Chapter 63: The contribution of Studio E

Chapter 63: The contribution of Studio E

Introduction

¶63.1 Studio E was the architect for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. It provided architectural services in respect of the project between approximately February 2012 and July 2016. As architect, Studio E had primary responsibility for the design of the facade of Grenfell Tower, among other aspects of the refurbishment. We have concluded that Studio E fell well below the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent architect in respect of that work. Its failures relating to the design of the external wall and the selection of materials to be used in its construction had catastrophic consequences. Studio E therefore bears a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster.

Paul Hyett's evidence

¶63.2 Since we could foresee that questions of architectural practice might arise in the course of our investigations, we instructed Mr Paul Hyett to prepare a written report dealing with the various aspects of the refurbishment, including the professional standards to be expected of a reasonably competent architect, and the work of Studio E.^28102810 {PHYR0000032}; His main report was dated October 2019 and was revised in August 2020 {PHYR0000024}-{PHYR0000037}; He also produced a supplemental report in September 2020 which provided additional commentary on the opinions set out in his original report {PHYS0000001}-{PHYS0000005}. In its closing statement Studio E suggested that Mr Hyett did not have the experience or expertise needed to express an opinion on any aspect of overcladding a high-rise building, having had little or no personal experience of such work. It also suggested that, when expressing views about the use of the materials used in the cladding, he had ignored the fact that similar materials had been used on many buildings across the country on which reputable architects had presumably been employed. He had thus chosen not to consider evidence of what a responsible body of professional architects would have done at the time of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. We were therefore asked to place little or no weight on his evidence.^28112811 {SEA00014645/2} paragraph 1.5.

¶63.3 It is not in dispute, however, that Mr Hyett has had a long and distinguished career as an architect, including over 40 years of post-qualification experience in England and internationally. Between 2004 and 2020 he was a principal at HKS Architects^28122812 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000026/2} paragraph 1.1.5. before retiring in 2020 to run a consultancy advising on architectural services.^28132813 Hyett {Day63/10:1-6}. He is a member of the Royal Institute of British Architects ("RIBA") and was its President from September 2000 to August 2002.^28142814 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000026/2} paragraph 1.1.2. He also has a special interest in and experience of the education of architects. He was the RIBA Council member responsible for architectural education from 1998 to 2001, has acted as an external examiner at various universities, reported to the Burton Review of Architectural Education and later acted as deputy chair to the Stansfield Smith Review of Architectural Education. He is an honorary fellow of the American Institute of Architecture, the Royal Society of Architects in Wales and the Chartered Association of Building Engineers.^28152815 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000035} Appendix 4; For discussion of Mr Hyett's previous experience on particular building projects, including high-rise overcladding projects, see Hyett {Day63/54:18}-{Day63/60:16}.

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¶63.4 Mr Hyett candidly accepted that his personal experience of overcladding projects was limited.^28162816 Hyett {Day63/55:2-12}. However, the breadth and depth of his career made him well qualified to advise on how an architectural practice should approach a project that is outside the scope of its primary expertise. Much of his evidence was directed to identifying the steps that a competent practice should take and the questions it should ask itself in those circumstances and did not require direct experience of overcladding projects. We have no evidence of the circumstances in which similar materials may have been used on other buildings and in any event, we do not think that the use of what may have been inappropriate materials in other circumstances can assist us. In view of Mr Hyett's professional experience we are satisfied that he was well qualified to give evidence about the standards that could reasonably be expected of a firm like Studio E when undertaking a new project such as the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. In general, we found his evidence to be thorough and careful, reflecting an awareness of what it was reasonable to expect from an architect in general practice. It is worth noting that Studio E did not ask us to hear evidence from someone whose opinions differed from his.

Studio E's experience and expertise

¶63.5 The refurbishment of Grenfell Tower was a new type of project for Studio E, which did not have any significant experience in refurbishing or overcladding high-rise residential buildings.^28172817 Kuszell {Day6/20:7-19}; {Day6/11:19-22}; Sounes {Day6/173:14-16}; Sounes {SEA00014273/114} page 114, paragraph 271; Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000027/15} page 15, paragraph 2.5.5; {PHYR0000027/16} page 16, paragraph 2.5.12(a). Andrzej Kuszell accepted that it is unlikely that the firm would have won the commission if it had been put out to tender because of its lack of relevant experience.^28182818 Kuszell {Day6/70:10-16}. Having said that, we do not think that Studio E can be criticised for accepting the appointment, because architects can be expected to take on work outside their traditional areas of specialism from time to time.^28192819 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000027/17} paragraph 2.5.12(b); {PHYR0000027/18} paragraph 2.5.14. Hyett {Day63/80:5-18}; Hyett {Day63/82:7}-{Day63/83:17}. However, even before it had agreed to undertake the project, it should have been readily apparent to Mr Kuszell that none of the existing partners or employees had the relevant knowledge, experience or skills that would be needed. Indeed, Bruce Sounes appears to have recognised that some steps were required to improve existing knowledge and skills because he told Mr Kuszell in February 2012 that Studio E was "a little green on process and technicality" and proposed "some rapid CDP" [sic].^28202820 {SEA00003567}. However, he told us that his concerns related to the logistics of carrying out work in an occupied building rather than designing the external wall, which he considered to be straightforward.^28212821 Sounes {Day6/186:1-14}; {Day6/187:2-7}; {Day6/192:12-16}. In the end the "rapid CPD" consisted of nothing more than a discussion with Max Fordham and some research on the internet into overcladding high-rise residential buildings.^28222822 Sounes {Day6/192: 3-16}; {Day6/192:18}-{Day6/193:14}.

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¶63.6 In our view it was necessary for Studio E to engage someone who could bring to the firm specific experience of overcladding a high-rise residential building^28232823 Hyett {Day63/86:2}-{Day63/87:23}; {Day64/3:20}-{Day64/4:3}; Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000027/17} paragraph 2.5.12(b) and {PHYR0000027/18} paragraph 2.5.14; Hyett {Day63/80:5-18}; {Day63/82:7}-{Day63/83:17}. to ensure that it could provide the necessary services with appropriate skill and care.^28242824 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000027/17} paragraph 2.5.12(b); {PHYR0000027/18} paragraph 2.5.14; Hyett {Day63/80:5-18}; {Day63/82:7}-{Day63/83:17}. However, Studio E did not do so and appears to have thought, both at the time and in hindsight, that that was unnecessary because it could acquire the necessary knowledge and skills as the project progressed.^28252825 Kuszell {SEA00014271/11} page 11, paragraph 41; Kuszell {Day6/77:1}-{Day6/78:14}, {Day6/79:12}-{Day6/80:24}; Sounes {Day6/199:11-17}. As a result it failed to ensure that it was properly equipped to perform its obligations to the TMO.

