39} paragraph 3.56. Denise Welch, resilience advisor and RED duty officer that night,⁸⁶⁷⁸⁶⁷ Welch {CLG00030737/1} page 1, paragraph 1; Welch {CLG00030737/2-3} pages 2-3, paragraph 11. received the call at about 03.30.⁸⁶⁸⁸⁶⁸ Welch {CLG00030737/4} page 4, paragraph 16; McManus {CLG10009725/5} page 5, paragraph 15. Ms Welch called Gill McManus,⁸⁶⁹⁸⁶⁹ Welch {CLG00030737/4} page 4, paragraph 17. who was acting for the first time that night as duty head of resilience,⁸⁷⁰⁸⁷⁰ McManus {CLG10009725/5} page 5, paragraph 15. and then called David Norris, Home Office fire duty officer,⁸⁷¹⁸⁷¹ Welch {CLG00030737/4} page 4, paragraph 17. at about 03.45.⁸⁷²⁸⁷² McManus {CLG10009725/7} page 7, paragraph 23. Mr Norris became aware of the fire only at that point.⁸⁷³⁸⁷³ Welch {CLG00030737/4} page 4, paragraph 17. Ms Welch followed up her call with an email at 04.13⁸⁷⁴⁸⁷⁴ Email at 04.13 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00008000/4}; Welch {CLG00030737/4} page 4, paragraph 17. and at 04.29 Mr Norris sent the information to various members of the Home Office staff.⁸⁷⁵⁸⁷⁵ Email at 04.29 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00008000/3-4}. Given the Home Office's role in fire and rescue services,⁸⁷⁶⁸⁷⁶ Hurd {HOM00046080/1} page 1, paragraph 4. we are surprised that it was unaware of the Grenfell Tower fire until it had been notified by DCLG RED.⁸⁷⁷⁸⁷⁷ McManus {CLG10009725/7} page 7, paragraph 23; McManus {Day283/49:14}-{Day283/50:3}. RED also contacted the London Resilience Group, which confirmed that a major incident had been declared and that a strategic co-ordinating group meeting would take place at about 05.00. Ms McManus told us that it was unusual for RED not to have heard about an incident of this magnitude directly from the London Resilience Group.⁸⁷⁸⁸⁷⁸ McManus {Day283/51:10-18}. Meanwhile, at 03.49,

¶Ms Hammond sent an email to Stuart Wainwright, head of the Readiness and Response team, to notify him that the duty team was taking action.⁸⁷⁹⁸⁷⁹ Hammond {CAB00014764/13} page 13, paragraph 44.

¶103.51 At 04.44, on Ms Hammond's instructions, the duty officer sent a situation report to No.10,⁸⁸⁰⁸⁸⁰ Emails at 06.17 and 08.14, 14.06.17 {CAB00005650}. the National Security Adviser, Mark Sedwill, and the Deputy National Security Adviser, Paddy McGuinness.⁸⁸¹⁸⁸¹ Hammond {CAB00014764/13} page 13, paragraph 44; amongst those copied into the 04:44, 14.06.17 email were DCLG RED and OSCT Operational Support in the Home Office {CAB00000337/5-6}. At 06.17, Alastair Whitehead, private secretary at No.10 with responsibility for the Home Office, sent an email to the Prime Minister informing her of a major fire at Grenfell Tower. He described the entire block as ablaze, with some reports suggesting that residents were still trapped inside. The Prime Minister confirmed receipt of the email at 08.14.⁸⁸²⁸⁸² {CAB00005650}.

¶103.52 The Home Office assumed the role of lead government department for the response phase in view of its responsibility for the fire and rescue services.⁸⁸³⁸⁸³ Hurd {Day282/115:14}-{Day282/116:2}; Hurd {HOM00046080/1} page 1, paragraph 4. As part of that role the Home Office prepared situation reports in the days following the fire until 19 June 2017.⁸⁸⁴⁸⁸⁴ Known as Sit Reps and dated 14, 15, 16, 17 and 19 June 2017 {HOM00046089}; Hurd {HOM00046080/6} page 6, paragraph 21; ConOps {CAB00000026/15} paragraph 2.16(ii). Dame Melanie Dawes contacted Dr Jo Farrar on the morning of 14 June 2017, indicating that she thought that DCLG would be designated the lead government department for the recovery phase. However, she told us that it would not automatically be asked to do so in relation to an incident of that kind and that she had no recollection of the Home Office asking DCLG to take on that role or talking to DCLG as the recovery partner.⁸⁸⁵⁸⁸⁵ Dawes {Day285/20:16}-{Day285/21:2}.

The government's role in the strategic co-ordinating group

¶103.53 In her capacity as GLO Ms Welch joined the first strategic co-ordinating group meeting, which took place at 05.00, by telephone.⁸⁸⁶⁸⁸⁶ Hammond {CAB00014764/14} page 14, paragraph 45. The GLO was not expected to attend the scene of an emergency⁸⁸⁷⁸⁸⁷ McManus {CLG10009725/23} page 23, paragraph 95. but was expected to attend the strategic command centre or special operations room at which the strategic co-ordinating group was based.⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸ Emergency plan {CLG00005657/40-41}; McManus {Day283/55:8-17}; {Day283/56:14}-{Day283/58:7}. However, Ms McManus thought that it would be more effective for Ms Welch to join the meeting remotely,⁸⁸⁹⁸⁸⁹ McManus {Day283/55:21}-{Day 283/56:9}. so she did not ask her to go to the strategic command centre⁸⁹⁰⁸⁹⁰ McManus {CLG10009725/7} page 7, paragraph 25; emails at 04.40 and 04.55 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00030443/1}. and she did not do so.⁸⁹¹⁸⁹¹ McManus {Day283/61:24}-{Day283/62:18}. In fact, no GLO was sent to the strategic command centre on the morning of 14 June 2017.⁸⁹²⁸⁹² McManus {Day283/89:1-11}. The presence of a GLO at an early stage of the response would have helped RED understand what was going on and what was needed and would have reinforced its effectiveness as a link between the strategic co-ordinating group and the government.⁸⁹³⁸⁹³ Richardson {CLG00030412/28} page 28, paragraph 105; McManus {Day283/61:9-23}; McManus {Day283/58:7-12}; Module 4 Closing statement on behalf of the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities {CLG00036423/2} paragraph 4b.

Dissemination of reports

¶103.54 On the morning of 14 June 2017, RED was not providing timely reports about the prevailing situation from the strategic co-ordinating group meetings.⁸⁹⁴⁸⁹⁴ Readout of 05.00 SCG meeting {CAB00000157/2}; readout of 06.30 SCG meeting {CAB00010263/1-2}; readout of 08.30 SCG meeting {CAB00008475/2}. Ms Welch produced a summary of the meeting at 05.00,⁸⁹⁵⁸⁹⁵ {CAB00000157/2-3}. which she sent to colleagues at RED and to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat Control email address at 06.16.⁸⁹⁶⁸⁹⁶ Email at 06.16 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00000157/2}. The OSCT Operation Support within the Home Office circulated to the CCS Control and others a situation report at 05:56 on 14 June 2017, which included reference to, but not a summary of, the 05:00 SCG meeting {HOM00046089/1-3}. However, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat Control did not send it on to Mr Wainwright until 07.13,⁸⁹⁷⁸⁹⁷ Email at 07.13 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00000157/2}; Hammond {Day280/181:23}-{Day280/182:1}. by which time the second meeting held at 06.30 had already started.⁸⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸ Both the DCLG RED and the Home Office joined the 06:30 SCG by telephone: email at 07:27 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00000157/1}. At that stage, no decision had been made about the need for national support,⁸⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹ Hammond {Day280/183:14-16}. as Mr Wainwright considered that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat would be better able to make that decision after the meeting.⁹⁰⁰⁹⁰⁰ Email at 07.27 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00000157/1}.

¶103.55 Mr Wainwright did not receive a summary of the 06.30 meeting until 08.40.⁹⁰¹⁹⁰¹ Email at 08.35 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00014771/3-4}. A summary of the next strategic co-ordinating group meeting held at 08.30 was not sent to RED until 10.41⁹⁰²⁹⁰² Email at 10.41 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00008475/2}. and was not sent on to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat until 11.10.⁹⁰³⁹⁰³ Email at 11.10 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00008475/1}. DCLG considered it unusual⁹⁰⁴⁹⁰⁴ McManus {Day283/85:7-23}; email at 13.24 on 14 June 2017{CLG00008026/1}. that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat asked it to join the next meeting of the strategic co-ordinating group at 14.00,⁹⁰⁵⁹⁰⁵ Email at 11.43 on 14 June 2017{CLG00008024/2}. but, in view of the repeated delays in sharing information that morning, we find it unsurprising. In our view the failure to share information from the strategic co-ordinating group promptly undermined at a critical stage the government's understanding of what was going on.

Assessment that support was not needed

¶103.56 The focus of the emails sent by DCLG in the early hours of 14 June 2017 was on the department's responsibilities for building regulations and housing, not on the local authority's ability to deal with an incident the size of the fire.⁹⁰⁶⁹⁰⁶ Emails at 04.08 and 04.33 {CLG00030443/1}; emails at 05.55 and 07.12 {CLG00002860}; email at 08.07 {CLG00030453}; email at 08.11 {CLG00002867/2}; email at 08.26 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00030455}; McManus {Day283/65:8-12}. Ms McManus told us that the information coming through at that time indicated that RBKC was coping well and that other boroughs were providing assistance.⁹⁰⁷⁹⁰⁷ McManus {Day283/77:18}-{Day283/78:3}. She told us that, in the absence of a request for support, RED would not normally contact a local authority in the middle of an emergency response.⁹⁰⁸⁹⁰⁸ McManus {Day283/78:5-15}.

¶103.57 At 08.09 Mr Wainwright sent an email to Ms Hammond saying that the LFB was not seeking additional resources and that the NHS had reported that it had sufficient capacity.⁹⁰⁹⁹⁰⁹ Email at 08.09 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00000159/1}; Hammond {CAB00014816/9} page 9, paragraph 20. RBKC's capacity was not mentioned. Ms Hammond told us that the national resources available to local responders included anything that the fire and rescue service needed, because at that stage they were in the response phase.⁹¹⁰⁹¹⁰ Hammond {Day280/184:11-19}.

¶103.58 We heard that on 14 June 2017 the Civil Contingencies Secretariat had been consistently told that the responders did not need any resources or assistance from the government.⁹¹¹⁹¹¹ {Day280/188:2-4}; Hammond {CAB00014764/14} page 14, paragraph 46. Ms Hammond said that she had regarded the absence of a request for help from RBKC as reassuring.⁹¹²⁹¹² {Day280/190:16-17}.

¶103.59 The response phase of the reaction to an emergency comprises crisis and consequence management, which for many emergencies is the biggest and most complex area of work.⁹¹³⁹¹³ ConOps {CAB00000026/27} paragraphs 3.22-3.23. It includes managing community relationships and providing shelter to displaced persons.⁹¹⁴⁹¹⁴ ConOps {CAB00000026/6-7} paragraph 1.5; ConOps {CAB00000026/27} paragraph 3.22-3.23. That overlapping, but integral, part of the response phase appears to have been overlooked in the initial stages of setting in motion the government's response.

Issuing an emergency notice

¶103.60 An emergency notice putting the rest of the department on notice that matters might escalate and that RED reserves might need to be brought in should be issued⁹¹⁵⁹¹⁵ The DCLG RED Reserves are people who work in other parts of the Department who can be released to work on urgent RED projects: McManus {CLG10009725/11} page 11, paragraph 41. if the deputy director considers that an incident will place significant pressures on RED's resources or if COBR has been activated.⁹¹⁶⁹¹⁶ DCLG's Emergency Response Plan {CLG00005657/11} paragraph 2.16. Katherine Richardson, deputy director of RED, decided to issue an emergency notice at 09.18⁹¹⁷⁹¹⁷ Email at 09.18 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00002875/2}; DCLG's Emergency Response Plan {CLG00005657/11} paragraph 2.16. after receiving an email at 09.16 from Robert Mason, head of DCLG's Emergencies Management Team.⁹¹⁸⁹¹⁸ Robert Mason {CLG00030435/2} page 2, paragraph 4. Page 7, paragraph 19; Email at 09.16 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00002874/1}. Ms McManus told us that the emergency notice had been sent then,⁹¹⁹⁹¹⁹ Email at 09:37 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00002879/1-2}; email at 09.39 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00002876}; Emergency Notice {CLG00008012}. after three strategic co-ordinating group meetings had been held and some eight hours after the police had declared a major incident,⁹²⁰⁹²⁰ Phase 1 Report II paragraph 10.332. because by that time staff had been available to set up the operations centre.⁹²¹⁹²¹ McManus {Day283/94:6-10}. However, it seems clear to us that the delay was an oversight that was corrected by Mr Mason's intervention.

¶103.61 The emergency notice informed recipients that RED had set up an operations centre⁹²²⁹²² The three main cells are the situation cell, the policy cell and the briefing cell: DCLG's Emergency Response Plan {CLG00005657/12-13} paragraphs 3.7-3.17. at 08.00.⁹²³⁹²³ DCLG RED Emergency Notice {CLG00008012}; McManus {CLG10009725/22} page 22, paragraph 93. (An operations centre is the name for a collection of "cells" working together on behalf of the department to respond to a severe emergency or one affecting a wide area.) However, by 09.37, at least two of the three main cells (the situation cell and the briefing cell) had not been formally activated.⁹²⁴⁹²⁴ Email at 09.37 on 14 June 2017 from Lynne Dowdican to RED Control notifying them that she had appointed an Operations Centre Manager and was seeking a briefing cell and a situation cell {CLG00002879/1-2}. Ms Dowdican had taken over from Gill McManus minutes earlier, see email at 09.32 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00002875/1}; McManus {Day283/81:13}-{Day283/82:5}. Although a full operations centre is used only for the most serious emergencies, it was clear from the outset to Mr Mason that RED and the government generally were likely to be heavily involved in the case of the Grenfell Tower fire.⁹²⁵⁹²⁵ Robert Mason {CLG00030435/6-7} pages 6-7, paragraph 17. The delay in formally setting up the situation and briefing cells may have affected

¶RED's understanding of what was happening at the incident, although we recognise that

¶DCLG was not standing still until the emergency notice was issued.

¶103.62 Despite the fact that Mr Mason was not on duty on 14 June 2017,⁹²⁶⁹²⁶ Robert Mason {CLG00030435/7} page 7, paragraph 19; Robert Mason {CLG10009810/2-3} pages 2-3, paragraph 7. he was still recorded as the response manager for the operations centre in the emergency notice.⁹²⁷⁹²⁷ {CLG00008012}. Mr Mason explained that the roles of response director and response manager were "standing roles", which Ms Richardson, as deputy director of RED, and he, as head of emergencies management, would automatically fill.⁹²⁸⁹²⁸ Robert Mason {CLG00030435/7} page 7, paragraph 19; Robert Mason {CLG10009810/2-3} pages 2-3, paragraph 7.

