A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals

1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military Base Is the "Best Option"; the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention Approvals to CIA Officers in [Redacted]

¶On September 17, 2001, six days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification (MON) to authorize the director of central intelligence (DCI) to "undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities."⁷⁷ September 17,2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Although the CIA had previously been provided limited authorities to detain specific, named individuals pending the issuance of formal criminal charges, the MON provided unprecedented authorities, granting the CIA significant discretion in determining whom to detain, the factual basis for the detention, and the length of the detention.K The MON made no reference to interrogations or interrogation techniques.⁹⁹ September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶On September 14, 2001, three days before the issuance of the MON, the chief of operations of the CIA's [Redacted] based on an urgent requirement from the chief of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), sent an email to CIA Stations in [Redacted] seeking input on appropriate locations for potential CIA detention facilities.¹⁰¹⁰ D1RECTO[Redacted] ( [Redacted] email fronl: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Cable re Country [Redacted] date: January 29,2009. Over the course of the next month, CIA officers considered at least four countries in [Redacted] and one in [Redacted] a s possible hosts for detention facilities and [Redacted] at least three proposed site locations.¹¹¹¹ Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." [Redacted]

¶On September 26, 2001, senior CTC personnel met to discuss the capture and detain authorities in the MON. On September 28, 2001, [Redacted] T C Legal,

¶[Redacted] sent an email describing the meeting and a number of policy decisions. The email stated that covert facilities would be operated "in a manner consistent with, but not pursuant to, the formal provision of appropriately comparable Federal instructions for the operation of prison facilitiesandthe incarceration of inmates held under the maximum lawful security mechanisms." [Redacted] s email recognized the CIA's lack of experience in running detention facilities, and stated that the CIA would consider acquiring cleared personnel from the Department of Defense or the Bureau of Prisons with specialized expertise to assist the CIA in operating the facilities.¹²¹² Email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; subject: EYES ONLY - Capture and Detention; date: September 28, 2001, at 09:29:24 AM. On September 27, 2001, CIA Headquarters informed CIA Stations that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet "U.S. POW Standards."¹³¹³ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (272119Z SEP 01)

¶In early November 2001, CIA Headquarters further determined that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards and that CIA detention and interrogation operations should be tailored to "meet the requirements of U.S. law and the federal rules of criminal procedure," adding that "[sjpecific methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. courts."¹⁴¹⁴ November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogation." See also Volume I. The CIA's search for detention site locations was then put on hold and an internal memorandum from senior CIA officials explained that detention at a U.S. military base outside of the United States was the "best option."¹⁵¹⁵ Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." The memorandum thus urged the DCI to "[pjress DOD and the US military, at highest levels, to have the US Military agree to host a long-term facility, and have them identify an agreeable location," specifically requesting that the DCI "[s]eek to have the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay designated as a long-term detention facility."¹⁶¹⁶ Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of CounterteiTorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists."

¶Addressing the risks associated with the CIA maintaining a detention facility, the CIA memorandum warned that "[a]s captured terrorists may be held days, months, or years, the likelihood of exposure will grow over time," and that "[mjedia exposure could inflame public opinion against a host government and the U.S., thereby threatening the continued operation of the facility." The memorandum also anticipated that, "[i]n a foreign country, close cooperation with the host government will entail intensive negotiations."¹⁷¹⁷ Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." The CIA memorandum warned that "any foreign country poses uncontrollable risks that could create incidents, vulnerability to the security of the facility, bilateral problems, and uncertainty over maintaining the facility."1" The memorandum recommended the establishment of a "short-term" facility in which the CIA's role would be limited to "oversight, funding and responsibility." The CIA would "contract out all other requirements to other US Government organizations, commercial companies, and, as appropriate, foreign governments."¹⁹¹⁹ Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists."

¶On October 8, 2001, DCI George Tenet delegated the management and oversight of the capture and detention authorities provided by the MON to the CIA's deputy director for operations (DDO), James Pavitt, and the CIA's chief of the Counter-terrorism Center, Cofer Black.²⁰²⁰ Memorandum from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Deputy Director for Operations, October 8, 2001, Subject: (U) Delegations of Authorities. The DCI also directed that all requests and approvals for capture and detention be documented in writing. On December 17, 2001, however, the DDO rescinded these requirements and issued via a CIA cable "blanket approval" for CIA officers in [Redacted] t 0 "determine [who poses] the requisite 'continuing serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities.'"²¹²¹ D I R E C T O [Redacted] 7 1 4 1 0 Z DEC 01) By March 2002, CIA Headquarters had expanded the authority beyond the language of the MON and instructed CIA personnel that it would be appropriate to detain individuals who might not be high-value targets in their own right, but could provide information on high-value targets.²²²² W A S H I N G T O [Redacted] (272040Z MAR 02)

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] sent a cable to CIA Stations and Bases stating that "at this stage in the war [we] believe there is sufficient opportunity in advance to document the key aspects of many, if not most, of our capture and detain operations."²³²³ DIRECTOR [Redacted] 7 2 2 1 6 Z APR 03) [Redacted] s cable also provided guidance as to who could be detained under the MON, stating:

"there must be an articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a 'continuing serious threat' of violence or death to U.S. persons or interests or that the person is planning a terrorist activity.