Studio E's role and responsibilities

¶63.7 Studio E was appointed as lead consultant and lead designer. As lead consultant it was responsible for advising on the need for, and the scope of services to be provided by, consultants, specialists, sub-contractors and suppliers and for monitoring the work of other consultants. As lead designer it was responsible for co-ordinating the design of all constructional elements, including work by consultants, specialists and suppliers and for determining materials, elements and components.^28262826 {SEA00009824/5}. However, Studio E appears to have laboured under a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of its obligations. As a result, it treated sub-contractors and consultants as solely responsible for their work and assumed, without enquiry, that it met the required standards. Throughout its evidence and submissions to the Inquiry, Studio E's witnesses sought to place responsibility on others, such as Max Fordham, Exova, Harley and building control for ensuring that work was of the required standard. In particular, Studio E maintained that it was for others to ensure that materials chosen for use in the construction of the cladding were suitable and would ensure compliance with the Building Regulations. That was clearly wrong. Although others involved in the refurbishment had incurred separate obligations of their own in relation to the quality of the work and materials used, Studio E had an overriding obligation, initially to the TMO and subsequently to Rydon, to ensure that the work was carried out properly and the choices of materials were suitable.

The outline design

¶63.8 Bruce Sounes was given the responsibility of managing the project on behalf of Studio E. He said that he had been aware in a general way of the requirements of Part B of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations and Approved Document B, but he did not take any steps to familiarise himself with it in any detail at the beginning of the project and did not take the trouble to understand its significance for the project he was taking on.^28272827 Sounes {Day7/132:7-21}. He occasionally referred to Approved Document B^28282828 Sounes {Day7/135:6-9}. but did not read the guidance relating to requirement B4 and did not appear to have any clear understanding of what it entailed.^28292829 Sounes {Day7/136:6-20}.

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¶63.9 Although Mr Sounes agreed that it was Studio E's responsibility to investigate any legislative requirements relating to the project at the earliest opportunity in the design process,^28302830 Hyett {Day64/41:4-18}; {Day64/55:12-16}; Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000027/46} paragraph 2.9.2 and 2.9.4; {PHYR0000027/47-48} paragraphs 2.9.6 and 2.9.8; Hyett {Day64/41:19-24}; Sounes {Day7/85:1-8}; {Day7/88:1-18}; {Day7/127:8-22}; {Day7/128:18-23}; {Day7/130:14}-{Day7/131:9}; {Day7/184:15-19}; {Day7/134:25}-{Day7/135:5}. he did not do so or ensure that someone else did. That was a basic error and his consequent ignorance of paragraphs 12.5 to 12.9 of Approved Document B meant that he was unaware of the guidance it contained on the risks arising from the use of certain materials and the ways in which compliance with functional requirement B4(1) could be achieved. He therefore gave no thought to the manner in which compliance was to be ensured.^28312831 Hyett {Day64/43:6}-{Day64/44:14}; {Day64/58:5-9}. In its opening statement Studio E suggested that, taken as a whole, its design might have been capable of complying with the Building Regulations (presumably when the work had been completed) and that projects often proceed to advanced stages with designs in relation to which the method of achieving compliance with the Building Regulations has not yet been fully considered.^28322832 Studio E's written opening statement {SEA00014642/20} paragraphs 9.10 and 9.11. However, that is not consistent with Mr Sounes' own evidence^28332833 See the references at footnote [2655] above. or with the terms of the contract between Studio E and the TMO (and subsequently Rydon), under which Studio E had an obligation to seek to ensure that all designs complied with the relevant statutory requirements.^28342834 Schedule of services, clause 8. In our view, in failing to review Approved Document B and to consider carefully its significance for the project Mr Sounes fell seriously below the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent architect.^28352835 Hyett {Day64/63:23}-{Day64/64:2}.

¶63.10 One consequence of the approach adopted by Mr Sounes was that he did not take active responsibility for the choice of the materials that were to form part of the external wall of the building. Instead of satisfying himself independently of their suitability, he assumed that, because others appeared to be satisfied that both the ACM panels and the Celotex insulation were acceptable for use in that context, there was nothing to worry about. He therefore failed to identify that both were composed of combustible materials and failed to recognise the dangers of using them in an external wall. As a consequence, the external wall did not comply with functional requirement B4(1).^28362836 Phase 1 Report Volume IV paragraph 26.4. Those were serious errors that had direct and catastrophic consequences.

¶63.11 Any reasonably competent architect should have known, or at any rate should have taken the trouble to discover, that paragraphs 12.5 and 12.7 of Approved Document B contained a warning against the use of combustible materials in external walls.^28372837 Hyett {Day64/65:14}-{Day64/66:23}. Indeed, Leadbitter warned Studio E against the use of combustible insulation behind the rainscreen in January 2013.^28382838 {MET00081282}. This email was only disclosed to the Inquiry by the MPS in May 2023. The Celotex FR5000 specified by Studio E was a polyisocyanurate material and as such was combustible. Any competent architect ought to have known that, or, if uncertain about its composition, should have discovered it. However, notwithstanding the clear terms of paragraph 12.7 of Approved Document B, Studio E specified Celotex FR5000 for use in the external wall without giving any consideration to whether the resulting structure would comply with functional requirement B4(1). That was a significant failure.^28392839 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/49} paragraph 4.3.24; {PHYR0000029/93} paragraph 4.4.41.

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¶63.12 We have described in Chapter 56 how FR5000 came to be included in the NBS Specification and non-combustible insulation was ruled out. Mr Sounes accepted Max Fordham's suggestion that they should aim for a U-value of 0.15 W/m2K, but neither he nor anyone else at Studio E gave any independent thought to whether an alternative solution was available or to whether the proposed U-value was acceptable if it could be achieved only by using combustible insulation.