Decision to hold a cross-government meeting

¶103.63 By 10.04 on 14 June 2017, the Prime Minister had asked for⁹²⁹⁹²⁹ Whitehead {CAB00014857/9} page 9, paragraph 27. a cross-government meeting⁹³⁰⁹³⁰ Email at 10.04 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00000337/1}. to be arranged to understand better what was happening, to ensure that the different departments that might have a role were co-ordinating their operations and to establish whether any additional assistance could be provided.⁹³¹⁹³¹ Whitehead {CAB00014857/9} page 9, paragraph 27. It was to be held at 10 Victoria Street.

¶103.64 It was decided that the meeting should be held at minister of state level, rather than cabinet-level, because the Home Secretary was unavailable.⁹³²⁹³² Email at 10.04 on 14 June 2017{CAB00000337/1-2}. It was chaired by the Minister for Policing and Fire, Mr Nicholas Hurd MP,⁹³³⁹³³ Email at 10.04 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00000337/1}. who had been appointed to the post two days earlier.⁹³⁴⁹³⁴ Appointed on 12 June 2017; Hurd {HOM00046080/1} paragraph 1. He told us that at the time he had not been aware of the Civil Contingencies Act or the Regulations, the Emergency Preparedness guidance, the Emergency Response and Recovery guidance or the ConOps guidance⁹³⁵⁹³⁵ Hurd {Day282/114:15}-{Day282/115:4}. and had had no training in resilience.⁹³⁶⁹³⁶ Hurd {Day282/115:5-13}.

¶103.65 Ms Hammond told us that she had not assumed that the minister would not have mastered his brief simply because he had been so recently appointed.⁹³⁷⁹³⁷ Hammond {Day281/154:14-16}. In our view, however, that might have been a safer assumption to make. Indeed, when Mr Hurd was asked whether he was adequately briefed for the task, he frankly admitted that that was scarcely possible, given that it was only his second day in the post.⁹³⁸⁹³⁸ Hurd {Day282/148:16-23}. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat later concluded that the first cross-government meeting should have been chaired by a more senior minister. A similar recommendation had been made by the cabinet in the aftermath of the flooding in 2014 and 2015.⁹³⁹⁹³⁹ Grenfell Tower tragedy – Lessons for the Central Response {CAB00014768/4} paragraph 17. With the benefit of hindsight Dame Melanie Dawes expressed the view that, if the initial cross-government meeting had been chaired at cabinet level⁹⁴⁰⁹⁴⁰ By a Secretary of State. or by the Prime Minister, more questions might have been asked about the local response.⁹⁴¹⁹⁴¹ Dawes {CLG00030653/36} page 36, paragraph 119. It is not clear why earlier recommendations were not followed.

¶In our view, the cross-government meetings would have benefited from being chaired by a more senior minister who had a better understanding of what was required to respond to an emergency.

¶103.66 The meeting was described as a cross-government co-ordination meeting⁹⁴²⁹⁴² Email at 10.09 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00000337/1}. and in the email correspondence relating to it was specifically stated not to have been a COBR meeting.⁹⁴³⁹⁴³ Email at 10.14 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00014775}. Alastair Whitehead told us that on 14 June 2017 there had been no detailed discussion within No.10 about activating COBR because it had been understood that, although the incident was serious, it was one that was being handled by the local emergency services, who could rely on the assistance of other boroughs where necessary.⁹⁴⁴⁹⁴⁴ Whitehead {CAB00014857/8} page 8, paragraph 26. It is interesting to note that none of the witnesses told us that they had referred to ConOps during the period following the fire.⁹⁴⁵⁹⁴⁵ Hammond {Day280/159:18-22}.

¶103.67 A message from Ms Hammond to Camilla Marshall in the No.10 Press Office at 12.58 on 14 June 2017 shed more light on the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's understanding of the level of the emergency at the time. In it she sought to explain the difference between a formal crisis management response (the COBR process, technically a cabinet sub-committee) and a less formal co-ordination meeting.⁹⁴⁶⁹⁴⁶ Email at 12.58 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00013996/1}. She said that what really determined the difference was whether the government had a leading role in the response, which in that case was clearly being managed extremely well by local responders. They were therefore checking on requirements for resources and looking ahead to what arrangements for support were going to be needed from across the system in the next few days.⁹⁴⁷⁹⁴⁷ Email at 12.58 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00013996/1}. Although not identified as a factor, it is clear that the absence of a request from RBKC for support and the belief that the response was being handled well by local responders influenced the level of government engagement on 14 June 2017. Ms Hammond told us that if it had been clear to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat at the time that RBKC was struggling, it is possible that a COBR meeting would have been called.⁹⁴⁸⁹⁴⁸ Hammond {Day280/212:20-25}.

¶103.68 In preparation for the cross-government meeting at 16.00 on 14 June 2017 the Civil Contingencies Secretariat provided the secretariat support and developed an information pack (CRIP), as it would have done for a COBR meeting.⁹⁴⁹⁹⁴⁹ Hammond {CAB00014816/8} page 8, paragraph 17; ConOps {CAB00000026/24} paragraph 3.10. It is likely that some of the people working in the situation cell preparing the CRIP would also then have been part of the secretariat for the meeting.⁹⁵⁰⁹⁵⁰ Hammond {Day281/192:5}-{Day281/193:5}. Ms Hammond said that in practical terms there was no significance in the fact that the meeting was not formally a COBR meeting and that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat had done all the same things.⁹⁵¹⁹⁵¹ Hammond {Day280/200:15-22}; Hammond {Day280/213:1-8}. The implications of failing to activate COBR formally are discussed further at paragraphs 103.172 to 103.177.

Checks on RBKC

¶103.69 At 09.00 on 14 June 2017, Dr Farrar received a briefing from Ms Richardson which included information about the leadership and co-ordination of the local response. At that stage, it had not become clear who was leading the response in relation to humanitarian assistance.⁹⁵²⁹⁵² Farrar {Day284/16:14-23}. At 09.07, Dame Melanie Dawes sent an email to Nicholas Holgate offering government support as and when it might be helpful.⁹⁵³⁹⁵³ Email at 09.07 on 14 June 2017 {RBK00005766}. He responded by thanking her but did not ask for assistance, saying that there was plenty of "blue light resource".⁹⁵⁴⁹⁵⁴ Email at 09.09 on 14 June 2017 {RBK00005766}. Mr Holgate told us that he had not thought of going back to Dame Melanie at a later stage because it was not obvious to him what assistance the government could provide.⁹⁵⁵⁹⁵⁵ Holgate {Day273/98:3}-{Day273/99:3}.

¶103.70 At 09.27 Dr Farrar's secretary attempted to get hold of Mr Holgate to tell him that Dr Farrar was his primary contact in the government and to arrange a time for them to speak.⁹⁵⁶⁹⁵⁶ Email at 09.27 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00030460}; Farrar {Day284/27:6}-{Day284/28:3}. Dr Farrar followed that up with a text message to Mr Holgate but did not receive any response and was unable to speak to him until the next day.⁹⁵⁷⁹⁵⁷ Farrar {Day284/28:4-11}; Holgate {Day273/98:19-23}; Farrar {CLG00030414/6} page 6, paragraph 27; Farrar {CLG00030414/10} page 10, paragraph 44. DCLG continued to make efforts to contact RBKC and offer government support throughout 14 June 2017,⁹⁵⁸⁹⁵⁸ Email at 11.22 on 14 June 2017 {RBK00048990}; email at 12.16 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00030466/1}; Randall {CLG00030427/13-14} pages 13-14, paragraph 54; email at 16.37 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00002995}. but its offers were couched in general terms.

¶103.71 At 13.42 on 14 June 2017 Dr Farrar's secretary contacted Alex Powell, deputy director for local government stewardship at DCLG, to ask for background information on RBKC.⁹⁵⁹⁹⁵⁹ Farrar {CLG00030414/6} page 6, paragraph 30. Dr Farrar described it as standard procedure⁹⁶⁰⁹⁶⁰ Farrar {Day284/29:1-11}. and no concerns were raised about the general performance of RBKC.⁹⁶¹⁹⁶¹ Farrar {Day284/29:14}-{Day284/30:3}; email at 14.05 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00002954}. Dame Melanie sent some general information about the leader of RBKC, Nicholas Paget-Brown, and the chief executive, Nicholas Holgate, to the Rt Hon Alok Sharma MP, then Minister of State for Housing and Planning. She described Mr Paget-Brown as "a safe pair of hands" and said that Mr Holgate had previously worked in the Treasury and that the department had a very good relationship with him.⁹⁶²⁹⁶² Email at 14.19 on 14 June 2017 {CLG00002952}. Dr Farrar accepted that the information that had been gathered was quite basic and superficial.⁹⁶³⁹⁶³ Farrar{Day284/33:5}-{Day284/34:4}. Crucially, no information was provided to Dr Farrar which was relevant to RBKC's ability to respond to an emergency. Dr Farrar told us that she did not believe that it had been RED's responsibility to make such an assessment and that it did not have the resources to do so.⁹⁶⁴⁹⁶⁴ Farrar {Day284/34:10}-{Day284/35:4}. The fact that the leader and chief executive of RBKC were both known to those at DCLG and held in high regard by those who knew them appears to have contributed to a confidence in the ability of RBKC to respond to the fire that turned out to be misplaced.⁹⁶⁵⁹⁶⁵ {CLG00002952}; Farrar {Day284/35:1-4}.

Ministerial visit to Grenfell Tower

¶103.72 One of the first things Mr Hurd did was to visit Grenfell Tower at approximately 13.00 on 14 June 2017,⁹⁶⁶⁹⁶⁶ Hurd {HOM00046080/2} page 2, paragraph 6; Hurd {Day282/145:23}-{Day282/146:1}. where he met Dany Cotton, LFB Commissioner, and others.⁹⁶⁷⁹⁶⁷ Hurd {HOM00046080/2} page 2, paragraph 7. He was not accompanied by anyone from RBKC, having taken the initiative himself to go there,⁹⁶⁸⁹⁶⁸ Hurd {Day282/147:19}-{Day282/148:15}. and did not visit any of the surrounding areas, including the rest centres.⁹⁶⁹⁹⁶⁹ Hurd {Day282/146:2-12}. He told us that, in hindsight, he wished things had been done differently because he could then have gone into the cross-government meeting with some basic information which he fairly conceded the meeting did not have.⁹⁷⁰⁹⁷⁰ Hurd {Day282/147:19}-{Day282/148:15}.

Cross-government meeting 14 June 2017

¶103.73 After consulting No.10 and the Home Office⁹⁷¹⁹⁷¹ Emails at 10.44 {CAB00001126/2}, and 12.05 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00001126/1}; email at 13:51 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00002927}. the Civil Contingencies Secretariat produced a number of documents in preparation for the meeting on 14 June 2017, including an agenda, brief for the chairman and a list of those invited to attend.⁹⁷²⁹⁷² {CAB00001129}; {CAB00002715}; {CAB00002711}. Matters for discussion included immediate shelter and medium-term rehousing and support for those affected by the fire.⁹⁷³⁹⁷³ {CAB00001129}; {CAB00002715/2-3} items 3(b)-3(c). The list of those invited to attend did not include a representative from RBKC.⁹⁷⁴⁹⁷⁴ {CAB00002711}. Ms Hammond told us that she had expected information about the local authority to come from the Mayor of London, RED and the ministers to whom they had been reporting.⁹⁷⁵⁹⁷⁵ Hammond {Day281/5:1-10}. She could not remember anyone deciding that RBKC should or should not be represented, but she accepted that it would have been normal for Mr Holgate, as the chief executive of RBKC, to attend a meeting of that kind.⁹⁷⁶⁹⁷⁶ Hammond {Day281/7:23-24}.

¶103.74 At 13.55 on 14 June 2017, RED sent the Civil Contingencies Secretariat by email Mr Holgate's name and telephone number as the local government representative⁹⁷⁷⁹⁷⁷ Email at 13.55 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00000365/1}. and at 16.30, 30 minutes after the meeting had begun, RED asked the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to arrange for him to join the meeting by telephone to provide a local contribution as soon as possible.⁹⁷⁸⁹⁷⁸ Email at 16.30 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00007461/2}. Until that point the Civil Contingencies Secretariat had not appreciated that Mr Holgate's details had been sent to enable him to join the meeting.⁹⁷⁹⁹⁷⁹ Emails at 17.40, 17.49 and 17.59 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00007461/1-2}. As a result, no one from RBKC attended the meeting. Apparently, no one at the meeting remarked on the absence of RBKC.⁹⁸⁰⁹⁸⁰ Hammond {CAB00014764/16} page 16, paragraph 51.

¶103.75 Ms Hammond did not accept that the omission of Mr Holgate from the list of those invited was a significant error.⁹⁸¹⁹⁸¹ Hammond {Day281/6:2-13}. The failure of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to include someone from RBKC in the list or to mention RBKC in the chairman's brief made it less likely that anyone would notice Mr Holgate's absence.

¶103.76 Ms Hammond did not think that the absence of RBKC had adversely affected the meeting's understanding of what was happening, given the other sources of information available to it.⁹⁸²⁹⁸² Hammond {Day281/8:19-24}. However, those sources of information were inevitably one step removed from the local authority. It is self-evident that many of the questions raised in the chairman's brief, such as those relating to arrangements for emergency shelter, the provision being made for those requiring alternative accommodation, for how long alternative housing might be required and how difficult that would be for the local authority to organise, would have been better answered by the chief executive of RBKC, particularly in the context of a fast-moving emergency.⁹⁸³⁹⁸³ Chair's Brief {CAB00002715/2} paragraph 8.

