Chapter 64: The contribution of Rydon

Introduction

¶64.1 Rydon failed in a number of important respects properly to perform its role as primary contractor for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. It promised the TMO that when completed the refurbishment would comply with the Building Regulations, but it did not. When co-ordinating, supervising and monitoring the work it did not give sufficient importance to the safety of the building's occupants and it displayed a casual attitude to fire safety throughout the project. As a result, Rydon bears considerable responsibility for the fire at Grenfell Tower.

The nature of Rydon's responsibilities on the project

¶64.2 Under its contract with the TMO Rydon was responsible for all aspects of the design and construction of the refurbishment²⁹⁶⁸²⁹⁶⁸ JCT Design and Build Contract 2011 {RYD00094235/69} clause 2.17.1.3. and was obliged to ensure, among other things, that when completed the building complied with the Building Regulations. That obligation existed whether the work was carried out by Rydon itself or by its sub-contractors, consultants or other specialists.²⁹⁶⁹²⁹⁶⁹ JCT Design and Build Contract 2011 {RYD00094235/69} clause 2.17.1.2.

¶64.3 Although the contract contemplated that Rydon might delegate design work to specialists,²⁹⁷⁰²⁹⁷⁰ JCT Design and Build Contract 2011 {RYD00094235/69} clause 2.17.1.1. it remained responsible for the quality of the work carried out by those whom it engaged for that purpose. It also had an obligation to co-ordinate, integrate, supervise and monitor the work.²⁹⁷¹²⁹⁷¹ JCT Design and Build Contract 2011 {RYD00094235/69} clause 2.17.1.2; the Preliminaries, part 2A/44, s.A32 {TMO10041791/128} paragraph 110, which provided that Rydon was obliged to: "Accept responsibility for coordination, supervision and administration of the Works, including subcontracts"; the Preliminaries part 2A/57, s.A33 {TMO10041791/141} paragraph 630, which provided that Rydon had to establish and maintain quality control procedures, including in respect of the work of sub-contractors so that it complied with specified requirements.Show full note However, many people other than Rydon and the TMO were liable to be affected by work carried out by sub-contractors and consultants, not least those who would occupy the building when the refurbishment had been completed. It is of no comfort to them to be told that Rydon remains responsible to the TMO for poor design or faulty workmanship or worse, when they have to suffer the consequences. In our view, therefore, regardless of any legal obligations, Rydon should have ensured that those it appointed as sub-contractors and consultants were sufficiently qualified to undertake the work and provide the services required of them effectively. Accordingly, Rydon cannot avoid all blame simply by relying on the engagement of specialist sub-contractors and designers, such as Studio E, Harley and Exova.²⁹⁷²²⁹⁷² See, for example, Rydon's Closing Submissions for Modules 1 & 2 at {RYD00094564/9} paragraphs 1.35-1.36. Apart from anything else, Rydon itself had the important responsibility of overseeing their work and ensuring that it complied with the contract.

¶64.4 That was all the more so, given that Rydon was also the principal contractor under the CDM Regulations 2007 and 2015. Pursuant to the CDM Regulations 2007, its primary duty as principal contractor was properly to plan, manage and co-ordinate work during the construction phase in order to ensure that health and safety risks were properly controlled.²⁹⁷³²⁹⁷³ Regulation 22(1) of the CDM Regulations 2007 {INQ00011315/11}; Approved Code of Practice to the CDM Regulations 2007, L144 {INQ00013936/36} paragraph 146. That included ensuring that it was competent to deal with any health and safety problems that arose during the construction phase,²⁹⁷⁴²⁹⁷⁴ Approved Code of Practice to the CDM Regulations 2007, L144 {INQ00013936/36} paragraph 150(b). including risks from fire. It also included satisfying itself that the designers it engaged were competent and adequately resourced²⁹⁷⁵²⁹⁷⁵ Approved Code of Practice to the CDM Regulations 2007, L144 {INQ00013936/37} paragraph 150(h). and ensuring co-operation between contractors and designers and the co-ordination of their work.²⁹⁷⁶²⁹⁷⁶ Regulation 22(1)(i) of the CDM Regulations 2007 {INQ00011315/11}; Approved Code of Practice to the CDM Regulations 2007, L144 {INQ00013936/37} paragraph 151. In the event, Rydon failed to give fire safety the importance it deserved.