¶63.13 As lead designer, Studio E was responsible for deciding what U-value could reasonably be achieved and how, and Mr Sounes was at fault in failing to recognise that. Max Fordham provided him with technical data relating to Celotex FR5000 by way of an example in order to assist his calculations; it was inappropriate for him to treat that as advice from Max Fordham to use FR5000. It was even more inappropriate to accept it uncritically without taking steps to understand the nature of the product and satisfying himself of its suitability. That was a serious error on the part of Mr Sounes.

¶63.14 Similarly, Mr Sounes did not take any steps to ensure that the rainscreen panels proposed for the cladding were consistent with the guidance in Approved Document B or were likely to meet the functional requirements of the Building Regulations. He appears to have been content to include ACM PE panels in the NBS specification (albeit as an alternative) for aesthetic reasons and because he knew they had been used on other projects,^28402840 Sounes {Day7/170:2-5}; Sounes {SEA00014273/140} page 140, paragraph 343; Sounes {Day20/93:12}-{Day20/95:14}. rather than in reliance on any detailed information he had obtained about the nature of the product based on the manufacturer's literature or the certificate of a recognised certifying body.^28412841 Sounes {Day20/135:1-7}.

¶63.15 When he was first considering options for the cladding panels, Mr Sounes did not address his mind to fire performance.^28422842 Sounes {Day20/83:8-12}; Geof Blades did not recall the content of the conversation – see Blades {Day41/85:3-7}. He did not consider whether any of the panels he had in mind were consistent with the guidance in Approved Document B and although he did propose some panels that had a fire-resistant core^28432843 {SEA00005320}; {SEA00005330}. This panel was not ultimately selected for inclusion in the NBS Specification. or were non-combustible,^28442844 {SEA00014616/41} paragraph 1.2. that was coincidental and did not reflect a judgment based on information he had obtained about their reaction to fire.^28452845 Sounes {Day20/89:20-25}. Unfortunately, Mr Sounes was not aware that ACM panels could be produced with different cores.^28462846 Sounes {Day20/176:17-24}.

¶63.16 The production of the NBS Specification, which identified the materials to be used in the facade, was left to junior assistants at Studio E, mainly Tomas Rek and before him Adrian Jess.^28472847 Sounes {Day7/151:7}-{Day7/152: 3}. Bruce Sounes told us that only some of the initial draft of the specification had been discussed with him and that he had trusted them to complete it without reference to him,^28482848 Sounes {Day7/152:4-8}. but neither of them appears to have given any consideration to the suitability of the materials intended for use in the external wall. As the architect responsible for the project Mr Sounes should have supervised their work. In particular, he should have satisfied himself that they had properly investigated the suitability of any materials or products they had included in the specification or, if they had not, should have satisfied himself independently that they were suitable. In fact, no further consideration of the materials was undertaken after they had been included in the specification and his failure to do either of those things was a significant error.^28492849 Hyett {Day64/69:6-18}; {Day64/72:21}-{Day64/73:15}; {Day64/76:14}-{Day64/77:5}; {Day64/123:23}-{Day64/124:25}.

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¶63.17 Studio E produced three versions of the NBS Specification, one on 21 November 2013,^28502850 {SEA00000152}. one on 29 November 2013^28512851 {SEA00000153}. This version was issued to tenderers. and one on 30 January 2014.^28522852 {SEA00000169}. Mr Sounes confirmed that no one at Studio E had satisfied themselves before they were drawn up that the materials referred to in any of those versions would ensure compliance with the Building Regulations.^28532853 Sounes {Day7/170:2-5}; {Day20/173:12-24}; Rek {Day12/20:15-20}; {Day12/22:25}-{Day12/23:2}; {Day12/24:16-21}, {Day12/27:7-21}. That was a fundamental failing on the part of Studio E which had significant consequences. Mr Sounes sought to explain that omission by telling us that Studio E would not usually expect to verify compliance of all materials and products before submitting a full plans application to building control,^28542854 Sounes {SEA00014273/121} page 121, paragraph 292. and that to do so would be wasted work if the contractor subsequently made a change.^28552855 Sounes {Day20/64:21}-{Day20/65:7}. He also suggested that building control might take a different view of the proposals and that it was not common practice to carry out a full assessment of compliance with the functional requirements of Part B of Schedule 1 at RIBA stages D or E.^28562856 Sounes {Day20/65:1-3}.

¶63.18 Mr Sounes was wrong in his understanding. Under its contract with the TMO, it was Studio E's responsibility to ensure that the materials included in the NBS Specification complied with the Building Regulations.^28572857 Appendix B: Schedule of Services {SEA00009824/7}: "co-ordinating design of all constructional elements, including work by consultants, specialists or suppliers" and "determining materials, elements and components, standards of workmanship, type of construction and performance in use". We accept Mr Hyett's evidence that if an architect specifies a particular product to be used, he assumes responsibility for making sure that its use is compatible with the functional requirements in the Building Regulations.^28582858 Hyett {Day64/69:6-18}; {Day64/72:21}-{Day64/73:15}; {Day64/76:14}-{Day64/77:5}; {Day64/123:23}-{Day64/124:25}. Tomas Rek and Neil Crawford assumed that Mr Sounes had satisfied himself that the products and materials included in the specification were suitable, but neither of them took steps to verify that assumption or to satisfy themselves independently that they were. When he handed the project over to Mr Crawford, Bruce Sounes did not warn him that he had not carried out any investigation into the materials to be used in the cladding to satisfy himself that they were suitable.^28592859 Rek {Day12/44:22}-{Day12/45:1}; Crawford {Day9/139:14}-{Day9/140:13}; {Day9/146:4-6}. In failing to satisfy itself that the materials specified would enable the refurbished building to comply with the Building Regulations, Studio E, and particular Mr Sounes, Mr Crawford and Mr Rek, fell seriously below the standard to be expected of persons in their positions.

¶63.19 Mr Sounes sought to justify the choice of materials by asserting that Studio E had asked for advice about them and that it was not for Studio E to satisfy itself that the products were suitable because it did not have the ability to do so.^28602860 Sounes {Day7/170:21}-{Day7/171:4}. We do not accept that. We saw no evidence that Mr Sounes had asked any specialist for advice or that he had received any advice that would satisfy a reasonably competent architect that the products specified in the proposed application were suitable for the purpose and would not result in the refurbished building contravening the Building Regulations.

