B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were "Counterproductive " and "Ineffective "; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience

¶[Redacted] N F ) At the time of the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON— which, as noted, did not reference interrogation techniques—the CIA had in place long-standing formal standards for conducting interrogations. The CIA had shared these standards with the

¶1530 [Redacted] 04); [Redacted] 1537 [Redacted] 04) [Redacted] [Redacted]04); email from: [REDACTED] (COB [DETENTION SITE BLACK]); to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] subject: re [Redacted] date: April

¶Committee. In January 1989, the CIA informed the Committee that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers."³⁶³⁶ January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs, to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on [Redacted] a t 7 "8 (DTS #1989-0131). Testimony of the CIA deputy director of operations in 1988 denounced coercive interrogation techniques, stating, "[pjhysical abuse or other degrading treatment was rejected not only because it is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be ineffective."³⁷³⁷ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), p. 15 (DTS #1988-2302). By October 2001, CIA policy was to comply with the Department of the Army Field Manual "Intelligence Interrogation "³⁸³⁸ Attachment to Memorandum entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists," CTC: 1026(13 8)/01 from J. Cofer Black, Director of DCI Counterterrorist Center, to Director of Central Intelligence via multiple parties, October 25, 2001; Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogations." A CIA Directorate of Operations Handbook from October 2001 states that the CIA does not engage in "human rights violations," which it defined as: "Torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges or trial." The handbook further stated that "[i]t is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation."³⁹³⁹ Directorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(l)(a), updated October 9,2001.

¶The CIA did, however, have historical experience using coercive forms of interrogation. In 1963, the CIA produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, intended as a manual for Cold War interrogations, which included the "principal coercive techniques of interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis and induced regression."⁴⁰⁴⁰ KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, July 1963, at 85. Tn 1978, DCI Stansfield Turner asked former CIA officer John Limond Hart to investigate the CIA interrogation of Soviet KGB officer Yuri Nosenko⁴¹⁴¹ According to public records, in the mid-1960s, the CIA imprisoned and interrogated Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB officer who defected to the U.S. in early 1964, for three years (April 1964 to September 1967). Senior CIA officers at the time did not believe Nosenko was an actual defector and ordered his imprisonment and interrogation. Nosenko was confined in a specially constructed "jail," with nothing but a cot, and was subjected to a series of sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.Show full note using the KUBARK methods—to include sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.⁴²⁴² Among other documents, see CIA "Family Jewels" Memorandum, 16 May 1973, pp. 5, 23-24, available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAr In Hart's testimony before the House Sclcct Committee on Assassinations on September 15, 1978, he noted that in his 31 years of government service:

"It has never fallen to my lot to be involved with any experience as unpleasant in every possible way as, first, the investigation of this case, and, second, the necessity of lecturing upon it and testifying. To me it is an abomination, and I

am happy to say that... it is not in my memory typical of what my colleagues and I did in the agency during the time I was connected with it."⁴³⁴³ "Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations of U.S. House of Representatives, 95 th Congress, Second Session, September 11-15, 1978. Testimony of John Hart, pp. 487-536 (September 15, 1978) (DTS #Q04761).

¶Notwithstanding the Hart investigation findings, just five years later, in 1983, a CIA officer incorporated significant portions of the KUBARK manual into the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) Training Manual, which the same officer used to provide interrogation training in Latin America in the early 1980s, and which was used to provide interrogation training to the [Redacted] [Redacted] m 198I-44 CIA o f f i [Redacted] was involved in the HRE training and conducted interrogations. The CIA inspector general later recommended that he be orally admonished for inappropriate use of interrogation techniques.⁴⁵⁴⁵ April 13, 1989, Memorandum from CIA Inspector General William F. Donnelly to Jim Currie and John Nelson, SSCI Staff, re: Answers to SSCI Questions [Redacted] attachment M to Memorandum to Chairman and Vice Chairman, re: Inquiry into [Redacted] Interrogation Training, July 10, 1989 (DTS # 1989-0675). See also [Redacted] [Redacted]QS^jMeniorandum for Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy Inspector General, re: [Redacted] IG-[Redacted]84.Show full note In the fall of 2002, [Redacted] became the CIA's chief of interrogations in the CIA's Renditions Group,⁴⁶⁴⁶ As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." the officer in charge of CIA interrogations⁴⁷⁴⁷ December 4, 2002, Training Report, Revised Version, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 ( [Redacted] w a s recently assigned to the CTC/RG to manage the HVT Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) mission, assuming die role as HVT interrogator/Team Chief.").

¶Despite the CIA's previous statements that coercive physical and psychological interrogation techniques "result in false answers"⁴⁸⁴⁸ January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence re: SSCI Questions on [Redacted] at 7-8 (DTS #1989-0131). and have "proven to be ineffective,"⁴⁹⁴⁹ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), at 15 (DTS #1988-2302). as well as the aforementioned early November 2001 determination that "[sjpecific methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. courts,"⁵⁰⁵⁰ November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogation." See also Volume I. by the end of November 2001, CIA officers had begun researching potential legal defenses for using interrogation techniques that were considered torture by foreign governments and a non-governmental organization. On November 26, 2001, attorneys in the CIA's Office of General Counsel circulated a draft legal memorandum describing the criminal prohibition on torture and a potential "novel" legal defense for CIA officers who engaged in torture. The memorandum stated that the "CIA could argue that the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm," adding that "states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives."⁵¹⁵¹ ' November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers." The draft memo cited the "Israeli example" as a possible basis for arguing that "torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm." mi 11 iii [Redacted] i i mi inn i An August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum to the White House Counsel includes a similar analysis of the "necessity defense" in response to potential charges of torture.⁵²⁵² Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Like the November 26, 2001, draft memo, the OLC memorandum addressed the Israeli example.

¶In January 2002, the National Security Council principals began to debate whether to apply the protections of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 ("Geneva") to the conflict with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. A letter drafted for DCI Tenet to the president urged that the CIA be exempt from any application of these protections, arguing that application of Geneva would "significantly hamper the ability of CIA to obtain critical threat information necessary to save American lives."⁵³⁵³ Email [Redacted] to: [REDACTED] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: For OOB Wednesday - Draft Letter to the President; date: January 29, 2002. No records have been identified to indicate that this letter was or was not sent. On February 1, 2002—approximately two months prior to the detention of the CIA's first detainee— a CIA attorney wrote that if CIA detainees were covered by Geneva there would be "few alternatives to simply asking questions." The attorney concluded that, if that were the case, "then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention, but ultimately saves lives."⁵⁴⁵⁴ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] d [REDACTED]; subject: POW's and Questioning; date: February 1, 2002, at 01:02:12 PM.

¶On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum stating that neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners of war under Geneva, and that Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a conflict, did not apply to al-Qa'ida or Taliban detainees.⁵⁵⁵⁵ February 7, 2002, Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, chief of staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re. Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees.

