Chapter 65: The contribution of Harley

Chapter 65: The contribution of Harley

Introduction

¶65.1 In July 2014 Rydon appointed Harley as a sub-contractor to carry out the design and construction of the overcladding of Grenfell Tower. On 25 July 2014^30623062 {RYD00013524}. Zak Maynard sent an undated letter of intent signed by Simon Lawrence^30633063 Letter of Intent {HAR00000120}. on behalf of Rydon as an attachment to an email to Mark Harris of Harley. The letter of intent stated that Rydon intended to appoint Harley as the envelope package sub-contractor. On 16 September 2014 Zak Maynard confirmed that the scope of the letter of intent had been increased to cover the full value of the work. Although the letter of intent contemplated that the parties would enter into a formal contract for the work, Rydon did not provide a document and Harley does not appear to have pressed for one. As a result, the parties did not execute a formal written agreement and their relationship was governed at all material times by the terms of the letter of intent.^30643064 Letter of Intent {HAR00000120}; Maynard {Day31/44:8-17}; {Day31/51:11-20}; {Day31/54:11}-{Day31/55:1}; Bailey {Day32/57:4-25}; Harris {Day34/14:7-11}; {Day34/16:2-7}.

¶65.2 The letter of intent provided that the contract between Harley and Rydon was subject to the terms of the DOM2 Articles of Agreement^30653065 DOM2 2011 Sub-Contract Articles of Agreement {INQ00011295}. and Subcontract Conditions.^30663066 DOM 2011 2011 Sub-Contract Conditions {INQ00011211}. It described the work to be carried out and the conditions under which the contract was to be performed by reference to nine Appendices.^30673067 Appendix A: Scope of Works & Ascertainment of Lump Sum Price (Envelope Package) dated 25 July 2014 {HAR00000397}; Appendix B: Rydon Standard Terms and Conditions {HAR00000389}; Appendix C: The Rydon Way {HAR00000390}; Appendix D: Subcontractor Pre-Contract Interview dated 16 June 2014 {HAR00000391}; Appendix E: Traffic Management Plan {HAR00000392}; Appendix F: Schedule of Information {HAR00000396}; Appendix G: Site Protection Policy {HAR00000393}; Appendix H: Payment Schedule {HAR00000394}; Appendix P: Programme of Works {HAR00000395}.Show full note Under the contract Harley was responsible for all aspects of the design of the facade. In particular, it bore responsibility for ensuring that the design of the facade complied with all statutory requirements, including the requirements of the Building Regulations. Moreover, all the provisions of the draft building contract between Rydon and the TMO were incorporated into the letter of intent, insofar as they were relevant to the sub-contract works.^30683068 Letter of Intent {HAR00000120/2} clause 2(b). They included an obligation to accept full responsibility for the design of the project and the selection of materials, including the work carried out by Studio E.^30693069 Letter of Intent {HAR00000120/2} clause 2(b); DOM2 Subcontract Conditions {INQ00011211/8} clause 2.5.1; The Design and Build Contract {RYD00094235/69} clause 2.17. In those circumstances, Harley accepted responsibility to Rydon for the contents of the NBS Specification insofar as they related to the design of the facade.^30703070 Ray Bailey {Day32/85:12}-{Day32/87:10}.

¶65.3 In its closing statement Harley pointed out that it had no formal contract with Rydon, simply a letter of intent with a large number of appendices which incorporated the terms of Rydon's contracts with the TMO, not all of which it had read in full.^30713071 {HAR00020580/6}, paragraph 12. That was put forward as an explanation of its failure to understand the full extent of its contractual obligations and as a reason for following common practices within the industry. However, it is clear that any organisation that enters into a contract of this kind, no matter how complex its terms, has a responsibility to understand the nature of the obligations it has undertaken. Simply failing to understand the contract and following industry practices will not do. Despite that, however, Harley was aware that it had a responsibility to check that the materials described in the NBS Specification were suitable and to ensure that on the completion of the work the external walls of the tower complied with the Building Regulations, including functional requirement B4(1).

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¶65.4 It is clear that Rydon and Studio E both regarded Harley as an expert in the design and construction of ventilated rainscreen facades and expected it to bring to bear the skill and experience that could be expected of an expert sub-contractor of that kind. If it had stopped to think about it, Harley must have known that. With that in mind we obtained a report from Mr Jonathan Sakula MA, Ceng., FIStructE, FICE,^30723072 Sakula, Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Phase 2, Module 1, Report of Facade Expert {JOS00000001}. to help us understand what could be expected of a reasonably competent facade contractor in the period between January 2012 and June 2017. Mr Sakula also gave oral evidence.^30733073 Sakula {Day125}.

¶65.5 In a closing statement Harley challenged Mr Sakula's evidence on the grounds that he had limited experience of the use of ACM products on high-rise buildings and was himself a facade consultant rather than a cladding contractor, the suggestion being that he had little experience of the practical world in which companies such as Harley operate. We found that argument surprising, not only because it proceeds on the footing that Harley was not an expert in designing and installing building facades, but also because Harley accepted that it had undertaken significant responsibilities for ensuring the suitability of the materials that others had proposed using. We found Mr Sakula an impressive witness and we were not asked to hear evidence from anyone else who had experience of the cladding industry at the time in question. Although we have been mindful of the scope of his experience and of the various arguments put forward on Harley's behalf, we have generally accepted his evidence as reliable.

¶65.6 In the light of the evidence as a whole, we consider that Harley's work on the refurbishment was characterised by a failure to take its responsibilities seriously, ignorance, complacency and a failure properly to manage its staff. As the specialist contractor responsible for the external wall of the tower, the standard of Harley's work fell well below that to be expected of a reasonably competent cladding contractor and it must therefore bear a significant degree of responsibility for the fire.

Technical competence

¶65.7 We are satisfied that Harley failed to achieve the standard of a reasonably competent cladding contractor in several different aspects of its work. Many of those failures had the same root cause, namely, the inadequate technical expertise of its employees and representatives.

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The Building Regulations and Approved Document B

¶65.8 At the time of the refurbishment Ray Bailey considered himself to be as well placed as anyone in the specialist cladding industry to advise on whether materials used in the construction of an external wall complied with the applicable regulations.^30743074 Ray Bailey {Day32/8:2-9}. However, he conceded that he had not read through Approved Document B for some years and had then found it quite complicated.^30753075 Ray Bailey {Day32/6:20-21}. He considered himself to have a working, but not a detailed, knowledge of it.^30763076 Ray Bailey {Day32/6:21-22}.

¶65.9 Although Daniel Anketell-Jones later completed an MSc in facade engineering, at the time of the refurbishment his knowledge of the Building Regulations did not extend beyond matters relating to structural stability and he was not very familiar at all with Approved Document B.^30773077 Anketell-Jones {Day35/119:3-15}; {Day35/122:22-23}. Ben Bailey said that he had seen parts of Approved Document B but had never received any training to help him understand the Building Regulations, Approved Document B or any of the associated guidance.^30783078 Ben Bailey {Day39/18:10-24}. Both Mark Harris and Mike Albiston candidly admitted that they had not been competent to advise on any question of compliance with the Building Regulations or Approved Document B.^30793079 Harris {HAR00010159/8} page 8, paragraph 34; Harris {Day34/7:12-24}; Albiston {Day35/35:18-25}.

¶65.10 Before he became involved in the refurbishment, Kevin Lamb had never undertaken any formal training on the Building Regulations or the guidance in the approved documents.^30803080 Lamb {Day37/70:18-22}. He said that he had taken steps to refresh his memory of Approved Document B during the refurbishment^30813081 Lamb {Day37/130:2-5}. but did not think that it was his responsibility to look at it in any detail.^30823082 Lamb {Day37/131:3-5}. He did not give a second thought to which route to compliance was being adopted.^30833083 Lamb {Day37/142:1-14}.

