Chapter 62: Building Control

Chapter 62: Building Control

¶62.1 In Chapter 48 of this report we described the provisions of the Building Act 1984 and the Building Regulations 2010 which govern the process by which building work falling within their scope is checked by local authorities for compliance with the statutory requirements. In this chapter, we examine the role that RBKC building control played in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower and the events leading up to the issue of a completion certificate in July 2016.

¶62.2 We have been greatly assisted in our investigations by Beryl Menzies, FCABE, PPBEng, CBuildE, CABE, MRICS, a consultant in fire safety and fire-related building services. Ms Menzies has over 40 years' experience in building control, having worked in the Building Regulations Division of the Greater London Council between 1973 and 1985 and subsequently as a Chief Engineer at the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.^25592559 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/3}. Her evidence was not challenged by any of the core participants and we were not asked to consider evidence from anyone else with similar professional experience. We have therefore relied on her expert opinion when reaching our conclusions. RBKC also made some admissions that the work of its employees fell below the standard that could reasonably be expected of competent building control officers.^25602560 RBKC Module 1 Opening Submissions {RBK00055479/26-27} paragraphs 97-105; RBKC Module 1 and 2 Closing Submissions {RBK00064252/1} paragraph 4.

¶62.3 RBKC was the building control body for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. It was first approached by Studio E for initial advice in June 2012^25612561 {SEA00000023}. and was involved with the refurbishment until a completion certificate was issued in July 2016.^25622562 {RBK00018811}. Within RBKC, two surveyors were largely responsible for the project, John Allen, the special projects manager, from 2012 to late 2013, and John Hoban, a senior surveyor, from late 2013 to July 2016.^25632563 Allen {RBK00033930/1-2} pages 1-2, paragraph 3, 5, 7 and 12; Hoban {RBK00033934/1} page 1, paragraph 4. Paul Hanson, a fire engineer in the department, also gave advice on matters concerning functional requirements B1 and B5 of the Building Regulations.^25642564 Hanson {RBK00033894/23-25} pages 23-25, paragraphs 124-140.

¶62.4 Until September 2013, the building control department had been managed by John Jackson.^25652565 Allen {RBK00033930/1} page 1, paragraph 3. As special projects manager John Allen had been responsible for the larger, more complicated buildings that RBKC had to deal with,^25662566 Allen {Day47/8:12-24}; Allen {RBK00033930/1} page 1, paragraphs 3-4. including the KALC project and the Grenfell Tower refurbishment,^25672567 Allen {Day47/95:9-16}. (although it is not clear that the Grenfell Tower refurbishment would have been considered a special project but for its link to the KALC project.)^25682568 Allen {Day47/95:17}-{Day47/96:3}. In September 2013 the department was restructured and John Allen became Building Control Manager.^25692569 Stallwood {RBK00033910/2} paragraph 6. During the restructuring, procedures for allocating work within the department changed. Thereafter work was allocated on a "patch" system, under which a surveyor was allocated to a particular area and was expected to take whatever work came into the department from that area, regardless of its scale or complexity.^25702570 Anon {RBK00029897/3} page 3, paragraph 10; Allen {Day47/97:5-20}; Hoban {Day45/101:13-20}. In December 2013, John Allen handed over day to day responsibility for KALC and the Grenfell refurbishment to John Hoban, although those projects were on another officer's "patch" at that time.^25712571 {SEA00010232}; Hoban {Day45/100:20}-{Day45/101:6}; {Day45/100:17-24}. Mr Allen initially allocated the Grenfell project to Jose Anon, the deputy Building Control Manager, but Mr Anon did not feel he had the capacity to take on the additional work at the time. He also had friends who lived in the tower and felt a need to keep a professional distance. Anon {RBK00029897/8} page 8, paragraph 37-38; Allen {RBK00033930/2} page 2, paragraphs 7 and 10.Show full note

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Means of Escape group

¶62.5 In addition to its team of surveyors, RBKC had what was known as the "Means of Escape" group, which operated as an internal consultancy on matters relating to functional requirements B1 (means of warning and escape) and B5 (access and facilities for the fire service).^25722572 Hanson {RBK00033894/5} page 5, paragraph 31. At the time of the refurbishment, the Means of Escape group consisted of just one person, Paul Hanson, a qualified fire engineer. Mr Hanson did not have the power to make decisions on full plans applications and did not conduct site inspections,^25732573 Hanson {RBK00033894/6} page 6, paragraph 38. although in the case of Grenfell Tower he did attend some meetings on site. He also attended a demonstration of the smoke control system in 2016.^25742574 {RBK00002965}; {RBK00010784}; {RBK00003856} (this document is misdated, and the meeting took place on 7 January 2016, see email attaching the minutes) {RBK00003855}. Although Mr Hoban formally had overall responsibility for building control matters, Mr Hanson effectively made decisions in relation to functional requirements B1 and B5 because Mr Hoban deferred to Mr Hanson on those matters. He also sought his advice on matters affecting functional requirements B2, B3 and B4 if he needed assistance.^25752575 Hoban {RBK00033934/4} page 4, paragraph 36; Hoban {RBK00050416/3} page 3, paragraph 9(b); Hoban {Day45/121:25}-{Day45/124:15}; {RBK00048682}; {RBK00052478/7}. The evidence suggests that the role of the Means of Escape group within the department was not well understood, particularly by other professionals working on the Grenfell refurbishment,^25762576 {RBK00048682/1}; Crawford {Day11/128:3}-{Day11/130:25}; Lawrence {Day25/173:20}-{Day25/174:18}. and Mr Hoban agreed that its relationship with the surveyors could have been clearer.^25772577 Hoban {Day45/124:16}-{Day45/125:12}. Ms Menzies thought that the department could have made better use of the Means of Escape group generally, in particular because Mr Hanson was a qualified fire engineer.^25782578 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/52} paragraph 208.

Records

¶62.6 At the time of the refurbishment, RBKC's building control department kept records in a number of different ways: an electronic record-keeping system called "Acolaid", hard-copy files, electronic diaries, a hard-copy office diary and individual surveyors' notebooks.^25792579 Hoban {Day45/85:5}-{Day45/86:13}. The department adopted a "weeding" policy in relation to hard-copy files, with the result that not all the documents originally placed on the file were retained after a job had been closed.^25802580 Stallwood {RBK00033910/8} page 8, paragraphs 37-38. RBKC was unable to find the hard-copy file for the Grenfell refurbishment or Mr Hoban's personal notebooks covering the relevant period,^25812581 Stallwood {RBK00033910/4-6} pages 4-6, paragraphs 17-24 and 27; Hoban {RBK00050416/10} page 10, paragraph 33(e). but because of the weeding policy it is not clear which documents would have been retained. Mr Hoban thought that his plan check record sheet (an A4 sheet divided into topics such as "structure", "fire", "damp-proofing" and so on that he used when checking plans)^25822582 Hoban {Day45/80:13}-{Day45/81:8}. and his notes would probably have been weeded out.^25832583 Hoban {RBK00050416/5} page 5, paragraph 18.

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¶62.7 Mr Hoban did not use a tracker to monitor the drawings that had been submitted in support of the Grenfell full plans application,^25842584 Hoban {RBK00050416/6} page 6, paragraph 18(b)-(d). although the department did have a tracker which was available for surveyors to use, if a client requested it.^25852585 Allen {Day47/55:2}-{Day47/56:6}. However, we have seen no indication that the use of a tracker in connection with the refurbishment was proposed by building control or that it was requested by Studio E or Rydon.