¶From the issuance of the MON to early 2002, there are no indications in CIA records that the CIA conducted significant research to identify effective interrogation practices, such as conferring with experienced U.S. military or law enforcement interrogators, or with the intelligence, military, or law enforcement services of other countries with experience in counterterrorism and the interrogation of terrorist suspects.⁵⁶⁵⁶ After the CIA was unsuccessful in acquiring information from its last detainee, Muhammad Rahim, using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, an after-action review in April 2008 suggested that the CIA conduct a survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries in an effort to develop effective interrogation techniques. See undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Redacted] After-Action Review, author [REDACTED], and undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Walling as an EIT. For additional information, see Volume I.Show full note Nor are there CIA records referencing any review of the CIA's past use of coercive interrogation techniques and associated lessons learned. The only research documented in CIA records during this time on the issue of interrogation was the preparation of a report on an al-Qa'ida manual that was initially assessed by the CIA to include strategies to resist interrogation. This report was commissioned by the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS) and drafted by two CIA contractors, Dr. Grayson SWIGERT and Dr. Hammond DUNBAR.⁵⁷⁵⁷ Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR, Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to A1 Qaeda Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective (undated). See also Memorandum for the Record, November 15, 2007, SSCI Staff Briefing with Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR (DTS #2009-0572).

¶Both SWIGERT and DUNBAR had been psychologists with the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, which exposes select U.S. military personnel to, among other things, coercive interrogation techniques that they might be subjected to if taken prisoner by countries that did not adhere to Geneva protections. Neither psychologist had experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al- Qa'ida, a background in terrorism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise. SWIGERT had reviewed research on "learned helplessness," in which individuals might become passive and depressed in response to adverse or uncontrollable events.⁵⁸⁵⁸ See, for example, [Redacted] Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, subject, "Qualifications to provide special mission interrogation consultation"; Undated, untitled memo stating: "The following information was obtained by a telephone conversation with [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] , Interrogator Training, Lesson Plan, Title: A Scientific Approach to Successful Interrogation; D1R [Redacted](031227Z APR 02). ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^Show full note He theorized that inducing such a state could encourage a detainee to cooperate and provide information.⁵⁹⁵⁹ See, for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, [Redacted] subject: "Qualifications to provide special mission interrogation consultation."

2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval Without Inter-Agency Deliberation

¶In late March 2002, Pakistani government authorities, working with the CIA, captured al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah in a raid during which Abu Zubaydah suffered bullet wounds. At that time, Abu Zubaydah was assessed by CIA officers in ALEC Station, the office within the CIA with specific responsibility for al-Qa'ida, to possess detailed knowledge of al-Qa'ida terrorist attack plans. However, as is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, this assessment significantly overstated Abu Zubaydah's role in al-Qa'ida and the information he was likely to possess.⁶⁰⁶⁰ See detainee review of Abu Zubaydah in Volume III. See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, "Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001." The document states: "Khaldan Not Affiliated With Al-Qa'ida. A common misperception in outside articles is that Khaldan camp was run by al- Qa'ida. Pre-11 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a 'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant,' which led to the inference that the Khaldan camp he was administering was tied to Usama bin Laden. The group's flagship camp, al- Faruq, reportedly was created in the late 1980s so that bin Laden's new organization could have a training infrastructure independent of 'Abdullah Azzam's Maktab al-Khidamat, the nongovernmental organization that supported Khaldan. Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and Khaldan was not overseen by bin Laden's organization. There were relations between the al-Qa'ida camps and Khaldan. Trainees, particularly Saudis, who had finished basic training at Khaldan were referred to al-Qa'ida camps for advanced courses, and Khaldan staff observed al-Qa'ida training. The two groups, however, did not exchange trainers."Show full note

¶On the day that Abu Zubaydah was captured, CIA attorneys discussed interpretations of the criminal prohibition on torture that might permit CIA officers to engage in certain interrogation activities.⁶¹⁶¹ March 29, 2002, email from [REDACTED] [Redacted] cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject, NEW INFO: A-Z Interrogation Plan ("I have thought about the 18 USC sect. 2340 issues we briefly discussed yesterday."). An attorney in CTC also sent an email with the subject line "Torture Update" to [Redacted] T C Legal [Redacted] listing, without commentary, the restrictions on interrogation in the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the criminal prohibition on torture.⁶²⁶² Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] subject: Torture Update; date: March 28, 2002, at 11:28:17 AM.

¶In late March 2002, anticipating its eventual custody of Abu Zubaydah, the CIA began considering options for his transfer to CIA custody and detention under the MON. The CIA rejected U.S. military custody [Redacted] in large part because of the lack of security and the fact that Abu Zubaydah would have to be declared to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).⁶³⁶³ [Redacted] 19595 (281106Z MAR 02). PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. The CIA's concerns about custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, included the general lack of secrecy and the "possible loss of control to US military and/or FBI."⁶⁴⁶⁴ PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002. Rendition to Country [Redacted] was rejected because of the perception that the results of that country's recent interrogations had been disappointing, as well as the intense interest in Abu Zubaydah from CIA leadership. As ALEC Station wrote, the CIA needed to participate directly in the interrogation, "[n]ot because we believe necessarily we can improve on [Country [Redacted] performance, but because the reasons for the lack of progress will be transparent and reportable up the line."⁶⁵⁶⁵ ALEC [Redacted] (282105Z MAR 02)

¶Over the course of four days, the CIA settled on a detention site in Country [Redacted] because of that country's [Redacted] and the lack of U.S. court jurisdiction. The only disadvantages identified by the CIA with detention in Country [Redacted] were that it would not be a "USG-controlled facility" and that "diplomatic/policy decisions" would be required.⁶⁶⁶⁶ PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. As a March 28, 2002, CLA document acknowledged, the proposal to render Abu Zubaydah to Country [Redacted] had not yet been broached with that country's officials. The document also warned: "[w]e can't guarantee security. If AZ's presence does become known, not clear what the impact would be."⁶⁷⁶⁷ PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002.