¶65.11 Accordingly, Harley's own evidence was that none of those engaged on the refurbishment had any more than a passing familiarity with the relevant Building Regulations or approved documents. That, in our view, was unacceptable for an organisation which held itself out to be a specialist cladding contractor.^30843084 Sakula {Day125/27:16}-{Day125/30:12}; {Day125/34:1-7}.

¶65.12 Harley held itself out as a specialist cladding contractor with sufficient technical expertise to undertake what was, on any view, a large and complicated project. Under its contract with Rydon it was responsible for the design of the cladding and for ensuring that it complied with the relevant statutory requirements.^30853085 Undated Letter of Intent from Rydon Management Systems to Harley Curtain Wall Ltd {HAR00000120/1-2} Item 1. At the very least, therefore, it should have been familiar with the regulations and with any statutory and industry guidance that was relevant to its work. It is difficult to understand how Harley could reasonably have believed it could discharge its obligations to Rydon without having that essential technical knowledge.

¶65.13 According to Jonathan Sakula, whose expert opinion on this point we accept, at that time a reasonably competent cladding contractor would have had a system in place for checking the suitability of any products proposed for use on a refurbishment project of that kind.^30863086 Sakula {Day125/26:23}-{Day125/27:2}; {Day 125/26:2-12}. In order for such a system to function effectively it would have to be managed by someone with sufficient technical knowledge.^30873087 Sakula, Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Phase 2, Module 1, Report of Facade Expert {JOS00000001/25-26}; Sakula {Day125/140:25}-{Day125/141:9}. However, Harley had no such system and does not appear to have employed anyone capable of managing one, despite its obligation to Rydon to ensure that suitable products and materials were used.

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¶65.14 In our view Ben Bailey lacked the competence and experience to act as Harley's project manager on a project of the size and complexity of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. The project manager's responsibilities included ensuring that work was done to a high standard;^30883088 Ben Bailey {Day39/13:2-3}. and for that reason the project manager was the most senior person from Harley who regularly attended the site.^30893089 Ben Bailey {Day39/13:4-10}. However, Ben Bailey was at the time a 25 year old graduate with a foundation degree in motor sport engineering, who had not previously held the position of project manager and had no obvious qualifications for the role. We consider that, for a project of this nature, Harley ought to have appointed as project manager someone who had the training and experience required to manage a large project of that kind. It failed to do so.

Testing regime

¶65.15 It is clear from the evidence that none of those employed by Harley on the refurbishment had even a basic grasp of the fire testing regime that applied to the products used in the external wall of the tower. Ray Bailey thought that a Class 0 classification meant that a product was "difficult to ignite and if you take the source of flame away from it, it won't continue to burn".^30903090 Ray Bailey {Day33/6:14-17}. He also thought, quite wrongly, that a Class 0 classification meant that a product was safe to use in any application on any building over 18 metres in height.^30913091 Ray Bailey {Day33/6:18-25}. For the senior executive and owner of a specialist cladding sub-contractor, that was a striking misconception.

¶65.16 Daniel Anketell-Jones said that he had been unaware of the difference between "non-combustible", "limited combustibility" and "Class 0"^30923092 Anketell-Jones {Day35/180:23}-{Day35/181:5}. and thought that "Class 0" meant that the material could not catch fire.^30933093 Anketell-Jones {Day36/92:7-14}. Such ignorance on the part of the one person whom Harley regarded as having technical expertise in matters of fire safety is remarkable. Mr Lamb claimed to have understood what Class 0 meant, but he said that he had had no need to understand the tests that underpinned that classification.^30943094 Lamb {Day37/144:1-5}. His assertion that all major elements of an external wall cladding system would have to be Class 0 betrayed a fundamental ignorance of the basic principles underlying the testing and classification regime set out in Approved Document B. If a designer seeks to follow the guidance provided by what has been called the "linear route" in relation to a building over 18 metres in height, paragraph 12.7 requires insulation products to be materials of limited combustibility. Mr Lamb did not understand that distinction. We consider that to be inexcusable in one who was employed to carry out design work.^30953095 Lamb {Day37/149:22}-{Day37/150:4}.

¶65.17 Mr Anketell-Jones also claimed to be unaware of the BS 8414 test methods or the BR 135 criteria and said that he had never considered whether they were relevant to the question whether products were safe for use on high-rise buildings.^30963096 Anketell-Jones {Day36/95:8}-{Day36/96:3}. However, on 16 January 2016, he sent an email to Jonathan Roome of Celotex asking for the test results and certificates for RS5000 for the purposes of advising a different client on a different project altogether. In that email he made detailed references to the fire testing regime and the limitations of the BS 8414 test.^30973097 See Chapter 56 for further detail. We think, therefore, that he was seeking to play down his technical knowledge when giving evidence before us and that he knew more than he was prepared to admit.

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¶65.18 Mr Sakula told us that at the time of the refurbishment it had been the practice of reasonably competent cladding contractors to obtain from one source or another information about technical developments and to make arrangements for disseminating that information within their organisations.^30983098 Sakula, Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Phase 2, Module 1, Report of Facade Expert {JOS00000001/29}. However, Harley had no such system in place and in that respect fell below the accepted standards prevailing at the time.

¶65.19 The general lack of understanding of these matters within Harley arose from its failure to take adequate steps to ensure that its employees were properly trained. Ray Bailey said that Harley's previous Estimating and Technical manager, Graham Hackley, had attended a course run by the CWCT and that it had been his responsibility to ensure that knowledge gained in that way was shared with the rest of the team.^30993099 Ray Bailey {Day33/19:6-9}. However, there is no evidence that Mr Hackley's role involved training other employees of Harley and it was ultimately the responsibility of Ray Bailey, not Graham Hackley, to ensure that Harley was competent to perform the work it took on. In any event, whatever Mr Hackley may have learnt of any value, it seems that it was not shared. When Mr Hackley left Harley in late 2012 or early 2013^31003100 Ray Bailey {Day32/9:8}. his expertise, such as it was, does not appear to have been replaced. Daniel Anketell-Jones took over as technical manager but was scarcely qualified to do so given that it was not until 2014 that he began studying part time for an MSc in facade engineering (which he had still not completed when he left Harley in 2016).^31013101 Anketell-Jones {HAR00010149/2} page 2, paragraphs 7-8.

Other standards and guidance

¶65.20 Harley's knowledge of the industry standards and guidance that were relevant to its work was similarly weak. Ray Bailey said that he had read the CWCT Standard for Systemised Building Envelopes issued in 2008 in the past but conceded that he did not know it in detail.^31023102 Ray Bailey {Day32/7:15-25}. He had not seen the CWCT's Technical Guidance Note 73, published in March 2011, until after the fire.^31033103 Ray Bailey {Day33/2:1-13}. Even at the time of their oral evidence to the Inquiry in September 2020, neither he nor Mr Anketell-Jones could recall ever having seen the Curtins specification.^31043104 Ray Bailey {Day32/64:4-19}; Anketell-Jones {Day35/201:22}-{Day35/202:2}. That was a significant omission because the Curtins specification had been expressly incorporated into Harley's contract and required the facade system to comply fully with the recommendations of the BRE document "Fire performance of External Insulation for Walls of Multi Storey Buildings", 2nd ed. (2003) (BR 135). It also contained broader performance standards, such as a requirement that the system should not be a fire risk at any stage of installation, nor constitute a fire hazard after completion if for any reason the insulation were to become exposed.^31053105 {CCL00001449}. Harley should have read in full and complied with the documents that were incorporated into its sub-contract.^31063106 Sakula {Day125/151:12-17}.