¶63.20 Mr Sounes himself did not consider whether the proposed use of Celotex FR5000 above 18 metres met the guidance in Approved Document B or would result in the external wall's complying with functional requirement B4(1). He did not ask Max Fordham that question^28612861 Sounes {Day20/42:6-11}. nor did he seek any advice from Exova about it.^28622862 Sounes {Day20/42:12}-{Day20/43:6}. Nor did anyone else at Studio E discuss the matter with Exova. Similarly, Mr Sounes did not investigate whether any of the various alternative rainscreen products proposed in the NBS Specification were suitable, including the ACM panels which were included as an alternative to zinc.^28632863 Sounes {Day20/173:12-24}. Although he said that he had carried out research and had consulted others, including Exova,^28642864 Sounes {SEA00014273/140) page 140, paragraph 343.2. he was not able to point to any particular advice he had received,^28652865 Sounes {Day8/57:2}-{Day8/58:6}. and at no point did he ask Exova to comment on the suitability of any of the rainscreen products included in the NBS Specification.

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¶63.21 Industry guidance was available at the time which contained warnings about the dangers associated with the use of certain kinds of rainscreen panels. In particular, the Standard for Systemised Building Envelopes, Part 6, published by the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology (CWCT), which was incorporated into the NBS Specification,^28662866 {SEA00000169/69} Clauses 310 and 342. contained important information on the fire performance of materials to be used in the external envelope of a building and specific guidance on aluminium envelope systems to include composite components as well as insulation materials.^28672867 {CWCT0000046}. However, no one at Studio E was familiar with the CWCT standard or had even read it^28682868 Rek {Day12/19:14-18}; {Day12/34:14-17}; {Day12/39:1-16}; Crawford {Day9/146:15-17}; Sounes {Day7/164:14-18}. and no one troubled to check it at the time. Similarly, it failed to consider the warnings about use of combustible materials in cladding systems contained in BR 135, even though the publication had been included in the structural engineer's specification.^28692869 Crawford {Day10/69:8}-{Day10/70:5}; {CCL00001449/11} paragraph 7.1.13. As a result, Studio E specified products that did not reflect any of that guidance.

¶63.22 The fact is that Mr Sounes simply assumed that all the cladding panels included in the NBS Specification were suitable for the refurbishment because they had been used on other projects.^28702870 Sounes {Day7/170:2-5}; Sounes {SEA00014273/140} page 140, paragraph 343; Sounes {Day20/93:12}-{Day20/95:14, {Day20/68:5-14}. In its opening statement Studio E sought to justify the use of ACM material and PIR insulation by reference to their frequency of use by others on previous projects,^28712871 Studio E's Opening Submissions {SEA00014642/16-17} paragraph 8.16; {SEA00014262/24} paragraph 10.11; {SEA00014262/36} paragraph 15.17. but we do not accept that. Relying on what others have done in the past is not good enough when the practice in question affects people's safety, is inconsistent with industry guidance and, most importantly, does not withstand rational scrutiny.

¶63.23 Mr Sounes was the lead designer responsible for the project at the time the NBS Specification was compiled. It was therefore his responsibility to ensure that the materials specified in it were consistent with the requirements of the Building Regulations. He failed to do so. He also failed to make it clear to the TMO, Rydon and Harley that Studio E had not taken steps to satisfy itself by reference to testing or other data that the materials included in the specification would result in an external wall that complied with the regulations. He was at fault in not doing so.

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¶63.24 Studio E failed to devise a proper cavity barrier strategy for the overcladding system, which led to ever-increasing confusion as the project developed.^28722872 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/66} paragraph 4.3.69 and {PHYR0000029/76} paragraphs 4.3.83 to 4.3.86. The cavity barrier strategy should have been established by the time the tender documents were published.^28732873 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/64} paragraph 4.3.63 and {PHYR0000029/76} paragraph 4.3.86. The strategy produced by Studio E was seriously deficient in failing to include a cavity barrier at the window sill.^28742874 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/65} paragraph 4.3.68; {SEA00002499}; {PHYR0000029/76} paragraph 4.3.83. In addition, the drawings did not place the cavity barrier above the window close enough to the head of the window,^28752875 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000028/62} paragraph 3.8.12.; Figure 3.30 and 3.29 produced by reference to {HAR00003958}. there were no cavity barriers included in the bay elevations and none of the elevation drawings of the complete facade were marked to show the presence of cavity barriers.^28762876 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/66-67} paragraph 4.3.69; figure 4.50. No cavity barriers had been included at the junction of the cladding and the crown.^28772877 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/75} paragraph 4.3.81; {SEA00002551}. Those errors indicate that no one at Studio E had given any clear thought during the preparation of the tender documents to the strategy for dividing the cavities behind the rainscreen into fireproof compartments.

¶63.25 On the basis of Mr Hyett's evidence we are satisfied that at tender stage Studio E should have produced drawings showing all vertical and horizontal cavity barriers for all bay and column conditions for all four facade elevations at 1:20 scale and at 1:5 scale for details around the windows where they abutted the columns.^28782878 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/68} paragraphs 4.3.71-4.3.72; {SEA00002499}; {SEA00010474}; {PHYR0000029/76} paragraph 4.3.85; {SEA00002551}. We accept his criticism that Studio E should have identified the clash between the brackets and supporting angles and sought to resolve it.^28792879 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/69} paragraph 4.3.73; {PHYR0000029/71} paragraph 4.3.77-4.3.78; {PHYR0000029/76} paragraph 4.3.86.

¶63.26 We do not accept that the design of a cavity barrier strategy could be left entirely to Harley as the cladding sub-contractor. It was Studio E's responsibility to explore and resolve the strategy at tender stage in order that the details subsequently produced by Harley were properly based.^28802880 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000028/63} paragraph 3.18.13; See also {SEA00009824/7} under the subheading "Designers, including Lead Designer". Studio E had responsibility for: determining materials, elements and components, standards of workmanship, type of construction and performance in use for the design.