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Rydon's expertise

An inexperienced team

¶64.5 Rydon's team working on the Grenfell Tower project were notably inexperienced. Simon Lawrence (contracts manager), Simon O'Connor (project manager) and Zak Maynard (commercial manager) were all acting in those capacities for the first time.²⁹⁷⁷²⁹⁷⁷ Email from Stephen Blake on 9 May 2014 regarding changes of structure and promotions {RYD00004258}. That was not necessarily inappropriate, but Rydon should have responded to their lack of experience by taking steps to ensure they received sufficient supervision, training and support from others with greater experience. In the event, it plainly failed to do so.²⁹⁷⁸²⁹⁷⁸ O'Connor {Day26/179:15-23}; Blake {Day28/30:11}-{Day28/33:5}. Although Stephen Blake said that Simon O'Connor's promotion to project manager had been nominal, in the sense that his role on the project had been effectively that of a site manager, no attempt was made to explain that to him or to ensure that the position of site manager was filled by someone else with suitable experience.²⁹⁷⁹²⁹⁷⁹ Blake {Day28/31:12}-{Day28/33:5}.

¶64.6 Rydon's failures in that respect contributed to a general lack of clarity about the responsibilities that its employees were expected to shoulder, a confusion that extended beyond Rydon. In many cases staff did not recognise the descriptions of themselves that Rydon had included in its tender documents. For example, Simon O'Connor was described as holding an HNC²⁹⁸⁰²⁹⁸⁰ Higher National Certificate. in Building Studies and as being responsible for "co-ordinating design", as "lead[ing] the on-site team in terms of design" and as "contribut[ing] technical expertise during value engineering", but, when asked for his comments, he disagreed with each of those assertions. He did not have an HNC and had not been involved in any value engineering process on any project.²⁹⁸¹²⁹⁸¹ O'Connor {Day26/19:2}-{Day26/22:16}. Stephen Blake accepted that the way in which Mr O'Connor's qualifications and experience had been described was thoroughly misleading.²⁹⁸²²⁹⁸² Blake {Day28/40:10-14}.

A lack of knowledge

¶64.7 Those whom Rydon employed on the project lacked even the most basic knowledge of the regulatory regime within which the refurbishment was being carried out, including the relevant statutory and industry guidance and descriptions of best practice. None of Rydon's employees had any substantive knowledge of the Building Regulations or of the approved documents that applied to the project.²⁹⁸³²⁹⁸³ Lawrence {Day22/71:1-4}; O'Connor {Day26/75:16-23}; Hughes {Day27/28:25}-{Day27/29:12}; Blake {Day28/63:11-13}; Martin {Day30/16:17}-{Day30/18:16}; Osgood {Day30/107:4-10}. Many of its witnesses did not even know that different kinds of rainscreen cladding panels were available, and those who did had no understanding of the ways in which the different materials reacted to fire.²⁹⁸⁴²⁹⁸⁴ Lawrence {Day24/21:13-23}; O'Connor {Day26/27:18-24}; Hughes {Day27/53:24} –{Day27/54:1}; Blake {Day28/48:20-24}; Osgood {Day30/141:5-7}; {Day30/184:1-3}; {Day30/185:17-24}; {Day30/188:9-11}; {Day30/115:13-15}; {Day30/141:5-7}; {Day30/110:1-6}.

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¶64.8 Rydon had no, or no effective, system for ensuring that its employees received regular training during their employment. Simon Lawrence had never discussed training with his peers or supervisors and Stephen Blake conceded that he had not undertaken any continuing professional development in the period between leaving university in 1985 and the fire in 2017.²⁹⁸⁵²⁹⁸⁵ Lawrence {Day22/104:22-24}; Blake {Day28/41:10-15}. Rydon thus failed to take any steps to maintain or improve the competence of its employees or its awareness as a business of matters affecting fire safety.

Reliance on third parties

¶64.9 The lack of knowledge and experience among Rydon's own employees was such that it did not have a clear understanding of fire safety matters or any way of determining for itself whether the work of its sub-contractors satisfied basic fire safety standards, let alone the requirements of the Building Regulations. Importantly, it was in no position to know whether the right questions had been asked or to evaluate the information given to it. As far as fire safety was concerned, the evidence of Rydon's witnesses showed that it was untroubled by either consideration and failed to consider even the simplest questions relating to the design of the facade from the point of view of fire safety. There was, for example, no discussion internally about the Building Regulations or Approved Document B, nor about which route to compliance was being followed for the cladding system, and it did nothing itself to find out whether the ACM panels proposed for use on the tower were suitable for that purpose.²⁹⁸⁶²⁹⁸⁶ Blake {Day28/86:8-12}; Lawrence {Day23/179:2-7}.

¶64.10 Although Rydon was of course entitled to expect its sub-contractors to carry out their work competently and in accordance with their own contractual obligations, that did not relieve it of its responsibility to the TMO for the quality of their work, nor did it relieve it of its responsibility to co-ordinate and supervise their work. At the very least, Rydon should have been aware of all those aspects of the design that required the attention of appropriately qualified professionals so that it could satisfy itself that people with the necessary skill and training had applied their minds to them. That is what is involved in co-ordinating and supervising the design process. Rydon was not aware of any of the questions that needed to be considered as part of the design process and so failed to exercise the degree of supervision that we consider was required.