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¶65.21 Daniel Anketell-Jones said that he had not been aware that the facade had to meet the requirements of the CWCT Standard for Systemised Building Envelopes^31073107 Anketell-Jones {Day36/67:12-15}; {Day37/37:23-25}. or the Curtins specification,^31083108 Anketell-Jones {Day35/201:15-21}. that he had not been familiar with BR 135,^31093109 Anketell-Jones {Day35/203:8-11}. and that he had not been aware of any guidance published by the CWCT or the Building Control Alliance.^31103110 Anketell-Jones {Day35/36:6-10}; {Day35/193:8-13}. Indeed, he said that it was not until about the end of 2015 that he had begun to appreciate that those documents existed.^31113111 Anketell-Jones {Day35/179:17-23}. He said he had not been aware that there was any industry guidance that emphasised the importance of closing cavities around the windows of high-rise buildings,^31123112 Anketell-Jones {Day35/188:1-5}. and had not been aware that window openings required protection from the spread of fire at all.^31133113 Anketell-Jones {Day35/188:6-9}. If the gaps in his knowledge were as wide as he suggested, he should not have been working on the refurbishment in a design capacity. If they were not, his failure to take action was all the more serious.

¶65.22 Mr Anketell-Jones said many times during his evidence that his expertise was limited to structural matters,^31143114 For example, Anketell-Jones {Day36/10:7-13}; {Day36/72:8-12}. but the contemporaneous evidence suggests that he knew rather more about the fire performance of some construction products than he was prepared to admit. For example: a. He was sent the abseil report on the fire at Taplow House, a Harley development on which ACM PE cladding had been used.^31153115 {HAR00010169/1}.

¶b. In response to a question from a client that he described as a "headache", he made a detailed request to Celotex for certificates demonstrating that RS5000 insulation had passed certain fire performance tests.^31163116 Email from Daniel Anketell-Jones to Jonathan Roome on 16 January 2015 {CEL00000019/2}.

¶c. He sent an email in which he expressed the view that ACM panels would disappear rather quickly in a fire.^31173117 {HAR00006585/1}.

¶d. He attended the Annual General Meeting of the CWCT on 7 October 2014^31183118 {CEL00001037}. at which Sarah Colwell of the BRE gave a detailed presentation on BS 8414 and BR 135,^31193119 {CEL00001038/4-7}. as well as providing a list and images of previous national and international cladding fires.^31203120 {CEL00001038/2-3}.

¶65.23 In the light of those matters it is difficult to believe that Mr Anketell-Jones was as ignorant of matters relating to fire safety as he would have had us believe. Accordingly we can place little reliance on his protestations of ignorance or lack of expertise. We think that he knew more than he was prepared to admit about the combustibility of ACM PE and the technical requirements the cladding was required to meet. That is why he was regarded within Harley as the person who could give advice on fire safety matters.

¶65.24 Although Kevin Lamb was certain that he had reviewed the CWCT Standard for Systemised Building Envelopes during his work on the Grenfell Tower project, that had not gone beyond a brief look and he candidly admitted that he had not considered whether his designs complied with it.^31213121 Lamb {Day37/130:11-13}; {Day37/135:21}-{Day37/136:18}. It was not until March 2015, when a conversation took place between Harley, Exova, Rydon and building control in respect of the fire performance of the cavity barriers,^31223122 See Chapter 57. that he had consulted any external guidance.^31233123 Lamb {HAR00010419/13} page 13, paragraph 50; Lamb {Day37/162:5}.

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¶65.25 Since Mr Lamb was a sub-contractor, Harley ought to have referred him to relevant guidance documents or standards and ensured that he considered them.^31243124 Sakula {Day125/72:8-21}. It ought also to have had a system for checking that his work complied with the relevant statutory requirements and guidance documents.^31253125 Sakula {Day125/72:22}-{Day125/73:1}. Regrettably, however, it did not. Instead, neither Harley nor Kevin Lamb gave sufficient consideration to the documents which were key to their work, namely, BR 135, CWCT's Standard for Systemised Building Envelopes, CWCT's Technical Note 73 and BCA Technical Guidance Note 18 (Issue 0 and Issue 1).^31263126 Sakula, Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Phase 2, Module 1, Report of Facade Expert {JOS00000001/38-46}. A reasonably competent cladding contractor would have been aware of those documents and would have considered them, together with the functional requirements of the Building Regulations and Approved Document B.^31273127 Sakula, Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Phase 2, Module 1, Report of Facade Expert {JOS00000001/38-44}; Sakula {Day125/85:11-21}.

International cladding fires

¶65.26 None of Harley's staff involved in the refurbishment were aware of the many fires overseas involving ACM PE cladding, although they were well known within the cladding industry.^31283128 Sakula, Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Phase 2, Module 1, Report of Facade Expert {JOS00000001/34} paragraph 8.1.1; {JOS00000001/36-37} paragraphs 9.2-9.5. We are satisfied that a reasonably competent contractor in Harley's position would have been aware of them and would have had them in mind when considering the suitability of ACM for Grenfell Tower.

Conclusion

¶65.27 Harley's striking lack of technical knowledge and its failure to implement any proper system to monitor and improve it fell far short of the standard of a reasonably competent cladding contractor. That fundamental failure was the cause of much of its inadequate work on the refurbishment.

¶65.28 It may be that, in the years when Harley was involved in the refurbishment, its understanding of the Building Regulations, Approved Document B, Class 0 and the concept of combustibility was similar to that of some other cladding contractors.^31293129 Sakula, Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Phase 2, Module 1, Report of Facade Expert {JOS00000001/54} paragraph 14.11; Sakula {Day125/48:6}-{Day125/49:21}. As the evidence of government officials, BRE and the certification bodies revealed, there was some confusion about those matters. Harley may well not have been alone in 2013 in thinking that all that was required in the case of a rainscreen panel was a Class 0 classification, but in our view a reasonably competent cladding contractor should have been aware of the guidance in paragraph 12.7 of Approved Document B and of the distinction between Class 0 and limited combustibility. In any event, the position became clearer in the summer of 2014 when the Building Control Alliance published its Technical Guidance Note 18 (issue 0) which stated in terms that all elements of the external wall had to be of limited combustibility. A reasonably competent cladding contractor would quickly have become aware of that guidance note and of the clarification it offered. It would also have been aware that Class 0 was not a measure of combustibility and therefore would not have thought that it equated to limited combustibility.

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The choice of ACM panels

¶65.29 Harley bears a significant degree of responsibility for the decision to use Reynobond ACM PE panels on the tower. Between late 2013 and September 2014, Studio E continued to seek assistance from Harley in relation to the products that would be included in the NBS Specification and, ultimately, in the TMO's tender information for prospective contractors. During that process, Harley continued to promote the use of Reynobond ACM PE panels.^31303130 {HAR00005509}; Harris {Day34/95:22}-{Day34/100:6}. It had a strong preference for the use of ACM for the rainscreen because it was familiar with the product, having used it on many previous buildings, and could calculate its costs with confidence. It therefore encouraged the use of Reynobond PE 55 in its own interests,^31313131 Email from Mark Harris to Tomas Rek CC Ray Bailey, Mike Albiston, Bruce Sounes on 7 November 2013 {HAR00010172/3}. among which were maintaining its commercial relationship with Deborah French (Arconic's UK sales representative).^31323132 Harris {Day34/95:10}-{Day34/97:14}; {Day34/99:15}-{Day34/100:2} and {HAR00010172}. It is right to point out that Harley's involvement at that stage was entirely voluntary in the hope of being appointed to the project by whoever was appointed by the TMO as main contractor. It was under no contractual obligation to give advice to Studio E or to investigate the suitability of ACM PE, but in encouraging its use as the rainscreen Harley had a responsibility to satisfy itself that it was suitable for that purpose.