¶The decision to detain Abu Zubaydah at a covert detention facility in Country [Redacted] did not involve the input of the National Security Council Principals Committee, the Department of State, the U.S. ambassador, or the CIA chief of Station in Country [Redacted] 6 8 On March 29, 2002, an email from the Office of the Deputy DCI stated that "[w]e will have to acknowledge certain gaps in our planning/preparations, but this is the option the DDCI will lead with for POTUS consideration."⁶⁹⁶⁹ Email from: [Redacted] : to: [Redacted] subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002. POTUS is an abbreviation for President of the United States. That morning, the president approved moving forward with the plan to transfer Abu Zubaydah to Country [Redacted] 7 0 During the same Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) session, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld suggested exploring the option of putting Abu Zubaydah on a ship; however, CIA records do not indicate any further input from the jrincipals.⁷¹⁷¹ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; email from: [REDACTED] [Redacted] to: James Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE GREEN] Briefing for was Armitage; date: September 26, 2002. After the PDB session, the assistant secretary of state [Redacted] briefed. The assistant secretary indicated that he would brief the secretary and deputy secretary of state. An internal CIA email stated that at the NSC, only National Security Advisor Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley were briefed. See DIRECTOR [Redacted] ( [Redacted] MAR 02); email from: [REDACTED] [Redacted] to: James Pavitt; date: September 26, 2002.Show full note That day, the CIA Station in Country [Redacted] obtained the approval of Country [Redacted] s

¶[Redacted] officials for the CIA detention site.⁷²⁷² [REDACTED] 69132 MAR 02) The U.S. deputy chief of mission in Country [Redacted] who was notified by the CIA Station after Country [Redacted] s leadership, concurred in the absence of the ambassador, [Redacted] 7 3 Shortly thereafter, Abu Zubaydah was rendered from Pakistan to Country [Redacted] where he was held at the first CIA detention site, referred to in this summary as "DETENTION SITE GREEN."⁷⁴⁷⁴ For additional information on the rendition of Abu Zubaydah and the establishment of DETENTION SITE GREEN, see. Volume 1. ^ ^ ^ CIA records indicate that Country [Redacted] was the last location of a CIA detention facility known to the president or the vice president, as subsequent locations were kept from the principals as a matter of White House policy to avoid inadvertent disclosures of the location of the CIA detention sites.⁷⁵⁷⁵ HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [REDACTED]; HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] CIA records indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of the presence of CIA detention facilities in Countries [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] It is less clear whether policymakers were aware of the detention facilities in Country [Redacted] and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future Challenges

¶[Redacted] 1) The day after the rendition of Abu Zubaydah to DETENTION SITE GREEN, the [Redacted] which was responsible for the security of the detention facility, linked its support for the CIA's detention site to a request for [Redacted] support from the CIA [Redacted] The CIA eventually provided the requested [Redacted] [Redacted] According to CIA cables and internal documents, [Redacted] the CIA's detention facility.⁷⁷⁷⁷ See, for example, [REDACTED] 74636 [Redacted] Those officials were replaced by different officials whom the CIA believed were not supportive of the CIA's detention site.⁷⁸⁷⁸ [REDACTED] 76975 Despite considerable effort by the C I A ^ t a t i o n i n Countiyl[Redacted]oretaii^upport for DETENTION SITE GREEN from its new

[Redacted] [Redacted] to replace [Redacted] [Redacted] individuals responsible for supporting

¶[Redacted] partners, [Redacted] [Redacted] called for the closing of the CIA detention facility within three weeks.⁷⁹⁷⁹ [REDACTED] 77115 [Redacted] Continued lobbying by the chief of Station, however, eventually led Country [Redacted] to reverse this decision, allowing DETENTION SITE GREEN to remain operational.⁸⁰⁸⁰ [REDACTED] 77281 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]t was only as leaks detailing the program began to emerge that foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement." As described, however, the tensions with Country [Redacted] were unrelated to public revelations about the program.

¶On April [Redacted] 2002, the CIA Station in Country [Redacted] attempted to list the number of Country [Redacted] officers who, "[t]o the best of Station's knowledge," had "knowledge of the presence of Abu Zubaydah" in a specific city in Country [Redacted] The list included eight individuals, references to "various" personnel [Redacted] a n d { h e » s t a ff» of [Redacted] [Redacted] and concluded "[d]oubtless many others."⁸¹⁸¹ [REDACTED] 69626 [Redacted] [Redacted] By April [Redacted] 2002, a media organization had learned that Abu Zubaydah was in Country [Redacted] prompting the CIA to explain to the media organization the "security implications" of revealing the information.⁸²⁸² Email from: William Harlow, Director of the CIA Office of Public Affairs; to: John McLaughlin, Buzzy Krongard, John Moseman, John Rizzo, James Pavitt, [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz; subject: [REDACTED] call Re: Abu Zubaydah; date: April 25, 2002,12:06:33 PM. The CIA Station in Country [Redacted] also expressed concern that press inquiries "would do nothing for our liaison and bilateral relations, possibly diminishing chances that [the [Redacted] of Country [Redacted] will permit [Abu Zubaydah] to remain in country or that he would accept other [Abu Zubaydah]-like renderees in the future."⁸³⁸³ [REDACTED] [Redacted] 701681 In November 2002, after the CIA learned that a major U.S. newspaper knew that Abu Zubaydah was in Country [Redacted] senior CIA officials, as well as Vice President Cheney, urged the newspaper not to publish the information.⁸⁴⁸⁴ A ril ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] P 6> 2006, Interview, [Redacted] Chief, Renditions and Detainees Group While the U.S. newspaper did not reveal Country [Redacted] as the location of Abu Zubaydah, the fact that it had the information, combined with previous media interest, resulted in the decision to close DETENTION SITE GREEN.⁸⁵⁸⁵ DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted]

FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to Cooperate; Abu Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Information the CIA Later Describes as "Important" and "Vital"

¶[Redacted] ) After Abu Zubaydah was rendered to DETENTION SITE GREEN on March [Redacted] , 2002, he was questioned by special agents from the Federal Bureau of

¶Investigation (FBI) who spoke Arabic and had experience interrogating members of al-Qa'ida. Abu Zubaydah confirmed his identity to the FBI officers, informed the FBI officers he wanted to cooperate, and provided background information on his activities. That evening, Abu Zubaydah's medical condition deteriorated rapidly and he required immediate hospitalization. Although Abu Zubaydah was largely unable to communicate because of a breathing tube, he continued to provide information to FBI and CIA officials at the hospital using an Arabic alphabet chart. According to records, the FBI officers remained at Abu Zubaydah's bedside throughout this ordeal and assisted in his medical care. When Abu Zubaydah's breathing tube was removed on April 8, 2002, Abu Zubaydah provided additional intelligence and reiterated his intention to cooperate.85

¶During an April 10, 2002, debriefing session, conducted in the hospital's intensive care unit, Abu Zubaydah revealed to the FBI officers that an individual named "Mukhtar" was the al-Qa'ida "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified a picture of Mukhtar provided by the FBI from the FBI's Most Wanted list. The picture was of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM), who had been indictcd in 1996 for his role in Ramzi Yousef s terrorist plotting to detonate explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy them mid-flight over the Pacific Ocean.⁸⁷⁸⁷ See United States Court of Appeals, August Term, 2001, U.S. v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, and DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted]TAN 02). See also [Redacted] A [Redacted] MAR 02). Abu Zubaydah told the interrogators that "Mukhtar" was related to Ramzi Yousef, whom Abu Zubaydah said was in an American jail (Yousef had been convicted for the aforementioned terrorist plotting and was involved in the 1993 World Trade Center terrorist attack).⁸⁸⁸⁸ [Redacted] 10022 (121216Z APR 02). CIA records include the variant spelling, "Muhktar." KSM was placed on the FBI's public "Most Wanted Terrorist" list on October 10,2001. See also U.S. Department of Justice materials related to Ramzi Ahmed Yousef.