¶64.11 Rydon conceded that in substance it had provided the TMO with nothing more than a management service.²⁹⁸⁷²⁹⁸⁷ Blake {Day28/66:21}-{Day28/69:1}; Email from Simon Lawrence to David Brissenden on 22 April 2015 {RYD00039525/3}; Lawrence {Day22/108:10-19}. In reality, it had organised the work being carried out by a web of sub-contractors and consultants, acting as a channel of communication between the TMO and the various persons contributing to the project in their different capacities. However, it is clear that Rydon failed in number of important respects to perform even its management role properly. It was not appropriate or safe for a contractor undertaking a project on the scale of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment to conduct its business in that manner.

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Failure to investigate the competence of sub-contractors

¶64.12 Although Rydon relied entirely on its sub-contractors and consultants to perform its own contractual obligations to the TMO, it made no serious effort to find out whether the bodies it proposed to engage for that purpose were competent.

¶64.13 Studio E had been responsible for producing the outline design for the refurbishment and the NBS Specification. Although Rydon was required under its contract with the TMO to accept Studio E as lead designer and enter into a contract with it,²⁹⁸⁸²⁹⁸⁸ {RYD00003489/115} clause 7F. it did not attempt to assess the quality of the work that Studio E had already done.²⁹⁸⁹²⁹⁸⁹ Rydon was fully responsible for the design of the works, including any design contained in the Employer's Requirements, and for any discrepancy in or divergence between the Employer's Requirements and/or the Contractor's Proposals and/or any drawings, details, documents and other information submitted by him. It was also responsible for adopting and taking responsibility for any design work carried out by professional consultants at the request of the TMO {RYD00094235/69} clause 2.17.1.2; Lawrence {Day22/132:1}-{Day22/139:5}.Show full note Instead, it relied entirely on an assumption that Harley would take the initiative by raising any concerns it had about Studio E's work. For its own part, Rydon never asked Harley to examine Studio E's work on its behalf and never asked Harley directly whether it had evaluated the work Studio E had done.²⁹⁹⁰²⁹⁹⁰ Lawrence {Day22/133:11} – {Day22/135:5}.

¶64.14 Rydon did not become aware that Studio E had not previously undertaken a project of that kind and never had a clear understanding of, or even a desire to understand, the extent to which Studio E was conversant with the requirements of the Building Regulations or Approved Document B in so far as they applied to it.²⁹⁹¹²⁹⁹¹ Lawrence {Day22/135:6}-{Day22/136:10}. If it had been aware of Studio E's lack of experience in overcladding high-rise buildings, it is possible that Rydon would have taken more seriously the need to instruct a fire engineer to assess the safety of the external wall.

¶64.15 Similarly, Rydon made no specific assessment of Harley's competence to undertake the refurbishment project, relying largely, if not solely, on the fact that it had previously employed Harley as a sub-contractor on other projects, including the Chalcots Estate and Ferrier Point projects.²⁹⁹²²⁹⁹² Lawrence {Day23/48:17-25}.

The fire safety strategy

¶64.16 As principal contractor it was Rydon's responsibility to ensure that sufficient expertise and resources were made available to the project and that the work carried out by external consultants, such as Exova, was satisfactory. In the event, Rydon's approach to Exova, and to fire engineering generally, was alarmingly complacent.

¶64.17 Rydon appears to have had no interest in the use of a fire engineer on the Grenfell Tower project. It attended a contractor induction meeting on 1 April 2014, two weeks after it had been appointed as principal contractor, at which the involvement of Exova was discussed.²⁹⁹³²⁹⁹³ {ART00002255}. The minutes of that meeting record that Exova had completed the fire strategy at the tender stage and that the company's services had not been transferred to Rydon but that Mr Lawrence would contact it with a view to instructing it for the future.²⁹⁹⁴²⁹⁹⁴ {ART00002255/4} item 5.3. (The minutes, drafted by Artelia, were misleading because the fire strategy had not been completed at the tender stage and indeed never was completed.) Despite that commitment, however, he made no attempt to find out who was Exova's client or what were the terms on which it was acting.²⁹⁹⁵²⁹⁹⁵ Lawrence {Day23/51:9-15}; {Day23/53:11-21}. He had no discussions with the TMO, Studio E or Artelia about the role that Exova might play in the future of the project.²⁹⁹⁶²⁹⁹⁶ Lawrence {Day23/52:4-10}. He repeated his assurance that he would contact Exova at several subsequent site meetings, but failed to take any action in respect of it.