¶62.8 The absence of complete contemporaneous records means that in many instances we have had to rely on Mr Hoban's personal recollection. That is unsatisfactory, not least because with the passage of time his memory had become understandably hazy and in places incomplete. Having said that, we are satisfied that we have been able to make reliable findings on the most important matters relating to building control's work on the Grenfell refurbishment. While some points of detail were in dispute, the key points about what Mr Hoban and his colleagues knew about the refurbishment and how they went about their work were not contentious.^25862586 RBKC Module 1 Opening Submissions {RBK00055479/26-27} paragraphs 97-105; RBKC Module 1 and 2 Closing Submissions {RBK00064252/1} paragraph 4.

Initial approach

¶62.9 Mr Allen first became aware of the Grenfell refurbishment when his manager, Mr Jackson, asked him to contact Terence Ashton of Exova^25872587 Allen {RBK00033930/2} page 2, paragraph 12. but he could not remember when that was or exactly what they had discussed.^25882588 Allen {Day47/173:17}-{Day47/174:10}. On 6 June 2012 Studio E approached building control seeking an indication of the fee likely to be charged for the project^25892589 {SEA00000023}; {SEA00004471}; Allen {Day47/202:4}-{Day47/203:1}. and on 31 October 2012 Mr Ashton sent John Allen a copy of issue 1 of Exova's Outline Fire Safety Strategy.^25902590 {EXO00001368}.

¶62.10 Mr Allen told us that he had not known that the refurbishment involved overcladding the building until around the time of the full plans application.^25912591 Allen {Day47/176:16}. It is true that the Outline Fire Safety Strategy would not have alerted him to that fact, since cladding was not mentioned in it,^25922592 {EXO00000519/4}. but in 2012 Studio E had given him an estimate of the costs involved which had included overcladding as a line item. When that was shown to him Mr Allen accepted that he probably had read it and that he had seen that the project involved overcladding.^25932593 {SEA00004471}; {ART00000053/4}; Allen {Day47/203:11}-{Day47/204:10}.

¶62.11 On 7 November 2012 Studio E and Exova had a meeting with building control to discuss the fire safety strategy.^25942594 The meeting was attended by John Allen and Dave Gammon from RBKC, Terry Ashton from Exova and Adrian Jess from Studio E {SEA00006526}. However, that meeting and subsequent communications between the design team and building control focused primarily on the lower four floors of the tower and the smoke ventilation system.^25952595 {EXO00001371}; {SEA00009805}; {SEA00000154}; {SEA00010232}; {SEA00010369}; {SEA00002629}; {SEA00002630}; {RBK00048649}; {RBK00003854}; {RBK00003810}. We deal with the smoke ventilation system, including the involvement of building control, in Chapter 60. The proposals for overcladding the tower were not discussed with building control either at that meeting or at any time before the full plans application was submitted in August 2014,^25962596 Sounes {Day21/132:23}-{Day21/133:3}; {Day21/164:4-24}; Ashton {Day17/70:7-11}; Allen {Day47/175:4-11}. but by the time he took over responsibility for the project in late 2013, John Hoban had become aware that it involved overcladding, because he had seen it on the drawings.^25972597 Hoban {Day45/138:2-11}. He told us that he would have expected a contractor or architect to seek advice from building control on cladding proposals before it submitted a full plans application, but neither Rydon nor Studio E had done so in this case.^25982598 Hoban {Day45/154:13-21}. Having seen that the project included overcladding, we consider that Mr Hoban should at that stage have taken the initiative and asked for more information about the project as a whole.^25992599 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/9} paragraph 38; {BMER0000004/96} paragraph 303.

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¶62.12 On 25 October 2013, Studio E sent building control its proposed fire safety strategy for the tower, including Issue 2 of Exova's Outline Fire Safety Strategy.^26002600 {SEA00009805/2}. On 11 November 2013, John Allen told Bruce Sounes that he did not think that the information on the smoke control system that had so far been submitted was adequate to enable an effective consultation to be held with the fire authority on functional requirements B1 and B5 as required by the Fire Safety Order.^26012601 {SEA00009805/1}. In January 2014, Studio E sent an email to building control asking them to consult the fire authority notwithstanding their concerns about the extent of the information available to them,^26022602 {RBK00048649}. but they did not do so at that time.^26032603 {RBK00003854}. There was no further contact between the design team and building control between January 2014 and July 2014.^26042604 {RBK00003810}; Hoban {Day45/142:23}-{Day45/143:2}.

The full plans application

¶62.13 On 4 August 2014 Studio E submitted a signed but undated full plans application to building control.^26052605 {RYD00014378} and {RYD00014379}. RBKC acknowledged receipt of the application on 5 August 2014{RBK00027424} and that is the date that the five-week statutory time limit for a decision started to run. Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/86} paragraph 274. By that time some demolition and site clearance work had already begun^26062606 {RYD00012259}. and Mr Hoban considered that the application had been made rather late in the day.^26072607 Hoban {Day45/154:22-24}.

¶62.14 The drawings supporting the application were submitted nearly two months after the application itself^26082608 {RYD00018742}. and were incomplete.^26092609 Menzies {Day60/134:7}-{Day60/135:10}; Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/88}. At the very least they ought to have shown that in principle the refurbishment was capable of complying with functional requirements B1 to B5 of the Building Regulations, but they did not. Indeed, on the basis of the information provided in relation to functional requirement B1 (means of escape) alone, the application ought to have been rejected.^26102610 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/9} paragraph 37. Mr Hoban's reason for not rejecting it was that he was trying to "work with" the applicant,^26112611 Hoban {Day45/160:13}-{Day45/161:12}; Menzies {Day60/33:9-21}. but that does not provide a good reason for failing to follow the statutory procedures. It does, however, reflect a fundamental misunderstanding among many of those who work in the construction industry, contractors, building control bodies and others, that the function of building control is to provide a service to applicants rather than to enforce the regulations robustly for the benefit of the community at large. In this case Mr Hoban accepted, in hindsight, that he ought to have rejected the full plans application for lacking the necessary supporting documentation.^26122612 Hoban {Day45/161:5-12}.

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¶62.15 As we have noted, a local authority is required to make a decision on a full plans application within five weeks of the deposit of the plans, although that can be extended by agreement to two months.^26132613 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/14} paragraph 62. However, in this case building control did not make a decision within the prescribed time and there is no evidence that any extension of time was agreed with either Rydon or Studio E. Mr Allen said that the statutory time limits did not work in the context of design and build projects and that there was little point in rejecting an incomplete application because building work could still go on.^26142614 Allen {Day47/168:1-22}. We found that part of his evidence rather disturbing, because it amounted to saying that in his eyes the legislation had to give way to commercial considerations and the practices of the construction industry. We do not think that is a proper approach to take to a statutory function and we are fortified in that conclusion by the evidence of Ms Menzies, who could see no reason why the statutory time limits could not be adhered to in the case of design and build projects.^26152615 Menzies {Day60/33:4-7}; {Day60/34:2}-{Day60/35:2}.

¶62.16 There is a note on the Acolaid system dated 5 August 2014 headed "Meaningful response", in which Mr Hoban recorded that he had asked for details of the works,^26162616 {RBK00044876/69}. but he does not appear to have put his request in correspondence to Studio E or Rydon, either by email or letter. Mr Allen said that if a surveyor felt the need to go back to an applicant for further information, or if there was a problem with the application, such as a missing document or drawing, that should be recorded in writing, but in this case it was not.^26172617 Allen {Day47/48:7}-{Day47/49:25}. Unfortunately, Mr Hoban's response to the full plans application lacked rigour and fell short of the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent building control officer.^26182618 Menzies {Day60/126:9}-{Day60/127:15}; Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/9} paragraph 37; Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/98-99} paragraph 317. He accepted that if he had exercised reasonable care and skill he would have asked Studio E for the information that was needed,^26192619 Hoban {Day45/96:10-22}. but there is no record of his having done so, save for the "meaningful response" note, which does not record what further details he asked for.^26202620 {RBK00044876/69}.