¶Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers that "Mukhtar" trained the 9/11 hijackers and also provided additional information on KSM's background, to include that KSM spoke fluent English, was approximately 34 years old, and was responsible for al-Qa'ida operations outside of Afghanistan.⁸⁹⁸⁹ [Redacted] 10022(1212167 APR 02); [Redacted] 18334 (261703Z MAR 02) Subsequent representations on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program consistently describe Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as well as his identification of KSM's alias ("Mukhtar"), as being "important" and "vital" information.⁹⁰⁹⁰ See, for example, President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech, based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, which stated that Abu Zubaydah provided "quite important" information and "disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Mukhtar. This was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM." A review of CIA records found that this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases.⁹¹⁹¹ See information later in this summary and Volume II for additional details.

5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah

¶While Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel at CIA Headquarters began discussing how CIA officers would interrogate Abu Zubaydah upon his return to DETENTION SITE GREEN. The initial CIA interrogation proposal recommended that the interrogators engage with Abu Zubaydah to get him to provide information, and suggested that a "hard approach," involving foreign government personnel, be taken "only as a last resort."⁹²⁹² Attachment to email from: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] subject: Interrogation Strategy, Powerpoint on [Redacted] [Abu Zubaydah] Interrogation Strategy, 01 April 2002; date: March 31,2002. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ At a meeting about this proposal, [Redacted] T C Legal, [Redacted] recommended that a psychologist working on contract in the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS), Grayson SWIGERT, be used by CTC to "provide real-time recommendations to overcome Abu Zubaydah^esistance to interrogation."⁹³⁹³ Email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: [Redacted] April 1,2002, re: POC for [Grayson SWIGERT]- consultant who drafted al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation backgrounder (noting that CTC/LGL woukUeach out to SWIGERT). According to die email, after the meeting, [Redacted] T C Legal, [Redacted] [Redacted] provided SWIGERT's contact information to ALEC Station officers, noting that it was SWIGERT who composed an OTS assessment on al-Qa'ida resistance techniques.Show full note SWIGERT had come to [Redacted] s attention through [Redacted] who worked in OTS. Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters formally proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with him. CIA records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions would lead Abu Zubaydah to develop a sense of "learned helplessness."⁹⁴⁹⁴ On the evening of April 1, 2002, "at the request of CTC/OPSand ALEC" Station, a cable from OTS with a proposed interrogation strategy was sent to Country [Redacted] ( [Redacted] 178955 (012236Z APR 02). The information in this cable was consistent with a subsequent cable, which was coordinated with SWIGERT, that proposed "several environmental modifications to create an atmosphere that enhances the strategic interrogation process." The cable noted, "[t |he deliberate manipulation of the environment is intended to cause psychological disorientation, and reduced psychological wherewithal for the interrogation," as well as "the deliberate establishment of psychological dependence upon the interrogator," and "an increased sense of learned helplessness." (See [REDACTED] 69500 (070009Z APR 02).) For detailed information, see Volume I and the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.Show full note CIA Headquarters then sent an interrogation team to Country [Redacted] including SWIGERT, whose initial role was to consult on the psychological aspects of the interrogation.⁹⁵⁹⁵ DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] APR 02)

¶DCI Tenet was provided an update on the Abu Zubaydah interrogation plans on April 12, 2002. The update stated that the CIA team was preparing for Abu Zubaydah's transfer back to DETENTION SITE GREEN, and noted the CIA interrogation team intended to "set the stage" and increase control over Abu Zubaydah.⁹⁶⁹⁶ CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630 Hours." The update stated:

"Our [CIA] lead interrogator will require Abu Zubaydah to reveal the most sensitive secret he knows we are seeking; if he dissembles or diverts the conversation, the interview will stop and resume at a later time.... In accordance with the strategy, and with concurrence from FBI Headquarters, the two on-site FBI agents will no longer directly participate in the interview/debriefing sessions."⁹⁷⁹⁷ CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630 Hours." m i 11 i i i i [Redacted] m i l urn i

¶The FBI special agents questioning Abu Zubaydah at the hospital objected to the CIA's plans. In a message to FBI Headquarters, an FBI special agent wrote that the CIA psychologists had acquired "tremendous influence."⁹⁸⁹⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939). The message further stated:

"AZ's health has improved over the last two days and Agency [CIA] is ready to move [Abu Zubaydah] out of the hospital and back t [Redacted] n [Redacted] in an elaborate plan to change AZ's environment. Agency [CIA] advised this day that they will be immediately changing tactics in all future AZ interviews by having only there [sic] [CIA officer] interact with AZ (there will be no FBI presence in interview room). This change contradicts all conversations had to date.... They believe AZ is offering, 'throw away information' and holding back from providing threat information (It should be note [sic] that we have obtained critical information regarding AZ thus far and have now got him speaking about threat information, albeit from his hospital bed and not [an] appropriate interview environment for full follow-up (due to his health). Suddenly the psychiatric team here wants AZ to only interact with their [CIA officer, and the CIA sees this] as being the best way to get the threat information.... We offered several compromise solutions... all suggestions were immediately declined without further discussion. .. .This again is quite odd as all information obtained from AZ has come from FBI lead interviewers and questioning.... 1 have spent an un-calculable amount of hours at [Abu Zubaydah's] bedside assisting with medical help, holding his hand and comforting him through various medical procedures, even assisting him in going [to] the bathroom.... We have built tremendous report [sic] with AZ and now that we are on the eve of 'regular' interviews to get threat information, we have been 'written out' of future interviews."⁹⁹⁹⁹ Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).

6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah's "Most Important Secret"; FBI Temporarily Barred from the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning

¶O n April 13, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still at the hospital, the CIA implemented the "new interrogation program."¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰ 110026 (131233Z APR 02) [Redacted] This initial meeting was held with just one interrogator in the room and lasted 11. minutes. A cable stated that the CIA interrogator was coached by the "psychological team."¹⁰¹¹⁰¹ 110026 (131233Z APR 02) The CIA interrogator advised Abu Zubaydah that he (Abu Zubaydah) "had a most important secret that [the interrogator] needed to know." According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah "amazingly" nodded in agreement about the secret, but "did not divulge any information, as [the interrogation team] expected."¹⁰²¹⁰² 10026 (131233Z APR 02) A cable further explained that Abu Zubaydah indicated that he understood that the key question was about "impending future terrorist plans against the United States,"¹⁰³¹⁰³ [Redacted] 10029 (131505Z APR 02) and that the CIA officer told Abu Zubaydah to signal for him "when he decides to discuss that 'one key item he knows he is keeping from the [interrogator].'"¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁴ 10029 (131505Z APR 02) The FBI officers provided a similar account to FBI Headquarters, adding that: "We spent the rest of the day in the adjoining room with [the CIA officer] and one of the psychiatrists [REDACTED] waiting for [Abu Zubaydah] to signal he was ready to talk. [Abu Zubaydah] apparently went to sleep... they did not approach [Abu Zubaydah] the rest of the day."¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939). In their communications with FBI Headquarters, the FBI officers wrote that they explained their rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation team and "tried to explain that we have used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members with much success (al-Owhali,¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁶ See Intelligence Science Board "Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies" for additional details on the FBI's interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali. KKM, Jandal, Badawi etc.). We tried to politely suggest that valuable time was passing where we could attempt to solicit threat information...."¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2< v x [Redacted] w ) On April 15, 2002, per a scripted plan, the same CIA interrogator delivered what a CIA cable described as "the pre-move message" to Abu Zubaydah: that "time is running out," that his situation had changed, and that the interrogator was disappointed that Abu Zubaydah did not signal "to discuss the one thing he was hiding."¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁸ 10043 (151614Z APR 02) Abu Zubaydah was sedated and moved from the hospital to DETENTION SITE GREEN. When Abu Zubaydah awoke at 11:00 PM, four hours after his arrival, he was described as surprised and disturbed by his new situation. An April 16, 2002, cable states the "objective is to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah] is at his most vulnerable state."¹⁰⁹¹⁰⁹ 10047 (161406Z APR 02)

¶A cable described Abu Zubaydah's ccll as white with no natural lighting or windows, but with four halogen lights pointed into the cell.¹¹⁰¹¹⁰ [Redacted] 10116 (250731Z APR 02) An air conditioner was also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the ccll. The interrogation cell had three padlocks. Abu Zubaydah was also provided with one of two chairs that were rotated based on his level of cooperation (one described as more comfortable than the other). Security officers wore all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and goggles to keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah "from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or dialogue with."¹¹¹¹¹¹ II 10053 (162029Z APR 02) The security officers communicated by hand signals when they were with Abu Zubaydah and used hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud rock music was played or noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah's "sense of hopelessness."¹¹²¹¹² [Redacted] 110116 (250731Z APR 02). CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah was nude, but given a towel to cover himself when interrogated. See, for e x a m p [Redacted] 10080 (200735Z APR 02). 1 1 [Redacted] Abu Zubaydah was typically kept naked and sleep deprived.¹¹³¹¹³ [Redacted] 1 0 0 5 3 (162029Z APR 0 2 ) [Redacted] 0 9 4 ( 2 1 l 9 0 i z A P R 0 2 ) - A s detailed in Volume III, the FBI Special Agents only questioned Abu Zubaydah when he was covered with a towel. Sleep deprivation during this period also differed from how sleep deprivation was implemented after the Department of Justice approved the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002. Rather than being placed in a stress position during sleep deprivation, Abu Zubaydah was kept awake by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI interrogators. Records further indicate that during breaks in the interrogations at this time, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep. See, for example, [Redacted] 10116 (250731Z APR 02).Show full note

¶An April 16, 2002, cable explained that the interrogation strategy had shifted since Abu Zubaydah's medical condition prevented "total isolation as originally planned." According to the cable, a 24-hour interrogation strategy was now "deemed to be the best approach" for acquiring information. As a result, the FBI officers were once again allowed to question Abu Zubaydah.¹¹⁴¹¹⁴ 110047 (161406Z APR 02) [Redacted] On April 17, 2002, an FBI officer met with Abu Zubaydah for six hours.¹¹⁵¹¹⁵ 110058 (171904Z APR 02) FBI records state that Abu Zubaydah had "not seen the interviewing (FBI) agent" since April 11, 2002, but that Abu Zubaydah greeted the agent by name.¹¹⁶¹¹⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939). During the questioning Abu Zubaydah denied any knowledge related to specific targets for a pending attack and "advised that many of the brothers on the front lines (nfi) [no further information] talked about all types of attacks against America but that for the most part this was usually just talk and that [the United States] should not be concerned about this type of talk."¹¹⁷¹¹⁷ [Redacted] 10058 (171904Z APR 02) Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida, KSM, his past travel to the United States, as well as general information on extremists in Pakistan.¹¹⁸¹¹⁸ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information.

¶Abu Zubaydah continued to provide information to interrogators throughout April 2002, but not information on pending attacks against the United States. On the evening of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a uranium-based explosive device in the United States. Abu Zubaydah stated he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the names of the two individuals, but provided physical descriptions of the pair.¹¹⁹¹¹⁹ [Redacted] 10090 (210703Z APR 02). As described in more detail in Volume II, Abu Zubaydah did provide kunyas for the pair. This information was acquired after Abu Zubaydah was confronted with emails indicating that he had sent the two individuals to KSM.¹²⁰¹²⁰ [Redacted] 1 0 0 6 3 (180515Z APR 02). As described in detail in Volume II and Volume III, as well as more briefly in this summary, Abu Zubaydah provided this information after being allowed to sleep. The CIA would later represent that this information was acquired "as a result" of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that the information acquired resulted in the thwarting of the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla.¹²¹¹²¹ See information in this summary and Volume II for additional details on the CIA's representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to policy makers and the Department of Justice. However, the chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force stated that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find them," while another CIA officer stated that the CIA was already "alert" to the threat posed by Jose Padilla, and that the CIA's "suspicion" was only "enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah."¹²²¹²² CIA email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] t o : [Redacted] subject: AZ information; date: July 10,2002, at 01:18:50 PM. The email states: "The only way we put this together is that Paki liaison mentioned to [Redacted] ut t w o a n c t w o the arrest of two individuals (one being an American) and [Redacted] P ' together. Therefore, AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find them." See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which a CIA officer states, "the Pakistani liaison felt it was important to bring [Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids.. .there was enough information indicating that his travel was suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion was enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which occurred on 21 April."Show full note Additional information on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla is provided later in this summary.