.. .We are not permitted to detain someone merely upon a suspicion that he or she has valuable information about terrorists or planned acts of terrorism.... Similarly, the mere membership in a particular group, or the mere existence of a particular familial tie, docs not ncccssarily connote that the threshold of 'continuing, serious threat' has been satisfied."²⁴²⁴ DIRECTOR (072216Z APR 03). In a later meeting with Committee staff, [Redacted] C Legal, [Redacted] stated that the prospect that the CIA "could hold [detainees] forever" was "terrifying," adding, "[n]o one wants to be in a position of being called back from retirement in however many years to go figure out what do you do with so and so who still poses a threat " See November 13, 2001, Transcript of Staff Briefing on Covert Action Legal Issues (DTS #2002-0629). 11 >i 11111 [Redacted] i ii i iiShow full note

2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees Wrongly Detained

¶While the CIA has represented in public and classified settings that it detained "fewer than one hundred" individuals,²⁵²⁵ CIA Director Hayden typically described the program as holding "fewer than a hundred" detainees. For example, in testimony before the Committee on February 4, 2008, in response to a question from Chairman Rockefeller during an open hearing, Hayden stated, "[iln the life of the CIA detention program we have held fewer than a hundred people." (See DTS #2008-1140.) Specific references to "98" detainees were included in a May 5, 2006, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) report on Renditions, Detentions and Interrogations. See also Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation o f H i g h V a l u e a l Qaeda Detainees. Other examples of this CIA representatio^nclude a s t a t e m e n t b ^ T C o f f i [Redacted] to the HPSCI on February 15, 2006, and a statement by [Redacted] T C Legal [Redacted] e S S c T o n June 10, 2008. See DTS #2008-2698.Show full note the Committee's review of CIA records indicates that the total number of CIA detainees was at least 119.²⁶²⁶ The Committee's accounting of the number of CIA detainees is conservative and only includes individuals for whom there is clear evidence of detention in CIA custody. The Committee thus did not count, among the 119 detainees, six of the 31 individuals listed in a memo entitled "Updated List of Detainees In [Redacted] [Redacted] attached to a March 2003 email sent by DETENTION SITE COBALT site manager [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1], because they were not explicitly described as CIA detainees and because they did not otherwise appearinCIA records. (See email from: [Redacted] A 0 F F 1 C E R 11; t o [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] s u b j e [Redacted] DETAINEES; date: March 2003.) An additional individual is the subject of CIA cables describing a planned transfer from U.S. military to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT. He was likewise not included among the 119 CIA detainees because of a lack of CIA records confirming either his transfer to, or his presence at, DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed in this summary, in December 2008, the CIA attempted to identify the total number of CIA detainees. In a graph prepared for CIA leadership, the CIA represented the number of CIA detainees as "112+ ?" See [Redacted] 12417 (I01719Z OCT 02); ALEC [Redacted] (232056Z OCT 0 2 [Redacted] 190159 (240508Z OCT 02); and ALEC [Redacted] (301226Z OCT 02).Show full note Internal CIA documents indicate that inadequate record keeping made it impossible for the CIA to determine how many individuals it had detained. In December 2003, a CIA Station overseeing CIA detention operations in Country [Redacted] informed CIA Headquarters that it had made the "unsettling discovery" that the CIA was "holding a number of detainees about whom" it knew "very little."²⁷²⁷ [Redacted] 15281 [Redacted] Nearly five years later, in late 2008, the CIA attempted to determine how many individuals the CIA had detained. At the completion of the review, CIA leaders, including CIA Director Michael Hayden, were informed that the review found that the CIA had detained at least 112 individuals, and possibly more.²⁸²⁸ As of June 27, 2013, when the CIA provided its Response to the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program (hereinafter, the "CIA's June 2013 Response"), the CIA had not yet made an independent determination of the number of individuals it had detained. The CIA's June 2013 Response does not address the number of detainees determined by the Committee to be held by the CIA, other than to assert that the discrepancy between past CIA representations, that there were fewer than 100 detainees, and the Committee's determination of there being at least 119 CIA detainees, was not "substantively meaningful." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the discrepancy "does not impact the previously known scale of the program," and that "[i]t remains true that approximately 100 detainees were part of the program; not 10 and not 200." The CIA's June 2013 Response also states that, "[t]he Study leaves unarticulated what impact the relatively small discrepancy might have had on policymakers or Congressional overseers." The CIA's June 2013 Response further asserts that, at the time Director Hayden was representing there had been fewer than 100 detainees (2007-2009), the CIA's internal research Statistics; date: December 20, 2008.) By December 23, 2008, CTC had created a graph that identified the total number of CIA detainees, excluding Gul Rahman, "Post 12/3/02" as 111. The graph identified the total number including Gul Rahman, but excluding other detainees "pre-12/3/02" as "112+ ?." (See CIA-produced PowerPoint Slide, RDG Numbers, dated December 23,2008.) With regard to the Committee's inclusion of detainees held at DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to December 3, 2002, the CIA does not dispute that they were held by the CIA pursuant to the same MON authorities as detainees held after that date. Moreover, the CIA has regularly counted among its detainees a number of individuals who were held solely at DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to December 3, 2002, as well as several who were held exclusively at Country [Redacted] i t i e s on behalf of the CIA. In discussing the role of DETENTION SITE COBALT in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, then Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt told the CIA Office of Inspector General in August 2003 that "there are those who say that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility, but that is 'bullshit.'" (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, James Pavitt, August 21, 2003.)Show full note According to an email summarizing the meeting, CIA Director Hayden instructed a CIA officer to devise a way to keep the number of CIA detainees at the same number the CIA had previously briefed to Congress. The email, which the briefer sent only to himself, stated:

"I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be included in RDI²⁹²⁹ The "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records. numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 ~ pick whatever date i [sic] needed to make that happen but the number is 98."³⁰³⁰ Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] HirnselfJ; subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: January 5, 2009. According to the CIA's June 2013 Response, "Hayden did not view the discrepancy, if it existed, as particularly significant given that, if true, it would increase the total number by just over 10 percent."

¶While the CIA acknowledged to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that it had wrongly detained five individuals throughout the course of its detention program,³¹³¹ They include Sayed Habib, who was detained duetofabrications made by KSM while KSM was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques ( [Redacted] 1281 (1308012 JUN 04); [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 2817 [Redacted] . Ali Saeed Awadh, the subject of mistaken identity (ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Modin Nik Muhammed, whom the CIA determined had been purposeftilly misidentified by a source due to a blood feud 143701 [Redacted] [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 152893 [Redacted] d [Redacted] T Khalid al-Masri, whose "prolonged detention" was determined by the CIA Inspector General to be "unjustified" (CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007, at 83); and Zarmein, who was one of 11 ii 11111 [Redacted] ' >i i iiShow full note a review of CIA records indicates

¶"indicate[dj the total number of detainees could have been as high as 112," and that "uncertainty existed within CIA about whether a group of additional detainees were actually part of the program, partially because some of them had passed tlirough [DETENTION SITE COBALT] prior to the formal establishment of the program under CTC auspices on 3 December 2002" (emphasis added). This June 27, 2013, CIA statement is inaccurate: the CIA's determination at the time was that there had been at least 112 CIA detainees and that the inclusion of detainees held prior to December 3, 2002, would make that number higher. On December 20, 2008, a CTC officer informed the chief of CTC that "112 were detained by CIA since September 11, 2001," noting "[tjhese revised statistics do not include any detainees at [DETENTION SITE COBALT] (other than Gul Rahman) who departed [DETENTION SITE COBALT] prior to RDG assuming authority of [DETENTION SITE COBALT] as of 03 December 2002." (See " [Redacted] numbers brief.doc," attached to email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] b j e c t : Revised Rendition and Detention that at least 21 additional individuals, or a total of 26 of the 119 (22 percent) CIA detainees identified in this Study, did not meet the MON standard for detention.³²³² '2 They include Abu Hudhaifa, who was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation before being released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be (WASHINGTON [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 51303 [Redacted] Muhammad Klnin, who, like Zarmeiu, was annul); detainees about whom the CIA acknowledged knowing "very little" [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Gul Rahman, another case of mistaken identity (HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] |): Shaistah Habibullah Khan, who, like his brother. Saved Habib, was the subject of fabrications by KSM ( M E A D Q U A R T [Redacted] [Redacted] ; HaiKjhaltfi^vkMvas detained as "useful leverage" against a family member [Redacted] [Redacted] Nazar AM, an "intellectually challenged" individual whti.se taped crying was used as leverage against his family member [Redacted] 13065 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 7 [Redacted] [29864 [Redacted] [Redacted] J Jimi;i Gill, wlii' wi;s H'lcuscd with a payment of [Redacted] and [Redacted] |other curi rn I f [Redacted] I I [Redacted] [Redacted] 133693 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 53265 [Redacted] [Redacted] 133693 Hayatullah Haqaani, whom the CIA determined "may have been in the wrong place (lie wrong t i m e [Redacted] 33322 [Redacted] A I i Jan. who was detained for using a satellite phone, traces on which "revealed no derogatory inform [Redacted] 1542[Redacted] [Redacted] two individuals [Redacted] Moliammud al-Shomaila and Salah Nasir Salim Ali—on whom derogatory information was "speculative" (email from: | REDACTED]; to: | REDACTED!. | REDACTEDI, and IREDACTED]: subject: Backgrounders: date: April 19. 