¶62.17 We are not persuaded that Mr Hoban made a real effort to obtain the missing information from Studio E. He told us on more than one occasion that he had asked Rydon to provide him with information and that he had obtained some information for himself by looking at things on site,^26212621 Hoban {Day45/167:6-28}; {Day46/30:17}-{Day46/31:23}; {Day46/70:4-9}. but very little of that is documented in his notes and those requests, if they were made at all, were not followed up by letters or emails.^26222622 Hoban {Day45/32:2-5}. Mr Hoban ought to have asked for further information about the cladding at the full plans stage. His failure to do so represents a serious failing on the part of building control.^26232623 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/9} paragraph 39; Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/96} paragraph 303.

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¶62.18 Mr Hoban made his first visit to the site on 29 August 2014.^26242624 {RBK00052478/8}; Hoban {Day45/142:4}. He discussed the works with Simon O'Connor, Rydon's Project Manager, but did not discuss the overcladding in any detail and was not told that there was an outstanding planning application to change the rainscreen from zinc to ACM.^26252625 {SEA00000189}; Hoban {Day45/144:21}-{Day45/147:13}. Mr Crawford said that he had met Mr Hoban on site during the week of 25 August 2014 and had given him some drawings to take away,^26262626 Crawford {SEA00014275/65} page 65, paragraph 206; Crawford {Day11/137:12}-{Day11/139:1}. but Mr Hoban did not recall any such meeting and said that he would not normally take drawings away from a site.^26272627 Hoban {Day45/145:14-16}; {Day45/148:1-21}; {Day45/153:10-24}. Mr O'Connor thought that Mr Crawford might have been at the initial meeting but did not remember Mr Hoban taking away any drawings.^26282628 O'Connor {Day26/217:11-18}. The contemporaneous evidence does not refer to Mr Hoban meeting Mr Crawford on site at that time or to his taking drawings away.^26292629 {SEA00000189}. On the basis of that evidence and the evidence of others, we think it likely that Mr Crawford's recollection that Mr Hoban took drawings away with him is mistaken.

¶62.19 Studio E did not submit any drawings to building control until 24 September 2014 when Mr Crawford sent a zip file attached to an email.^26302630 {RYD00018742}. The contents of the zip file did not reflect the drawings listed in the covering email^26312631 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/88} paragraph 277-281. but Mr Hoban did not question that at the time.^26322632 Hoban {Day45/164:9}-{Day45/165:1}. Some of the drawings were older revisions or otherwise out of date; for example, they showed zinc rainscreen despite the fact that ACM had been in contemplation for many months and that the final colour and finish had been selected in July 2014, subject to planning approval.^26332633 {RYD00018750}. The drawings did not show the type of cladding panel or insulation being proposed.^26342634 {RYD00018750}.

¶62.20 Mr Hoban was aware that insufficient information about the cladding had been provided and was waiting for more to be sent to him.^26352635 Hoban {Day45/166:8-21}. He could not recall whether he had directly asked anyone about the nature of the insulation,^26362636 Hoban {Day45/166:8-21}. although he said that he had asked for more details "on the job".^26372637 Hoban {Day45/167:11-18}. He said that he had repeatedly asked for information and had discovered some for himself by talking with the contractor and seeing what was being done on site.^26382638 Hoban {Day45/173:10-17}. However, there is no record of his asking for more information, so if he did make any such request, he probably did so in the course of an informal conversation with someone from Rydon or Studio E on site. In any event, although no further details of the cladding were formally submitted, drawings sent to building control for other purposes in November 2014 and March 2015 showed ACM rainscreen panels on the facade.^26392639 {RYD00024038}; {SEA00000225}; {SEA00000252}; {HAR00003955}. Mr Hoban could not remember whether those drawings had alerted him to the change from zinc to ACM.^26402640 Hoban {Day46/7:11-13}.

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¶62.21 On 25 September 2014 RBKC planning officers approved the use of Reynobond smoke silver cassette-fixed ACM panels but Studio E did not inform building control of that at the time and, as we have noted, the drawings submitted to building control continued to refer to zinc panels.^26412641 {IBI00001802}; Hoban {Day45/197:20}-{Day45/198:4}.

¶62.22 On 29 September 2014 Studio E provided building control with a copy of Issue 3 of Exova's Outline Fire Safety Strategy.^26422642 {SEA00000215}. Mr Hoban could not remember whether he had read it at the time^26432643 Hoban {Day45/167:19}-{Day45/168:12}. and when it was shown to him in the course of his evidence he could not remember whether he had seen it before.^26442644 Hoban {Day45/168:20}-{Day45/168:6}. However, he had read Issue 2 when that had been sent to him and he was aware of what Exova had said in it about functional requirement B4.^26452645 Hoban {Day45/169:2}-{Day45/170:25}. Mr Hoban did not ask Exova (or anybody else for that matter) whether a further report had been or would be provided to complete the advice on functional requirement B4 and he conceded that he might not have gone back to the file and done everything necessary.^26462646 Hoban {Day45/169:2}-{Day45/170:25}. His failure to do so was another serious omission.

¶62.23 The same day, 29 September 2014, Mr Hoban also asked Mr Hanson for his comments.^26472647 {RBK00048693}. It is not clear whether he gave Mr Hanson a copy of Issue 3 of the Outline Fire Safety Strategy, which he received shortly afterwards, although he thought he had probably given him a hard copy.^26482648 Hoban {Day45/174:21}-{Day45/175:7}. (Mr Hanson had already been given a copy of Issue 2 by Studio E in October 2013.^26492649 {RBK00027290}.) Mr Hanson responded to Mr Hoban on 10 November 2014 saying that building control was not in a position to approve the proposals due to a lack of information about the extraction rate of the smoke ventilation system.^26502650 {RBK00033895/3}. Notwithstanding the absence of that information, on 11 November 2014, Mr Hoban submitted a formal request to the LFB for their comments on matters affecting functional requirements B1 and B5.^26512651 {RBK00033896}. For further detail on the process for consulting the LFB, see Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/139-140} paragraphs 461-467. He did not ask for its comments on functional requirement B4. The LFB would not normally comment on requirement B4 unless it had been specifically asked to do so.^26522652 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/139-140} paragraph 466; FSIGN 501 {LFB00054550/10-12}.

¶62.24 On 18 November 2014 Mr Hoban told Neil Crawford that a formal decision notice on the full plans application would be forwarded shortly.^26532653 {RBK00002974}. At that point a response from the fire authority was still outstanding. Mr Hoban said that he had completed the standard form decision notice^26542654 A blank copy of the standard form can be found at {RBK00052487}. with a schedule of conditions but no copy was available and there is no record of the conditions. Mr Hoban said that he had put it out for the business support group to process, but there is no evidence that a notice was actually sent out^26552655 Hoban {RBK00050416/4}, page 4 paragraphs 12-14. A copy of a blank pro forma can be seen at {RBK00052487}. and Mr Hoban did not check whether it had been.^26562656 Hoban {Day45/194:3-14}.