Consultation with Exova

¶63.27 Although Exova became involved in the project at an early stage, Studio E's interest in obtaining its advice was directed mainly to the work involved in creating new dwellings in the lowest floors of Grenfell Tower. In April 2012 Bruce Sounes sent Exova information about the refurbishment, including some architectural drawings, and later that month a representative of Exova attended a design team meeting at which the overcladding was discussed. However, Studio E did not consult Exova about that aspect of the project and did not keep it informed of progress generally.^28812881 See, for example, the failure to send the Stage D report. Hyett {Day64/205:5-12}. Most importantly, Studio E failed to take a close interest in Exova's work on the Outline Fire Safety Strategy, which, as we have noted elsewhere, remained materially incomplete in the absence of advice on the fire safety of the proposed overcladding and its effect on functional requirement B4. Studio E did not notice the absence from the strategy of any reference to the cladding.^28822882 Sounes {Day8/65:5}-{Day8/66:5} (version 1 OFSS); {Day8/68:19}-{Day8/69:3} (version 2 OFSS); {Day12/149:13-24} (version 3 OFSS). More significantly, at no stage did Mr Sounes ask Exova to clarify its advice on functional requirement B4,^28832883 Sounes {Day8/51:6-24}; {Day8/69:18-24}. although he accepted that the implications of the overcladding for the spread of fire over the external walls of the building had never been discussed in writing by Exova or any other fire consultant.^28842884 Sounes {Day12/155:25}-{Day12/156:6}. He did not discuss it with Terrence Ashton because he did not regard it as a matter of concern.^28852885 Sounes {Day8/53:17-21}. Although Bruce Sounes originally expected Exova to complete its advice in a future version of the Outline Fire Safety Strategy,^28862886 Sounes {Day8/52:12-15}. he ought to have pressed for it to be completed when version 3 was issued just before the tender documents were published and it was clear that part of it remained outstanding.^28872887 Ashton {Day17/48:5-17}. However, he failed to do so. He thought it was the responsibility of the design and build contractor to ensure that the advice was completed,^28882888 Sounes {Day12/157:6}-{Day12/158:20}. but he failed to warn the TMO or Rydon that Exova's work had not been finished.

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¶63.28 Studio E was reassured generally by the fact that Exova had been instructed on the project, even though it did not provide Exova with the full range of information that would have enabled it to provide proper advice and did not question the limited advice that it did receive.^28892889 Sounes {SEA00014273/140} page 140, paragraph 343.2. For example, Neil Crawford said that he had felt confident about the choice of insulation and the design of the cavity barriers because he had understood that Exova had a wealth of knowledge of similar projects.^28902890 Crawford {Day9/177:6-11}. However, he had no idea on what basis Exova might have concluded that the design of the external wall complied with the Building Regulations.^28912891 Crawford {Day9/177:3-5}.

Design errors following the novation to Rydon

¶63.29 As had been envisaged at the outset,^28922892 See Chapter 52. Studio E's services were eventually transferred to Rydon following its appointment as principal contractor for the refurbishment. Although proposals relating to a formal contract were exchanged in April 2014, it was not until nearly two years later that the relationship between them was eventually encapsulated in a deed dated 3 February 2016. No satisfactory explanation for the delay was put forward, although Neil Crawford said that it was not unusual for projects to run to the end with no formal contract in existence.^28932893 Crawford {Day9/68:18-19}. This seems to us to be another example of a cavalier attitude to formalities which appears to have been shared by many of those involved in the project and which is liable to lead to a failure to understand where responsibilities lie.

¶63.30 Under the deed Studio E warranted that it had exercised and would continue to exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence in the discharge of the services covered by the deed to the standard reasonably to be expected of a competent professional experienced in the provision of professional services for works similar in size, scope, complexity, quality and nature to the development.^28942894 {RYD00094228/3} Clause 2.3. The language thus made it clear that the undertaking covered all the work on the refurbishment that Studio E had done for Rydon in the past, as well as any that it might do for it in the future.^28952895 And see also {RYD00094228/3} Clause 2.1 which provided that Studio E "has and will continue to perform for [Rydon] the Services in respect of the development"; Bruce Sounes understood the time that the obligation had retrospective effect: Sounes {Day7/102:15}-{Day7/103:5}. Studio E also undertook to seek to ensure that all aspects of the architectural designs complied with the Employer's Requirements,^28962896 {RYD00094228/9} Item 4. Bruce Sounes confirmed that he understood at the time that that was Studio E's obligation to Rydon: Sounes {Day7/105:6-25}; Neil Crawford said that in February 2016 he had not known that Studio E was under that obligation to Rydon: Crawford {Day9/53:4-10}; {Day9/60:15}-{Day9/61:3}. and that all designs complied with the relevant statutory requirements.^28972897 {RYD00094228/9}; Both Bruce Sounes and Neil Crawford understood that that 'statutory requirements' included the Building Regulations and the CDM Regulations: Sounes {Day7/107:8-16}; Crawford {Day9/62:8-13}. It also agreed to co-ordinate any design work done by consultants, specialist contractors, subcontractors and suppliers^28982898 {RYD00094228/10} Item 13. and to be responsible for co-ordinating the steps needed to obtain building control approval.^28992899 {RYD00094228/9} Item 7.

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¶63.31 We think it clear that the deed imposed an obligation on Studio E to take reasonable steps to ensure that all designs, whether produced by itself or sub-contractors, complied with the relevant statutory requirements, including the Building Regulations 2010. That would include identifying any obvious instances of non-compliance with the Building Regulations and the associated statutory guidance, including Approved Document B, in any drawings which were provided to Studio E for review. However, Bruce Sounes did not think that Studio E had any obligation to check the work of Rydon's subcontractors to ensure that it complied with the Building Regulations.^29002900 Sounes {Day7/112:15}-{Day7/113:8}. He thought that specialist sub-contractors were responsible for the design element of their work and were themselves responsible for ensuring that it complied with any statutory requirements. In his view, building control was primarily responsible for confirming compliance.^29012901 Sounes {Day7/124:4-11}. Neil Crawford's understanding was fundamentally the same.^29022902 Crawford {Day9/62:20-24}; {Day9/70:25}-{Day9/71:5}; {Day9/63:7-12}; {Day9/71:20}-{Day9/72:5}. They appear to have had their own understanding of the obligations being assumed by Studio E, which did not bear much relationship to the language used in the document.