¶103.77 Following the meeting, Mr Hurd told the media that he had left it feeling reassured that the resources and the capacity needed to support people were in place.⁹⁸⁴⁹⁸⁴ Fourth SIT REP – 18:20hrs on 14 June 2017 (Home Office, OSCT Operational Support) {HOM00046089/16}. It appears to us that the government had fundamentally misunderstood the position.⁹⁸⁵⁹⁸⁵ That is echoed in the CCS report 'Grenfell Tower tragedy - Lessons for the Central Response', which identified a "significant discrepancy between the situation as generally understood in Whitehall for the first 24-36 hours, and that facing the local community" but failed to identify Mr Holgate's absence from the 14 June cross-government co- ordination meeting as a contributing factor. That is because the review erroneously recorded RBKC's chief executive as having attended the meeting on 14 June 2017. That was a critical error in what was intended to be an exercise in identifying lessons learnt, {CAB00014768/1} paragraph 4 and {CAB00014768/2-3} paragraph 11.Show full note

¶103.78 The minutes of the meeting do not record any discussion of the need for financial assistance, information or humanitarian support for those affected by the fire.⁹⁸⁶⁹⁸⁶ Minutes 14 June 2017 {CAB00002714}. Although it was agreed that trauma counselling should be offered to firefighters and ambulance workers,⁹⁸⁷⁹⁸⁷ Minutes 14 June 2017 {CAB00002714/1} paragraph (c). we have seen nothing to suggest that there was any discussion about providing counselling of a similar nature to former residents of the tower.⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁸ Hammond {Day281/10:10}. Moreover, although the minutes refer to providing temporary accommodation for residents of the tower they do not mention the need to provide accommodation for residents evacuated from the surrounding area.⁹⁸⁹⁹⁸⁹ Minutes 14 June 2017 {CAB00002714/1} paragraph (b). See also Hurd {Day282/145:7-17}. It appears that, with the exception of shelter,⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹⁰ To which there is a brief, general mention: "The local Council were presently identifying temporary accommodation for those residents of Grenfell Tower." {CAB00002714/1} paragraph (b). none of the initial needs of survivors without serious injuries described in Emergency Response and Recovery were considered at that first meeting.⁹⁹¹⁹⁹¹ The guidance indicates that the initial needs of survivors without serious injuries are likely to include shelter and warmth, information on and assistance with contacting family and friends, support in their distress, food and drink, treatment of injuries and medicinal and mobility needs, changing, washing and toilet facilities and perhaps spare clothing. It also warns that the immediate and longer-term psychological needs of survivors without serious injuries (who may also be bereaved) should not be overlooked {CAB00004519/119-120} paragraphs 7.3.2-7.3.4.Show full note

¶103.79 Following the fire, Workstream 4 of the National Security Capability Review drafted by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat acknowledged that there can be a tendency for the strategic co-ordinating group to concentrate during the early stages of a crisis on the response of the emergency services to the detriment of those matters that fall to local government and other civilian-led support services.⁹⁹²⁹⁹² Workstream 4 of the National Security Capability Review, dated 28 September 2017 {CAB00007084/2} paragraph 6. In our view, reliance at the cross-government meeting on information derived from members of the strategic co-ordinating group, but not from RBKC directly, is likely to have exacerbated any tendency to focus on that aspect.

¶103.80 Ms Hammond said that support from the government was more likely to be needed in the recovery phase. Be that as it may, it did not obviate the need for the first cross-government co-ordination meeting to consider the immediate needs of the survivors.⁹⁹³⁹⁹³ Hammond {Day280/210:23}-{Day280/211:8}. Indeed, ConOps specifically contemplated that for most emergencies response and recovery would initially be undertaken in parallel.⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁴ ConOps {CAB00000026/43} paragraph 3.76.

¶103.81 In our view, at the meeting on 14 June 2017 too few of the right questions were asked about the local authority's responsibilities to those affected. The questions that were asked were asked of the wrong people and the minister chairing the meeting did not have the experience needed to perform that task.

¶103.82 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat took the minutes of the meeting. Ms Hammond told us that minutes of such meetings are kept for the purposes of providing records⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁵ Hammond {Day281/11:18-25}. but are not circulated to those present for approval or correction and that, if anyone wanted to refer to them, it would be necessary to ask the Civil Contingencies Secretariat for permission.⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁶ Hammond {Day281/23:17-19}; emails at 12.22 {CAB00009842/2} page 2 and 17.55 {CAB00009842/1}. The only document circulated to those who had been present at the meeting was a list of "Actions".⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁷ Actions 14 June 2017{CAB00001236}; Hammond {CAB00014868/8} page 8, paragraph 23(f).

¶103.83 A draft version of the minutes contained the following passage:

"The Minister for Local Government stated that the local Council were presently identifying temporary accommodation for those residents of Grenfell Tower. Longer term re-housing would also be the responsibility of the Council. The Mayor of London pressed for further reassurance and asked that contact was made with the local Council to ensure that affected individuals are not left without accommodation."⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁸ Draft Minutes 14 June 2017 {CAB00013811/1}. That draft version was emailed internally within the CCS at 11.21 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00013810}.

¶However, in the final version⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹ Hammond {CAB00014868/7} page 7, paragraph 23(a). the final sentence of that passage was deleted and replaced by a sentence reading simply:

¶"The Council were not currently asking for additional support".¹⁰⁰⁰¹⁰⁰⁰ Minutes 14 June 2017 {CAB00002714/1} paragraph (b).

¶It is not clear how the draft came to be altered and Ms Hammond could not assist.¹⁰⁰¹¹⁰⁰¹ Hammond {Day281/21:10-25}.

¶In our view, it is indicative of the approach of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, which involves equating the absence of a request for support with reassurance that support is not needed. The working assumption was that if people needed help, they asked for it.¹⁰⁰²¹⁰⁰² Hurd {Day282/205:12-24}.

¶103.84 We accept that local authorities may not be predisposed to ask for support and may need both encouragement and a clear process for doing so.¹⁰⁰³¹⁰⁰³ Workstream 4 of the National Security Capability Review, dated 28 September 2017 {CAB00007084/3} paragraph 8. Mr Hurd said that the government should have realised earlier that the scale and complexity of the disaster were such that no one local authority could be expected to cope with it and that it should have been quicker to put in place the means of understanding what was happening in the locality.¹⁰⁰⁴¹⁰⁰⁴ Hurd {Day282/207:25}–{Day282/208:15}. We agree and endorse the recommendation of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat that in future the government probe further to establish whether the local tier is handling the response to an emergency adequately.¹⁰⁰⁵¹⁰⁰⁵ Workstream 3 of the National Security Capability Review, dated 28 September 2017 {CAB00007083/10}. In our view, the absence of a request for support is not a safe or sufficient basis for the government to assume that support is not required.

15 June 2017: the picture becomes clearer

¶103.85 We have seen evidence to suggest that the strategic co-ordinating group was aware of the shortage of accommodation recorded in RED's summary of the meeting held at 19.30 on 14 June 2017.¹⁰⁰⁶¹⁰⁰⁶ Email at 21.28, 14.06.17 {CLG00008048/2}; Email at 20.49, 14.06.17 {CAB00007180/1-3}; Farrar {Day284/39:15}-{Day284/44:5}. Nonetheless, on the morning of 15 June 2017 Dr Farrar did not question the shortfall of accommodation.¹⁰⁰⁷¹⁰⁰⁷ Farrar {CLG00030414/8} paragraph 39; Farrar {Day284/53:14}-{Day284/54:4}. Instead, she passed the information she had received from RBKC by email to Dame Melanie's private secretary, noting that there had been a quick response in providing temporary accommodation on the evening of 14 June 2017 and that the task for 15 and 16 June 2017 was to find more permanent homes.¹⁰⁰⁸¹⁰⁰⁸ Email at 10.37 on 15 June 2017 {CLG00003102}. Dr Farrar told us that she had trusted RED to follow up concerns and report any problems and that her email to Dame Melanie was a note of what she had been told.¹⁰⁰⁹¹⁰⁰⁹ Farrar {Day284/52:1}-{Day284/54:4}.

¶103.86 At 08.34 on 15 June 2017, Alastair Whitehead sent an email to Stuart Wainwright observing that shelter still seemed to be a concern based on the situation report he had seen.¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰ Email at 08.34 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00003270/1}. He then sent an email to Lorna Gratton, private secretary at No.10 with responsibility for DCLG, in which he described rehousing and co-ordination of support for the families affected as "a mess" and proposed the deployment of DCLG teams in the area.¹⁰¹¹¹⁰¹¹ Email at 09.15 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00005941}. At the same time, the Prime Minister was speaking directly to the Secretary of State, the Rt. Hon Sajid Javid MP, making the same point and asking what central government could do to support RBKC.¹⁰¹²¹⁰¹² Email at 09.17 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00005941}. Sir Jeremy Heywood, head of the Civil Service, also sent an email to Dame Melanie Dawes expressing concern that the local authority did not have a grip on the aftermath of the fire and asking whether DCLG should send staff to help.¹⁰¹³¹⁰¹³ Email at 09.12 on 15 June 2017 {CLG10009750}. Dame Melanie told us that she had been concerned about what was being communicated at strategic co-ordinating group meetings because direct communication with the council was revealing problems that were not being raised at those meetings.¹⁰¹⁴¹⁰¹⁴ Dawes {Day285/99:8-20}.

¶103.87 At about midday on 15 June 2017 the Prime Minister visited Grenfell Tower. She was briefed by the emergency services but did not meet any residents.¹⁰¹⁵¹⁰¹⁵ Emails from 09.09 to 13.55 on 15 June 2017 {CLG00008159/2-6}; Jones {IWS00001723/5} page 5, paragraph 30; El- Gourja {IWS00001700/8} page 8, paragraph 34; Dainton {IWS00001974/38} page 38, paragraph 221.

¶103.88 During the course of 15 June 2017, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat became increasingly concerned in the light of discussions with DCLG about whether individuals affected by the fire were being properly looked after.¹⁰¹⁶¹⁰¹⁶ Wainwright {CAB00014776/8} page 8, paragraph 29. At 14.26, it received confirmation that DCLG had raised the provision of temporary accommodation with the local authority, but a full picture had yet to emerge and DCLG had not provided current information on the number of people displaced from the tower.¹⁰¹⁷¹⁰¹⁷ Action Tracker {CAB00001253/1-2} Items 2-3, circulated by email at 14.27 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00003286}. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat's increasing concern was also reflected in detailed questions about those matters in the chairman's brief produced for the cross-government meeting later that day.¹⁰¹⁸¹⁰¹⁸ Chair's Brief on 15 June 2017 {CAB00002721/2} paragraphs 8-9.

Contact between DCLG and RBKC

¶103.89 On the morning of 15 June 2017, Dame Melanie's office tried unsuccessfully to arrange a call with Mr Holgate.¹⁰¹⁹¹⁰¹⁹ Email at 09.52 on 15 June 2017 {CLG00003084}; Dawes {CLG00030653/16} page 16, paragraph 50. At 12.30, Dr Farrar finally spoke to him.¹⁰²⁰¹⁰²⁰ Farrar {Day284/28:4-11}; Farrar {CLG00030414/10}, page 10, paragraph 44. She thought it unsatisfactory that that was the first time they had spoken, given that she was the person in DCLG designated as the point of contact with him.¹⁰²¹¹⁰²¹ Farrar {Day284/68:15}-{Day284/69:18}. Their conversation added to her concerns. Although Mr Holgate sounded very confident and reassuring, the information he gave her did not match that which she had received from other sources.¹⁰²²¹⁰²² Farrar {Day284/73:3-5}. For example, he assured her that there was hotel accommodation for everybody who needed it, although in addition to those who had lived in the tower there were 845 people who did not have access to their homes.¹⁰²³¹⁰²³ Email at 16.26 on 15 June 2017 {CLG00008140}; Farrar {Day284/71:1}-{Day284/72:3}. During the call Dr Farrar twice offered government support to Mr Holgate, which he declined.¹⁰²⁴¹⁰²⁴ Farrar {Day284/74:6-7}. Dr Farrar specifically asked him about support from London Resilience, which he confirmed he had, notwithstanding that the Gold arrangements had not then been formally invoked.¹⁰²⁵¹⁰²⁵ {LFB00061240/1}; Farrar {Day284/84:15}-{Day284/85:25}; McManus {Day283/102:18}-{Day283/103:21}. We heard from Dame Melanie that she and Dr Farrar could have checked whether the Gold arrangements were in operation but did not do so.¹⁰²⁶¹⁰²⁶ Dawes {Day285/212:14-23}.

¶103.90 By 14.45 on 15 June 2017 DCLG had deployed an official to the police strategic command centre. It had also offered to make DCLG staff available to help out at RBKC offices, but that had been declined. RED reported to No.10 that the police and RBKC together were getting things under control.¹⁰²⁷¹⁰²⁷ The DCLG RED Note to No.10 at 14.45 on 15 June 2017 {CLG00003194}; Kay {CLG00030430/7} page 7, paragraph 29.

¶103.91 At about 15.00 on 15 June 2017, Ms McManus contacted Mr Priestley, chief community safety officer at RBKC and Council Silver responsible for the operational response.¹⁰²⁸¹⁰²⁸ Email at 15.10 on 15 June 2017 {CLG00020191}. She did not recall having asked him how the local authority was coping and told us that that was not the kind of information she would gather at that point. In our view, that was a missed opportunity for RED to improve its understanding of the situation and explain what assistance it could provide.¹⁰²⁹¹⁰²⁹ McManus {Day283/99:10-25}.

The second cross-government meeting

¶103.92 The second cross-government meeting took place at 15.30 on 15 June 2017. It was again chaired by Nicholas Hurd and was the first cross-government meeting attended by Mr Holgate.¹⁰³⁰¹⁰³⁰ Minutes of 15 June 2017 {CAB00002720/1}. That appears to have been the first contact between Mr Hurd and Mr Holgate: Hurd {Day282/154:17-21}.

¶103.93 The minutes recorded that 77 people from Grenfell Tower and 25 people from the surrounding area had been placed in hotels for immediate shelter and, with only 30 people at the Westway Centre the previous night, a large number of people were assumed to have gone to stay with friends and family.¹⁰³¹¹⁰³¹ Minutes 15 June 2017 {CAB00002720/3} paragraph 2(a). At that stage, it appears that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat was not aware that about 845 people who had been evacuated from nearby properties were also likely to require short-term accommodation.¹⁰³²¹⁰³² Hammond {Day281/47:14}-{Day281/48:5}. Dr Farrar had discussed that figure with Mr Holgate at 12.30, but the summary of their call was not circulated to those who attended the cross-government meeting until four hours later.¹⁰³³¹⁰³³ Email at 16.26 on 15 June 2017 {CLG00008140/1-2}. We consider that was an unreasonable delay in a fast-moving situation, which meant the opportunity to challenge the figures was missed.

¶103.94 During the meeting the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's concern about RBKC's handling of the response became firmer when it became clear that RBKC did not know how many people had been displaced from the tower.¹⁰³⁴¹⁰³⁴ Hammond {Day281/44:25}-{Day281/45:3}. Mr Holgate was defensive and tried to assure ministers that no additional help was required.¹⁰³⁵¹⁰³⁵ Richardson {CLG00030412/21} page 21, paragraph 77; Hurd {Day282/173:12-14}. However, he was unable to articulate a clear plan for housing those affected and was unable to say how many people would require accommodation, what services they needed, what resources RBKC had to deliver those services or what support it would need to do so.¹⁰³⁶¹⁰³⁶ Wainwright {CAB00014776/9} page 9, paragraph 30. We heard from Mr Hurd that his overriding impression was of the complete collapse of Mr Holgate's credibility under questioning.¹⁰³⁷¹⁰³⁷ Hurd {Day282/168:6-12}; See also email at 20.08 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00002899/1}.

¶103.95 By 17.30, No.10 had asked DCLG to look into further support for RBKC, suggesting that people could be sent to assist it.¹⁰³⁸¹⁰³⁸ Email at 17.32 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00006264/1}. However, DCLG still failed to recognise the seriousness of the problems with RBKC.¹⁰³⁹¹⁰³⁹ Email at 22.09 on 15 June 2017 in which Dame Melanie expressed her view about how well RBKC was "gripping this" {CLG10009757}. At 20.39, Ms Hammond contacted DCLG proposing it take stock of how RBKC was doing¹⁰⁴⁰¹⁰⁴⁰ Email at 20.11 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00002896/2}. and, later, suggested that Dr Farrar might call Mr Holgate as someone with experience of senior leadership in local government.¹⁰⁴¹¹⁰⁴¹ Email at 20.39 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00002896/1}. At 21.03 Ms Richardson responded, confirming that Dr Farrar had spoken to Mr Holgate, offering specific support on housing, and that DCLG's housing minister also intended to speak to RBKC the following morning in order to obtain the missing details.¹⁰⁴²¹⁰⁴² Email at 21.03 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00002896/1}.