¶During the month of April 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized, on life support, and unable to speak, the CIA disseminated 39 intelligence reports based on his interrogations.¹²³¹²³ S e e analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the [Redacted]tabase. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. At the end of April 2002, the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team provided CIA Headquarters with three interrogation strategies. CIA Headquarters chose the most coercive interrogation option, which was proposed and supported by CIA contractor SWIGERT.¹²⁴¹²⁴ ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] MAY 02) This coercive interrogation option—which included sensory deprivation—was again opposed by the FBI special agents at the detention site.¹²⁵¹²⁵ See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multiple ccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in the AZ Interrogations; date: April 30, 2002, at 12:02:47 PM. The interrogation proposal was to engage in "only a single-minded, consistent, totally focused questioning of current threat information."¹²⁶¹²⁶ See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multiple ccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in the AZ Interrogations; date: April 30,2002, at 12:02:47 PM. Once implemented, this approach failed to produce the information CIA Headquarters believed Abu Zubaydah possessed: threats to the United States and information about al-Qa'ida operatives located in the United States. Nonetheless, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide other intelligence. In May 2002, the CIA disseminated 56 intelligence reports based on the interrogations.¹²⁷¹²⁷ See analysis provided to the Committee on April 18,2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the [Redacted] database. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

¶In early June 2002, the CIA interrogation team recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members departed the facility "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attend to personal matters [Redacted] as well as to discuss "the endgame" of Abu Zubaydah [Redacted] with officers from CIA Headquarters.¹²⁸¹²⁸ I2H [Redacted] 10424 (070814ZJUN 02) As a result, from June 18, 2002, through August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation without being asked any questions. Despite the fact that Abu Zubaydah was in isolation for nearly half of the month, the CIA disseminated 37 intelligence reports based on the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah in June 2002.¹²⁹¹²⁹ See analysis provided to tlie Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the [Redacted] database. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III of the Committee Study. The CIA would later represent publicly—as well as in classified settings-—that during the use of "established US Government interrogation techniques," Abu Zubaydah "stopped all cooperation" in June 2002, requiring the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.¹³⁰¹³⁰ See Presidential Speech on September 6,2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CI A personnel. See also ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that lie probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also CIA Director Michael Hayden, Classified Statement for the Record, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-1563) ("...FBI and CIA continued unsuccessfully to try to glean information from Abu Zubaydah using established US Government interrogation techniques....").Show full note CIA records do not support this assertion.

¶Prior to Abu Zubaydah's 47-day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.¹³¹¹³¹ See reporting charts in Abn Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005. The same information is included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and operatives in the United States served as the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of what would later be known as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" to become "compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding. Abu Zubaydah never provided this information, and CIA officers later concluded this was information Abu Zubaydah did not possess.¹³²¹³² See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

¶After Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation, the Abu Zubaydah I I I I I I I I I | iliniili M I [Redacted] p a r t e d Country [Redacted] Security and medical personnel remained at the detention site. The FBI special agents did not return to DETENTION SITE GREEN.¹³³¹³³ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume IB for additional details.

7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques Leads to the Development of the CIA 's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures "

¶In early July 2002, CIA officers held several meetings at CIA Headquarters to discuss the possible use of "novel interrogation methods" on Abu Zubaydah.¹³⁴¹³⁴ See CIA document dated, July 3, 2002, .1630 Hours, titled, "CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and [Redacted] Raid [Redacted] During the course of those meetings SWIGERT proposed using techniques derived from the U.S. military's SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) school.¹³⁵¹³⁵ For more information on the SERE program, see the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, December 2008. See also statement of Senator Carl Levin on the inquiry, December 11, 2008: "SERE training is intended to be used to teach our soldiers how to resist interrogation by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions and international law. In SERE school, our troops who are at risk of capture are exposed in a controlled environment with great protections and caution - to techniques adapted from abusive tactics used against American soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean War. SERE training techniques include stress positions, forced nudity, use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until recently, the Navy SERE school used the waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste of what they might be subjected to if captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to resist. The techniques were never intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody. As one [Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)] instructor explained, SERE training is based on illegal exploitation (under the rules listed in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50 years."Show full note SWIGERT provided a list of 12 SERE techniques for possible use by the CIA: (1) the attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap, (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) waterboard, (10) use of diapers, (11) use of insects, and (12) mock burial.¹³⁶¹³⁶ Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] subject: Description of Physical Pressures; date: July 8, 2002, at 04:15:15 PM. SWIGERT also recommended that the CIA enter into a contract with Hammond DUNBAR, his co-author of the CIA report on potential al-Qa'ida interrogation resistance training, to aid in the CIA interrogation process.¹³⁷¹³⁷ ALEC [Redacted] (051724Z JUL 02) Like SWIGERT, DUNBAR had never participated in a real-world interrogation. His interrogation experience was limited to the paper he authored with SWIGERT and his work with U.S. Air Force personnel at the SERE school.¹³⁸¹³⁸ See Resume, Hammond DUNBAR, submitted to the CLA in March 2003. In a section on "Interrogation and Debriefing Experience," DUNBAR's 2003 resume noted that he had been a "dehriefer for all USG DOD and Civilian [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted].)." All other experience in the section related to his interrogation experience as a contractor for the CIA beginning in 2002. DUNBAR's resume did state that he had participated in an interrogation training course in [Redacted] in 1992, and that he had taken a one-week Defense Interrogation Course at some point in 2002, although his resume does not indicate whether this was prior to, or after, the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the Committee Study was "incorrect... in asserting that the contractors selected had no relevant experience." The CIA's June 2013 Response notes SWIGERT and DUNBAR's experience at the Department of Defense SERE school, and SWIGERT's "academic research" and "research papers" on "such topics as resistance training, captivity familiarization, and learned helplessness - all of which were relevant to the development of the program." The CIA's June 2013 Response does not describe any experience related to actual interrogations or counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural, geographic, or linguistic expertise. The CIA's June 2013 Response provides tine following explanation: "Drs. [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] had the closest proximate expertise CIA sought at the beginning of the program, specifically in the area of non-standard means of interrogation. Experts on traditional interrogation methods did not meet this requirement. Non-standard interrogation methodologies were not an area of expertise of CIA officers or of the US Government generally. We believe their expertise was so unique that we would have been derelict had we not sought them out when it became clear that CIA would be heading into the uncharted territory of the program" (italics and emphasis in original). As noted above, the CIA did not seek out SWIGERT and DUNBAR after a decision was made to use coercive interrogation techniques; rather, SWIGERT and DUNBAR played a role in convincing the CIA to adopt such a policy. 11 ii 11111 [Redacted]Show full note

¶I" May 2003, a senior CIA interrogator would tell personnel from the CIA's Office of Inspector General that SWIGERT and DUNBAR's SERE school model was based on resisting North Vietnamese "physical torture" and was designed to extract "confessions for propaganda purposes" from U.S. airmen "who possessed little actionable intelligence." The CIA, he believed, "need[ed] a different working model for interrogating terrorists where confessions are not the ultimate goal."¹³⁹¹³⁹ Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22, 2003. The senior interrogator had participated in the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques with SWIGERT and DUNBAR

¶After the July 2002 meetings, the CIA's [Redacted] T C Legal, [Redacted] f t e d a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft asking the Department of Justice for "a formal declination of prosecution, in advance, for any employees of the United States, as well as any other personnel acting on behalf of the United States, who may employ methods in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might subject those individuals to prosecution."¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰ Email from: |; to: ; subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002. The letter further indicated that "the interrogation team had concluded" that "the use of more aggressive methods is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the critical information we need to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women and children within the United States and abroad." The letter added that these "aggressive methods" would otherwise be prohibited by the torture statute, "apart from potential reliance upon the doctrines of necessity or of self-defense."¹⁴¹¹⁴¹ Email from: [Redacted] ; to: [Redacted] ; subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002. This letter was circulated internally at the CIA, including to SWIGERT; however, there are no records to indicate it was provided to the attorney