2006; [Redacted] 17411 [Redacted] ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] undated document titled, "Talking Points for HPSCI about Former CIA Detainees"); two individuals who were discovered to be foreign government sources prior to being rendered to CIA custody, and later determined to be former CIA [Redacted] ([REDACTED!); [Redacted] ALEC| ((REDACTED!); HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] E D A C T E D | ) r s e v e n individuals [Redacted] thought to be travelling to Iraq to join alQa'ida who were detained based on claims that were "thin but cannot he ignored" (email from: IREDACTED]; to: | REDACTED!-, cc: [REDACTED!. I REDACTED). [Redacted] ' [Redacted] I R E D A C T [Redacted] A C T E D ! . IREDACTED). [REDACTED|; subject: Request Chief/CTC Approval to Apprehend and Detain Individuals Departing Imminently for Iraq to Fight Against US Forces; date: September 16, 2003); and Btsmullah, who was mistakenly arrested [Redacted] [Redacted] and later released with [Redacted] and told not to speak about his experience [Redacted] 46620 [Redacted]Show full note This is a conservative calculation and includes only CIA detainees whom the CIA itself determined did not meet the standard for detention. It does not inclucfc individuals about whom there was internal disagreement within the CIA over whether the detainee met the standard or not, or the numerous detainees who, following their detention and interrogation, were found not to "pose a continuing threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests" or to be "planning terrorist activities" as required by the September 17, 2001. MON." With one known exception, there arc no CIA

¶"a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very little" ([Redacted] 1528 [Redacted] [Redacted] records to indicate that the CIA held personnel accountable for the detention of individuals the CIA itself determined were wrongfully detained.³⁴³⁴ The CIA's June 2013 Response "acknowledge^] that there were cases in which errors were made," but points only to the case of Khalid al Masri, whose wrongful detention was the subject of an Inspector General review. The CIA's June 2013 Response does not quantify the number of wrongfully detained individuals, other than to assert that it was "far fewer" than the 26 documented by the Committee. The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "the Agency frequently moved too slowly to release detainees," and that "[o]f the 26 cases cited by the Study, we adjudicated only three cases in less than 31 days. Most took three to six months. CIA should have acted sooner." As detailed in the Study, there was no accountability for personnel responsible for the extended detention of individuals determined by the CIA to have beenShow full note

¶[Redacted] 2) On at least four occasions, the CIA used host country detention sites in Country [Redacted] to detain individuals on behalf of the CIA who did not meet the MON standard for capture and detention. ALEC Station officers at CIA Headquarters explicitly acknowledged that these detainees did not meet the MON standard for detention, and recommended placing the individuals in host country detention facilities because they did not meet the standard. The host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and held them solely at the behest of the CIA.³⁵³⁵ ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] E C T O R [Redacted] [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] A L E [Redacted] B [Redacted] Despite the CIA's conclusion that these individuals did not meet the standard for detention, these individuals were included in die list of 26 wrongfully detained if they were released, but not if they were transferred to the custody of another country. The list thus does not include Hamid Aich, although CIA Headquarters recognized that Aich did not meet the threshold for unilateral CIA custody, and sought to place him in Country [Redacted] custody where the CIA could still debrief him. (See DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted])). Hamid Aich was transferred to Country [Redacted] custod^r^pn^[Redacted]^003^uid transferred to [Redacted] n o t h e r country's] custody more than a month later. (See [Redacted] 36682 [Redacted] 138836 [Redacted] [Redacted] The list also does not include Mohammad Dinshah, despite a determination prior to his capture that the CIA "does not view Dinshah as meeting the 'continuing serious threat' threshold required for this operation to be conducted pursuant to [CIA] authority," and a determination, after his capture, that "he does not meet the strict standards required to go to [DETENTION SITE COBALT]." (See D I R E C T O [Redacted] [Redacted] HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] - Dinshah was transferred to [Redacted] custody. See HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 11ii 11111 [Redacted] 1 " ' "Show full note