The morning of 16 June 2017

¶103.96 On the morning of 16 June 2017, there was growing concern within the Civil Contingencies Secretariat that the government did not have an accurate picture of the situation as it affected the survivors and other local residents.¹⁰⁴³¹⁰⁴³ Hammond {Day281/68:20-21}. Following the conclusion of the cross-government meeting on 15 June 2017, Mr Hurd had received a series of unofficial calls from individuals working as volunteers in the community, including the vicar of St Clement's church, impressing upon him the extent of the problems and the need for government support.¹⁰⁴⁴¹⁰⁴⁴ Hurd {Day282/174:13-22}.

¶103.97 At 07.41 on 16 June 2017, Lorna Gratton told DCLG of her concern about the organisation of the response and suggested that more support from the DCLG, such as the secondment of a small team of people similar to the victim support unit, might be necessary.¹⁰⁴⁵¹⁰⁴⁵ Email at 07.41 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00008227/2}. Following that intervention and the concerns raised at the same time by Mr Hurd,¹⁰⁴⁶¹⁰⁴⁶ Email at 08.02 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00008227}. Helen MacNamara sent a message to a colleague in DCLG saying that the Prime Minister had expressed concern and wanted the government to get a grip on the situation.¹⁰⁴⁷¹⁰⁴⁷ Email at 08.23 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00008227}.

¶103.98 During the morning of 16 June 2017 Lorna Gratton asked DCLG to suggest ways in which RBKC could be supported,¹⁰⁴⁸¹⁰⁴⁸ Table of the DCLG calls and meetings on 16 June 2017 {CLG00018819/3}. offering further resources, if required, and seeking a date by which everyone displaced by the fire would be re-housed, ideally within two weeks. She also sought a commitment from DCLG to ensure that further support was accepted by RBKC. DCLG suggested that the victim support unit within the Home Office could be expanded to provide support to those affected by the Grenfell Tower fire.¹⁰⁴⁹¹⁰⁴⁹ Email at 11.19 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00006453/1}. A little later, Mr Hurd's private secretary expressed concern about the lack of co-ordination of the response and emphasised the need to use the coming cross-government meeting to find out what was really happening.¹⁰⁵⁰¹⁰⁵⁰ Email at 09.33 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00001152/1-2}. By that time the co-ordination of the government's response was being severely hampered by inadequate information.¹⁰⁵¹¹⁰⁵¹ Hurd {Day282/181:20}-{Day282/182:10}.

DCLG visit to the Westway Centre

¶103.99 Following her conversation with Mr Holgate at 12.30 on 15 June 2017, Dr Farrar decided to join the Secretary of State's visit to the Westway Centre on the morning of 16 June 2017.¹⁰⁵²¹⁰⁵² Farrar {CLG00030414/10} page 10, paragraph 46; email at 19.21 on 15 June 2017 {CLG00003210/1}. That visit became pivotal to her understanding of RBKC's ability to manage the situation.¹⁰⁵³¹⁰⁵³ Farrar {Day284/121:11-13}. She formed the view that the relief effort was neither well-managed nor properly co-ordinated.¹⁰⁵⁴¹⁰⁵⁴ Farrar {CLG00030414/14} page 14, paragraph 62. Dr Farrar told us that, when she attended the Westway Centre on 16 June 2017, she had been surprised by a notable absence of senior RBKC officers and had not been reassured by her discussions with those officials from RBKC who were there.¹⁰⁵⁵¹⁰⁵⁵ Farrar {CLG00030414/14} page 14, paragraph 63; Farrar {Day284/113:18}-{Day284/115:9}. At about 09.40 on 16 June 2017, Dr Farrar was present at a meeting between the leader of the council, Mr Paget-Brown, and the Secretary of State.¹⁰⁵⁶¹⁰⁵⁶ Farrar {CLG00030414/14} page 14, paragraph 63. She told us that she had been worried that the offers of support had not been passed to Mr Paget-Brown, who did not seem to be aware of what was available.¹⁰⁵⁷¹⁰⁵⁷ Farrar {Day284/119:21-25}. When he had agreed that additional support for RBKC's rehousing effort would be helpful, Dr Farrar communicated that by text message to Katherine Richardson, who sent it on to Sally Randall to take forward without delay.¹⁰⁵⁸¹⁰⁵⁸ Farrar {CLG00030414/14-15} pages 14-15, paragraph 67; text message at 10.13 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00030628}; See also email at 14.11 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00003383} summarising the meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr Paget-Brown.

¶103.100 The minutes of the meeting of the strategic co-ordinating group held at 11.00 following the Secretary of State's visit recorded the government's misgivings for the first time,¹⁰⁵⁹¹⁰⁵⁹ McManus {Day283/105:15}-{Day283/106:3}. in particular the Secretary of State's worries about access to cash, donations and information for the survivors.¹⁰⁶⁰¹⁰⁶⁰ Minutes of SCG meeting at 11.00 on 16 June 2017 under heading 'DCLG' {MOL00000036/3}.

The appointment of John Barradell

¶103.101 Following the meeting with Mr Paget-Brown on the morning of 16 June 2017, Dr Farrar contacted Ms Richardson¹⁰⁶¹¹⁰⁶¹ Text message {CLG00030627}. and Dame Melanie Dawes to discuss the appointment of a specialist emergency manager, proposing Mr Barradell¹⁰⁶²¹⁰⁶² The Deputy Chair of the London Resilience Forum, Chair of the Local Authorities' Panel and the Town Clerk and Chief Executive of the City of London Corporation. as a potential candidate.¹⁰⁶³¹⁰⁶³ Farrar {CLG00030414/16} page 16, paragraph 75. Separately, by the evening of 15 June 2017 the decision had been taken to activate the London Gold arrangements and Mr Barradell had arranged to attend RBKC for a preliminary discussion.¹⁰⁶⁴¹⁰⁶⁴ {LFB00061240/1}; Sawyer {GOL00001349/11} page 11, paragraph 54. It appears that RED was unaware that the decision to activate the Gold arrangements had been made on the evening of 15 June 2017 and that their formal activation was expected to occur the next day.¹⁰⁶⁵¹⁰⁶⁵ {LFB00061236}; McManus {Day283/102:18}-{Day283/103:21}; {LFB00061250} The documents we have seen suggest that RED and DCLG generally did not have a good understanding of what was happening.¹⁰⁶⁶¹⁰⁶⁶ {CLG00030627}; Farrar {CLG00030414/16} page 16, paragraphs 76-77; {CLG00003297}; {CLG00030514}; Farrar {CLG00030414/16} page 16, paragraph 77.

¶103.102 When Dr Farrar went to see Mr Holgate he was in discussion with John Barradell, who said that he was there to support Mr Holgate and that there would be a chief executive rota as part of the London Resilience arrangements.¹⁰⁶⁷¹⁰⁶⁷ Farrar {CLG00030414/16} page 16, paragraph 78. She felt that an experienced person needed to be in the lead, rather than acting as support.¹⁰⁶⁸¹⁰⁶⁸ Farrar {Day284/132:21-23}. She intervened, asking Mr Barradell privately if he would take over the London Gold role on a permanent basis.¹⁰⁶⁹¹⁰⁶⁹ Farrar {CLG00030414/17} page 17, paragraph 79. He agreed in principle and she then sent a text message to Dame Melanie telling her that she was speaking to London Councils to obtain their agreement.¹⁰⁷⁰¹⁰⁷⁰ Farrar {CLG00030414/16} page 17, paragraph 79. Dr Farrar then spoke to John O'Brien, chief executive of London Councils,¹⁰⁷¹¹⁰⁷¹ Farrar {Day284/140:2-13}; Farrar {Day284/143:8}. who agreed to help in bringing that about.¹⁰⁷²¹⁰⁷² Farrar {Day284/140:18-22}. Mr Holgate also agreed to that course.¹⁰⁷³¹⁰⁷³ Farrar {CLG00030414/16-17} pages 16-17, paragraph 78-79. Dr Farrar told Ms Richardson that Mr Barradell had taken over London Gold full time under the London Councils' arrangement.¹⁰⁷⁴¹⁰⁷⁴ {CLG00030626}. Mr Barradell said that Dr Farrar may have had a different understanding of the effect of activating the London Gold arrangements.¹⁰⁷⁵¹⁰⁷⁵ Barradell {Day279/113:1-25}. However, Mr Barradell told us that when taking on a role beyond that envisaged by the civil contingencies structure in London, he was not concerned about his authority as long as he had the support of the political leadership of RBKC and the support of the government.¹⁰⁷⁶¹⁰⁷⁶ Barradell {Day279/116:9}-{Day279/117:3}.

¶103.103 At about the same time Ms Hammond learned from David Bellamy that John Barradell had been appointed to take over from RBKC as "Recovery Gold".¹⁰⁷⁷¹⁰⁷⁷ Hammond {CAB00014764/19} page 19, paragraph 68. She thought that the decision had been taken by the Mayor's office or Mr Bellamy and that there had been an existing arrangement under which that was possible.¹⁰⁷⁸¹⁰⁷⁸ Hammond {Day281/77:8-11}. Ms Hammond did not suggest that she had looked into the legal basis for his appointment; she said that no legal concerns had been raised.¹⁰⁷⁹¹⁰⁷⁹ Hammond {Day281/77:8-11}. The CRIP produced at 12.00 on 16 June 2017 stated that John Barradell had been appointed to co-ordinate logistical support to RBKC.¹⁰⁸⁰¹⁰⁸⁰ CRIP 3 {CAB00000148/1-2}.

Transition from response to recovery

¶103.104 The question when to move from response to recovery was raised repeatedly in correspondence in the days immediately following the fire but was never clearly answered.¹⁰⁸¹¹⁰⁸¹ Whitehouse {CAB00014782/8-9} pages 8-9, paragraphs 21-23; email at 13.05 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00004061}; email at 21.28 on 14 June 2017 containing notes from the 19.30 SCG meeting {CLG00008048/1-2}; Farrar {Day284/40:19}-{Day284/43:15}; email at 06.42 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00003269/1}; email at 08.32 on 15 June 2017 {CAB00003269/1}. Mr Hurd told us that he had not been aware of the particular moment at which the Home Office had relinquished the role of lead government department to DCLG; rather he sensed that during the course of 15 June 2017 there had been a growing recognition that DCLG was effectively evolving as the lead ministry for the recovery phase.¹⁰⁸²¹⁰⁸² Hurd {Day282/116:16-24}.

¶103.105 At 08.14 on 16 June 2017 Dr Farrar received an email from Mr Mason, head of emergencies management at RED, indicating that the police had been pressing the previous day to transfer control of the local relief effort to RBKC but that RBKC felt it was too early.¹⁰⁸³¹⁰⁸³ Email at 08.14 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00003294/1}; Farrar {CLG00030414/12-13} pages 12-13, paragraph 57. Dr Farrar expressed her concern that RBKC might find it difficult to take overall leadership of the relief effort and asked Mr Mason to contact the Home Office to gauge its view.¹⁰⁸⁴¹⁰⁸⁴ Email at 09.02 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00003294/1}; Farrar {CLG00030414/12-13} pages 12-13, paragraph 57.

¶103.106 At 09.22 on 16 June 2017, Ms Hammond said that she thought it likely that there would be a transition to the recovery phase on 17 or 18 June 2017.¹⁰⁸⁵¹⁰⁸⁵ Email at 09.22 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00001150/1}. However, at 10.50, No.10 notified the Civil Contingencies Secretariat that the Prime Minister had decided to chair that afternoon's cross-government meeting and that it would be renamed "The Grenfell Tower Recovery Taskforce".¹⁰⁸⁶¹⁰⁸⁶ Email at 10.50 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00000473/3}; Tallantire {CAB00014769/3} page 3, paragraph 12; Gratton {CAB00014853/22} page 22, paragraph 64. The change of name had been proposed by Mr Whitehead¹⁰⁸⁷¹⁰⁸⁷ Whitehead {CAB00014857/20} page 20, paragraph 54. to shift the focus from the initial emergency response to supporting the recovery phase. It had been decided upon without consulting the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.¹⁰⁸⁸¹⁰⁸⁸ Hammond {CAB00014764/20} page 20, paragraph 69. ConOps provided that, although, following most emergencies, response and recovery activity will initially be undertaken in parallel,¹⁰⁸⁹¹⁰⁸⁹ ConOps {CAB00000026/43} paragraph 3.76. the timing of the formal handover from the response to the recovery phase should be agreed between the two lead government departments, in consultation with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat¹⁰⁹⁰¹⁰⁹⁰ ConOps {CAB00000026/43} paragraph 3.74-3.76. and should start once the situation has been stabilised.¹⁰⁹¹¹⁰⁹¹ ConOps {CAB00000026/7} paragraph 1.6.

¶103.107 Ms Hammond described the creation of the Grenfell Tower Recovery Taskforce as marking a formal shift in emphasis which reflected the primary focus of the meeting, rather than the end of one thing and the start of another.¹⁰⁹²¹⁰⁹² Hammond {Day281/88:25}-{Day281/89:11}. However, we do not think that the recovery phase began on 16 June 2017¹⁰⁹³¹⁰⁹³ Hammond {Day280/210:23}-{Day280/211:8}. or that the first meeting of the Grenfell Tower Recovery Taskforce was concerned with recovery.¹⁰⁹⁴¹⁰⁹⁴ Hammond {Day281/91:6-10}.

¶103.108 The government's formal transition to the recovery phase took place on 25 July 2017¹⁰⁹⁵¹⁰⁹⁵ The local transition appears to have taken place at 23.59 on Friday 23 June 2017 {GOL000000062/3}. with the first meeting of the Grenfell Ministerial Recovery Group.¹⁰⁹⁶¹⁰⁹⁶ Summary Grenfell Fire Response (CCS Internal Lessons) {CAB00000105/1} paragraph 1; Whitehouse {CAB00014782/13-14} pages 13-14, paragraph 34. In our view, the designation by No.10 of the cross-government meetings as meetings of a "Recovery Taskforce" was rightly seeking to shift their focus towards the immediate needs of the survivors, but it ignored the fact that they were an essential part of the response phase and risked creating confusion while the situation had yet to be stabilised.

The Grenfell Tower Recovery Taskforce

¶103.109 Meetings of the Grenfell Tower Recovery Taskforce ("the Taskforce") were held in the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms at 70 Whitehall, the location from which COBR normally operated.¹⁰⁹⁷¹⁰⁹⁷ ConOps {CAB00000026/21} paragraph 3.1. Although Ms Hammond invited us not to attach any significance to that change of location, we think that in this case it indicated an increase in government engagement in line with, at least, a Level 2 serious emergency, as outlined in ConOps,¹⁰⁹⁸¹⁰⁹⁸ Hammond {Day281/91:11-16}; ConOps {CAB00000026/8-9} paragraph 1.8. and that a de facto COBR meeting had been initiated for the first time.¹⁰⁹⁹¹⁰⁹⁹ Hammond {Day281/202:16-22}.