¶62.25 There is no written record of the review of the full plans application that led Mr Hoban to issue the decision notice. He said that he had prepared a memorandum in relation to functional requirements B2, B3 and B4^26572657 Hoban {Day45/185:17}-{Day45/186:9}. but no copy of any such document was made available to us. When asked how he had concluded that the proposals were likely to comply with the Building Regulations, Mr Hoban said that there would have been conditions^26582658 Hoban {Day45/187:3-8}. and when asked how he was able to issue a decision notice when Mr Hanson had said in his comments on functional requirement B1 that building control could not approve the proposals, he again said that it would be subject to conditions.^26592659 Hoban {Day45/187:19-25}. Mr Hoban apparently felt able to approve the full plans application, even though it did not contain any details of the proposed insulation or rainscreen panels, because he had included a condition that the facade as a whole should comply with section 12 of Approved Document B.^26602660 Hoban {Day45/188:2}-{Day45/190:25}. However, he did not have a specific recollection of the conditions he had attached to the decision notice and did not know whether he had recorded them elsewhere.^26612661 Hoban {Day45/192:13-20}; {Day45/193:8-20}. We have not seen any documents or correspondence referring to specific conditions of any kind. Mr Allen said that he would expect any conditions applied to a full plans approval to be recorded in writing and kept on the file.^26622662 Allen {Day47/51:4}-{Day47/52:12}. In our view the failure to keep a formal record of a matter of that kind was a very serious omission.

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¶62.26 On 12 December 2014, the LFB sent building control an email attaching a response to the consultation,^26632663 {RBK00033896}. but neither building control nor the LFB has been able to find the response itself.^26642664 {LFB00000300}. On 5 February 2016, following revisions to the smoke control proposals, building control consulted the LFB again^26652665 {RBK00033897}. and on 4 March 2016 the LFB expressed itself satisfied with the proposals.^26662666 {LFB00000291}; {LFB00000292}; {SEA00014148}; {SEA00014149}.

¶62.27 Mr Hoban approved the full plans application despite Mr Hanson's advice that there was insufficient information in relation to functional requirement B1 to enable that to be done. He also consulted the fire authority without sufficient information^26672667 Menzies {Day60/191:4-10}. and did not wait for a response before making his decision.^26682668 Mr Hoban informed Mr Crawford that a decision notice would be issued on 18 November 2014 {RBK00002974}, five days after he submitted the consultation request to the LFB {RBK00033896}. In addition, he failed to carry out a methodical review of the documents submitted to him and failed to notice obvious errors and inconsistencies in the drawings. He either did not read version 3 of Exova's Outline Fire Safety Strategy^26692669 Hoban {Day45/167:19}-{Day45/168:12}. or failed to appreciate that on its own terms it was incomplete in an important respect. The only evidence we have seen of a structured review of the full plans application is the memorandum prepared by Mr Hanson on Requirement B1.^26702670 {RBK00033895/3}. We accept that Mr Hoban probably made some notes on the application, but, bearing in mind the evidence we heard about his working practices at the time, we think it unlikely that he made any detailed notes of his assessment of functional requirements B2, B3 or B4. RBKC's own proforma for full plans applications, the P60 form, was basic and did not assist officers in carrying out a thorough review of a full plans application or recording their decisions.^26712671 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/65}. We do not know what, if any, conditions Mr Hoban attached to his approval of the full plans, but if, as he suggested, they included a condition that the cladding comply with section 12 of Approved Document B, that would not have been sufficient to enable him to issue a completion certificate in due course. It ought to have required Studio E to provide sufficient evidence that functional requirements B2, B3 and B4 had been met.^26722672 Menzies {Day60/139:2}-{Day60/140:24}.

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¶62.28 Other formal aspects of the application were also handled poorly. RBKC failed to issue a formal decision notice, which it accepted was a failing on its part.^26732673 RBKC Module 1 Opening Submissions {RBK00055479/27} paragraph 100. Mr Hoban accepted that he ought to have ensured that the decision notice he had prepared had been sent out, but he failed to do so.^26742674 Hoban {Day45/194:10-13}. All in all, RBKC's approach to the full plans application shows a consistent lack of care and disregard for the procedural requirements of the Building Regulations. RBKC accepted that it bore some responsibility for the failure of the applicant to provide sufficient information in a structured and easily accessible format,^26752675 RBKC Module 1 Opening Submissions {RBK00055479/27} paragraph 99. but its failings at full plans stage were far more extensive than that. Mr Hoban failed to ask for basic information about the cladding, did not carry out a proper review of the information he was provided with and gave a conditional approval in circumstances where he ought to have rejected the application altogether. Mr Hoban's willingness to accommodate Studio E led him to disregard the primary function of building control, with the result that a critical opportunity to scrutinise the design of the cladding was missed.

Building control's knowledge of the construction of the external wall

Rainscreen

¶62.29 There is no correspondence or documentation of any kind passing between building control and any of those engaged on the refurbishment which touches on the question whether the proposed composition of the external wall complied with the Building Regulations. Moreover, no comprehensive package of up-to-date drawings and information was ever provided to building control.^26762676 Menzies {BMER0000004/96} paragraph 303; Hoban {Day45/173:4-9}. However, Mr Hoban knew that ACM was being used because the contractor had told him so at some stage and he had seen the materials once they had arrived on site.^26772677 Hoban {Day45/167:2-5}. He could not say with certainty that he had noticed that ACM had been indicated on the drawings sent to him in November 2014^26782678 Hoban {Day46/3:18}-{Day46/4:10}. or March 2015,^26792679 Hoban {Day46/7:6-13}. but he thought that he had become aware that ACM panels were being used in around 2015 when he met Ben Bailey on site.^26802680 Hoban {Day45/197:2-15}; {Day45/200:24}-{Day45/201:24}. He was not surprised when he saw ACM being installed instead of zinc as, in his words, "things change".^26812681 Hoban {Day45/201:10-16}.

¶62.30 Mr Hoban said that after seeing ACM panels being installed on the building he had looked at the BBA certificate to see whether Reynobond ACM was Class 0,^26822682 Hoban {Day45/205:1-7}. although he said that he had probably looked only at the first page, from which he had understood that it was.^26832683 Hoban {Day46/18:12-25}; {Day46/23:14-17}; {Day46/23:11-17}. He had not mentioned that fact in any of his witness statements, however, and we think that if he had had a genuine recollection of checking the BBA certificate he would have said something about it. As a result we feel bound to treat his sudden recollection in the witness box as unreliable.

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¶62.31 Mr Hoban was not aware of the advice in Approved Document B that test evidence should be checked carefully^26842684 ADB Appendix A, note 2 {CLG00000224/119}. "Any test evidence used to substantiate the fire resistance rating of a construction should be carefully checked to ensure that it demonstrates compliance that is adequate and applicable to the intended use. Small differences in detail (such as fixing method, joints, dimensions and the introduction of insulation materials etc.) may significantly affect the rating." Hoban {Day46/25:14}-{Day46/26:1}.Show full note and at the time had not been aware of the way in which the polyethylene core of an ACM panel would react to fire.^26852685 Hoban {Day46/21:1-14}. He did not consider himself to be qualified to interpret test evidence and said that he would have needed the assistance of a fire engineer to do that.^26862686 Hoban {Day46/77:9-22}. Mr Allen did not consider that to be a specialist area, however, and considered that scrutinising manufacturers' information was a core function of a building control officer. He did not train his officers in how to go about it because he expected them to be able to do it already.^26872687 Allen {Day47/77:4-25}. Although Mr Anon, deputy Building Control Manager at RBKC, said that building control officers do not have the technical expertise to challenge a product's certification,^26882688 Anon {RBK00029897/8} page 8, paragraph 36. Ms Menzies agreed with Mr Allen.^26892689 Menzies {Day60/98:1}-{Day60/100:6}. Given the nature of their role, we are satisfied that building control officers can be expected to examine certificates of that kind to ascertain whether materials are suitable for the use for which they are intended.