Rainscreen panels

¶63.32 Bruce Sounes received a copy of the BBA certificate for the Reynobond ACM panels in April 2014^29032903 Sounes {SEA00014273/153} page 153, paragraph 377; {SEA00002686}. but failed to read it in full carefully.^29042904 Sounes {Day21/12:5-7}; {Day21/13:1-3}. He thought that Rydon had taken over responsibility for the design and that it was not his function to assess the suitability of any material that might be used.^29052905 Sounes {Day21/16:22}-{Day21/18:12}. Mr Crawford, who came into the project in the summer of 2014, thought it unlikely that he had looked at the BBA certificate.^29062906 Crawford {Day10/149:22}-{Day10/150:13}.

¶63.33 Although Mr Hyett did not think that the dangers posed by ACM PE panels were well known to architects generally at that time, he was nonetheless critical of Studio E's failure to investigate their fire performance. In his report Mr Hyett said that he considered it reasonable for an architect reading just the first page of the BBA certificate relating to Reynobond to conclude that the product was rated Class 0 and so met the guidance given in paragraph 12.6 and diagram 40 of Approved Document B. He said that he did not consider that an architect could be criticised for taking the statement on the front of the certificate at face value and not going on to read section 6, which contained further information about the product's behaviour in relation to fire.^29072907 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/97} paragraph 4.4.55; {PHYR0000029/106} paragraph 4.4.88; {PHYR0000029/106} paragraph 4.4.90; Hyett {Day64/137:15}-{Day64/138:23}; {Day64/144:5-13}; {Day64/145:9-14}; {Day64/148:8-16}. Mr Hyett noted, however, that the certificate related to only one colour sample and warned that other colours might not have met the same standard.^29082908 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/57} paragraph 4.3.35(a); {PHYR0000029/96} paragraph 4.4.51 and 4.4.54; {PHYR0000029/99} paragraph 4.4.59.

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¶63.34 In the course of giving evidence, however, Mr Hyett changed his opinion. Having been asked to give further consideration to the contents and structure of the BBA certificate, he accepted that the first page was directing the reader to the various sections containing more detailed information on different characteristics. He agreed that it was directing the reader to section 6 for information about the product's behaviour in relation to fire and that a reasonably competent architect would not read the statements on the first page in isolation from the rest of the document.^29092909 Hyett {Day64/149:2}-{Day64/150:7}; {Day64/151:8-15}; {Day64/160:1-6}. He thought that a reasonably competent architect would conclude from section 6.4 of the certificate that the panels used at Grenfell Tower were not covered by the certificate because they were not the same colour or finish as those described in the certificate.^29102910 Hyett {Day64/157:4-17}. In those circumstances he was of the view that the architect ought to have investigated the fire performance of the panels with the manufacturer.^29112911 Hyett {Day64/157:18}-{Day64/158:3}. He was also of the opinion that a reasonably competent architect ought to have understood from reading the BBA certificate that the product was available in a fire retardant version,^29122912 Hyett {Day64/158:5}-{Day64/159:18}. which should have prompted him to ask for advice about the difference between the two versions of the product and whether the use of the fire retardant version would be more appropriate.^29132913 Hyett {Day64/159:20}-{Day64/160:6}.

¶63.35 We do not find Hr Hyett's change of heart surprising, because a formal document such as a BBA certificate is designed to be read as a whole. There would be no point in including the information contained in the later sections if it were not of potential importance to the reader. We accept Mr Hyett's opinion that once Studio E had become aware in or around March 2014 of the plan to substitute the Reynobond 55 PE for the zinc rainscreen panel originally specified,^29142914 Chapter 55. it ought to have conducted an urgent investigation into its characteristics in order to satisfy itself that the external wall as a whole would comply with the requirements of the Building Regulations.^29152915 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/94} paragraph 4.4.45. Studio E as lead designer was responsible for satisfying itself that the product was suitable for use and for obtaining advice from Exova if it was in any doubt.^29162916 Hyett {Day64/128:25}-{Day64/130:5}; {Day64/130:15}-{Day64/131:9}. We consider that in failing to do so Studio E fell seriously below the standard of a reasonably competent architect. Mr Sounes appears to have thought that, in relation to a project being carried out under a design and build contract, the architect, having become a consultant engaged by the contractor, had no responsibility for overseeing what others were doing.^29172917 Sounes {Day20/71:3-14}. That was wrong, however, because after its services had been transferred from the TMO to Rydon Studio E remained responsible for ensuring the suitability of the proposed cladding panels.^29182918 {RYD00094228/9} item 8 and {RYD00094228/10} item 13.

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¶63.36 Mr Sounes and Mr Crawford should have read the BBA certificate in full carefully. It was a short document and plainly an important one. Even though by that time Studio E's services had been transferred to Rydon, it remained under an obligation to exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence in the discharge of its services,^29192919 {RYD00094228/3} clause 2.3. which included seeking to ensure that all designs complied with the relevant statutory requirements.^29202920 {RYD00094228/9} item 8 and {RYD00094228/10} item 13. We were troubled by Mr Sounes' practice of not reading the whole of the BBA certificate for any product he was planning to recommend for a project. His failure to do so fell very far below the standard of a reasonably competent architect.

Checking Harley's designs

¶63.37 Studio E told us that the cladding had been designed by Harley and that as specialist cladding sub-contractor it had assumed responsibility for all aspects of the design.^29212921 Studio E's written Opening Submissions {SEA00014642/3} paragraph 3.1.5(c). Bruce Sounes said that he did not expect Studio E to be required to check that Harley's drawings were consistent with any legislative requirements,^29222922 Sounes {Day7/131:21}-{Day7/132:5}. since that was not a role it had agreed to undertake in relation to the project.^29232923 Sounes {Day7/113:9-17}; {Day7/122:5-18}; {Day7/123:2-8}; {Day7/125:9-11}. Neil Crawford's understanding was the same.^29242924 Crawford {Day9/62:20-24}; {Day9/70:25}-{Day9/71:1-5}; {Day9/63:7-12}; {Day9/71:20-25}; {Day9/72:1-5}. They were both wrong about that, however, because they failed to pay attention to the obligations Studio E had assumed to the TMO and misunderstood the effect of the novation to Rydon.