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¶64.18 Mr Lawrence explained to Bruce Sounes in March or April 2014 that Rydon did not normally appoint fire engineering consultants on the assumption that the safety of the design had been established before it had been appointed and was not its responsibility.²⁹⁹⁷²⁹⁹⁷ See Chapter 54; Sounes {SEA00014273/152} page 152, paragraph 372. In his view, it was the responsibility of building control to identify any defects in the design.²⁹⁹⁸²⁹⁹⁸ Sounes {SEA00014273/152} page 152, paragraph 372; Lawrence {Day23/65:17-24}; {Day23/74:8-12}.

¶64.19 Simon Lawrence said that Rydon had considered asking Exova to advise on the alterations to the lower four floors of the tower between April and October 2014,²⁹⁹⁹²⁹⁹⁹ Lawrence {Day23/63:14-20}. but there is no contemporaneous evidence that it considered using Exova or any other fire engineer for that purpose.³⁰⁰⁰³⁰⁰⁰ See Chapter 54; Lawrence {Day23/79:13}-{Day23/80:7}. We do not think that Rydon gave any genuine consideration to seeking the advice of a fire engineer in respect of the lower four floors, or indeed at all.

¶64.20 In the event, Rydon took a positive decision not to appoint a fire engineer, probably because it did not think that it needed to do so in order to protect its own interests. The decision was taken without consulting the TMO, Studio E, Harley or any other party that might have had an interest in receiving fire safety advice.³⁰⁰¹³⁰⁰¹ Lawrence {Day23/80:8-21}. Indeed, there is nothing in the contemporaneous evidence to indicate that Rydon told anyone that it had made a decision of that kind. Simon Lawrence professed not to know whether Rydon had told the TMO or Studio E that it was no longer considering the appointment of a fire engineer,³⁰⁰²³⁰⁰² Lawrence {Day23/80:22}-{Day23/81:17}. but the complete absence of any indication that it did so suggests strongly that it did not. Rydon should have appreciated that it was ill-equipped to make an informed judgement about the need for fire engineering advice and should therefore have consulted the TMO (its client) and Studio E (its principal designer) before making any decision.

¶64.21 To the extent that Rydon investigated the quality of Exova's work at all, its actions were cursory and superficial. Rydon received Issue 3 of Exova's Outline Fire Safety Strategy as part of the tender documents³⁰⁰³³⁰⁰³ {TMO10007081/3} Item 115. and accepted that it contained the fire safety strategy underpinning the design work that had been carried out before its appointment.³⁰⁰⁴³⁰⁰⁴ Lawrence {Day23/85:4-6}; {Day23/88:4-9}. Nonetheless, it did not ask Studio E whether Exova's work had been sufficient for its purposes and did not attempt to familiarise itself with the terms on which Exova had been appointed.³⁰⁰⁵³⁰⁰⁵ Lawrence {Day23/85:16-25}. It does not appear to have occurred to Rydon that the title of the Outline Fire Safety Strategy itself suggested that it might not be in final form.³⁰⁰⁶³⁰⁰⁶ Lawrence {Day23/89:2-7}. Each of those was a serious failure on the part of Rydon.

¶64.22 Rydon's evidence was that it believed that Issue 3 of Exova's Outline Fire Safety Strategy was comprehensive and provided all the information needed to ensure that the design of the refurbishment was safe.³⁰⁰⁷³⁰⁰⁷ Lawrence {Day23/89:24}-{Day23/90-1-2}. That was self-evidently not the case, however, given the expressly provisional nature of the opinion provided in respect of functional requirement B4(1). Furthermore, Rydon did not ask what information Exova had used in compiling it, assuming instead that it had been prepared on the basis of all the information in the tender pack.³⁰⁰⁸³⁰⁰⁸ Lawrence {Day23/90:13}-{Day23/91:1}. However, Simon Lawrence did not know whether Exova had seen the NBS Specification³⁰⁰⁹³⁰⁰⁹ Lawrence {Day24/115:11-25}. and no one at Rydon appears to have noticed that Exova's description of the project did not include overcladding or any reference to the system it was proposed to use.³⁰¹⁰³⁰¹⁰ Grenfell Tower Outline Fire Safety Strategy {CST00000085/4}; Lawrence {Day23/91:9}-{Day23/92:1}. Mr Lawrence assumed that Exova had been involved in the design of the refurbishment from the outset, but did not ask anyone whether that had actually been the case.³⁰¹¹³⁰¹¹ Lawrence {Day23/92:18-24}.