¶62.32 In view of its importance in enabling the fire to spread around the tower, it is worth noting that Mr Hoban paid little, if any, attention to the crown during his review of the drawings or his visits to the site. He was aware that it was composed of ACM panels^26902690 Hoban {Day46/138:11-14}. and ought to have asked for more information about it. He should have given some thought to the risk that it might provide a means whereby fire could spread from one part of the building to another, but he failed to do so.^26912691 Menzies Building Control {BMER0000004/123} paragraph 405; Menzies {Day60/165:18}-{Day60/168:11}.

Insulation

¶62.33 Mr Hoban's evidence about his knowledge of the use of Celotex RS5000 in the external wall system and of its characteristics was not easy to follow. In his witness statements he did not specifically mention Celotex RS5000, although he did mention "Celotex insulation".^26922692 Hoban {RBK00050416/16} page 16, paragraph 43. He said that he had become aware that Celotex was to be used when he saw it on site, although he thought he might have been told about it before that.^26932693 Hoban {Day46/30:17-24}. He said in his statements that he had looked for information about the insulation on the Celotex website^26942694 Hoban {RBK00033934/8} page 8, paragraph 67; Hoban {RBK00050416/16} page 16, paragraph 43(a). and that what he had found there told him that it was fit for purpose.^26952695 Hoban {RBK00050416/17} paragraph 43(c). When he was asked about that, however, he was unable to recall any details of his research. He could not recall which product he had looked at on the Celotex website^26962696 Hoban {Day46/32:18-23}. but he said he would have noted the particular brand of product in his notebook when he was on site.^26972697 Hoban {Day46/33:2-10}. He told us that he had also looked up Celotex RS5000 on the LABC website,^26982698 Hoban {Day45/39:14-15}. but he had not mentioned that in either of his witness statements. He could not say whether he had seen the LABC certificate, either on the Celotex website or that of LABC itself.^26992699 Hoban {Day46/33:23}-{Day46/34:3}; {Day46/34:12-23}; {Day46/35:5-20}; {Day46/39:5-22}. He could not identify the document or text he had seen online, although he said that it might have contained statements similar to those in the LABC registered details and drawing document list for RS5000.^27002700 {CEL00000009}; Hoban {Day46/35:6}-{Day46/36:20}. That document said that Celotex RS5000 was suitable for use in rainscreen wall construction on buildings above 18 metres in height, had been successfully tested to BS 8414:2 2005, met the criteria set out in BR 135, and achieved a "Class 0" spread of flame rating.^27012701 {CEL00000009}. Mr Hoban could not say whether he had had any discussions about the insulation with Rydon, Studio E or Harley before looking it up on line^27022702 Hoban {Day46/31:14-17}. and he could not remember whether he had asked any of them for evidence that the insulation was appropriate for use in the cladding system.^27032703 Hoban {Day46/31:18-23}. However, he said he had felt confident that they knew what they were doing.^27042704 Hoban {Day46/32:9-12}.

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¶62.34 Mr Hoban said that he had been aware at the time that in other contexts manufacturers and others would misuse common expressions such as "fire retardant"^27052705 Hoban {Day46/52:14}-{Day46/54:6}. and that he had been aware of the need to check that any test relied upon by a manufacturer to demonstrate a product's suitability matched the intended use of the product.^27062706 Hoban {Day45/56:21}-{Day45/57:3}. He agreed that he had accepted at face value the statement that Celotex RS5000 had passed a BS 8414 test^27072707 Hoban {Day46/58:3-8}. and that he had not been entitled to assume that the design and construction team had checked the suitability of the cladding materials for themselves.^27082708 Hoban {Day46/59:10-13}.

¶62.35 Mr Hoban's evidence taken in the round has left us in some doubt about exactly what he did to identify the insulation or to satisfy himself that it complied with the Building Regulations. First, and most importantly, he failed to identify the fact that it was not of limited combustibility. It is not clear what information about Celotex he looked at online, but whatever it was, he did not examine it carefully. Instead, he simply accepted the assertion that RS5000 was suitable for use on tall buildings.^27092709 Hoban {Day46/45:4-15}. Critically, he failed to investigate whether the design of the cladding system proposed for Grenfell Tower was the same as that which had been tested in the BS 8414 test to which the product literature referred and did not ask Studio E to obtain test reports to justify its use. He accepted that that had been a serious failing on his part.^27102710 Hoban {Day46/45:11-16}.

¶62.36 Mr Hoban did not become aware that Kingspan insulation was being used and no one from Rydon, Harley or Studio E told him that it had been substituted for Celotex RS5000 on occasions.^27112711 Hoban {Day46/167:7-9}. Mr Hoban said that if he had known that he would have looked at the BBA certificate relating to it.^27122712 Hoban {Day46/168:10-17}.

Infill panels

¶62.37 Mr Hoban had not been aware that the P1 window infill panels contained Styrofoam^27132713 Hoban {Day46/26:3-20}. and did not know one way or another whether they complied with the guidance in paragraph 12.7 of Approved Document B, although he agreed that Styrofoam was not a material of limited combustibility.^27142714 Hoban {Day46/28:12-20}. However, in March 2015 he had been provided with a copy of the Harley Specification which showed that the P1 panels contained Styrofoam.^27152715 {SEA00000252}; {HAR00003955}. When asked why he did not notice that at the time, he said that he thought that he had not read the document properly^27162716 Hoban {Day46/26:22-23}. and had relied on the fact that Exova had been working on the project.^27172717 Hoban {Day46/27:16-21}. He also had not checked whether the Kingspan TP10 insulation in the P2 window infill panels was of limited combustibility.^27182718 Hoban {Day46/29:3-9}. Mr Hoban accepted that he ought to have questioned the use of those materials.^27192719 Hoban {Day46/29:10-18}. During his site visits he ought also to have noticed that gaps around the windows were being packed with insulation and should have checked whether the material being used was of limited combustibility.

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Cavity barriers

¶62.38 The full plans application did not include a cavity barrier strategy and the drawings supplied with it did not show any cavity barriers.^27202720 Hoban {Day46/91:21-24} Mr Hoban said that he would have expected them to be shown on the drawings and that he believed he had chased the contractor for information about them.^27212721 Hoban {Day46/92:2-12}. Studio E sent drawings showing cavity barriers to building control on 6 March 2015.^27222722 {RYD00034134}; drawings attached to the email included {RYD00034136}; {RYD00034135}; {RYD00034137}. They showed cavity barriers in line with compartment walls and floors but not around the windows.^27232723 {SEA00002499}. Mr Hoban said that he had understood that the framework supporting the window (which he had thought was steel) would act as a cavity barrier^27242724 Hoban {Day 46/95:6-14}. but when he gave evidence he could not recall why he had thought that.^27252725 Hoban {Day46/95:15}-{Day46/96:15}. It is not clear to us how he could have come to such an understanding, as there is no indication in the drawings that the framework was steel^27262726 Hoban {Day46/102:2-9}]. and Mr Lamb's evidence was that the use of steel had not been part of the design.^27272727 Lamb {Day38/146:2-15}. We are sceptical of his explanation and think it likely that it was an afterthought on his part to explain his failure to notice the omission. At all events, Mr Hoban did not check the windows on site to see whether cavity barriers had been installed around them^27282728 Hoban {Day46/98:4-22}. because the work that he had seen had, in his view, been of an adequate standard. He accepted, however, that he should have done so.^27292729 Hoban {Day46/99:9}-{Day46/100:8}.