¶65.30 Mark Harris accepted that he thought Studio E was relying on Harley, as the specialist cladding contractor, to propose materials that were suitable for use on the tower,^31333133 Harris {Day34/52:20}-{Day34/53:1}. and although Ray Bailey did not think that Studio E was relying on Harley at all,^31343134 Ray Bailey {Day32/145:3-11}. he agreed that Harley would not recommend a product that it did not believe complied with the Building Regulations.^31353135 Ray Bailey {Day32/144:22}-{Day32/145:1}. However, the question whether ACM was suitable for use on the tower was never raised by Harley with Studio E (or indeed vice-versa). Both assumed that the product was safe because it had been used on many other buildings, but neither of them took any steps to investigate its fire performance.

¶65.31 That assumption was born of complacency and incompetence. The view of Mr Sakula, which we accept, was that no reasonably competent cladding contractor would have relied simply on the fact that ACM PE had been used on buildings for many years.^31363136 Sakula {Day125/109:14}-{Day125/110:16}. It is particularly surprising that Harley was able to make such an assumption, given the dramatic fires that in the previous two years had affected buildings overseas clad in ACM panels. They were well known in the cladding industry generally and, as a specialist cladding contractor, Harley ought to have been aware of them. A reasonably competent cladding contractor would have known about the combustibility of ACM PE and should therefore have known about the risks posed by the use of such material.^31373137 Sakula, Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Phase 2, Module 1, Report of Facade Expert {JOS00000001/59}.

¶65.32 The NBS Specification was completed by Studio E on 30 January 2014. It included the use of Proteus HR zinc honeycomb rainscreen panels but required tendering contractors to provide alternative prices for other products, including Reynobond Duragloss 5000 ACM.^31383138 {SEA00000169/65}. At no point did Studio E and Harley ever discuss whether the Reynobond product was suitable for use on Grenfell Tower;^31393139 Harris {HAR00010159/6} page 6, paragraph 22; Harris {Day34/115:12-25}. they both appear simply to have assumed that ACM PE would perform well on any high-rise building.

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¶65.33 Harley's relationship with Arconic and its consequent ability to offer a significant reduction in the price of Reynobond panels was a factor which helped Rydon secure the contract, and in due course Harley was appointed by Rydon as cladding sub-contractor.

¶65.34 Once Rydon had secured the contract for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment in March 2014, there was no way back. Unless RBKC's planning department objected on aesthetic grounds, it was inevitable that Reynobond PE 55 would be chosen for the rainscreen panels simply on the grounds of cost. Harley's involvement thus made a significant contribution to the eventual use of ACM PE on Grenfell Tower.

¶65.35 The letter of intent and the DOM 2 sub-contract conditions, which in due course constituted the terms under which Harley carried out the work on the refurbishment, incorporated all the provisions of the contract between Rydon and the TMO relating to the installation of the cladding, including in relation to the choice of materials.^31403140 Letter of Intent {HAR00000120} paragraph 2(b); DOM2 Subcontract Conditions {INQ00011211/8}) clause 2.5.1; Design and Build Contract {RYD00094235/69} clause 2.17. As a result, Harley had an obligation to ensure that the materials chosen for the work were suitable and it is therefore not surprising that Ray Bailey accepted that Harley had an independent obligation to examine the NBS Specification to ensure that the products to which it referred complied with relevant statutory requirements.^31413141 Ray Bailey {Day32/85:12-{Day32/87:10}. Harley failed to do so, however, because it assumed that if a material or product had been included in the specification, someone, principally Studio E, had ensured that it was suitable for its intended purpose. Kevin Lamb, who was responsible for producing most of the drawings required for the fabrication of the rainscreen, did not think that Harley was responsible for ensuring the suitability of the materials or products identified in the NBS Specification.^31423142 Lamb {Day37/110:4-7}. Ray Bailey said that he had assumed that Daniel Anketell-Jones had checked that they were suitable, but Daniel Anketell-Jones said that he had not turned his mind to the question.^31433143 Ray Bailey {Day35/51:4-13}; Anketell-Jones {Day36/69:1-9}; {Day36/78:1-20}.

¶65.36 That evidence is surprising because on 7 October 2014 Daniel Anketell-Jones attended the CWCT Annual General Meeting, together with Mark Stapley, at which a presentation was given which expressly referred to a number of cladding fires in high-rise buildings abroad and to the availability of fire-resistant cladding panels.^31443144 {CEL00001038/3}. The next day Daniel Anketell- Jones's brother, Samuel Anketell-Jones, who was also employed by Harley, asked Deborah French of Arconic for information about Reynobond ACM panels with fire-resistant cores.^31453145 {MET00081175}. Although we did not hear evidence on the question, his email strongly suggests that he had spoken to one or both of Daniel Anketell-Jones or Mark Stapley and that Harley knew more than it was willing to admit about the availability of panels with fire-resistant cores and about the dangers posed by panels with unmodified polyethylene cores.^31463146 See Chapter 55.

¶65.37 The section of the NBS Specification that dealt with the design of the cladding was 11 pages long. We consider that Daniel Anketell-Jones, and indeed every other Harley employee involved in the refurbishment project, should have read and understood at least those sections and should have kept them under consideration throughout the work. In our opinion, there is no reasonable excuse for a specialist contractor in Harley's position not ensuring that they did so.

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¶65.38 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, no check on the suitability of the ACM PE panels was subsequently carried out by anyone at Harley. ACM panels were included in the "Specification Notes" produced by Kevin Lamb in early 2015 describing the products that would be used in the construction of the external facade of the tower.^31473147 {RYD00046822}; {HAR00010160/5}.

¶65.39 In the light of Mr Sakula's evidence, we consider that the approach demonstrated by Harley generally fell below the generally applicable standards of the time. A reasonably competent cladding contractor would have carefully considered whether ACM PE cladding panels were suitable for use on a building such as Grenfell Tower and would have ensured that all other construction professionals involved in the project were aware of their combustibility.^31483148 Sakula {Day125/199:12}-{Day125/200:20}.

Certifications and product literature

¶65.40 Mr Sakula thought that it was reasonable for a cladding contractor in Harley's position to rely on certificates such as those issued by the British Board of Agrément (BBA) and Local Authority Building Control,^31493149 Sakula {Day125/161:7}-{Day125/162:4}. but he also said that he would have expected the contractor's technical department to have looked at the details of the certificates more closely. In the light of his evidence we consider that a reasonably competent cladding contractor would have examined such certificates carefully and also the sales and technical literature produced by the manufacturer in order to understand the claims being made for the product and their relevance to the refurbishment. In that respect also, Harley failed to act appropriately.

¶65.41 On 23 April 2014 Deborah French of Arconic sent Harley a copy of the British Board of Agrément certificate for Reynobond PE 55 cladding panels.^31503150 {RYD00003932}. Although Harley had an obligation under its contract with Rydon to consider documents of that kind in order to satisfy itself that the products being used on the tower were suitable, no one at Harley gave it more than the most cursory examination at any time.^31513151 Ray Bailey {Day32/124:16-18}; {Day33/33:14}.

¶65.42 Ray Bailey had read the British Board of Agrément certificate when it was first published in 2008 but did not look at it again after that or discuss it with anyone.^31523152 Ray Bailey {Day33/35:15}-{Day33/36:20}. Daniel Anketell- Jones could not remember having seen the British Board of Agrément certificate during the Grenfell Tower project.^31533153 Anketell-Jones {Day37/6:16}-{Day37/7:22}. Kevin Lamb did not consider that it was part of his job to look at British Board of Agrément certificates relating to products that were included in his designs.^31543154 Lamb {Day38/24:15-18}.