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¶64.23 In fact, Issue 3 of the Outline Fire Safety Strategy contained no proper assessment of compliance with functional requirements B3 or B4 of the Building Regulations, and in the case of functional requirement B4 stated only that the provisional opinion that the proposed changes would have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external fire spread would be confirmed by an analysis in a future issue of the report.³⁰¹²³⁰¹² Grenfell Tower Outline Fire Safety Strategy {CST00000085/9} paragraph 3.14. Although Simon Lawrence had reviewed Issue 3 of the Outline Fire Safety Strategy in late 2013 or early 2014 and again in September 2014,³⁰¹³³⁰¹³ Lawrence {Day23/84:20}-{Day23/85:2}; {Day23/94:14-16}. he failed to notice that no further issue of the report had been produced.³⁰¹⁴³⁰¹⁴ Lawrence {Day23/94:17}-{Day23/95:11}. Rydon therefore took no steps to ensure that it was forthcoming.³⁰¹⁵³⁰¹⁵ Lawrence {Day23/95:12-19}.

¶64.24 Simon Lawrence appears to have understood that part of the report to mean that the cladding would have no adverse effect on the fire safety of the tower provided Rydon ensured that it complied with functional requirement B4.³⁰¹⁶³⁰¹⁶ Lawrence {Day23/95:21-24}; {Day23/97:4-7}. However, if that had been its meaning, it would have rendered Exova's analysis pointless. There could be no reasonable basis for any such understanding.

¶64.25 Rydon appears to have thought that any defects in the design or choice of materials would ultimately be identified by building control,³⁰¹⁷³⁰¹⁷ Lawrence {Day23/94:17}-{Day23/97:21}. but that reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of building control.

¶64.26 When giving evidence Simon Lawrence accepted that it was the responsibility of a design and build contractor to satisfy itself that the fire strategy for a given project was correct.³⁰¹⁸³⁰¹⁸ Lawrence {Day23/70:24}-{Day23/71:5}. It seems clear to us, however, that Rydon simply did not trouble to understand what Issue 3 of the Outline Fire Safety Strategy did and did not cover and what reliance could reasonably be placed on it. Rydon understood that it was ultimately responsible for ensuring the fire safety of the refurbished building,³⁰¹⁹³⁰¹⁹ Lawrence {Day23/83:17-25}. but it abdicated that responsibility by failing to take an interest in Exova's work.³⁰²⁰³⁰²⁰ Lawrence {Day23/83:2-7}. Rydon should have been aware that Exova had not provided a final opinion on compliance with functional requirement B4³⁰²¹³⁰²¹ Hyett, 'Failures of Statutory Compliance' (Amended Report) {PHYR0000029/28} paragraph 4.2.22. and should have ensured that it was provided. Simon Lawrence was content for Studio E to obtain free advice from Exova but clearly decided that Rydon would not be paying for it.³⁰²²³⁰²² Email from Simon Lawrence to Neil Crawford cc Simon O'Connor on 19 September 2014 at 14:25 {SEA00011754/1}; Lawrence {Day23/72:12-18}.

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¶64.27 We have concluded that the exchanges of emails in September 2014 involving Exova³⁰²³³⁰²³ {SEA00011754}. should have alerted Rydon to three important things. First, it should have been clear to Rydon that Exova was giving advice to the design team on the basis of incomplete information. Second, Rydon should have noticed that Harley and Studio E were unable to reach a settled view on the appropriate design strategy for cavity barriers in the facade of the tower and that they might therefore benefit from the assistance of an independent fire engineer. Third, if Rydon had been aware that in Issue 3 of its Outline Fire Safety Strategy Exova had provided only a provisional conclusion on compliance with functional requirement B4, it should have been alerted to the need to obtain a fully considered opinion to complete the work. None of those matters required Rydon to have its own specialist design or fire engineering expertise. On the contrary, they fall well within the capacity of a reasonably competent design and build contractor.

¶64.28 As we have already said, Rydon's role was to take the lead in ensuring that important issues such as fire safety were properly considered. In our view, its approach to the involvement of Exova represents a serious failing. It is telling that Simon Lawrence conceded, in hindsight, that the advice of a fire engineer is essential on any construction project with any significant degree of complexity.³⁰²⁴³⁰²⁴ Lawrence {Day23/48:6-9}. That Rydon did not realise that at the time indicates the extent of its general lack of concern for fire safety in relation to the project.

Failure properly to evaluate and co-ordinate design work

¶64.29 Rydon's internal system for evaluating and co-ordinating the design work was inadequate. One effective tool that it could and should have used to co-ordinate the design process effectively was a matrix of responsibilities identifying which of the many sub-contractors and consultants was responsible for particular aspects of the work. Such a matrix should ensure that everyone involved in a project knows where responsibility lies for each decision and is important for the effective management of any design and build contract.³⁰²⁵³⁰²⁵ Hyett, 'Failures of Statutory Compliance' (Amended Report) {PHYR0000029/87} paragraphs 4.4.17-4.4.18. In the absence of a matrix of responsibilities it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Rydon to ensure that its sub-contractors and consultants properly understood their separate responsibilities or that Rydon itself understood where responsibility for individual decisions lay. Its failure to establish a matrix of responsibilities resulted in a failure on the part of those responsible for the design of the cladding to recognise that they were responsible for various critical decisions affecting fire safety, including the compliance of the cladding with the Building Regulations.