Site visits

¶62.39 Mr Hoban told us that he had tried to visit the site once a month while the refurbishment was being carried out,^27302730 Hoban {RBK00050416/19} page 19, paragraph 48. but he visited it much less often than that during the period when the cladding was being installed because the pressure of work had increased and he trusted the professionals working on the project.^27312731 Hoban {Day46/164:16}-{Day46/166:21}; Hoban {RBK00033934/9} page 9, paragraph 84. He did not visit the site between 15 May 2015 and 17 August 2015.^27322732 See site visit records {RBK00052478/4}. In our view he should have visited more often during that period. The primary means of checking compliance with the Building Regulations is by visiting the site and looking at the work.^27332733 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/61} paragraph 249. That calls for careful and detailed inspection. It is clear from Mr Hoban's evidence that even when he did visit the site he did not check the installation of the cladding thoroughly and missed important defects, such as poorly installed cavity barriers.^27342734 Hoban {Day46/127:6-12}; {Day46/130:21-25}.

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Regulation 38

¶62.40 Regulation 38 of the Building Regulations requires the person carrying out the works to pass fire safety information to the Responsible Person for the purposes of the Fire Safety Order.^27352735 See Chapter 48. Under regulation 17 of the Building Regulations, if the Fire Safety Order applies to a building on completion of the work (as in the case of Grenfell Tower), the local authority has a duty to issue a completion certificate confirming that the requirements of regulation 38 have been satisfied if, after taking all reasonable steps to do so, it has been able to ascertain that that is the case.

¶62.41 The fourth edition of the Building Regulations Procedural Guidance, which was in force until March 2015, advised that a copy of the information provided under regulation 38 should be sent to the local authority.^27362736 Lane, Phase 2, Fire Safety Information Report {BLARP20000021/88} paragraph 12.4.2. The fifth edition, in force from March 2015 to July 2020, does not contain that guidance,^27372737 Lane, Phase 2, Fire Safety Information Report {BLARP20000021/92} paragraph 12.5.7. but both the fourth and fifth editions advise that local authorities should not issue completion certificates unless they have received written confirmation from the applicant that the information required by regulation 38 has been provided to the Responsible Person.^27382738 Lane, Phase 2, Fire Safety Information Report {BLARP20000021/89} paragraph 12.4.4; Lane, Phase 2, Fire Safety Information Report {BLARP20000021/128} paragraph 14.7.3.

¶62.42 Mr Hoban was aware of the requirements of regulation 38 of the Building Regulations.^27392739 Hoban {Day46/197:18-23}. The practice at RBKC building control at the time of the Grenfell refurbishment was simply for officers informally to ask contractors whether they had provided the necessary information to building owners.^27402740 Hoban {Day46/199:23}-{Day46/200:16}; Allen {Day47/188:3}-{Day47/189:20}. Mr Allen said that they did not take independent steps to satisfy themselves that that had been done^27412741 Allen {Day47/189:11-16}. and that his personal practice was just to check with the client if someone happened to be on site towards the end of a project.^27422742 Allen {Day47/190:6-9}. Not surprisingly, Mr Hoban adopted the same practice. He believed that he had asked David Hughes whether Rydon had sent the information to the TMO, but he did not record either the question or the answer in writing.^27432743 Hoban {Day46/200:18-24} {Day46/201:23}.

¶62.43 The practice adopted by RBKC did not in our view amount to taking all reasonable steps to ascertain whether regulation 38 had been satisfied and did not follow the procedural guidance in force at the time. It appears that a similar practice may have been followed by other local authority building control departments. If so, it suggests a widespread failure by building control bodies to comply with the regulations. Ms Menzies accepted in hindsight that the practice was not appropriate and we agree. It does not excuse the casual approach demonstrated by RBKC building control in this case.

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Completion certificate

¶62.44 Mr Hoban caused a completion certificate for the Grenfell refurbishment to be issued in the name of Mr Allen on 7 July 2016.^27442744 {RBK00018811}. He agreed that, given that the external wall did not comply with functional requirement B4 of the Building Regulations, he should not have done so.^27452745 Hoban {Day46/204:7-14}. We accept that when he caused the certificate to be issued Mr Hoban thought that the functional requirements of the Building Regulations had been satisfied,^27462746 Hoban {Day46/204:12-14}. but his failure to scrutinise the design and execution of the work with sufficient rigour meant that his confidence was entirely misplaced. In its statements to the Inquiry RBKC has rightly accepted that a completion certificate should not have been issued.^27472747 RBKC Module 1 Opening Submissions {RBK00055479/27} paragraph 105.

General observations

¶62.45 The two most serious errors made by Mr Hoban were, first, the failure to recognise that the presence of unmodified polyethylene cores rendered the ACM panels highly combustible, and second, the failure to recognise that the insulation, which was visible on the tower during his site visits,^27482748 Hoban {Day46/167:21}-{Day46/168:17}. was not of limited combustibility. For reasons we have explained elsewhere, neither of the insulation products should have been used in the overcladding of Grenfell Tower. In his statements Mr Hoban seems to suggest that the contractor might have used materials other than those that had been specified, but when he gave evidence he made it clear that he knew at the time that ACM was being used.

¶62.46 At the time of the refurbishment Mr Hoban was a senior building control surveyor and had worked at RBKC as a building control officer for over 25 years. However, part of the reason for those major errors was that he did not possess the knowledge and experience to be expected of a building control officer dealing with a project of that kind. In particular, there were some significant gaps in his understanding of the Building Regulations and important industry guidance so far as they concerned fire safety. He was an associate member of the Chartered Association of Building Engineers but understood that his grade of membership did not require him to engage in any regular professional training^27492749 Hoban {Day45/13:23}-{Day45/14:7}. and to a large extent it was left to him to decide what additional training he required. He attended conferences from time to time and read professional magazines,^27502750 Hoban {Day45/14:3-24}, {Day45/23:16-23}. but the only formal training he received was that which was provided by the department.

¶62.47 The building control department organised lunchtime seminars between four and six times a year^27512751 Allen {Day47/74:12-18}. (although no lunchtime seminars were held in 2016).^27522752 {RBK00051200}. They were generally delivered by the department's managers and were directed to specific topics relating to building control, such as the publication of a new edition of an Approved Document.^27532753 Hoban {Day45/17:18-21}; {Day45/20:2-25}. Training was provided on the new Approved Document B following its publication in 2010. On occasions, manufacturers or other industry professionals, such as architects or surveyors, were invited to deliver lunchtime seminars,^27542754 Hoban {Day45/30:1-10}. but Mr Hoban had not attended any seminars dealing with the overcladding of high-rise residential buildings.^27552755 Hoban {Day45/27:13-15}. Nor was he given any specific training on any other industry guidance.^27562756 Hoban {Day45/21:4-17}.

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¶62.48 The Grenfell Tower refurbishment was Mr Hoban's first residential high-rise overcladding project and, apart from the KALC project, for which he also assumed responsibility, his first design and build project. Surprisingly, Mr Allen was not aware of either fact,^27572757 Hoban {Day45/183:20-24}; Allen {Day47/133:18}-{Day47/114:7}. although we think he should have been.