¶63.38 Following the novation to Rydon, Studio E remained responsible for the design work it had already carried out for the TMO and became responsible for any further work it was required to carry out under the terms of its contract with Rydon.^29252925 {RYD00094228/3} paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3. Studio E's design work before novation was not confined to matters of aesthetic intent or appearance and Harley clearly assumed that Studio E had satisfied itself that the tender drawings and specifications were consistent with the relevant statutory requirements and guidance.

¶63.39 It is clear that Studio E took an unduly narrow view of its responsibilities after the novation. Neil Crawford maintained throughout that Studio E was only responsible for checking Harley's drawings and specifications for "architectural intent", by which he meant conformity with the preliminary design only.^29262926 Studio E's Opening Submissions {SEA00014642/31} paragraph 13.6; Crawford {SEA00014275/17-18} pages 17-18, paragraphs 41-42; Crawford {Day9/20:11-19}. His understanding was inconsistent, however, with the terms of its contract with Rydon, which included seeking to ensure that all designs complied with the relevant statutory requirements.^29272927 {RYD00094228/9} items 4, 5 and 8. Studio E's role in relation to Harley's work does not appear to have been the subject of any discussion with Rydon, which also appears to have assumed that Harley could be left to take responsibility for such matters. Neither Rydon nor Studio E appears to have understood properly the scope of their individual responsibilities.

¶63.40 Such a failure to understand the scope of its obligations might, perhaps, have been explicable if the terms on which Studio E had been engaged were unusual, but there is no reason to think that they were, since they were based on standard RIBA terms. Mr Hyett's understanding was that when an architect stamps a sub-contractor's drawing as complying with architectural intent it amounts to confirmation that the drawing demonstrates a proper understanding, interpretation and application of the architectural specification. He considered that Studio E had an obligation to assess Harley's designs for compliance with the employer's requirements and the applicable statutory requirements.^29282928 Hyett Supplemental Report {PHYS0000002/30} paragraph 2.3.21; Hyett {Day64/16:4}-{Day64/17:14}; Hyett, Module 1 report (revised) {PHYR0000029/141} paragraph 4.4.154; Hyett {Day64/19:13}-{Day64/20:13}; {Day64/26:11}-{Day64/28:9}; {Day64/29:2-10}; {Day64/25:2-9}; {Day64/27:18}-{Day64/28:2}. In the light of his evidence we think that if Studio E's work in relation to Harley's designs was intended to be as narrow in scope as has been suggested, that would have been formally recorded in some way.^29292929 Hyett {Day64/24:9}-{Day64/26:8}; {RYD00094228/9} item 8.

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Insulation

¶63.41 As set out at Chapter 56, Harley substituted Celotex RS5000 for the Celotex FR5000 specified by Studio E in the NBS Specification without reference to Studio E, although a copy of the datasheet for RS5000 was sent to Neil Crawford on 18 September 2014 in connection with a question about cavity barriers and insulation.^29302930 {HAR00012103}; {HAR00012104}.

¶63.42 Once Studio E had been made aware of the substitution, it had an obligation to satisfy itself that the use of RS5000 was consistent with the Building Regulations and approved guidance. (Since its use was not consistent with the approved guidance, Studio E should have drawn that to the attention of Rydon.)^29312931 Hyett {Day64/183:23}-{Day64/184:3}; {Day64/204:13}-{Day64/205:4}; {Day65/17:12}-{Day65/19:20}. That could have involved asking Exova to comment on the characteristics of RS5000^29322932 Hyett {Day64/204:25}-{Day64/205:4}. or itself examining the suitability of RS5000 by a careful reading of the product literature.^29332933 {RYD00094228/9}. We agree with Mr Hyett that Studio E would not have performed its obligations to Rydon merely by relying on Harley to check the characteristics of RS5000 when the substitution was made. In fact, Mr Crawford took it on trust that, if Harley thought RS5000 was suitable, he did not need to investigate further.^29342934 Crawford {Day10/48:5-9}. It was a serious omission on Mr Crawford's part not to have made any independent assessment of RS5000 after he had been told that Harley intended to use it.

¶63.43 If Mr Crawford had looked into the characteristics of RS5000 he would have realised that the external wall system described in the Celotex Rainscreen Cladding Compliance Guide and the product datasheet for RS5000 was not the same as that which had been designed for Grenfell Tower.^29352935 Hyett {Day65/4:11-24}; {CEL00000416/3}; Hyett {Day65/6:3}-{Day65/7:1}; {Day65/7:3}-{Day65/9:14}; {Day65/14:9}-{Day65/15:18}; {Day65/19:9-23}; {Day65/22:1}-{Day65/24:19}. He would, or certainly should, therefore have realised that RS5000 was not generally suitable for use on buildings over 18 metres in height and should not have been proposed for use in the refurbishment. The failure to investigate the characteristics of RS5000 was another serious failing on Mr Crawford's part.

¶63.44 Mr Crawford also failed to notice that Harley's specification did not identify the insulation to be used in the construction of the external wall.^29362936 {HAR00003866}; {HAR00003869/1}; {HAR00017762}; {HAR00003955}; {RYD00046822/1}. Despite that omission, Mr Crawford stamped the specification as conforming to design intent when it did not.^29372937 {RYD00046822/1}; Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/89} paragraph 4.4.29.

Cavity barriers

¶63.45 Studio E's failure to provide a comprehensive cavity barrier strategy at tender stage was carried through into Harley's design. Most significantly, three of Harley's typical bay drawings did not include cavity barriers around the window openings, contrary to the guidance in Approved Document B. Studio E failed to notice that omission. Neil Crawford's own view was that it was not possible to place cavity barriers around the windows^29382938 Crawford {Day10/176:4}-{Day10/177:7}. but Mr Hyett's indicative scheme demonstrates that it was.^29392939 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000028/39} paragraph 3.7.20; {PHYR0000028/40-43} figures 3.16 – 3.19 and {PHYR0000028/58-59} paragraphs 3.8.8-3.8.11. Studio E also failed to identify the fact that Harley had not provided for cavity barriers at the window head and sill level.^29402940 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/112} paragraph 4.4.102. Ultimately, therefore, Studio E failed to recognise that the arrangement shown on Harley's drawings would not inhibit the passage of fire around the windows in a way that complied with Approved Document B.^29412941 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/115} paragraph 4.4.105.