Failure properly to monitor sub-contractors

¶64.30 Rydon appears to have assumed that Studio E was co-ordinating the design work. As early as April 2014, it authorised Studio E and Harley to talk directly to each other about matters of design, provided that all correspondence was copied to itself.³⁰²⁶³⁰²⁶ {HAR00000927}; Lawrence {Day23/167:6}-{Day23/168:12}. For such an approach to be successful, however, Rydon had to take active steps to ensure that Harley and Studio E were working effectively together and that all relevant matters of design were being considered, but it failed to do so. On the contrary, it relied on Studio E and Harley to lead the design process, which it saw as a "free flow" of information between Studio E and Harley, in which it did not need to play an active role.³⁰²⁷³⁰²⁷ Lawrence {Day22/181:18-23}; Lawrence {Day23/25:17}-{Day23/28:14}. It intervened only if it saw that an element of the design was missing or if one of them complained about the other's performance,³⁰²⁸³⁰²⁸ Lawrence {Day23/27:1-6}; O'Connor {Day26/37:16-24}. but it was ill-equipped to determine whether something was missing, given that it had no proper system for monitoring the design process and employed no one qualified to identify any defects.

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¶64.31 Rydon also failed to make use of an electronic drawing control system, which meant that it was not able to co-ordinate the exchange of drawings between Harley and Studio E or indeed to understand which drawings had been issued and which were missing.³⁰²⁹³⁰²⁹ Lawrence {Day22/165:9}-{Day22/167:23}. Rydon did not tell anyone at Studio E that it was expecting Studio E to co-ordinate the drawing exchange process on its behalf or that it had no proper drawing control system of its own.³⁰³⁰³⁰³⁰ Lawrence {Day22/168:1-9}. Moreover, Rydon had no system in place for recording design changes throughout the project, save for a tracker that Simon Lawrence started himself to monitor changes that had programme and cost implications.³⁰³¹³⁰³¹ Lawrence {Day23/31:20}-{Day23/40:17}; {ART00003086}; {ART00008861}; {RYD00022907}.

¶64.32 Design drawings produced by Harley were sent to Studio E for comment, but Studio E reviewed them only to ensure that they complied with architectural intent and contained no obvious errors. Rydon does not appear to have asked itself whether such a limited examination was sufficient to enable Studio E to discharge its contractual obligation to examine Harley's drawings and report on them, or to discharge Rydon's own obligation to the TMO to ensure that the design of the refurbishment complied with statutory requirements.³⁰³²³⁰³² Lawrence {Day22/182:11}-{Day22/185:20}; Crawford {SEA00014275/78} page 78, paragraph 256; Crawford {Day9/85:11}-{Day9/92:12}. Indeed, Rydon never turned its mind to the question whether Studio E was actually considering statutory compliance when it reviewed design drawings.³⁰³³³⁰³³ Lawrence {Day22/185:10-20}. By failing to ask those questions Rydon failed to ensure that the design of the cladding was safe, at least as far as fire was concerned.

Undue reliance on previous projects

¶64.33 Insofar as Rydon turned its mind to the fire performance of the products used in the refurbishment at all, it assumed they were safe because it had used them on previous projects, particularly the Chalcots Estate and Ferrier Point projects, where it had worked with Harley to install ACM rainscreens.³⁰³⁴³⁰³⁴ Lawrence {Day22:178/11}-{Day22/179:8}.

¶64.34 However, Rydon failed to learn important lessons from the fire that took place at Taplow House on the Chalcots Estate on 16 January 2012. The fire gave it direct experience of the potential importance of fire barriers, particularly around windows, in preventing the spread of fire over the walls of high-rise residential buildings, but there is no evidence that it applied that knowledge to the Grenfell Tower refurbishment.³⁰³⁵³⁰³⁵ Blake {Day29/127:9-19}. Rydon had no system for sharing that experience or the learning derived from it with its employees. Nor did it have any system for ensuring that such lessons were heeded in its future work.³⁰³⁶³⁰³⁶ Blake {Day29/124:3-9}.