¶103.110 Ms Hammond told us that there had been no reason to activate COBR on 16 June 2017 because the things that could be discussed at a COBR meeting could as easily be discussed at a meeting of the Taskforce.¹¹⁰⁰¹¹⁰⁰ Hammond {Day281/93:23}-{Day281/94:6}. It seems to us that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat should have formally activated a COBR response by that time,¹¹⁰¹¹¹⁰¹ ConOps {CAB00000026/19} paragraph 2.26(d). as envisaged by ConOps, taking forward elements of the recovery phase before formally handing over to a ministerial recovery group to take further action once the situation had been stabilised.¹¹⁰²¹¹⁰² ConOps {CAB00000026/27} paragraph 3.22; See also ConOps {CAB00000026/22} paragraph 3.2 diagram which includes a "Recovery Group" as one of the potential COBR supporting structures to be activated. Neither the Prime Minister nor the officials in her office had expertise in responding to an emergency of the kind facing them and would have had to rely on the expertise and advice of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, the relevant government departments and other public bodies.¹¹⁰³¹¹⁰³ Gratton {CAB00014853/22} page 22, paragraph 63. The evidence suggests that No.10 received no advice about the possibility of activating COBR at that stage, or the benefits of doing so, or about the distinction between the response and recovery phases.¹¹⁰⁴¹¹⁰⁴ Gratton {CAB00014853/5} page 5, paragraph 15.

¶103.111 Following the Prime Minister's decision to chair the meeting of the Taskforce on 16 June 2017, the secretariat role of the Cabinet Office was largely taken over by No.10, which drafted the agenda, produced the CRIP¹¹⁰⁵¹¹⁰⁵ Email at 11.39 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00001158/1}; email at 10.50 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00012900}; email at 13.19 on 18 June 2017 {CAB00003178/1}. and decided who should attend.¹¹⁰⁶¹¹⁰⁶ Emails from 12.56 to 12.59 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00000462/1-2}; Attendees List for 16 June 2017 {CAB00002728}. It declined the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's offer of a "pre-brief".¹¹⁰⁷¹¹⁰⁷ Emails at 19.40 and 19.46 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00001286/2}.

Support for those affected

¶103.112 The first Taskforce meeting took place at 13.00 on 16 June 2017. It was chaired by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Theresa May MP, and was attended by, among others, the National Security Adviser, Mark Sedwill, Mr Barradell, described as "Local Authority Gold Commander",¹¹⁰⁸¹¹⁰⁸ Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/2}. and Mr Holgate.¹¹⁰⁹¹¹⁰⁹ Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/2}.

¶103.113 At the beginning of the meeting the Prime Minister said that she wanted to ensure that the government was providing the best package of support for the victims and doing everything possible to assist those on the ground.¹¹¹⁰¹¹¹⁰ Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/2} paragraph 1. It is clear from the minutes that there were still significant problems over the provision of immediate support to those affected. The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government could not provide an absolute assurance that there was complete co-ordination between the government and the local authority but told those present that DCLG had already undertaken to deploy more people.¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹ Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/3} paragraph 3. A list of Grenfell Tower residents remained outstanding,¹¹¹²¹¹¹² Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/6} paragraph 15. together with the number of residents that needed re-housing.¹¹¹³¹¹¹³ Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/5} paragraph 8.

The Grenfell Victims Unit

¶103.114 The Prime Minister said that she wanted the government to support the affected families and in particular wanted to establish a single point of contact for families that could deal with all aspects of their recovery.¹¹¹⁴¹¹¹⁴ Draft Minutes 16.06.17 {CAB00012896/1}. It was agreed that DCLG would set up an integrated support service following the model of the Victims of Terrorism Unit to co-ordinate cross-government activity and provide those affected with a single point of access to government services,¹¹¹⁵¹¹¹⁵ Actions 16 June 2017 {CAB00002727/1} Action 4. such as immigration, benefits, transport, the coronial process, education, health and financial assistance.¹¹¹⁶¹¹¹⁶ Kay {CLG00030430/9} page 9, paragraph 38.

¶103.115 The gap in victim support had been raised by Isla Hurley Brunt, then head of community resilience and recovery at the Civil Contingencies Secretariat,¹¹¹⁷¹¹¹⁷ Hurley Brunt {CAB00014787/1} page 1, paragraph 1: Isla Hurley Brunt reported to Ian Whitehouse. on 14 June 2017 when she sent an email to Ian Whitehouse expressing doubts about the support that would be available when it was unclear whether those affected were victims of crime.¹¹¹⁸¹¹¹⁸ Email at 18:03 on 14 June 2017 {CAB00014358}; Isla Hurley Brunt {CAB00014801/4} page 4, paragraph 14. However, it was not until 16 June 2017 that a central victim support unit was proposed, notably by Ms Gratton, a No.10 official without the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's expertise in emergency response.¹¹¹⁹¹¹¹⁹ Email at 07.41 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00005546/1}. That stands in marked contrast to the automatic support that would have been available in response to a terrorist attack.¹¹²⁰¹¹²⁰ Email at 09.43 on 15 June 2017 {CLG00003087/2}; Grenfell Tower tragedy – Lessons for the Central Response {CAB00014768/3} paragraph 13. We agree with the

¶Civil Contingencies Secretariat's own assessment that there were inconsistencies between the response to the Grenfell Tower fire and the response to recent terrorist attacks that require attention.¹¹²¹¹¹²¹ Grenfell Tower tragedy – Lessons for the Central Response {CAB00014768/3} paragraph 13.

¶103.116 Following the meeting of the Taskforce on 16 June 2017, Ms Hammond chaired a meeting of officials focusing on the establishment of a Grenfell Victims Unit.¹¹²²¹¹²² Hammond {CAB00014764/20} page 20, paragraph 72; email at 16.14 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00030523/2-3}. During the meeting, representatives from the Victims of Terrorism Unit explained how it worked. It was agreed that every government department involved¹¹²³¹¹²³ Jillian Kay's 16 June 2017 Paper on Victims Unit: Grenfell Tower {CLG00030529}; Kay {CLG00030430/9} page 9, paragraph 39. would identify someone to work with the unit and that HM Revenue and Customs would provide 20 caseworkers to start work on the morning of 17 June 2017.¹¹²⁴¹¹²⁴ Email at 18.28 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00030523/2-3}; Kay {CLG00030430/9} page 9, paragraph 38. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs' surge team was made up of operational staff who were trained to deploy into administrative roles in different parts of central government. Jillian Kay, director for local government policy at DCLG,¹¹²⁵¹¹²⁵ Kay {CLG00030430/2} page 2, paragraph 7. and Suzanne Kochanowski, also of DCLG, were given the responsibility for setting up the Grenfell Victims Unit.¹¹²⁶¹¹²⁶ Hammond {CAB00014816/17} page 17, paragraph 45; Kay {CLG00030430/9} page 9, paragraph 37.

¶103.117 On 17 June 2017, the 20 members of the HM Revenue and Customs surge team and two people from the Department for Transport were deployed by DCLG to Portland House, the centre of London Gold operations, to support the Gold Command under Mr Barradell, and the Westway Centre.¹¹²⁷¹¹²⁷ Kay {CLG00030430/10} page 10, paragraph 41. Over the weekend, Ms Kay's priorities were to understand the nature of the support being put in place by the new Gold Command structure and to enable the Grenfell Victims Unit to work alongside the support being provided locally. There was a danger that, if it were a separate channel of support, it could cause confusion and further frustration among those affected by the fire.¹¹²⁸¹¹²⁸ Kay {CLG00030430/9} page 9, paragraph 38. DCLG had been pursuing the idea of a direct public telephone line for the victims unit¹¹²⁹¹¹²⁹ Jillian Kay's 16 June 2017 Paper on Victims Unit: Grenfell Tower {CLG00030529/1} paragraph 5. until Ms Kay learned that Gold Command was intending to use a key worker model with a social worker or other named contact point for each of the affected families and was talking to the Red Cross about establishing a telephone line.¹¹³⁰¹¹³⁰ Kay {CLG00030430/10-11} pages 10-11, paragraph 44. In the light of that, DCLG developed a single telephone line and email address for family liaison officers and key workers to use to secure support from across the government,¹¹³¹¹¹³¹ Email at 18.10 on 17 June 2017 {CLG00030555}. repositioning the Grenfell Victims Unit as a second line of support.¹¹³²¹¹³² Kay {CLG00030430/10-11} pages 10-11, paragraph 44. By 16.11 on 18 June 2017, the telephone number and email address of the Grenfell Victims Unit were in use. However, at that stage there were still families without a family liaison officer or support worker. Although DCLG was aware of that, the victims unit emphasised that the service was not an advice line for victims and that families should not call it directly.¹¹³³¹¹³³ Email at 16.11 on 18 June 2017 {CLG00008945}.

¶103.118 On 19 June 2017 a pack was produced by DCLG setting out the purpose of the victims unit. It contained a telephone number and email address, made it clear that they were to be used by support and key workers and in addition provided the telephone number for the Red Cross for victims to contact.¹¹³⁴¹¹³⁴ Pack for Key Workers {CLG00005692/1}; email at 20.06 on 19 June 2017 {CLG00005691/1}; Kochanowski {CLG00030416/14} page 14, paragraph 50.

¶103.119 At 22.56 on 19 June 2017, Ms Kochanowski sent an email to Ms Kay telling her that the Westway Centre had been a bit chaotic¹¹³⁵¹¹³⁵ Email at 22.56 on 19 June 2017 {CLG00030588}. Ms Kay told us that that had prompted her to visit the Westway Centre on 20 June 2017, Kay {CLG00030430/15} page 15, paragraph 63. and that it was still unclear whether the key workers had been appointed. She said that the number of cases being handled by the victims unit was low (three in all) but that was because government staff were by then present at the Westway Centre. She also warned that the staff provided by HMRC would struggle to resolve the more difficult problems and navigate their way around government departments.¹¹³⁶¹¹³⁶ Email at 22.56 on 19 June 2017 {CLG00030588}.

¶103.120 Dame Melanie Dawes told us that DCLG's provision of support had been slowed down by confusion about what the Grenfell Victims Unit was, what ministers had asked for and what ultimately could be provided.¹¹³⁷¹¹³⁷ Dawes {Day285/214:15}-{Day285/215:8}. It seems to us that by 19 June 2017 the victims unit had become something quite different from what had been envisaged at the meeting of the Taskforce on 16 June 2017. The Prime Minister's intention had been to use the unit directly to support victims and fill any gaps in the support provided by others, whereas the model adopted by DCLG followed the approach of the Victims of Terrorism Unit. That depended on support already being in place for all who needed it, which, in the case of the Grenfell Tower fire, was lacking.¹¹³⁸¹¹³⁸ Not everyone had a key worker or social worker by that stage.

Events following the Taskforce meeting on 16 June 2017

¶103.121 Following the first Taskforce meeting, Mr Sedwill sent an email to Ms Hammond offering to contact DCLG about London-wide and government support for RBKC. He thought that RBKC was clearly out of its depth and that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat probably should have prompted DCLG to intervene earlier.¹¹³⁹¹¹³⁹ Email at 15.50 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00002898/1}. His offer was declined by Ms Hammond on the grounds that Mr Barradell and Dame Melanie had spoken to each other and everything was all right.¹¹⁴⁰¹¹⁴⁰ Email at 15.58 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00002898/1}.

¶103.122 During the afternoon of 16 June 2017, the Prime Minister attended a round table meeting at the Clement James Centre with residents and volunteers from Grenfell Tower and the surrounding area¹¹⁴¹¹¹⁴¹ List of attendees {CAB00005765/2} attached to email at 16.13 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00005764}; email at 17.26 on 18 June 2017 {CAB00006308/1-4}. and at 17.56 she sent an email to senior officials in No.10 expressing her frustration at what she described as the "utter uselessness" of RBKC.¹¹⁴²¹¹⁴² Email at 17.56 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00005339}.

¶103.123 At 18.25, Mr Whitehead sent an email to Ms Hammond informing her that there would be another Taskforce meeting chaired by the Prime Minister the following day and possibly a conference call on Sunday.¹¹⁴³¹¹⁴³ Email at 18.25 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00011967/1}. That was contrary to Ms Hammond's assumption that the next Taskforce meeting would not be held until Monday afternoon.¹¹⁴⁴¹¹⁴⁴ Emails at 18.04 and 18.22, 16 June 2017 {CAB00011967/1-2}. At that stage, Ms Hammond was worried about the pressure being put on DCLG.¹¹⁴⁵¹¹⁴⁵ Email at 09.22 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00001150/1}; Hammond {Day281/166:7-10}. Again, it appears that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat was being pressed to increase the level of intervention and oversight.

¶103.124 At 19.36, Ms Gratton sent an email to Dame Melanie and the Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State informing them that the Prime Minister was keen to make a further offer of assistance to RBKC and Gold Command, proposing that DCLG bring together whatever additional resources it could for the council and that it contact Gold Command to identify where the government could immediately and helpfully place people.¹¹⁴⁶¹¹⁴⁶ Email at 19.37 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00005727}.

¶103.125 That evening the Prime Minister also spoke to Mr Paget-Brown. He assured her that everyone made homeless would be in housing by the end of the day and that someone from RBKC would be in touch that evening with every one of the support centres.¹¹⁴⁷¹¹⁴⁷ Email at 19.54 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00006343}; However, Ms Gratton's note of 17 June 2017 indicates that Nicholas Paget-Brown did not make contact with all mosques, churches and temples by end of day Friday {RBK00038856/1-3}. In the event those assurances were not met.

Events of 17 June 2017

¶103.126 At 11.00 on Saturday, 17 June 2017, the Prime Minister chaired a further meeting of the Taskforce, again focusing on the provision of support for victims.¹¹⁴⁸¹¹⁴⁸ Minutes 17 June 2017 {CAB00002735}. Those attending the meeting were told that residents were unsure how to obtain support and needed help to do so.¹¹⁴⁹¹¹⁴⁹ Minutes 17 June 2017 {CAB00002735/3} paragraph 5. It was agreed that a number of steps should be taken directed at community engagement, obtaining detailed figures for the numbers of those who had been living in the tower, of those from the immediate vicinity who could not return to their homes and of those who could, keeping the Westway Centre open and providing financial support.¹¹⁵⁰¹¹⁵⁰ Actions, 17 June 2017 {CAB00001248/1-2} actions 2, 4, 5 and 11. A Taskforce meeting for officials was arranged for the following day to monitor progress.¹¹⁵¹¹¹⁵¹ Minutes 17 June 2017 {CAB00002735/7} paragraph 20.