¶65.43 If Harley had examined the British Board of Agrément certificate carefully, it would have recognised that it included several important qualifications, among them that it applied only to panels with a grey/green Duragloss 5000 coating,^31553155 {BBA00000047/5} section 6.4. and that the fire performance of a wall incorporating the panel could not be ascertained from the certificate alone.^31563156 {BBA00000047/5} section 6.5. In the light of Mr Sakula's evidence, we are satisfied that a reasonably competent cladding contractor would have read the certificate in full, would have had the qualifications in mind,^31573157 Sakula, Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Phase 2, Module 1, Report of Facade Expert {JOS00000001/49} paragraph 12.1. would have alerted the design team to its limitations,^31583158 Sakula {Day125/166:7-17}. and would have asked the manufacturer for more information about the tests that had been carried out on the product before deciding whether it was suitable for use.^31593159 Sakula {Day125/163:17}-{Day125/164:18}.

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Insulation

Celotex RS5000

¶65.44 From early June 2014, Harley was in close communication with Celotex in relation to the launch of Celotex RS5000 insulation^31603160 Task call record following call from Harley Facades regarding insulation {CEL00009874}. and representatives of Celotex, principally Jonathan Roome, subsequently made several visits to Harley's offices to promote the new product.^31613161 See Chapter 56.

¶65.45 The use of RS5000 in place of FR5000 resulted from those discussions. Since RS5000 was being promoted as a new product, Harley should have taken steps to satisfy itself that its use complied with the Building Regulations and any relevant statutory and industry guidance. However, it failed properly to do so.

¶65.46 Although Harley expected to be, and in due course was, appointed as a specialist cladding sub-contractor with responsibility for the design of the cladding, no one appears ever to have asked how functional requirement B4(1) was to be satisfied or which (if any) of the routes to compliance set out in Approved Document B it was proposed to follow. That was a serious failure, because unless it knew the answer to that question it could not tell whether RS5000 could properly be used. Indeed, Harley does not appear to have paid much attention to the fact that RS5000 was on the face of it a different product from that specified in the NBS Specification. The fact that RS5000 was in fact identical to FR5000 just means that in that respect Harley's incompetence did not result in any harm.

¶65.47 As a result of the conversations between Jonathan Roome and Ben Bailey in June 2014, Harley was well aware that Celotex did not at that time offer a product that was suitable for use on buildings above 18 metres in height.^31623162 Ben Bailey {Day39/55:15-25}; {Day39/56:1}. There was therefore no reasonable basis on which Daniel Anketell-Jones could have thought that the fire performance of RS5000 had been investigated by Studio E during the preparation of the NBS Specification or that it had been "checked through with desktop studies",^31633163 Anketell-Jones {Day36/102:13-19}. not least since RS5000 was not in the NBS Specification. Indeed, it could not have been because it did not exist as a separate brand in November 2013.

¶65.48 Ben Bailey claimed that after he had become involved in the project in February 2015 he had read the parts of the NBS Specification that concerned Harley's work.^31643164 Ben Bailey {Day39/64:21-25}; {Day39/65:1-19}. They clearly prescribed the use of a different Celotex insulation product, FR5000. Nonetheless, he did not question the use of RS5000 even though he must have realised that it was not the product specified. Mr Anketell-Jones said that he was not aware that anyone at Harley had considered whether Celotex FR5000 was suitable;^31653165 Anketell-Jones {Day36/71:10-22}. indeed, he could not remember that it had been included in the specification at all.^31663166 Anketell-Jones {Day36/70:21}-{Day36/71:4}.

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¶65.49 Harley also failed properly to examine the sales and technical literature relating to the Celotex RS5000 insulation. On 27 August 2014, Jonathan Roome sent Daniel Anketell-Jones a pack of information about Celotex RS5000, which included a detailed specification and testing information.^31673167 {CEL00011960}; {CEL00011961}; {CEL00011962}; {CEL00011963}; {CEL00011964}; {CEL00011965}; {CEL00011966}; {CEL00011967}. Mr Anketell-Jones said that his usual practice had been to pass information of that kind to others so that the suitability of the materials in question could be checked, but in that particular case he had not sent it to anyone else, nor had he taken any other steps to check whether the fire performance of RS5000 made it suitable for use.^31683168 Anketell-Jones {Day36/88:13-19}. His explanation was that he would have done so if he had been the designer, but that he had not considered that to be part of his responsibility.^31693169 Anketell-Jones {Day36/88:17-19}.

¶65.50 In fact, Mr Anketell-Jones did not know, or trouble himself to find out, whose job it was within Harley to check such matters and he appears not to have considered whether Kevin Lamb was likely to have read the information.^31703170 Anketell-Jones {Day36/93:4-13}. For his part, Ray Bailey did not read the literature himself; he simply assumed that Mr Anketell-Jones had read it.^31713171 Ray Bailey {Day33/78:4-20}. Kevin Lamb said that he had read what he described as a "compliance guide" on RS5000 produced by Celotex but did not discuss its contents with anyone or look into the suitability of the product.^31723172 Lamb {Day38/37:24}-{Day38/38:4-7}. If Harley had properly considered Celotex's product literature or got beyond the pink banner on the first page, it would have seen that the claim that RS5000 had been classed as suitable for use above 18 metres applied only if the product was incorporated into a cladding system identical to the one that had been tested.^31733173 {CEL00000012/3}.

¶65.51 Harley's Specification Notes of 15 July 2015^31743174 {RYD00046822}. did not specify the type of insulation that was to be used. Further, although its drawings included references to insulation, they did not include a description of what product was to be used either. That deprived others who might review the drawings of the ability to identify the products and conduct their own checks.

Kingspan K15

¶65.52 As we have said,^31753175 See Chapter 56. Kingspan K15 was used as a last-minute substitute for Celotex RS5000 when there was a delay in obtaining supplies of that product. It was used without any proper investigation being made into its suitability for that purpose or into whether its use would result in an external wall that complied with the Building Regulations or was consistent with statutory or industry guidance. Harley must bear primary responsibility for that failure, which was the result of a decision made without consulting Rydon or Studio E.

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¶65.53 Ben Bailey was aware that K15 had not been included in the NBS Specification, but the fact that Harley had installed it on other projects led him to assume that it was suitable for use on Grenfell Tower.^31763176 Ben Bailey {Day39/31:23}-{Day39/32:3}; {Day39/142:11-14}. He said that he had asked around in the Harley office whether it could be substituted for RS5000, despite the fact that it was not referred to in the NBS Specification.^31773177 Ben Bailey {Day39/117:3-19}. He referred to the version of the British Board of Agrément certificate relating to K15 dating from 2008, rather than the more recent version, because Harley happened to have had a copy on file at the time. He was not aware that a more recent certificate had been issued.^31783178 Ben Bailey {Day39/118:20}-{Day39/119:7}.

¶65.54 Ben Bailey did not examine the relevant LABC or British Board of Agrément certificates for the product (indeed, Harley possessed only a copy of the British Board of Agrément certificate issued in 2008, which was long out of date^31793179 {BBA00000038}; Ben Bailey {Day39/119:5-19}.) and took no steps to find out whether Kingspan K15 was a material of limited combustibility.^31803180 Ray Bailey {Day33/102:17-25}; Ben Bailey {Day39/127:21-25}. Nonetheless, he proceeded to place orders for K15 in May and September 2015 and to install it on the tower without telling Rydon (or anyone else) that it was being used.^31813181 {SIG00000012}; {SIG00000013}. In both respects Harley failed to meet the standard of a reasonably competent cladding contractor.