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Inappropriate reliance on building control

¶64.35 Rydon attempted to mitigate its lack of expertise by excessive and inappropriate reliance on building control, epitomised by Simon Lawrence's evidence that he saw building control as a "resource" on which he could rely because Rydon was paying a fee for it.³⁰³⁷³⁰³⁷ Lawrence {Day23/74:1-12}. Rydon viewed building control as the body that would ensure that its sub-contractors were complying with their contractual obligations,³⁰³⁸³⁰³⁸ Lawrence {Day22/68:7-15}; {Day23/2:21}-{Day23/3:12}; {Day24/192:12}-{Day24/199:10}; {Day25/12:18}-{Day25/14:1}; {Day25/18:14}-{Day25/24:9}; O'Connor {Day26/167:24}-{Day26/168:2}; Hughes {Day27/18:12}-{Day27/19:10}; Blake {Day29/70:22}-{Day29/74:1}; Sounes {SEA00014273/152} page 152, paragraph 372. but in our view it is never appropriate for a principal contractor (or any other party) to rely on building control to ensure that its designs comply with the Building Regulations.

¶64.36 In this case, it was particularly inappropriate and unsafe for Rydon to rely on building control to the extent that it did because its haphazard communications with building control meant that it could never be confident that it had given building control the information it needed properly to evaluate the design. For example, Rydon approved the substitution of Celotex RS5000 by Kingspan K15 (a product with a different chemical composition) and took no steps to conduct any investigation of its own into the suitability of the product or to ensure that building control and the TMO had been alerted to the change.³⁰³⁹³⁰³⁹ Blake {Day29/117:13-17}.

Failure to respond to concerns about fire safety

¶64.37 Rydon failed on at least two occasions to provide proper responses to specific enquiries about fire safety, indicating a lack of interest in the subject.

¶64.38 On 12 November 2014 Claire Williams wrote to Simon Lawrence seeking clarification on the fire retardance of the new cladding and saying that she had just had a "Lacknall moment".³⁰⁴⁰³⁰⁴⁰ {RYD00023468}. There is no evidence that he or anyone else at Rydon responded in any way to the email.

¶64.39 On 10 April 2015, Ms Williams wrote to Simon O'Connor and asked him for the fire rating of the cladding and fixings and to confirm their acceptance by building control.³⁰⁴¹³⁰⁴¹ {TMO00858290}. Although Ms Williams chased for a response, Rydon appears to have taken no action in response to her request.

The window reveals

¶64.40 As set out in detail in Chapter 56, Rydon failed to ensure that the non-combustible insulation material which had been specified by Studio E in the NBS Specification was used around the windows and instead allowed the use of combustible Celotex and Kingspan insulation products. Rydon also changed the internal window surrounds from plywood to uPVC without seeking the approval of the TMO or considering the fire safety consequences of doing so. The consequences were very serious because the deformation of the uPVC window surrounds in the kitchen of Flat 16 is most likely to have been the means by which fire first entered the cladding on 14 June 2017.

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Failures in site supervision

¶64.41 Rydon was responsible for inspecting the work done by Harley and other sub-contractors at Grenfell Tower,³⁰⁴²³⁰⁴² {TMO10041791/141} at A33/630. but the inspections it carried out were inadequate because they failed to detect some serious defects in workmanship, particularly in relation to cavity barriers. In many cases the effectiveness of cavity barriers was reduced as a result of poor attachment to the concrete walls, fitting in the wrong orientation or installation in the wrong location.³⁰⁴³³⁰⁴³ Lane, 'Section 8 – The External Wall – Materials and Construction' {BLAS0000008/40} figure 8.42; {BLAS0000008/41} figure 8.44; {BLAS0000008/44} figure 8.47; {BLAS0000008/46} figure 8.50; Hughes {Day27/115:5}-{Day27/116:11}. Rydon accepted that the quality of workmanship in those cases was very poor, but could not explain how it had failed to detect it.³⁰⁴⁴³⁰⁴⁴ Osgood {Day30/154:17}-{Day30/158:11}; O'Connor {Day26/172:18-25}. In substance, Rydon's employees appeared to have regarded its quality control process as little more than a snagging inspection, but that fell far short of performing its obligation to ensure that the work had been properly carried out.