¶103.127 On 17 June 2014 the Home Secretary, the Rt Hon Amber Rudd MP, and Mr Hurd visited the Westway Centre for the first time.¹¹⁵²¹¹⁵² Email at 16.11 on 17 June 2017 {LFB00119799/1}; Hurd {HOM00046080/15-16} pages 15-16, paragraph 51. They discovered a number of problems,¹¹⁵³¹¹⁵³ Hurd {Day282/189:16}-{Day282/190:3}. which in turn prompted the Home Office to write to Mr Barradell, among others, with observations about the current response. They included drawing attention to the distribution of money, the provision of emergency accommodation and poor communication.¹¹⁵⁴¹¹⁵⁴ {HOM00046091}.

¶103.128 On the evening of 17 June 2017, Peter Tallantire, head of the crisis management team in the Civil Contingencies Secretariat,¹¹⁵⁵¹¹⁵⁵ Peter Tallantire had taken over from Stuart Wainwright as the Deputy Director leading on the response on the evening of 15 June 2017, following a short, informal handover meeting, Tallantire {CAB00014769/2} page 2, paragraph 7. confirmed that it was not fully aware of what DCLG was doing and was worried that DCLG was operating in a largely reactive manner with limited power to influence the direction of the response.¹¹⁵⁶¹¹⁵⁶ Email at 23.19 on 17 June 2017 {CAB00003152/1}. Mr Tallantire suggested that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat try to do more to control the outcome by deploying a liaison officer to DCLG to work alongside its team, thereby enabling the Civil Contingencies

¶Secretariat to know what DCLG was thinking, shape events and help co-ordinate government support.¹¹⁵⁷¹¹⁵⁷ Email at 23.19 on 17 June 2017 {CAB00003152/1}.

¶103.129 Nearly four days after the fire, with Mr Barradell in post and the Prime Minister chairing the Taskforce meetings, the situation on the ground remained chaotic. That prompted Mr Sedwill to email Dame Melanie Dawes proposing the appointment of a "Gold for Whitehall on all the wider issues", or alternatively a "Gold plus Gold Minister", warning that it was necessary to drop everything else.¹¹⁵⁸¹¹⁵⁸ Email at 23.47 on 17 June 2017 {CAB00002980/1-2}. There was an acknowledgement, both within and outside the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, that it needed to deploy additional resources to help co-ordinate government support.

Events of 18 June 2017

¶103.130 On the morning of Sunday 18 June 2017, Ms Hammond supported Mr Sedwill's suggestion and offered to provide someone from the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to provide a link with whoever was chosen for the task.¹¹⁵⁹¹¹⁵⁹ Email at 07.11 on 18 June 2017 {CAB00002980/1}. Following that morning's meeting of Taskforce officials, she advised the Rt Hon Damian Green MP, First Secretary of State and Minister for the Cabinet Office, on how DCLG could be supported as the response to the emergency moved into recovery. Among other things she suggested that Ian Whitehouse be seconded to DCLG, which took place the next day.¹¹⁶⁰¹¹⁶⁰ Hammond {CAB00014764/22} page 22, paragraph 79.

Consideration of protected groups

¶103.131 Apart from one reference to a need to consider the religious dimension of burials,¹¹⁶¹¹¹⁶¹ Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/6} paragraph 15. neither the briefs nor the minutes of the cross-government or Taskforce meetings indicate an understanding of the particular needs of people from protected groups¹¹⁶²¹¹⁶² The relevant protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 are set out at section 149. Emergency Response and Recovery identifies four groups which require special consideration, see {CAB00004519/129-131} section 7.7. or any steps being taken to meet them. In our view, questions should have been asked and a greater effort should have been made about the different groups of people affected in order to understand better the effects of the fire on them and to find out whether steps were being taken to mitigate them.

Use of government staff

¶103.132 On the afternoon of 16 June 2017, Fiona Darby, deputy director for homelessness at DCLG, had contacted Laura Johnson, head of RBKC's housing department, to propose that Lizzie Clifford, a housing specialist at DCLG, join RBKC's BECC that afternoon as the link with DCLG to assist with the rehousing efforts.¹¹⁶³¹¹⁶³ Randall {CLG00030427/19} page 19, paragraph 74. Ms Johnson proposed in response that Ms Clifford join her three days later, on 19 June 2017.¹¹⁶⁴¹¹⁶⁴ Emails at 14.16 and 14.44 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00003398/1}. Following an intervention by Mr Barradell,¹¹⁶⁵¹¹⁶⁵ Emails at 16.14 and 16.24 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00003453/1-2}. Ms Clifford was subsequently deployed to Portland House, the seat of London Gold's operations,¹¹⁶⁶¹¹⁶⁶ McManus {CLG10009725/14} page 14, paragraphs 57-58; McManus {Day283/126:12}-{Day283/127:4}. from the morning of 17 June 2017. Ms McManus was also deployed to Portland House on 17 June 2017.¹¹⁶⁷¹¹⁶⁷ McManus {CLG10009725/14} page 14, paragraphs 57-58; McManus {Day283/126:12}-{Day283/127:4}.

The Westway Centre

¶103.133 At the meeting of the Taskforce on 17 June 2017 it was suggested that a single centre should provide services and advice to those affected by the fire, which was to be appropriately and sufficiently staffed by government officials and others and kept open for as long as necessary.¹¹⁶⁸¹¹⁶⁸ Minutes 17 June 2017 {CAB00002735/4} paragraph 9(ii); Actions 17 June 2017 {CAB00001248/2} Action 5. The Home Office made arrangements for officials to go to the designated centre on 18 June 2017 to assist with immigration enquiries. The officials were instructed that no immigration enforcement action should be taken and that they should wear plain clothes rather than uniform and not carry their Home Office badges.¹¹⁶⁹¹¹⁶⁹ Owen {HOM00046114/3} page 3, paragraph 11. The officials met their counterparts from DCLG at 08.00 in Westminster, as DCLG had not yet confirmed the location of the support centre. They subsequently arrived at the Westway Centre at 11.00.¹¹⁷⁰¹¹⁷⁰ Owen {HOM00046114/4} page 4, paragraph 13. The officials stayed at the centre until 16.30, by which time they had not received any enquiries for some two hours.¹¹⁷¹¹¹⁷¹ Owen {HOM00046114/4} page 4, paragraph 16. That day the Home Office also began operating a 24-hour telephone line to assist with immigration and passport matters.¹¹⁷²¹¹⁷² Hepple {HOM00046110/6-7} pages 6-7, paragraph 19.

¶103.134 On 18 June 2017, RED wanted to ensure it was providing support as requested by Gold Command.¹¹⁷³¹¹⁷³ Kay {CLG00030430/12} page 12, paragraph 51. It was concerned about using junior civil servants to carry out tasks that involved engaging with the local community, for which they had not been trained and with which staff from other London boroughs were much more familiar.¹¹⁷⁴¹¹⁷⁴ McManus {Day283/119:10} -{Day283/120:8}. At the Taskforce meeting held that morning,¹¹⁷⁵¹¹⁷⁵ That was a meeting, chaired by Paddy McGuinness and attended only by officials, rather than ministers: Attendees List for 18 June 2017 {CAB00002785}; Hammond {CAB00014764/21} page 21, paragraph 76. Mr Barradell asked the government¹¹⁷⁶¹¹⁷⁶ Kay {CLG00030430/13} page 13, paragraph 54; Kay {CLG00030430/14} page 14, paragraph 59; email at 20.01 on 18 June 2017 {CLG00009076}. for support in the form of staff experienced in community engagement. As a result, an official from the integration and faith team at DCLG¹¹⁷⁷¹¹⁷⁷ Suzanne Kochanowski was a senior team leader within the division and responsible for government policy and stakeholder engagement on race equality, racial and ethnic minorities, faith communities and community cohesion {CLG00030416/2} page 2, paragraph 5; See also Patel {CLG10009793/3} page 3, paragraph 6. was deployed to Gold Command that evening.¹¹⁷⁸¹¹⁷⁸ Kay {CLG00030430/13} page 13, paragraph 56. Mr Barradell also asked for and received professional help from DCLG and the Home Office to improve the signs and labelling at the Westway Centre.¹¹⁷⁹¹¹⁷⁹ Email at 18.04 on 18 June 2017 {CLG00008968/1}; Kay {CLG00030430/14} page 14, paragraph 59. He was very complimentary about the support provided by central government.¹¹⁸⁰¹¹⁸⁰ Barradell {Day279/215:18}-{Day279/216:3}.

¶103.135 On the evening of 18 June 2017, DCLG directed staff from six government departments to attend the Westway Centre for the next seven days, starting at 9.00 on Monday 19 June, as a "PM priority".¹¹⁸¹¹¹⁸¹ Email at 18.36, 18 June 2017 {CLG00020672/2-3}. Although HM Revenue and Customs operated a "surge" team of administrative officers who could be deployed to perform specific administrative functions, they were of limited use as they did not have experience in carrying out departmental roles.¹¹⁸²¹¹⁸² Hammond {Day281/144:16-25}: for example, issuing a driving licence. Ms Hammond told us that it was uncommon for staff from government departments to be deployed as part of a local response to an emergency¹¹⁸³¹¹⁸³ Hammond {CAB00014816/18} page 18, paragraph 47. and there do not appear to have been any procedures in place for such an eventuality. The fact that government staff were deployed at the Westway Centre is an indication of the degree of concern felt about the effectiveness of the centre as the focal point for support for those affected by the fire.

¶103.136 That same day, at the request of the Home Secretary, the Home Office produced leaflets in several languages containing government advice; they were delivered to the Westway Centre on 19 June 2017.¹¹⁸⁴¹¹⁸⁴ Lamberti {HOM00046095/6} page 6, paragraph 20. Mr Hurd accepted in evidence that they could and should have been sent out sooner.¹¹⁸⁵¹¹⁸⁵ Hurd {Day282/199:1-3}.

¶103.137 On 19 June 2017, Francesca Flessati from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office contacted DCLG and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat asking whether the latter would be offering advice on crisis management co-ordination and asking for any documents explaining how the centre was supposed to operate, its aims and objectives and its co-ordination and communication processes.¹¹⁸⁶¹¹⁸⁶ Email at 14.54 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00009996/3}. After receiving a response from the Civil Contingencies Secretariat expressing complete faith in Mr Barradell but declining to provide any substantive advice, Ms Flessati complained that just gathering civil servants in a sports hall with no proper communications did not seem the best way of providing an effective service.¹¹⁸⁷¹¹⁸⁷ Email at 15.49 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00012084/3}. Although by that stage the London Gold arrangements had been invoked and the Westway Centre was no longer being run by RBKC, there were still problems with the response on the ground.¹¹⁸⁸¹¹⁸⁸ London Local Authority Gold Incident Log Book {GOL00001690/7}; McManus {Day283/132:8}-{Day283/134:8}.

¶103.138 On the morning of 20 June 2017, Sebastian Bassett-James at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy ("BEIS") sent an email to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat raising similar concerns. Mr Bassett-James identified a lack of leadership and command and control and suggested that government oversight was needed together with more co-ordination and more information about what services were already being provided.¹¹⁸⁹¹¹⁸⁹ Email at 11.46 on 20 June 2017 {CAB00009946/2}; Bassett-James {BEI00002844/3-5} pages 3-5, paragraphs 12-19. In light of Mr Bassett-James's email, Ms McManus notified London Gold that RED had received reports that the Westway Centre did not seem structured.¹¹⁹⁰¹¹⁹⁰ London Local Authority Gold Incident Log Book {GOL00001690/7} entry 73; McManus {Day283/132:8}-{Day283/134:8}. When Ms Kay visited it late on the morning of 20 June 2017, she observed that it was fairly makeshift, with handwritten signs at the government desks that were hard to read. However, she considered the situation to be calm and improving.¹¹⁹¹¹¹⁹¹ Kay {CLG00030430/15-16} pages 15-16, paragraphs 65-69.

¶103.139 We have seen no evidence that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat provided any documentation or other support to government staff deployed to the Westway Centre. Indeed, Ms Hammond told us that it had not formally co-ordinated their deployment and that any training of staff was a matter for individual departments.¹¹⁹²¹¹⁹² Hammond {CAB00014816/18} page 18, paragraph 47; By comparison, Sebastian Bassett-James at BEIS produced a Utilities Co-ordination Cell staff guide, specifically designed to support staff in the Utilities Coordination Cell who were physically present at the Westway Centre because they were not crisis professionals and therefore needed specific guidance {BEI00002843}; Bassett-James {BEI00002844/2-3} pages 2-3, paragraphs 10-11; Bassett-James {BEI00002844/7-8} pages 7-8, paragraphs 30-32.Show full note Given its expertise in emergency response and recovery, we consider that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat should have given them some guidance on the objectives of the centre, and the role that they were expected to play.¹¹⁹³¹¹⁹³ Email at 15.49 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00012084/3}. The description of the Westway Centre as "organised chaos", with large numbers of officials, charities and community groups all trying to help,¹¹⁹⁴¹¹⁹⁴ Gill {HOM00046118/2} page 2, paragraph 8. is endorsed by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's own report, which found that most departmental staff who answered the urgent request for help on 18 June 2017 felt that the arrangements there were disjointed and that there was a lack of clear leadership or concern for the welfare of staff.¹¹⁹⁵¹¹⁹⁵ Grenfell Tower tragedy - Lessons for the Central Response {CAB00014768/3-4} paragraph 16.

100

Evacuated residents

¶103.140 The minutes of the Taskforce meeting on 16 June 2017 recorded, for the first time, that there had been 800 families living within the cordon in addition to those living in the tower.¹¹⁹⁶¹¹⁹⁶ Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/4} paragraph g. Until that point, there does not appear to have been any consideration at the cross-government meetings of the needs of residents who had been forced to evacuate, most of whom could not return home. The minutes recorded a commitment to ensure that residents, including those with nearby homes within the cordon,¹¹⁹⁷¹¹⁹⁷ Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/2} Item 2(1). were accommodated locally as quickly as possible, but government decision-making and monitoring continued to be hampered by inadequate and unreliable information.¹¹⁹⁸¹¹⁹⁸ Grenfell Tower tragedy - Lessons for the Central Response {CAB00014768/3} paragraph 12. Six days into the emergency response, the categorisation of residents was still changing, and the government remained unclear about the precise number of residents of Grenfell Tower and Grenfell Walk who were in emergency accommodation.

¶103.141 No concern was raised in the cross-government meetings about the effectiveness of the TMO until the Taskforce meeting on 19 June 2017.¹¹⁹⁹¹¹⁹⁹ Minutes 19 June 2017 {CAB00002741/3-4} paragraph 7. Ms Hammond told us that she had been aware of concern about its poor relationship with the tenants, the difficulties in getting precise information and a sense that it was not fulfilling its function.¹²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰ Hammond {Day281/138:13}-{Day281/139:10}.