¶62.49 Mr Hoban had a very limited grasp of industry guidance on rainscreen cladding, such as BR 135, which he had not read,^27582758 Hoban {Day45/52:12}-{Day45/53:15}; {Day45/59:15-22}; Menzies, Building Control{BMER0000004/97} paragraph 310; Menzies {Day60/81:7}-{Day60/83:4}. and was not aware of BCA Technical Guidance Note 18.^27592759 Hoban {Day45/66:1-6}; {Day45/67:6-12}; Menzies {Day60/80:20}-{Day60/81:1}. He should have been. His understanding of the BS 8414 tests and how they could be used to demonstrate compliance with functional requirement B4 was limited.^27602760 Hoban {Day45/37:21}-{Day45/40:17}; {Day45/68:6-22}; Menzies {Day60/103:21-23; {Day60/104:5-23}. None of the gaps in Mr Hoban's knowledge appear to have come to the attention of his managers and Mr Hoban himself does not appear to have taken any steps to develop his knowledge in those areas as part of his work on the refurbishment. He was aware, however, that cladding could provide a means of fire spread and that there was a need to fit cavity barriers;^27612761 Hoban {Day45/54:21}-{Day45/59:5}; {Day45/61:15-16}. and he was aware that cladding fires had occurred, both in this country and abroad, having seen references to them in the media.^27622762 Hoban {Day45/91:9}-{Day45/96:15}. He was not aware of the warnings to be found in industry guidance that some materials used in facades could generate molten or flaming debris and thereby contribute to the spread of fire^27632763 {BRE00005554/18}; Hoban {Day45/59:4-13}; {CEL00003364/11}; Hoban {Day45/60:4-16}; {Day45/64:7-23}. and did not seem to have a firm grasp on whether materials such as PIR insulation were of limited combustibility. Again, he should have been aware of those matters.

¶62.50 Mr Hoban was aware that manufacturers tend to present fire test data in misleading ways, but he did not regard himself as competent to examine test data for himself. He thought that was the responsibility of a fire engineer. Mr Allen and Ms Menzies both took a different view. We agree with them that a building control officer should be capable of examining manufacturers' information and test data critically and we do not understand why Mr Hoban thought otherwise. If he did not know how to read manufacturers' information or how to evaluate test data, he ought to have asked someone within the department for assistance.

¶62.51 Mr Hoban's opinion that the materials proposed for the refurbishment were suitable for their purpose appears to have been based at least in part on the fact that none of the other experienced professionals working on the project ever suggested that they might not comply with the Building Regulations.^27642764 Hoban {RBK00050416/10} page 10, paragraph 34(a). He trusted Studio E and Exova because he had worked with them on the KALC project and was reassured by the fact that Mr Ashton was involved in the refurbishment.^27652765 Hoban {Day45/202:6}-{Day46/204:10}. In his written evidence Mr Hoban said that at an initial meeting on site in November 2014 he had been told by representatives of Max Fordham, Exova and Siderise^27662766 Hoban {RBK00050416/17} page 17, paragraph 44. that the cladding would comply with the standards set out in Approved Document B.^27672767 Hoban {RBK00033934/8} page 8, paragraph 67; Hoban {RBK00050416/18} page 18, paragraph 44(c). However, no one representing Siderise was present at that meeting, which the minutes suggest concerned the smoke control system,^27682768 {MAX00004666}; {RBK00052478/5}. and Mr Ashton categorically denied having said anything of the kind.^27692769 Ashton {Day17/121:12}. There is no record of any such assurance in Mr Hoban's notes of the meeting and Mr Crawford could not recall a meeting where the compliance of the cladding system with Approved Document B had been discussed with him.^27702770 Crawford {Day11/186:4-8}. Mr Hoban was very confident in his recollection and it is possible that in the course of a casual conversation someone said that the cladding would comply with Approved Document B, but whatever was said, we do not accept that Mr Hoban was justified in relying on it to the extent of allowing important matters on a substantial project of this kind to go unchecked.

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¶62.52 Mr Hoban also relied on statements made to him by others that the same cladding system had been used elsewhere on buildings over 18 metres in height. He told us that he had discussed the cladding system with a person whom he described as "Harley's engineer" and had been told that it had been installed on many buildings of a similar height and construction throughout England and Wales.^27712771 Hoban {RBK00050416/11} page 11, paragraph 34(d); Hoban {RBK00033934/7} page 7, paragraph 66; Hoban {Day46/72:20-25}. Mr Hoban said that the person he had spoken to was probably Ben Bailey,^27722772 Hoban {Day46/71:20-24}. who had been introduced to him as an engineer by Simon O'Connor, Rydon's project manager.^27732773 Hoban {Day46/72:2-14}. Mr Hoban did not accept that that had led him to be complacent about compliance, but he did accept that it gave him confidence that the system was not new and had been used elsewhere.^27742774 Hoban {Day46/76:17-22}. Ben Bailey could not recall having had any conversations with Mr Hoban about the cladding system^27752775 Ben Bailey {Day40/23:20}-{Day40/24:9}. and doubted that he had told him that the cladding would comply with Approved Document B.^27762776 Ben Bailey {Day40/20:19-22}.

¶62.53 ACM rainscreen panels and PIR insulation had been used in the overcladding of other buildings over 18 metres in height and others involved in the project also felt reassured by that.^27772777 Crawford {Day10/148:8-19}; Rek {Day12/73:19}-{Day12/75:9}; Osgood {Day30/118:16-20}; Harris {Day34/53:2-12}; Sakula {Day125/110:3}-{Day125/111:7}. We think it quite likely that someone from Harley, possibly Ben Bailey, did tell Mr Hoban that similar materials had been used on other buildings and that that contributed to his understanding that they complied with the Building Regulations. We think he assumed that the other professionals involved in the project had satisfied themselves that the materials proposed for use in the cladding complied with Approved Document B and that he allowed himself to be lulled into a false sense of security.

¶62.54 Although Mr Hoban must bear primary responsibility for the failure of RBKC's building control department to deal properly with the refurbishment project, his ability to carry out his task effectively was hampered by an excessive workload and poor management of the department as a whole. He told us that he had been very busy at the time of the refurbishment^27782778 Hoban {Day46/156:4}-{Day46/157:2}; {Day46/157:20}-{Day46/158:2}. and candidly accepted that that had affected his work. That had led him to give priority to other work, particularly in 2015 and 2016.^27792779 Hoban {Day46/164:22}-{Day46/166:12}.

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¶62.55 The restructuring of RBKC's building control department in 2013 involved a substantial reduction in numbers.^27802780 Allen {Day47/99:14}-{Day47/100:4}; {Day47/101:17-22}; {Day47/102:19}-{Day47/103:6}, Hoban {Day45/107:1}-{Day45/109:16}. Both Mr Hoban and Mr Hanson said that at times after the restructuring they had experienced heavy workloads.^27812781 Hoban {Day45/110:7}-{Day45/113:12}. Mr Hoban's appraisal for 2015-16 refers to Mr Hoban covering the work of other colleagues {RBK00048753/3} and {RBK00048753/7}. Mr Crawford gave evidence that Mr Hoban had told him that he was overseeing "hundreds of projects" but Mr Hoban did not recall saying that, although his recollection was that he had been overseeing between 120 and 130 projects. Crawford {Day11/131:18-25}; Hoban {Day45/111:14}-{Day45/112:2}.Show full note John Allen said that with a small team there would be rare occasions on which a lot of work would come in at the same time and he would have to manage that and plug gaps,^27822782 {Day47/46:20}-{Day47/47:3}. but he did not accept that there had been a substantial increase in the amount of Mr Hoban's work after the restructuring.^27832783 Allen {Day47/121:13}-{Day47/123:20}. He also said that he had met his officers monthly to confirm that their workload was manageable and find out whether help was needed.^27842784 Allen {RBK00033930/3} page 3, paragraph 16; Mr Hoban agreed that he would meet Mr Allen monthly but said that his workload had not been discussed. Hoban {Day45/115:3-16}. Mr Allen could recall occasions on which he had offered Mr Hoban help and had reallocated some work to other officers.^27852785 Allen {Day47/120:24}-{Day47/121:12}. Mr Hoban said that he had asked for help in 2015 but his suggestions for lightening his load came at that time had come to nothing.^27862786 Hoban {Day46/157:20}-{Day46/158:2}. After he had left the witness box Mr Allen disclosed to the Inquiry his notes of his meetings with Mr Hoban. They show that Mr Allen had been aware that Mr Hoban had been struggling to carry out site visits between May 2014 and October 2015^27872787 {ALL00000003/3}-{ALL00000003/9}. and that in December 2015 Mr Hoban's records were not up to date.^27882788 {ALL00000003/9}.