¶65.55 It was not until December 2015 or January 2016, that Harley, facing another interruption to the supply of RS5000, sought permission from Rydon to substitute Kingspan K15 for Celotex RS5000.^31823182 Hughes {RYD00094213/10} page 10, paragraph 55. Permission was readily granted, but without any thought having been given to the characteristics of the material.^31833183 Hughes {Day27/71:23}-{Day27/72:1}. Ben Bailey assured Rydon that the products were substantially the same, although he had no basis for doing so, both because he did not have the technical expertise to make that assessment and because he had taken no steps to check that it was correct.^31843184 Ben Bailey {Day39/107:1-3}; {Day39/108:11-19}. Rydon failed to enquire into the suitability of the product or to inform the TMO or building control that it was being used.^31853185 Blake {Day29/115:7}-{Day29/117:11}; Hughes {Day27/67:5}-{Day27/68:8}; {Day27/70:4-6}.

¶65.56 Viewing the evidence in the round, it is clear to us that Harley failed adequately to examine the information it had been given about the products that it included in its designs. A reasonably competent cladding contractor would have taken steps to satisfy itself that any information it was given was relevant and reliable, but Harley failed to do so. In that respect it fell below the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent cladding contractor.

Window infill panels

¶65.57 When he first prepared Harley's Specification Notes in January 2015, Kevin Lamb proposed the use of Kingspan TP10 for the insulated panels within the window assemblies,^31863186 {HAR00003866}. but he did not consult Approved Document B or any other guidance to help him understand the fire performance required of materials to be used for that purpose.^31873187 Lamb {Day38/174:2-5}. He had not seen any certificates relating to TP10 and failed to investigate its fire performance or otherwise to check that it was suitable for that purpose.^31883188 Lamb {Day38/179:10-18}. The specification for the panels was ultimately changed to Styrofoam, but, again, Harley did not take any steps to find out whether the material was suitable for the use to which it was to be put.^31893189 Lamb {Day38/187:1-9}.

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¶65.58 The guidance given in Approved Document B was that the insulation in the window infill panels should be of limited combustibility in order to comply with the requirements of the Building Regulations. We are satisfied that a reasonably competent cladding contractor would have carried out careful and thorough checks on products of that kind each time they used them.^31903190 Sakula {Day125/111:18-24}. We have concluded that Harley failed to act in accordance with the standards to be expected of a reasonably competent cladding contractor in selecting those products without properly investigating their suitability.

Cavity barriers

¶65.59 Between August 2014 and May 2015, Harley produced fabrication drawings of the details around the windows of Grenfell Tower which contained a series of fundamental errors that were identified by Mr Hyett. The structures they described did not comply with the Building Regulations and did not reflect the guidance given in Approved Document B.^31913191 Hyett, Section 4 – Failures of Statutory Compliance {PHYR0000029/107-132} paragraphs 4.4.91-4.4.136.

¶65.60 The initial design of the cavity barriers had been produced by Studio E and passed to Harley for development in August 2014.^31923192 {HAR00010412/2}. Kevin Lamb first produced detailed drawings of the window arrangements on 22 August 2014,^31933193 {HAR00010426}. but they did not show cavity barriers within the facade. As such, they did not reflect the guidance in Approved Document B and could not be expected to produce a building that complied with functional requirements B4(1) and B3(4) of the Building Regulations. Thereafter, further versions of Kevin Lamb's designs were provided to Rydon and Studio E and were reviewed in design team meetings^31943194 See Chapter 57. but no one commented on the absence of cavity barriers.^31953195 Crawford {Day10/185:2-5}; {Day10/185:11-14}; {HAR00010423/2}.

¶65.61 Harley should have been aware of the need to install cavity barriers around windows because of its experience of the fire at Taplow House on the Chalcots Estate in January 2012. That was one of its previous overcladding projects which had suffered a fire but at which cavity barriers around the window had played a significant part in preventing the fire from spreading into the external wall. The significance of the cavity barriers had either not been properly appreciated or the lesson had been forgotten by the time Harley came to design the external wall of Grenfell Tower.

¶65.62 Nonetheless, the request for information which Daniel Anketell-Jones sent to Rydon and Studio E on 17 September 2014, in which he asked about the need for horizontal firebreaks within the cladding areas,^31963196 {SEA00011703}. shows that Harley had given some thought to the need for cavity barriers and that it understood that cavity barriers were required within the facade at least to some extent. However, no one at Harley appears to have considered any of the available guidance before making that request.^31973197 Anketell-Jones {Day36/158:10-13}, Lamb {Day38/74:5-11}.

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¶65.63 Harley asked for advice from Studio E, Exova and building control on the level of fire resistance that was required for the horizontal cavity barriers within the facade.^31983198 {HAR00003638/3-4}; see also Chapter 57. On 18 September 2014, Daniel Anketell-Jones asserted in an email to Neil Crawford that cavity barriers were not required in certain locations since the insulation was Class 0,^31993199 {HAR00012103}. but that was wrong. In his oral evidence, he accepted that in that email he had been expressing an opinion on what was required to comply with the guidance given in Approved Document B,^32003200 Anketell-Jones {Day36/166:2-16}. but he had not looked at it before doing so, nor had he sought any other advice to confirm that his view was correct.^32013201 Anketell-Jones {Day36/166:25}-{Day36/166:7}.

¶65.64 Between September 2014 and March 2015, Harley (in particular, Kevin Lamb) continued to develop the design of the windows. Further versions of Harley's drawings were circulated among the design team, none of which showed cavity barriers.^32023202 {SEA00011759}, attaching {RYD00018436}; {RYD00018537}; {RYD00018687}; {SEA00012531} attaching {SEA00003040}. Ray Bailey was aware of the importance of effective cavity barriers around windows but did not draw attention to the absence of cavity barriers around the windows in Harley's drawings. There appear to have been no discussions within Harley about what Approved Document B recommended in that respect.^32033203 Lamb {Day38/92:16}-{Day38/93:9}.

¶65.65 It was not until 3 March 2015 that Kevin Lamb included cavity barriers in his designs for the first time.^32043204 {SEA00012850}. His explanation for their inclusion at that stage was that completion of the designs had by then become urgent because construction had already begun and the cladding would soon be installed.^32053205 Lamb {Day38/97:5-14}. Even at that extremely late stage, however, Harley made no effort to satisfy itself that its designs complied with the guidance given in Approved Document B. In fact, as Mr Hyett explained, they did not. Among other things, there was still no provision for cavity barriers around the windows.^32063206 Lamb {Day38/101:11-14}.

¶65.66 Harley and the design team more generally were evidently deeply unsure about what was required in the way of cavity barriers, because there followed further discussions between Studio E, Exova, building control and Siderise (the manufacturer) in an effort to ascertain whether Harley's designs were acceptable.^32073207 {HAR00004013}; {EXO00001319}; {SEA00012906}; {SEA00000252}; {SEA00012927}; {HAR00003999}. The result of those conversations was yet further confusion and disagreement, largely because building control and Siderise differed in their view of what was required.^32083208 See Chapter 57. The issue was finally resolved to the satisfaction of building control in April 2015,^32093209 See Chapter 57. but Harley continued to seek advice from Siderise in May and June 2015.^32103210 {HAR00004238}; {HAR00019012/2}.

¶65.67 This episode reflects very poorly on all those involved. As a result of the fire at Taplow House in 2012, at which cavity barriers had played an important part in restricting the spread of fire, Ray Bailey and Daniel Anketell-Jones should have been aware of their importance for fire safety, but the significance of that incident appears to have been forgotten.^32113211 Anketell-Jones {Day35/149:14-19}.