¶103.142 The minutes of that meeting also recorded problems with the provision of hot water and gas to about 400 households within the wider cordon and noted that all households affected in that way were entitled to hotel accommodation and access to the discretionary fund.¹²⁰¹¹²⁰¹ Minutes 19 June 2017 {CAB00002741/3-4} paragraph 7. The list of things to be done following the meeting included directing DCLG and "Recovery Gold" (Mr Barradell) to consider urgently how best to respond to worries about the effectiveness of the TMO and reaching an immediate decision on what steps to take next.¹²⁰²¹²⁰² Actions 19 June 2017 {CAB00002739/1} Action 1. However, the list did not identify any specific action to be taken in response to the lack of hot water or gas in properties within the wider cordon.¹²⁰³¹²⁰³ Actions 19 June 2017 {CAB00002739}. Further, although those concerns were recorded at government level, Robert Black, the chief executive of the TMO, was not made aware of them¹²⁰⁴¹²⁰⁴ Black {Day275/104:12-16}. or of the decision to give affected residents access to hotel accommodation and financial assistance.¹²⁰⁵¹²⁰⁵ Black {Day275/78:20}-{Day275/79:1}. The lack of hot water remained a problem and was raised again at the meeting of Taskforce officials on 20 June 2017, when Mr Barradell suggested that an engineering solution was required.¹²⁰⁶¹²⁰⁶ Minutes 20 June 2017 {CAB00002792/3} paragraph 6.

101

¶103.143 On 20 June 2017, it became apparent to Dame Melanie Dawes that there was concern about the leadership of the TMO¹²⁰⁷¹²⁰⁷ Dawes {Day285/184:11-22}; {CLG00005813/1}; Dawes {CLG00030653/32} page 32, paragraph 102. and thereafter DCLG began to think how it could orchestrate a change of leadership.¹²⁰⁸¹²⁰⁸ Dawes {Day285/185:18-22}. However, the government does not appear to have properly understood the role of, or the limitations placed upon, the TMO.

The commitment to re-house residents

¶103.144 On 16 June 2017, the Prime Minister announced that those who had lost their homes as a result of the fire must be re-housed at the earliest possible opportunity and that the aim was to achieve that within three weeks at the latest.¹²⁰⁹¹²⁰⁹ Randall {CLG00030427/8} page 8, paragraph 28. In recognition of the exceptional nature of the circumstances and of the fact that that commitment went further than a local authority's obligations to other homeless households, the government agreed to meet the costs of providing temporary accommodation.¹²¹⁰¹²¹⁰ Randall {CLG00030427/8} page 8, paragraph 28. From 16 June 2017 onwards DCLG inevitably played a major part in seeking to deliver what it later recognised was an unrealistic commitment.¹²¹¹¹²¹¹ Randall {CLG00030427/8} page 8, paragraphs 28-29. See also email at 12.52 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00003260}.

¶103.145 On 18 June 2017, Helen MacNamara, director general of housing and planning at DCLG, sent an email to Barbara Brownlee, who had taken over responsibility for finding accommodation for those rendered homeless, to clarify the government's commitment.¹²¹²¹²¹² Email at 15.15 on 18 June 2017 {CLG00030574}. She said that residents of Grenfell Tower or Grenfell Walk (so-called "Category A" households) would be re-housed within three weeks in the local area with the costs of temporary accommodation met by the government.¹²¹³¹²¹³ Email at 15.15 on 18 June 2017 {CLG00030574}. Consideration was still being given to the situation of those who had lived in other buildings in the vicinity of the tower. The commitment was no doubt well meant but was always unrealistic and raised expectations in a way that was irresponsible. Some residents were still living in hotel accommodation two years after the fire.¹²¹⁴¹²¹⁴ Al-Assad {IWS00001789/9} page 9, paragraph 56.

Financial assistance

¶103.146 Providing financial assistance to those affected by the fire was hampered by a lack of reliable information. Records of financial support provided during previous emergencies were not readily available and information about the amount of money being distributed was often inconsistent or absent altogether.

¶103.147 At a meeting on 14 June 2017 Ms Richardson, Dr Farrar, Ms Kay and the Secretary of State discussed the local response and the support that the government could offer, including funding under the Bellwin scheme of emergency financial assistance to local authorities.¹²¹⁵¹²¹⁵ Farrar {Day284/18:25}-{Day284/20:1}. Bellwin is the name given to the statutory scheme established under s.155 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to provide emergency financial assistance to local authorities, Baldwin {CLG00030437/3} page 3, paragraph 8; Kay {CLG00030430/4} page 4, paragraph 14. The next day, the Secretary of State announced the availability of funding under that scheme,¹²¹⁶¹²¹⁶ Baldwin {CLG00030437/4} page 4, paragraph 13. but did not indicate, otherwise than in general terms, which costs would be met. The details were still being clarified on 19 June 2017.¹²¹⁷¹²¹⁷ Baldwin {CLG00030437/5} page 5, paragraph 14; email at 01.01 on 19 June 2017 {CLG00009221/1-5}.

102

¶103.148 On the morning of 16 June 2017, Lorna Gratton asked the Treasury what the government had done in the past in similar circumstances by way of giving residents immediate help with basic necessities.¹²¹⁸¹²¹⁸ Email at 08.50 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00005938/6-7}. It does not appear that any such request had been made previously.¹²¹⁹¹²¹⁹ Emails at 09.17 and 11.53 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00005938/5-6}. We are surprised that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat had not already obtained that information. It appears that DCLG had not spoken to the Treasury about the creation of a discretionary fund to support the residents of Grenfell Tower¹²²⁰¹²²⁰ Baldwin {CLG00030437/2} page 2, paragraphs 4-5; Baldwin {CLG00030437/5} page 5, paragraph 16. by the time of a discussion between the Secretary of State and No.10 that morning.¹²²¹¹²²¹ No.10 asked for a briefing on whether RBKC could set up a hardship fund, potentially funded by Bellwin, which would allow people to get SIM cards, mobile phones etc to reconnect, email at 11.37 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00008316/2}.

¶103.149 It appears that the creation of a substantial discretionary fund was discussed for the first time at a cross-government meeting on 16 June 2017,¹²²²¹²²² Minutes 15 June 2017 meeting refer simply to DWP "working to provide access to emergency and hardship funds" {CAB00002720/3} paragraph 2(b). at which the Prime Minister said that a £5 million discretionary fund would be established to help support those affected.¹²²³¹²²³ Minutes 16 June 2017 {CAB00002726/4} paragraph 7. The size of the fund and what it would cover in general terms was announced by the Prime Minister later that day.¹²²⁴¹²²⁴ Baldwin {CLG00030437/5} page 5, paragraph 16. From that point onwards, there were considerable difficulties in getting a clear and consistent understanding of how many people had received money and how much money had been distributed.¹²²⁵¹²²⁵ Hammond {CAB00014816/28} page 28, paragraph 72. At a number of Taskforce meetings, different figures were quoted by DCLG and ministers from the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), making it difficult to obtain a clear picture.¹²²⁶¹²²⁶ Summary Grenfell Fire Response (CCS Internal Lessons) {CAB00000105/1} paragraph 5.

¶103.150 At the meeting of the Taskforce on 17 June 2017 it was pointed out that after the winter floods in 2015 all affected households had been given a payment of £5,000.¹²²⁷¹²²⁷ Minutes 17 June 2017 {CAB00002735/5} paragraph 12(c); Khan {MOL00000189/14-15} pages 14-15, paragraph 60. The Mayor of London recalled that some of those present appeared to be reluctant to make lump sum payments of £5,000 rather than payments by way of instalments to those who needed support.¹²²⁸¹²²⁸ Khan {MOL00000189/14-15} pages 14-15, paragraph 60. It was agreed in principle that every family that had lived in the tower and those who had been forced out of their homes by the fire should be eligible to receive a sum of money to be paid out immediately through DWP staff on the ground.¹²²⁹¹²²⁹ Actions 17 June 2017 {CAB00001248/2} Actions 9 and 11. Following the meeting, DCLG was directed to produce a proposal for distributing the support fund.

¶103.151 It was subsequently ascertained that the government had provided each household affected by the floods in 2015 with an initial £500 in cash and a further £5,000 paid into bank accounts (i.e. £5,500 in total). Miss Gratton asked whether colleagues were happy to take the same approach to avoid unfavourable parallels being drawn with that emergency.¹²³⁰¹²³⁰ Email at 14.49 on 18 June 2017 {CAB00005286/1}. See also email at 14.29 on 18 June 2017 {CLG00005376/1}; email at 14.55 on 18 June 2017 {CAB00005286/1}; emails at 14.10, 14.33 and 17.50 on 18 June 2017 {CLG00005468/1-3}. That was two days after the Prime Minister had confirmed a £5 million discretionary fund and more than four days after the fire. We are surprised that the information about payments made to the victims of flooding was not already available to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. In our view, the lack of easily accessible information about how victims of previous emergencies had been supported financially contributed to the delay in funds being provided.

103

¶103.152 In the event, it was agreed that every household that had lost its home as a result of the fire should receive £5,500, made up of £500 in cash payment from the council and £5,000 paid into a bank account by DWP.¹²³¹¹²³¹ Baldwin {CLG00030437/8-9} pages 8-9, paragraph 28. Everyone over the age of 16 who had been displaced as a result of the fire was also able to claim a £500 cash payment. RBKC could increase the amount of the cash payment in individual circumstances,¹²³²¹²³² Baldwin {CLG00030437/8-9} pages 8-9, paragraph 28. drawing on the further funding from the government's Grenfell Tower Residents Discretionary Fund.¹²³³¹²³³ Email at 01.01 on 19 June 2017 {CLG00009178/2}.

¶103.153 The Discretionary Fund scheme went into operation on 19 June 2017.¹²³⁴¹²³⁴ Baldwin {CLG00030437/9} page 9, paragraph 29. By lunchtime on 19 June, £202,000 of discretionary support had been provided, Baldwin {CLG00030437/10} page 10, paragraph 31. We heard that some of those who went to the Portobello Road Post Office¹²³⁵¹²³⁵ Email at 01.01 on 19 June 2017 {CLG00009178/2}. to receive payments had not had any previous contact with the emergency relief effort.¹²³⁶¹²³⁶ Baldwin {CLG00030437/10} page 10, paragraph 32. The lack of any previous contact five days after the fire reflects poorly on the wider emergency relief effort. Westminster City Council staff who became involved as part of a tri-borough agreement¹²³⁷¹²³⁷ See paragraph 91.64. reported that some of the people coming in for help were vulnerable and required counselling before any practical steps could be taken to make payments to them.¹²³⁸¹²³⁸ Baldwin {CLG00030437/10} page 10, paragraph 32.

¶103.154 Following the Taskforce meeting on 19 June 2017, Mr Barradell was asked to confirm by the end of the day how many people eligible to receive a £500 cash payment had not yet done so and to make those payments as soon as possible.¹²³⁹¹²³⁹ Actions 19 June 2017 {CAB00002739/1} Action 4. It was not until the CRIP produced for the meeting on 21 June 2017 that reasonably reliable information was available about the number of those who were eligible to receive payments and the number of those who had done so. Even at that stage the figures were not consistent with those contained in other documents of the same date.¹²⁴⁰¹²⁴⁰ CRIP 9 {CAB00002403/4} Minutes 20 June 2017 {CAB00002792/3} paragraph 9: "63 (out of approximately 125) payments of £5,000 had been paid to households". We agree with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's own assessment that its understanding of the operational response was poor throughout that period and that inconsistent and missing data, particularly from DCLG, represented a constant challenge.¹²⁴¹¹²⁴¹ Grenfell Tower tragedy - Lessons for the Central Response {CAB00014768/3} paragraph 12; Summary Grenfell Fire Response (CCS Internal Lessons) {CAB00000105/1} paragraph 5.

Pressure on DCLG

¶103.155 DCLG was under considerable pressure during the seven days following the fire. Although RED was experienced in leading liaison with local responses in relation to other kinds of emergencies (such as flooding, or terrorist incidents), in the months before the Grenfell Tower fire it had been required to respond to emergencies more often than usual.¹²⁴²¹²⁴² These included the Westminster terrorist attack on 22 March 2017, the Manchester Arena bombing on 22 May 2017, the London Bridge terrorist attack on 3 June 2017, and the General Election on 8 June 2017 (including the run- up to it), Mason {CLG00030435/4} page 4, paragraph 11. At the same time, it was short of staff¹²⁴³¹²⁴³ Email at 20.26 on 20 June 2017 {CAB00012068/2}. and was in the process of being reduced in size.¹²⁴⁴¹²⁴⁴ Email at 08.48 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00002960/1}; On 14 June 2017, Dame Melanie had told Sir Jeremy Heywood that "at some point we may need to reflect on the impact of cuts to the civil service (DCLG will be less than 50% of its 2010 size by 2020)", email at 20.00 on 15 June 2017 {CLG10009757/2}.

104

¶103.156 Furthermore, the scale of the Grenfell Tower fire, involving a huge loss of life and mass displacement, was greater than anything it had previously encountered. The disaster generated immense public and political concern, made all the more intense by the fact that it fell within its own area of policy responsibility (local government and housing).¹²⁴⁵¹²⁴⁵ Whitehouse {CAB00014782/14} page 14, paragraph 35. Although the emergency was concentrated in a single location, it had national implications for the safety of tower blocks¹²⁴⁶¹²⁴⁶ Minutes 14 June 2017 {CAB00002714}; Dawes {CLG00030653/36} page 36, paragraph 118. and it appears that for that reason a significant part of the department's limited resources was taken up with reviewing its response to the earlier Lakanal House fire.¹²⁴⁷¹²⁴⁷ Dawes {Day285/98:13}-{Day285/100:9}. DCLG was, in effect, trying to manage two crises at the same time.¹²⁴⁸¹²⁴⁸ Dawes {Day285/98:13}-{Day285/100:9}.

¶103.157 Even after Mr Barradell's appointment as Recovery Gold, there were difficulties in obtaining clear, accurate information about who was responsible for what and the number of people needing support.¹²⁴⁹¹²⁴⁹ Tallantire {CAB00014769/5} page 5, paragraph 18. Nevertheless, we have seen no evidence to suggest that Ms Hammond raised concerns about DCLG with Mr McGuinness or Mr Sedwill.¹²⁵⁰¹²⁵⁰ Hammond {Day281/73:18-22}.

¶103.158 An Internal Lessons report produced by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in August 2017 concluded that it should have pressed for a liaison officer from DCLG to be present within the COBR situation cell regardless of the pressures on resources at DCLG.¹²⁵¹¹²⁵¹ Summary Grenfell Fire Response (CCS Internal Lessons) {CAB00000105/1} paragraph 5; Hammond {Day281/201:1-18}. However, in the email he sent to Katharine Hammond on 17 June 2017 Peter Tallantire indicated that he felt it was too late to do that and that it was probably the wrong solution, as most of the worries related to DCLG, which was already considered to be struggling.¹²⁵²¹²⁵² Email at 23.19 on 17 June 2017 {CAB00003152/1}. Mr Tallantire suggested instead that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's ignorance of DCLG's thinking should be resolved by deploying a liaison officer from the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to DCLG.¹²⁵³¹²⁵³ Email at 23.19 on 17 June 2017 {CAB00003152/1}. Although Ian Whitehouse was transferred to DCLG on 19 June 2017, we think that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat should have taken action at least three days earlier,¹²⁵⁴¹²⁵⁴ Email at 15.50 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00002898/1}. once it realised that DCLG was overstretched and under-resourced.¹²⁵⁵¹²⁵⁵ Email at 09.22 on 16.06.17 {CAB00001150/1}; Hammond {Day281/166:7-10}.