¶62.56 There is some suggestion in the documents that in 2014 the building control department was overwhelmed with work.^27892789 {RYD00004218}. Mr Hoban told Neil Crawford that he was working on hundreds of projects, although Mr Crawford thought at the time that he might have been exaggerating.^27902790 Crawford {Day11/131:18-24}. Mr Hoban told us, however, that at that time he had been coming in to work at weekends^27912791 Hoban {Day45/116:5-18}. and although Mr Allen did not think that the department as a whole was overstretched,^27922792 Allen {Day47/105:8-10}. we think that Mr Hoban clearly was. At times during the period between 2014 and 2016 he was unable to manage his workload and the quality of his work suffered as a result. He did not feel able to ask for support from his manager and there was no one else to whom he could take his concerns.^27932793 Hoban {Day46/158:22}; {Day46/159:12}-{Day46/160:3}; Allen {Day47/137:18}-{Day47/138:17}. As a result, he gave priority to other projects, particularly in April 2015 when an additional area or "patch" was allocated to him.^27942794 Hoban {Day46/156:4}-{Day46.157:2}. He said that, in hindsight, he wished that he had been given more time to deal with the Grenfell refurbishment.^27952795 Hoban {Day46/212:22}-{Day46/213:8}; {Day46/215:21}-{Day46/216:2}. Mr Hoban was also dealing with difficulties in his personal life during the summer of 2016, which he accepted may have meant that he did not do things as he should have done.^27962796 Hoban {Day45/170:18}-{Day45/171:6}.

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¶62.57 There was also a failure by RBKC's building control department to ensure that officers within the department received the training they needed to do their work properly. A building control body should provide continuing professional development for its officers,^27972797 Menzies {Day60/51:6-9}; {Day60/51:19}-{Day60/52:9}. as is reflected in the Building Control Performance Standards.^27982798 Menzies, Building Control {BMER0000004/45} paragraph 178(a). As a member of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, Mr Allen was required to undertake regular training, and in the years 2013 to 2017 he had exceeded the minimum hours required of him. He took responsibility for providing technical training to his officers on matters to do with the Building Regulations,^27992799 Allen {Day47/72:19-35}. but did not organise training on Approved Document B generally or on the fire safety risks posed by cladding systems on high-rise buildings. Similarly, there does not appear to have been any system for ensuring that officers had the knowledge and understanding to examine manufacturers' information critically, nor were they told that it was important to read certificates, such as BBA certificates, critically and in their entirety. Mr Allen expected his officers to possess those skills already.^28002800 Allen {Day47/80:1-15}. We do not think that building control officers would normally expect to receive formal training on examining product literature, but that they would normally acquire that skill through their work and from discussions with others.^28012801 Menzies {Day60/99:20-22}.

¶62.58 On 31 December 2013, Paul Hanson sent Mr Allen a copy of a guide published by the British Standards Institution (BSI) entitled "Don't be a flaming liability".^28022802 {RBK00059350}; {RBK00059351}. The covering email drew attention to confusion within the construction industry about the meaning of Class 0 and the tendency of manufacturers to make misleading statements about the fire performance of their products. The guide itself drew attention to the fact that manufacturers often wrongly refer to Class 0 as meaning "fireproof". Mr Allen was aware of confusion in the industry about the meaning of Class 0.^28032803 Allen {Day47/151:18}-{Day47/153:1}. Mr Hoban could not recall whether he had been aware of it^28042804 Hoban {Day46/47:20-24}. but he had been aware of manufacturers' propensity to use misleading terms more generally.^28052805 Hoban {Day46/51:18-25}, {Day46/52:14-25}, {Day46/53:23-24}.

¶62.59 In October 2015, Jose Anon (John Allen's deputy at the time) attended the London District Surveyors' general meeting where those present discussed a building in Southwark over 18 metres in height on which PIR insulation had been installed. They were told that Kingspan had confirmed that its PIR insulation was combustible. The notes of the meeting also referred to the need for cladding to be of limited combustibility.^28062806 {RBK00001221/4}. Mr Allen did not know whether Mr Anon had shared that information with the RBKC building control team^28072807 Allen {Day47/85:12-16}. but in our view Mr Anon should have ensured that information of that kind was disseminated through the department.

¶62.60 Mr Allen told us that he had regular meetings with the officers and would assess their general competence^28082808 Allen {Day47/78:1-11}. but we saw no concrete evidence to suggest that he actively checked the officers' skills to ensure that they had a basic knowledge and understanding of the problems that could arise. The failure to monitor the knowledge and skills of individual officers and to ensure that they received the training needed for them to carry out their function effectively was in our view a serious weakness in the way RBKC's building control department was run. It was compounded by a failure to recognise that Mr Hoban was struggling to keep up with the work allocated to him and to take steps to ensure that he had the time and knowledge needed properly to oversee a project as substantial as the Grenfell refurbishment. The absence of a quality management system meant that the defects in Mr Hoban's work were not identified.

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¶62.61 Record-keeping within the department was poor. RBKC accepted that there was no formal procedure for tracking the progress of applications for building control approval and that that was a failure on its part. In addition, Mr Hoban's own record-keeping was poor. He failed to make an electronic record of the conditions applied to the full plans approval and failed to record the full extent of his site visits on the Acolaid system. Someone ought to have noticed that at the time and taken steps to address it. Mr Allen was aware that Mr Hoban was behind in writing up site visit notes.^28092809 {ALL00000003/9}.

¶62.62 In addition to the electronic file the department maintained a paper file. Unfortunately, however, that file has been lost. That is itself a ground of criticism, but RBKC's practice of weeding files before they were sent for storage means that even if the paper file had been available, the information it contained about Mr Hoban's work on the refurbishment was likely to be limited. Weeding of files is to be discouraged because it carries a high risk that documents whose true significance is not appreciated at the time are likely to be lost. The department's poor record-keeping practices have hampered our investigation.

¶62.63 We have no doubt that the shortcomings in the management of the department to which we have referred played a significant part in Mr Hoban's failure to carry out his role properly.

¶62.64 In its opening and closing statements, RBKC candidly admitted that the work of its building control officers fell below the standard that could reasonably be expected of them, but in our view its admissions did not cover the full extent of its failures. Although we have found that other parties, in particular those responsible for the design of the cladding, bear considerable responsibility for the fact that following the refurbishment the external wall of Grenfell Tower did not comply with the Building Regulations and was dangerous, building control was the last line of defence and had a statutory obligation to check for compliance with the Building Regulations. It had a responsibility to protect the public and it wholly failed to perform that function. It therefore bears considerable responsibility for the dangerous condition of Grenfell Tower immediately on completion of the refurbishment.

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