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¶63.46 Harley's construction drawings that were endorsed by Studio E were deeply flawed. Once fire was present within a cavity zone it could move freely up the sides of the windows and within the adjoining columns.^29422942 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/131} paragraph 4.4.134 We agree with Mr Hyett that Studio E's failure adequately to review Harley's drawings flowed from a lack of technical knowledge and experience, exacerbated by the lack of a basic scheme design, which should have been completed at tender stage, against which Harley's work could have been competently checked.^29432943 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/142} paragraph 4.4.155.

¶63.47 Studio E's lack of technical knowledge and experience in respect of cavity barriers is evident from Neil Crawford's approach to Harley's request for information in September 2014.^29442944 See Chapter 54 See also Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/119} from paragraph 4.4.109. Harley asked for confirmation from Rydon, through Studio E, on the placing of cavity barriers.^29452945 {RYD00018043}. Mr Crawford sent the request on to Exova asking for advice. We agree with Mr Hyett that questions of that kind should have been resolved by Studio E much earlier, but at that point the parties were only starting to establish the basic approach.^29462946 {EXO00000708}. It is clear from the email correspondence between Terence Ashton, Neil Crawford and Daniel Anketell-Jones that Mr Crawford abrogated responsibility for answering Harley's questions about cavity barriers.^29472947 {EXO00000714}. He simply passed information between Exova and Harley without becoming directly involved. For reasons we have already explained, it was quite wrong for Studio E to take the view that Harley alone was responsible for formulating the cavity barrier strategy.

¶63.48 Studio E also failed to notice that materials specified by Harley, including Styrofoam in the P1 window infill panel and Kingspan TP10 in the P2 panel, were not suitable for use in their intended applications.^29482948 See Chapter 58. Despite that, Mr Crawford accepted the specification without commenting on the choice of those materials.^29492949 Crawford {Day11/116:9-18}. We reject Mr Crawford's assertion that it was not Studio E's function to check that the designs complied with the statutory requirements.^29502950 Crawford {Day11/117:4}-{Day11/118:23}; {Day11/120:2-13}. Its contract with Rydon provided otherwise and we agree with Mr Hyett that Studio E should have noticed that unsuitable insulation products had been specified by Harley and should have challenged their use.^29512951 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/135} paragraphs 4.4.140-4.4.141

¶63.49 Harley's construction drawings did not specify the materials to be used at the head, jamb and sill behind the window reveals. We agree with Mr Hyett that Studio E should have ensured that they did so, or should at least have referred to the NBS Specification to make it plain to whoever undertook the refurbishment of the window reveals that mineral wool (Rockwool) had been specified by Studio E.^29522952 {HAR00008469}; {HAR00008470}; {HAR00008880}; Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000029/139} paragraph 4.4.145; {PHYR0000029/141} paragraph 4.4.149. Studio E ought to have identified that omission on Harley's part and sought to rectify it.

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Communication with building control

¶63.50 Studio E's contract with Rydon included responsibility for co-ordinating Building Regulation approval.^29532953 {RYD00094228/9}. However, its full plans submission to RBKC building control contained drawings that were out of date or inaccurate^29542954 See Chapter 62, see also Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000030/60-64} paragraphs 5.4.29-5.4.34. and was insufficient to demonstrate compliance with the Building Regulations.^29552955 Menzies Module 1 Report {BMER0000004/9} paragraph 37. Further information was sent on a piecemeal basis. No complete package was ever sent to building control with clear information about the materials that were intended to make up the facade.^29562956 Menzies {Day60/137:9}-{Day60/138:10}. Studio E's failure to provide comprehensive and accurate information to building control made it difficult for RBKC to discharge its own functions under the Building Regulations.^29572957 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000030/64} paragraph 5.4.34.

Quality control and training

¶63.51 Studio E's internal review processes and quality assurance systems were weak and contributed to the failures in design that we have described above. Although Mr Sounes recognised at the outset of the project that it was necessary for the firm to educate itself in what was involved in overcladding a high-rise building, no obvious attempt was made to do so.^29582958 {SEA00003567}. A reasonably competent architect undertaking a project of that kind for the first time would have researched it both from a technical and regulatory perspective.^29592959 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000027/17} paragraph 2.5.14 and paragraph 2.5.12(b); Hyett {Day63/80:5‑18}; {Day63/82:7}-{Day63/84:10}. That would have included identifying and familiarising itself with any relevant regulations and guidance, including guidance published by reputable industry bodies. As far as we can see, Studio E did none of that.

¶63.52 Studio E had processes in place under which design work was intended to be subject to peer review, including in relation to matters of regulatory compliance,^29602960 Kuszell {SEA00014271/7} page 7, paragraph 24.2; Kuszell {Day6/119:7-18}; Sounes {SEA00014273/62} page 62, paragraph 130. but the technical and design reviews it carried out on the Grenfell Tower project fell well short of what could reasonably be expected.^29612961 Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000031/33-38} paragraphs 6.7.10-6.7.15 and 6.8.6. The technical review was carried out far too late^29622962 Only one technical review was carried out by Studio E, on 28 October 2015. That was more than a year after it had submitted the full plans application to RBKC building control and when the external facade works were 60% complete – {RYD00014378}; {SEA00013508}; Hyett, Module 1 Report (revised) {PHYR0000031/33} paragraph 6.7.11. and no senior technically experienced member of staff not otherwise involved in the project had any involvement in checking the designs, in particular for compliance with the Building Regulations.^29632963 As Mr Kuszell said should have happened, usually at RIBA Stage E/F – see Kuszell {SEA00014271/7} page 17, paragraph 24.2 and Sounes {SEA00014273/62} page 62, paragraph 130.

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"As-built" drawings

¶63.53 It was Studio E's responsibility under its contract with Rydon to provide a set of "as-built" drawings at the end of the project.^29642964 {RYD00094228/10} item 19. Although Studio E did so, the "as-built" drawings did not accurately record the structure of the building. For example, they did not contain reference to the type of insulation used^29652965 {SEA00003436}. and they inaccurately recorded that both zinc and ACM panels had been used in the cladding.^29662966 {SEA00003436}. "As-built" drawings are part of the information that should be handed over to the building owner as part of the health and safety file^29672967 See Chapter 61. and are clearly an important record of the construction for future users of the building.

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