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¶65.68 The evidence indicates that Harley was largely ignorant of the technical aspects of using cavity barriers and as a result was forced to rely too heavily on the advice of other members of the design team and the manufacturer. As the specialist cladding contractor, Harley could reasonably have been expected to possess a far greater degree of technical knowledge of the Building Regulations and Approved Document B in relation to the use and installation of cavity barriers than was the case.

¶65.69 It is particularly troubling that, although Kevin Lamb noticed that Studio E had failed to include cavity barriers around the windows^32123212 Lamb {Day38/54:5}-{Day38/56:24}. and told us that he had understood that Approved Document B required them in that location as an important means of ensuring the safety of residents,^32133213 Lamb {Day38/58:5-18}. he nonetheless failed to ask why they were missing or whether the designs complied with regulatory requirements. We do not accept his evidence that it was not his place to raise the matter.^32143214 Lamb {Day38/56:23-24}. He had no reason to think that others at Harley considered that cavity barriers were unnecessary or that anyone at Harley had consulted Studio E.^32153215 Lamb {Day38/57:25}-{Day38/58:3}.

¶65.70 Harley ought to have played an active part in the design of the cavity barriers and should have ensured that a detailed cavity barrier strategy had been established before construction work began. Even by March 2015, however, some eight months after it had been appointed by Rydon,^32163216 {HAR00005867}. Daniel Anketell-Jones remained unaware that Harley was working to the NBS Specification or what it contained.^32173217 Anketell-Jones {Day37/26:1-5}. The NBS Specification required Harley to design a system that contained fire stopping in accordance with the requirements of the Building Regulations, but Daniel Anketell-Jones did not ask himself what that meant because he failed to read it.^32183218 Anketell-Jones {Day37/38:10-22}. He repeatedly claimed that he did not have time to engage with the details of the NBS Specification, or design generally, because he was working on other projects.^32193219 Anketell-Jones {Day35/133:10-24}; {Day37/40:6-10}; Anketell-Jones {HAR00010149/3-4} pages 3-4, paragraph 14.

¶65.71 Harley's work on the architectural crown was carried out at a late stage.^32203220 Lamb {HAR00010419/9-10} pages 9-10, paragraph 35. Its designs for the crown omitted the cavity barrier at the top of the columns that had been included in the drawings produced by Studio E^32213221 {SEA00003242}; Crawford {Day11/66:9-11}; {SEA00002551}. and thus detracted from the original design.^32223222 Lamb {Day38/163:23}-{Day38/164:5}. Kevin Lamb said that he had intended to check whether the design required amendment to include a cavity barrier after it had been reviewed by the architect, but said that his question had ultimately been overlooked.^32233223 Lamb {Day38/165:7-14}. Overall it is clear that Harley failed to give any proper consideration to the fire performance of the crown. While the failure to include cavity barriers in the crown may not have contributed significantly to the spread of the fire,^32243224 Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report, Volume IV, {INQ00014817/59} paragraph 23.60. it reflects Harley's failure to give proper consideration to the fire safety of the facade.

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The design process

¶65.72 Harley's failure to produce designs for the refurbishment that complied with its contractual obligations reflected a failure properly to manage its own resources and a misunderstanding of its role in the refurbishment and the roles of other members of the design team.

Supervision and management

¶65.73 As an organisation, Harley failed to ensure that the various people engaged on the project were aware of the scope of their individual responsibilities. Ray Bailey and Ben Bailey both thought that Daniel Anketell-Jones was responsible for ensuring that designs produced by Harley (including those produced by Kevin Lamb on its behalf) complied in all respects with regulatory requirements.^32253225 Ray Bailey {Day32/17:21}-{Day32/18:2}; Ben Bailey {Day39/19:13-21}. For his part, although he had been designated as design manager for the refurbishment, Mr Anketell-Jones said that he had not considered supervision of the design process to be part of his responsibility.^32263226 Anketell-Jones {Day35/133:10-14}. We find that difficult to understand and think his evidence is probably best explained by the fact that the amount of work he had on other projects made it difficult for him to look at the designers' work.^32273227 Anketell-Jones {Day35/133:17-19}.

¶65.74 As we have already said, we do not think that as a witness Mr Anketell-Jones was always candid or reliable. In particular, we do not accept that his role in the design process was as limited as he suggested. His evidence was inconsistent with communications between Harley and Rydon, which indicated that he would be reviewing drawings on Harley's behalf.^32283228 Email dated 24 April 2014 from Mark Harris, "Our Dan will be taking a look at these on Monday" {HAR00005711}; Email dated 31 July 2014 from Mark Harris, "Lead designer will be Dan Anketell-Jones." {HAR00005916}. We prefer the evidence of Ray Bailey and Ben Bailey that he was given responsibility for checking the design work carried out by Harley, including the work done by Kevin Lamb on its behalf.

¶65.75 Mr Anketell-Jones had not read the contract between Harley and Rydon and did not accept that it was important for him to understand the nature of Harley's contractual responsibilities.^32293229 Anketell-Jones {Day35/195:3-15}. He thought that his responsibility as design manager was simply to ensure that the designers, in particular Kevin Lamb, were keeping up with the programme^32303230 Anketell-Jones {Day36/19:16-18}. and that the architect was responsible for approving the drawings Mr Lamb produced.^32313231 Anketell-Jones {Day35/195:3-15}. He was not aware, therefore, that Harley was contractually responsible for ensuring that the facade of the tower complied with the relevant statutory requirements^32323232 Anketell-Jones {Day35/195:16-21}. and did not apply his mind to the question whether the materials to be used would ensure that was the case.^32333233 Anketell-Jones {Day35/183:13}-{Day35/184:5}. If he did think at the time that the architect was responsible for checking the drawings produced by Mr Lamb (which we doubt), he was wrong and his responsibilities had not been properly explained to him. It was an important part of his role as design manager, and of Harley's generally, to supervise the work of Kevin Lamb in order to ensure that the designs he produced would result in a building that complied with the Building Regulations.^32343234 Anketell-Jones {HAR00010149/3-4} pages 3-4, paragraph 14. For his part, Kevin Lamb assumed that the suitability of the materials intended for use in the refurbishment had been considered and settled before he became involved on the project.^32353235 Lamb {Day38/21:2}-{Day38/22:12}.

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¶65.76 The development of the design of the windows of Grenfell Tower between September 2014 and March 2015 provides a telling example of Harley's failure properly to supervise Mr Lamb's work. During that period, Mr Lamb produced detailed drawings of the windows, none of which included cavity barriers in the required positions. The omission was not detected by Harley because it did not review the development of the design or examine with any care the drawings he produced.^32363236 Anketell-Jones {Day36/176:4-23}; see also Chapter 57.

¶65.77 In the light of Mr Sakula's evidence, we are satisfied that a reasonably competent cladding contractor would have established a system for supervising its sub-contractors. Such a system should have ensured that the work they carried out complied with relevant statutory requirements, industry guidance and normally accepted standards of safety.^32373237 Sakula {Day125/72:22}-{Day125/73:17}. In our view there were fundamental deficiencies in Harley's management which directly led to the creation of a design that did not comply with statutory guidance and could not be expected to result in a building that complied with the functional requirements of the Building Regulations. In that respect Harley fell short of the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent cladding contractor.

Relationship with Studio E

¶65.78 Harley also failed properly to manage its relationship with the other key designer, Studio E. It was content to assume that Studio E had considered and checked all those aspects of the external wall construction that had a bearing on fire safety. That was not the case, however, and it was not appropriate or reasonable for Harley to make that assumption, particularly in the face of clear evidence that Studio E had not done so.^32383238 For example, Harley knew that Studio E had not approved the use of Celotex RS5000, which did not appear in the NBS Specification – see Chapter 56. Harley should have taken steps to satisfy itself independently that the form of construction and the materials described in those drawings would result in a building that complied with the Building Regulations, but it failed to do so.^32393239 Ray Bailey {Day32/51:15}-{Day32/52:13}.