¶Contact between the Prime Minister and the residents of

¶Grenfell Tower

¶103.159 On the afternoon of 17 June 2017, the Prime Minister hosted a further meeting with Grenfell residents and community members in which wide-ranging complaints were made about the co-ordination of the response, the distribution of money to those who needed it and the limited information available on where people should go for help of different kinds. Those who attended the meeting asked, among many other things, that the TMO be removed from the management of the buildings affected, that central co-ordinators ensure they had links with local leaders and that liaison officers be provided for those affected.¹²⁵⁶¹²⁵⁶ Email at 18.03 on 17 June 2017 {RBK00038856/1-3}. Feedback from that meeting was then filtered back by No.10 to DCLG.¹²⁵⁷¹²⁵⁷ Emails from 17.26 to 20.04 on 18 June 2017 {CAB00006308}.

105

¶103.160 Thereafter, No.10 staff continued to be in direct contact with the residents and volunteers who had spoken to the Prime Minister and became involved in dealing with difficulties facing individual residents, such as re-housing¹²⁵⁸¹²⁵⁸ Emails from 16.11 to 19.24 on 17 June 2017 {CLG00005331}. and the distribution of cash.¹²⁵⁹¹²⁵⁹ Email at 17.24 on 18 June 2017 {CAB00005730}. The staff of No.10 were not usually involved in detailed matters of that kind during the response to an emergency but, given the lack of co-ordination between the government and the local authority, they clearly felt compelled to respond to the personal concerns of those affected.¹²⁶⁰¹²⁶⁰ Gratton {CAB00014853/29} page 29, paragraph 79. See also {CLG00005565/1-2}.

¶103.161 On 19 June 2017, Lorna Gratton and Jamie Cowling both raised the complaints of Walkway residents with DCLG. At 10.16 on 19 June 2017, Ms Gratton sent an email to DCLG relaying residents' complaints about the organisation and responsiveness of the TMO and asking for proposals for finding out whether they were justified.¹²⁶¹¹²⁶¹ Email at 10.16 on 19 June 2017 {CLG00009261}. By 13.27, Mr Cowling had informed DCLG that the TMO had sent texts to residents of the Walkways telling them to return to their homes, despite the fact that front doors were broken and there was significant dirt and debris from the fire both inside and out. Mr Cowling asked DCLG to let him know by 17.00 that day when repairs to residents' doors and cleaning would begin.¹²⁶²¹²⁶² Email at 13.27 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00005619}. See also email at 15.28 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00005564/1}; emails at 09.29 and 09.37 on 21 June 2017 {CAB00005909/1}. Following receipt of that email, DCLG sought to investigate how widespread was the problem of residents being expected to return to properties that did not have functioning utilities.¹²⁶³¹²⁶³ Emails from 14.02 to 14.15 on 19 June 2017 {CLG00005583/1-2}. See also email at 17.05 on 19 June 2017 {CLG00005667/2-3}. At 16.00 on 19 June 2017, questions about the effectiveness of the TMO were raised at a cross-government meeting for the first time.¹²⁶⁴¹²⁶⁴ Minutes 19 June 2017 {CAB00002741/3-4} paragraph 7.

¶103.162 Although the meetings between the Prime Minister and a select group of residents and volunteers were seen as constructive and as providing a mechanism by which to identify problems that had yet to be resolved,¹²⁶⁵¹²⁶⁵ Email at 18.06 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00006017/1}; email at 22.57 on 18 June 2017 {CAB00006311/1}. we consider that they demonstrate the lack of co-ordination between the government and local responders and the extent to which the concept of resilience based on the principle of subsidiarity failed in the case of the Grenfell Tower fire.¹²⁶⁶¹²⁶⁶ The principle of subsidiarity, by which decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level with co-ordination at the highest necessary level, is outlined in Chapter 99.

¶Failures of communication between No. 10 and the Civil

¶Contingencies Secretariat

¶103.163 Mr Tallantire's note headed "Key Points of Discussion with No.10", produced in the course of preparing the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's report entitled Grenfell Tower tragedy – Lessons for the Central Response,¹²⁶⁷¹²⁶⁷ {CAB00014768}; Tallantire {CAB00014830/9} page 9, paragraph 27.6. drew attention to a lack of consistent, reliable data both centrally and locally, difficulties contacting DCLG staff and an assurance by Dame Melanie Dawes that all was well at DCLG which had all the staff it needed.¹²⁶⁸¹²⁶⁸ {CAB00014827}; Hammond {Day281/205:15-18}. Although the note contained a positive view of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, it identified problems in relation to its communication with No.10. The Prime Minister's office had been working directly with DCLG on most policy matters as it sought to get the government's response under control and often did so without informing the

106

¶Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the requests and decisions it had made.¹²⁶⁹¹²⁶⁹ {CAB00014827}.

¶103.164 At 15.47 on 20 June 2017, No.10 asked for a detailed brief from DCLG containing a description of the situation on the ground, the latest victim figures and a short background note on the wider Lancaster West estate.¹²⁷⁰¹²⁷⁰ Email at 15.47 on 20 June 2017 {CAB00001178/2}. In response, the private secretary to the Secretary of State suggested that No.10 talk to colleagues from the Civil Contingencies Secretariat about the latest numbers, given the pressures on DCLG. He later explained that that had been a plea to No.10 to use the latest version of the CRIP as a situation report for the Prime Minister.¹²⁷¹¹²⁷¹ Email at 19.31 on 20 June 2017 {CAB00001178/1}. No.10's requests for more information and briefings created additional reporting mechanisms in parallel with those undertaken by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, which added to the pressure on an already struggling DCLG. It also suggests that No.10 was not getting what it wanted from the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

¶103.165 Mr Tallantire's "Key Points of Discussion with No.10" proposed that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat think more about how it could support without getting in the way.¹²⁷²¹²⁷² {CAB00014827}. In our view, it could have given No.10 better information about the emergency response and recovery arrangements and the options available to the government. At the same time, No.10 should have taken further steps to ensure that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat was aware of the requests and decisions it had made and was not kept in the dark.¹²⁷³¹²⁷³ {CAB00014827}.

¶103.166 During the days following the fire many of the suggestions for support that were implemented came from No.10 rather than the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. In a detailed and reflective analysis at the end of her evidence, Dame Melanie Dawes recognised that it would have helped the government, and the speed of ministerial decision-making, to have been clearer about the kind of support that it could provide in different situations and to consider in greater detail the kinds of action that the government might be asked to undertake.¹²⁷⁴¹²⁷⁴ Dawes {Day285/214:15}-{Day285/215:8}. We agree.

Ministerial intervention and emergency powers

¶103.167 Dr Farrar told us that government intervention in a local authority could range from a light-touch approach, under which individuals are deployed to a local authority to work within a specific department or within the existing leadership team, to the government's taking over the running of a local authority, putting in commissioners to run it directly. However, an intervention of the latter kind takes a number of weeks to implement. Consequently, although Dame Melanie and Dr Farrar did discuss sending in commissioners, it would have been hard to do that quickly,¹²⁷⁵¹²⁷⁵ Farrar {Day284/100:7}-{Day284/102:20}. not least because it generally involves taking over all the functions of the local authority concerned.¹²⁷⁶¹²⁷⁶ Farrar {Day284/107:21}-{Day284/109:17}.

107

¶103.168 During the period immediately after the fire, the government appears to have thought that there were no powers readily available to it to intervene directly¹²⁷⁷¹²⁷⁷ Key points from the discussion between Peter Tallantire and No.10 {CAB00014827}. and that it was therefore forced to rely on the power of persuasion¹²⁷⁸¹²⁷⁸ Farrar {Day284/107:21}-{Day284/109:17}. and the subsequent appointment of Mr Barradell. Ms Hammond told us that she had no recollection of any consideration being given to the powers available to ministers to give directions to Category 1 and Category 2 responders under sections 5(1) and 7 of the Civil Contingencies Act¹²⁷⁹¹²⁷⁹ Hammond {Day280/94:2-18}. Dr Farrar accepted that an order under section 5 has to be made by a statutory instrument, subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and, as such, would have taken considerable time to implement, Farrar {Day284/146:7}-{Day284/148:12}. Sections 5(1) and 7 of the Act {CAB00004616/7-10}. Ministerial Intervention under Part 1 of the Act is outlined in Chapter 99. and we have seen no evidence to suggest that consideration was given to using the powers to make emergency regulations under part 2 of the Act.¹²⁸⁰¹²⁸⁰ Sections 19-31 of the Act {CAB00004616/20-28}. Emergency Powers are outlined in Chapter 99.

¶103.169 On the morning of Monday 19 June 2017, No.10 proposed developing a new strategy for national and local resilience in response to major disasters which could include a new "Civil Disaster Reaction Force".¹²⁸¹¹²⁸¹ Email at 08.25 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00002960/2-3}. That proposal was prompted by concerns, even at that stage, about the response to the fire, rather than by any considered programme of work. It indicates the extent of the reflection being undertaken at the highest level and No.10's realisation that the government had limited practical ability to intervene to control events. Mr McGuinness pointed out that local authorities provide assistance to each other (although not always quickly enough) and that they have the skills to reinforce each other. He expressed the view that RED was meant to provide the means by which the government could reinforce and support their action, but that it was underpowered.¹²⁸²¹²⁸² Email at 08.40 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00002960/1-2}.

¶103.170 In response, Ms Hammond suggested that RED should be enhanced to enable the government to spot failing local authorities more quickly and ensure that support reached them and that better mutual aid arrangements should be put in place between local authorities with the addition of a national deployment mechanism.¹²⁸³¹²⁸³ Email at 08.47 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00002960/1}. She envisaged something similar to the National Police Co-ordination Centre,¹²⁸⁴¹²⁸⁴ Email at 18.42 on 19 June 2017 {CAB00002897/1}. with a centrally co-ordinated mechanism receiving a request from one authority for additional support, finding that support and deploying it.¹²⁸⁵¹²⁸⁵ Hammond {Day281/168:7-22}. Although a mechanism of that kind might have accelerated the process of providing mutual aid, it would not have solved the main difficulty, namely, that RBKC did not realise that it was unable to respond adequately to the situation that had been created. Reflecting on the Grenfell Tower fire a month later, Mr Sedwill re-emphasised his view that the government needed a mechanism to take over control in a crisis before a local authority realised that it could not cope.¹²⁸⁶¹²⁸⁶ Email at 07.37 on 17 July 2017 {CAB00002910/1}.

¶103.171 In September 2017 as part of a National Security Capability Review the Civil Contingencies Secretariat was asked in the light of events that had occurred in June 2017 to consider whether it was possible in law for the government to require a Category 1 responder to accept national support.¹²⁸⁷¹²⁸⁷ Workstream 4 of the National Security Capability Review dated 28 September 2017 {CAB00007084/10} paragraph 32.

108

Failing to activate COBR

¶103.172 We heard from Ms Hammond that none of the meetings to which we have referred were held under the auspices of COBR¹²⁸⁸¹²⁸⁸ Hammond {CAB00014816/8} page 8, paragraph 17. When asked about the many contemporaneous references to COBR¹²⁸⁹¹²⁸⁹ On 16 June 2017 Action 11 on the Actions List starts "COBR agreed…" {CAB00002727/2}; at 07.08 on 20 June 2017 Lorna Gratton refers to "COBR" in an internal No.10 email {CAB00005733/1}. Further, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat's Summary "Grenfell Fire Response (Civil Contingencies Secretariat Internal Lessons) asserted that COBR was activated on 14 June 2017 and ran until 25 July, when the Ministerial Recovery Group met for the first time, {CAB00000105/1}.Show full note and whether they indicated a degree of confusion about whether the process had been activated or not, Ms Hammond told us that they were simply administrative errors.¹²⁹⁰¹²⁹⁰ Hammond {Day281/105:9-11}. Ms Hammond also sought to explain references to COBR on the basis that, from 16 June 2017, the Taskforce meetings were held in the rooms in which COBR meetings are often held.¹²⁹¹¹²⁹¹ Hammond {Day281/105:17-23}. When asked why emails from Dame Melanie Dawes and Mr Sedwill referred to a Taskforce meeting as a COBR meeting,¹²⁹²¹²⁹² Email at 20.26 on 16 June 2017 {CAB00002932/1}; email at 23.47 on 17 June 2017 {CAB00002980/1-2}. she maintained that there had been no confusion and that it was just a shorthand for a meeting of that type.¹²⁹³¹²⁹³ Hammond {Day281/115:23}-{Day281/116:8}; Hammond {Day281/125:12-13}.

¶103.173 A considerable part of Ms Hammond's evidence was spent clarifying the meaning and relevance of the reference to COBR. She explained that a parallel version of COBR was not operating,¹²⁹⁴¹²⁹⁴ Hammond {Day281/202:16-22}. and her firm position throughout was that exactly the same things were done as would have been done if COBR had been formally activated.¹²⁹⁵¹²⁹⁵ Hammond {Day280/207:17-19}.

¶103.174 Formally activating COBR represents the government's highest level of response. Mr Hurd told us that it would have been appropriate to call a meeting at a more senior level from the start.¹²⁹⁶¹²⁹⁶ Hurd {Day282/126:4-10}. In this case, formally activating COBR would have emphasised the gravity of the incident and would have resulted in more senior ministers chairing the early cross-government meetings.¹²⁹⁷¹²⁹⁷ ConOps {CAB00000026/45} paragraph 4.2(iv). However, whether that would have made any material difference is debatable. The scale and urgency of the government's response increased significantly when the Prime Minister took over the meetings.

¶103.175 We heard from Dame Melanie that, if the initial cross-government co-ordination meeting had been chaired at cabinet-level¹²⁹⁸¹²⁹⁸ By a Secretary of State. or by the Prime Minister, it might have provided an additional layer of questioning and challenge about the local response to that being provided by the DCLG and the Home Office.¹²⁹⁹¹²⁹⁹ Dawes {CLG00030653/36} page 36, paragraph 119. In our view, that could have made a material difference to the way in which the meetings were approached and the actions arising from them.

¶103.176 For those outside central government, activating COBR would in itself have been an important indication to local responders of the likely form of central government engagement in the initial stages¹³⁰⁰¹³⁰⁰ Whitehead {CAB00014857/4} page 4, paragraph 15. and would have given them a signal that central government oversight was not with junior ministers but with senior cabinet ministers.

109

¶103.177 On 16 June 2017, Dame Melanie told Sir Jeremy Heywood that the new Gold Command considered the situation to be more complex than that which had followed the London bombings in 2005. She thought that the Prime Minister should have chaired a COBR meeting on 14 June 2017.¹³⁰¹¹³⁰¹ Email at 19.49 on 16 June 2017 {CLG00008533}. Her message indicates that a reference to COBR resonated inside as well as outside government. We do not doubt that, but the emphasis, as we see it, was on the importance of involving the Prime Minister at an early stage.

111