¶64.42 One important reason for Rydon's failure to ensure that the work done at Grenfell Tower was of proper quality was that those appointed to manage and inspect it were ill-equipped to do so. Daniel Osgood was brought onto the project between 27 April 2015 and 24 July 2015 to oversee the installation of the cladding.³⁰⁴⁵³⁰⁴⁵ Osgood {Day30/100:2}-{Day30/103:1}. Although he had previously worked on similar projects as a fitter, he had never worked with ACM panels.³⁰⁴⁶³⁰⁴⁶ Osgood {Day30/95:4}-{Day30/97:13}. He had never received any training in how to inspect cladding installations or in the requirements of the Building Regulations and he did not know that there was statutory guidance on the construction of the external walls of buildings over 18 metres in height.³⁰⁴⁷³⁰⁴⁷ Osgood {Day30/97:14}-{Day30/109:23}. Mr Osgood assumed that all materials installed on the outside of buildings were entirely "fireproof".³⁰⁴⁸³⁰⁴⁸ Osgood {Day30/110:4-6.}; {Day30/115:13-15}; {Day30/118:19-20}. He did not know of the need for cavity barriers to be installed around windows and was not aware of the difference between Rockwool (a non-combustible mineral wool insulation product) and Celotex RS5000 (a combustible PIR insulation product).³⁰⁴⁹³⁰⁴⁹ Osgood {Day30/141:5-7}; {Day30/184:1-3}; {Day30/185:17-24}; {Day30/188:9-11}; {Day30/115:13-15}; {Day30/110:1‑7}.

¶64.43 David Hughes was appointed in October 2015 as lead site manager, which required him to take responsibility for the inspection of Harley's work at a critical stage of the project.³⁰⁵⁰³⁰⁵⁰ Hughes {RYD00094213/5} page 5, paragraph 22. He had not previously worked on a project that involved fitting cladding to a high-rise building.³⁰⁵¹³⁰⁵¹ Hughes {Day27/6:7-9}. He did not understand, even in broad terms, the functional requirements of the Building Regulations, was not aware that the external walls of buildings should adequately resist the spread of fire over the surface, was not aware that guidance had been published on the construction of the external walls of buildings over 18 metres in height, was not aware of the expression "limited combustibility" and was not aware that cavity barriers should be fitted around windows.³⁰⁵²³⁰⁵² Hughes {Day27/28:25}-{Day27/34:20}.

¶64.44 Rydon compounded the problem by failing to ensure that inspections were carried out in accordance with relevant guidance, such as the overcladding specification produced by Curtins Consulting and the manufacturers' instructions for the installation of insulation and cavity barriers.³⁰⁵³³⁰⁵³ {ART00000914}; Lawrence {Day22/58:22}-{Day22/60:19}; Hughes {Day27/21:1-22}. Rydon also exercised little, if any, meaningful control over the materials that were used on site by its sub-contractors, trusting them instead to use only those which were appropriate.³⁰⁵⁴³⁰⁵⁴ O'Connor {Day26/96:15-24}.

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¶64.45 It is also clear that the quality of Rydon's work and its approach to the project more generally was poor. From mid-2015, when the project was nearing completion, the TMO and Artelia repeatedly raised concerns with Rydon about the resources it had dedicated to the project and its apparent inability or unwillingness to resolve complaints about the quality of the work.³⁰⁵⁵³⁰⁵⁵ {ART00006206}; {TMO00859230}; {ART00006681/3}; {ART00006657}; {ART00006641/1}. In June 2015, Simon Lawrence candidly reported to Stephen Blake that they had a poorly performing site, mainly the result of poor surveying and cheap, incompetent sub-contractors.³⁰⁵⁶³⁰⁵⁶ {RYD00044349}. In May 2016 Neil Reed of Artelia reported to Simon Cash that he had never before worked with a contractor demonstrating such a level of nonchalance.³⁰⁵⁷³⁰⁵⁷ {ART00006672}. Both Simon Lawrence's and Neil Reed's statements reflect a contemporaneous perception, supported by other evidence before us, that the general quality of Rydon's work fell significantly below that which could be expected of a reasonably competent design and build contractor.

Regulation 38 and the health and safety file

¶64.46 Rydon sub-contracted the collation of information required for the purposes of complying with regulation 38 of the Building Regulations and the preparation of the health and safety file required by the CDM Regulations to All Group Holdings Ltd. However, nobody at Rydon checked the operation and maintenance manual or the health and safety file to ensure it was complete and accurate. Stephen Blake did not consider that to be Rydon's responsibility.³⁰⁵⁸³⁰⁵⁸ Blake {Day29/170:16}-{Day29/171:9}. Mr Hughes said that he had taken a quick look at a draft of the operation and maintenance manual³⁰⁵⁹³⁰⁵⁹ Hughes {Day27/205:1-2}. but had not received the final version.³⁰⁶⁰³⁰⁶⁰ Hughes {Day27/205:3}. Rydon ought to have checked All Group Holding's work. It is doubtful whether the information provided to the TMO satisfied either regulation 38 or the requirements of the CDM Regulations.

¶64.47 Mr Hoban said that he had asked David Hughes whether Rydon had given the TMO the information required by regulation 38 and that Mr Hughes had told him that the necessary information was being sent to the TMO. We do not understand how Mr Hughes was able to give that assurance.³⁰⁶¹³⁰⁶¹ Hoban {Day46/200:18-24}; Hughes {Day27:202:25}-{Day27/203:8}.

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