¶65.79 Daniel Anketell-Jones' belief that Studio E was checking the drawings produced by Harley for compliance with the relevant requirements was founded on nothing more than an assumption; he did not speak to Studio E or take any other steps to confirm his understanding.^32403240 Anketell-Jones {Day36/34:6-11}. Ray Bailey said that if Harley was not entirely clear on a question of compliance, it would ask the architect and ultimately expect building control to decide whether the design complied with the regulations.^32413241 Ray Bailey {Day32/53:7-12}. However, he assumed that the drawings were being checked by Studio E without ever taking steps to verify whether that was so.^32423242 Ray Bailey {Day32/51:15}-{Day32/52:13}. There is very little evidence, however, that Harley ever sought to resolve doubts about compliance by referring a question to a third party. The reason may not be far to seek: it regarded everyone involved in any aspect of the design, other than itself, even including building control, as responsible for ensuring fire safety. Its approach to a matter of such importance was irresponsible, regardless of its contractual obligations.

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¶65.80 Studio E considered that its obligation to review drawings produced by Harley was limited to ensuring that they conformed to "architectural intent", meaning that they were consistent with the appearance contemplated by the original design. We have already concluded that its understanding about that was wrong; it was not consistent with its contract with Rydon, nor did it reflect common practice among architects, as confirmed by Mr Hyett. However, as the specialist cladding sub-contractor, Harley should have taken steps to ensure that its own designs complied with any relevant legislation and guidance, regardless of Studio E's approach to its work.

Kevin Lamb

¶65.81 Kevin Lamb pointed out, correctly, that the decision to use ACM panels in place of the zinc originally specified by Studio E had been made before he had become involved in the work.^32433243 Lamb {HAR00010419/5} page 5, paragraph 20. However, he took no steps to familiarise himself with the products that were the subject of his designs, particularly their fire performance. He understood that ACM panels comprised a core material between two thin sheets of aluminium but did not know what the core was made of and made no effort to find out.^32443244 Lamb {Day38/19:2-14}.

¶65.82 Despite being responsible for creating Harley's drawings, Kevin Lamb gave no thought to questions of compliance with the Building Regulations and was instead content to assume that such matters were being considered by someone else.^32453245 Lamb {Day38/19:15-19}; {Day38/37:14}-{Day38/38:7}; {Day38/40:7-10}. He said that it had never crossed his mind to consider whether there was a British Board of Agrément certificate for Reynobond PE 55 ACM,^32463246 Lamb {Day38/23:17-20}. let alone to look at it.

Installation

¶65.83 Harley's failure properly to supervise and manage its own staff extended to its management of Osborne Berry, which it had engaged to install the facade. Ben Bailey described his shock at seeing photographs of the cavity barriers taken after the fire and said that he had not seen workmanship like that on site.^32473247 Ben Bailey {HAR00010060/10} page 10, paragraph 32. He sought to explain his failure to notice the defects by suggesting that the insulation had covered the junction between the cavity barriers and the existing concrete walls, making it impossible to identify any defects without dismantling and damaging the finished works.^32483248 Ben Bailey {HAR00010060/10} page 10, paragraph 32. We do not accept that explanation, however, as there must have been many opportunities to inspect the cavity barriers before the insulation was fitted.^32493249 Berry {Day44/59:9-14}. Ben Bailey accepted that he ought to have been carrying out inspections at each stage of the installation.^32503250 Ben Bailey {Day40/164:1-9}. If he had done so, he would have inspected the work before the insulation obscured the back of the cavity barriers and it is likely that at least some of the problems would have come to light. We are satisfied that Harley failed to inspect the work of Osborne Berry with sufficient frequency or care to ensure that the defects noted above were identified. In our view the defects in the installation of the cavity barriers reflect a serious lack of competence on the part of Harley itself and Osborne Berry.

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Failure to concern itself with fire safety

¶65.84 Viewing the evidence as a whole, we are left with the clear impression that Harley did not concern itself sufficiently with fire safety at any stage during the refurbishment. Its attitude appears to have been that there was no need for it to do so, because others involved in the project, and ultimately building control, would ensure that the design was safe. Its approach is reflected in its response to the following situations.

¶65.85 The first arose from the formal request for information about the incorporation of cavity barriers or fire breaks in the external wall of the tower, in the course of which Mr Ashton referred to the possibility that the insulation might be combustible.^32513251 See Chapter 54 and Chapter 57. That should have prompted Harley to consider whether RS5000 was combustible and whether it could safely be used in that situation. It is particularly surprising that Mr Anketell-Jones did not think it necessary to make such enquiries, given that he understood it to be a different product from FR5000 that had been specified,^32523252 Anketell-Jones {Day36/102:13-19}. but he did not raise the question with any other member of the design team, nor did he take any other steps to find out whether the new product was acceptable to Rydon or Studio E.^32533253 Anketell-Jones {Day36/171:13-16}; {Day36/108:17-25}. He said that he had expected Kevin Lamb to tell Studio E that Harley intended to use Celotex RS5000 so that Studio E could consider its suitability,^32543254 Anketell-Jones {Day36/79:14}-{Day36/80:5}. but he had not discussed the use of Celotex RS5000 with Kevin Lamb and had not provided any of the relevant information to him.^32553255 Anketell-Jones {Day36/65:20}-{Day36/66:10}.

¶65.86 The second arose out of a discussion in March 2015 about the fire resistance required of the cavity barriers to be installed in the external wall. In the course of that discussion Mr Anketell-Jones referred to the likelihood that ACM panels would disappear quickly in a fire. That did not, however, prompt him to look into the characteristics of ACM PE or to ask himself (or anyone else) whether it was suitable material for use on the tower. That is surprising because only a few months earlier, in October 2014, he had attended the Annual General Meeting of the CWCT at which a presentation had been given by Dr Colwell of BRE on the then recent spate of cladding fires in various countries.^32563256 {CEL00001038}. Natural curiosity, if not professional competence, might have led Mr Anketell-Jones to enquire into the nature of Reynobond 55 PE to see whether it might give rise to a similar problem, but regrettably neither caused him to make or instigate the kind of enquiries that a reasonably competent cladding contractor would have made under those circumstances.

¶65.87 The third relates to a warning given by Mr Mort of Siderise Ltd, the company which made the cavity barriers, that the design of the window fixings contained what he described as a "weak link for fire." Mr Mort identified the area of weakness on a copy of a drawing sent to him by Ben Bailey, but Ben Bailey failed to pass the comment to Studio E, Rydon or Exova and took no steps to ensure that it was removed. Mr Mort copied his email to Kevin Lamb and Ray Bailey, but neither of them took any action in response to it. Kevin Lamb said that he had not noticed the warning about a weak link at all, despite having read the email,^32573257 Lamb {Day38/138:8-20}; {Day38/141:24}-{Day38/142:4}. and did not raise the matter with any other member of the design team.^32583258 Lamb {Day38/142:21-24}; {Day38/144:3-5}. Ray Bailey could not explain why he had not pursued the matter with Mr Mort^32593259 Ray Bailey {Day33/160:2-7}. but he ultimately accepted that the only sensible course of action had been to raise the matter with building control to ensure that the design was safe.^32603260 Ray Bailey {Day33/160:13-25}. The result of their inaction was that no attempt was made to address the weak link, which became part of the external wall of the tower.

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