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] general.¹⁴²¹⁴² Email from: ; to: ; subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002. and the CIA's acting general counsel, John Rizzo, met with attorneys from the National Security Council and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), as well as with Michael Chertoff, the head of the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and Daniel Levin, the chief of staff to the FBI director, to provide an overview of the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques and to ask for a formal, definitive DOJ opinion regarding the lawfulness of employing the specific CIA interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.¹⁴³¹⁴³ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (031357Z AUG 02)

¶The CIA attorneys described the 12 proposed interrogation techniques and told the Department of Justice and National Security Council attorneys that Abu Zubaydah continued to withhold critical intelligence on the identities of al-Qa'ida personnel in the United States and planned al-Qa'ida attacks. The CIA attorneys also told the group that CIA officers were complemented by:

"expert personnel retained on contract who possess extensive experience, gained within the Department of Defense, on the psychological and physical

methods of interrogation and the resistance techniques employed as countermeasures to such interrogation."¹⁴⁴¹⁴⁴ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (031357Z AUG 02)

¶According to the CIA cable describing the meeting, the representatives from the OLC, including Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, advised that the criminal prohibition on torture would not prohibit the methods proposed by the interrogation team because of the absence of any specific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁵ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (031357Z AUG 02) On July 13,2002, Yoo sent an unclassified letter to the CIA's acting general counsel describing his interpretation of the statute.¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁶ July 13, 2002, Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA.

¶Despite the initial view expressed by Yoo that the use of the proposed CIA interrogation techniques would be lawful, on July 17, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice requested a delay in the approval of the interrogation techniques for Abu Zubaydah's interrogation until the attorney general issued an opinion.¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁷ Memorandum for the Record from John H. Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 17, 2002. The following day, Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley requested that the Department of Justice "delay the approval of the memo detailing the next phase of interrogations" until the CIA provided specific details on its proposed interrogation techniques and "an explanation of why the CIA is confident these techniques will not cause lasting and irreparable harm to Abu Zubaydah."¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁸ July 19, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and [Redacted] Raid [Redacted] Rice asked the CIA to provide the OLC with a description of each of the planned interrogation techniques, and to "gather and provide any available empirical data on the reactions and likelihood of prolonged mental harm from the use of the 'water board' and the staged burial."¹⁴⁹¹⁴⁹ July 21, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and [Redacted] Raid [Redacted]

¶On July 15, 2002, a cable providing details on the proposed interrogation phase stated that only the DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base would be allowed to interrupt or stop an interrogation in process, and that the chief of Base would be the final decision-making authority as to whether the CIA's interrogation techniques applied to Abu Zubaydah would be discontinued.¹⁵⁰¹⁵⁰ 10536 (151006Z JUL 02) The CIA officers at the detention site added:

"If [Abu Zubaydah] develops a serious medical condition which may involve a host of conditions including a heart attack or another catastrophic type of condition, all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be provided to [him]. In the event [Abu Zubaydah] dies, we need to be prepared to act accordingly, keeping in mind the liaison equities involving our hosts."¹⁵¹¹⁵¹ [Redacted] 10536 (151006Z JUL 02)

¶To address these issues, the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were to die during the interrogation, he would be cremated.¹⁵²¹⁵² [Redacted] 10536 (151006Z JUL 02) The interrogation team closed the cable by stating:

"regardless which [disposition] option we follow however, and especially in light of the planned psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation and incommunicado for the remainder of his life."¹⁵³¹⁵³ 10536 (151006Z JUL 02)

¶Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station responded to the interrogation team's comments several days later. Their cable noted that the interrogation team was correct in its "understanding that the interrogation process takes precedcncc over preventative medical procedures."¹⁵⁴¹⁵⁴ (182321Z JUL 02) [Redacted] ALEC Station further observed:

"There is a fairly unanimous sentiment within HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will never be placed in a situation where he has any significant contact with others and/or has the opportunity to be released. While it is difficult to discuss specifics at this point, all major players are in concurrence that [Abu Zubaydah] should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country, but a final decision regarding his future incarceration condition has yet to be made."¹⁵⁵¹⁵⁵ 182321Z JUL 02)

¶As a result of the request by National Security Advisor Rice for additional research on the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques, CIA and DOJ personnel contacted individuals at the Department of Defense's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the agency that administers the SERE school, to gather information about the effects of using the techniques in training exercises.¹⁵⁶¹⁵⁶ Email from: [Redacted]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002; July 24, 2002, fax from [Redacted] to John Yoo and [REDACTED] providing information from the OTS/OAD psychologists; email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] ject: Discussion with JPRA Chief of Staff; date: July 24, 2002. According to CIA officer [Redacted] who had [Redacted] joined the CIA's OTS after [Redacted] years at JPRA, an individual with SERE school experience commented that "information gleaned via harsh treatment may not be accurate, as the prisoner may say anything to avoid further pain," and that "[c]urrent doctrine for interrogations conducted in the permanent phase of capture may lean towards 'soft' or 'indirect' rounds of

¶»1S7 questioning.

¶Pursuant to National Security Advisor Rice's request, CIA Headquarters personnel also requested information from the interrogation team—particularly SWIGERT and DUNBAR—about the psychological effects of the use of the waterboard and mock burial. The chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN responded by cable noting that:

"We are a nation of laws and we do not wish to parse words. A bottom line in considering the new measures proposed is that [Abu Zubaydah] is being held in solitary confinement, against his will, without legal representation, as an enemy of our country, our society and our people. Therefore, while the techniques described in Headquarters meetings and below are administered to student volunteers in the U.S. in a harmless way, with no measurable impact on the psyche of the volunteer, we do not believe we can assure the same here for a man forced through these processes and who will be made to believe this is the future course of the remainder of his life. Station, [DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base] and [DETENTION SITE GREEN] personnel will make every effort possible to insure [sic] that subject is not permanently physically or mental harmed but we should not say at the outset of this process that there is no risk."¹⁵⁸¹⁵⁸ [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02)

¶As former psychologists for the United States Air Force, SWIGERT and DUNBAR had no direct experience with the waterboard, as it was not used in Air Force SERE training. Nonetheless, they indicated that the waterboard—which they described as an "absolutely convincing technique"—was necessary to overwhelm Abu Zubaydah's ability to resist.¹⁵⁹¹⁵⁹ [Redacted] 10568 (261101Z JUL 02) They also responded that they were aware that the Navy—which used the waterboard technique in training—had not reported any significant long-term consequences on individuals from its use. Unlike the CIA's subsequent use of the waterboard, however, the Navy's use of the technique was a single training exercise and did not extend to multiple sessions. SWIGERT and DUNBAR wrote:

"any physical pressure applied to extremes can cause severe mental pain or suffering. Hooding, the use of loud music, sleep deprivation, controlling darkness and light, slapping, walling, or the use of stress positions taken to extreme can have the same outcome. The safety of any technique lies primarily in how it is applied and monitored.¹⁶⁰¹⁶⁰ [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02)

¶On July 24, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the use of 10 interrogation techniques, which included: the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap (insult slap), cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, use of diapers, and use of insects.¹⁶¹¹⁶¹ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (251609Z AUG 0 The interrogation team, however, indicated that they intended to wait for the approval to use the waterboard before proceeding with their interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. On July 26, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the use of the waterboard.¹⁶²¹⁶² Email from: [Redacted] to: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [Redacted] E D ] ; subject: EYES ONLY - Where we stand re: Abu Zubaydah; date: July 26,2002. J e T o f r [Redacted] 10568 (261101Z JUL02). The OLC finalized its classified written legal opinion on August 1, 2002. The earlier CIA request to conduct a mock burial was not formally considered by the OLC. The approved interrogation techniques, along with other CIA interrogation techniques that were subsequently identified and used by the CIA, are referred to as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques," or more commonly by the CIA as "EITs."

¶In the course of seeking approval to use the techniques, CIA Headquarters advised the Department of Justice and the national security advisor that "countless more Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows." CIA Headquarters further represented that the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team believed "Abu Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information," and "that in order to persuade him to provide" that information, "the use of more aggressive techniques is required."¹⁶³¹⁶³ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (031357Z AUG 02) The cable to DETENTION SITE GREEN from CIA Headquarters documenting the information CIA Headquarters had provided to the Department of Justice warned that "[t]he legal conclusions are predicated upon the determinations by the interrogation team that Abu Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information."¹⁶⁴¹⁶⁴ DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ According to cables, however, the CIA interrogators at the detention site had not determined that "the use of more aggressive techniques was required" to "persuade" Abu Zubaydah to provide threat information. Rather, the interrogation team believed the objective of the coercive interrogation techniques was to confirm Abu Zubaydah did not have additional information on threats to the United States, writing:

"Our assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided."¹⁶⁵¹⁶⁵ [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) and email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [Redacted] subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN], [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: July 23, 2002, at 07:56:49 PM.

¶As is described in this summary, and in more detail in the full Committee Study, the interrogation team later deemed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques a success, not because it resulted in critical threat information, but because it provided further evidence that Abu Zubaydah had not been withholding the aforementioned information from the interrogators.¹⁶⁶¹⁶⁶ [Redacted] 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Does Not Brief the President

¶described, CIA officers represented to National Security A S

¶Advisor Rice that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information on pending attacks and operatives in the United States. On July 31, 2002, Rice informed Deputy DCI John McLaughlin that, in balancing the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against the possible loss of American lives, she would not object to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques if the attorney general determined them to be legal.¹⁶⁷¹⁶⁷ Memorandum for the Record from John Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 31, 2002.

¶During the month of July 2002, the CIA anticipated that the president would need to approve the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques before they could be used. Therefore, in late July 2002, the CIA prepared talking points for a briefing of the president. These draft talking points indicated that the CIA was planning to use inteirogation techniques beyond what was normally permitted by law enforcement, and included a brief description of the waterboard interrogation technique. On August 1, 2002, based on comments from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the talking points were revised to eliminate references to the waterboard.¹⁶⁸¹⁶⁸ July 26, 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; July 31, 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation. Note that the draft document lists the incorrect year. CIA records indicate, however, that the talking points were not used to brief the president. On August 2, 2002, the National Security Council legal advisor informed the DCI's chief of staff that "Dr. Rice had been informed that there would be no briefing of the President on this matter,"¹⁶⁹¹⁶⁹ CIA records do not indicate who informed National Security Advisor Rice "that there would be no briefing of the President on this matter." but that the DCI had policy approval to employ the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.¹⁷⁰¹⁷⁰ Email from: John Moseman; to: John McLaughlin, Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; subject: Abu-Z Interrogation; date: August 2, 2002.

¶CIA records state that prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah in 2002, the CIA did not brief Secretary of State Colin Powell or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, two members of the National Security Council, on the techniques.¹⁷¹¹⁷¹ Email from: John Rizzo; to: [Redacted] subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003. The Committee, including the chairman and vice chairman, was also not briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques prior to their use.¹⁷²¹⁷² See Volume II for additional information on congressional briefings.

¶Approximately a year later, on July 31, 2003, senior CIA personnel believed the president had still not been briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.¹⁷³¹⁷³ An email from CIA Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo stated that "the President will be briefed as part of the regular annual [covert action] review. Briefing (by Rice or VP or Counsel to the President or some combination thereof) will describe the interrogation program, the fact that some aggressive but AG-approved techniques have been used, but will not apparently get into the details of the techniques themselves." See email from: John Rizzo; to: [Redacted] subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003.Show full note In August 2003, DCI Tenet told the CIA Office of Inspector General that "he had never spoken to the President regarding the detention and interrogation program or EITs, nor was he aware of whether the President had been briefed by his staff."¹⁷⁴¹⁷⁴ Office of General Counsel Comments on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program Special Review, at 23 ("[i]n August 2003, the DCI advised OIG..."); CIA Office of Inspector General, Interview of George Tenet, memorandum dated 8 September 2003, Subject: 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogation for Counterterrrorism Purposes. The May 2004 CIA Inspector General Special Review included a recommendation for the DCI to:

"Brief the President regarding the implementation of the Agency's detention and interrogation activities pursuant to the MON of 17 September 2001 or any other authorities, including the use of EITs and the fact that detainees have died. This Recommendation is significant."¹⁷⁵¹⁷⁵ Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001- October 2003), May 7, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).

¶In transmitting the Special Review to the Committee, DCI Tenet responded to the recommendation, noting only that "[t]he DCI will determine whether and to what extent the President requires a briefing on the Program."¹⁷⁶¹⁷⁶ Letter from George J. Tenet to Chairman Pat Roberts, June 22,2004 (DTS #2004-2710). On April 6, 2006, CIA Inspector General Helgerson responded to a request from Committee Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV on the status of corrective actions taken in response to the Special Review recommendations. With regard to a briefing for the president, Helgerson wrote: "Consistent with this recommendation, DCI Tenet, before he left office, and Director Goss, shortly after taking office, both advised me that they had made requests to brief the President."¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁷ Helgerson then added, "Additionally, public disclosure of many of these activities ensured wide awareness. In light of these developments, 1 consider the matter closed." The Helgerson letter does not indicate to whom Directors Tenet and Goss, who met regularly with the President, submitted requests to brief the President about the program. See letter from John L. Helgerson to Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, April 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-1564). The CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute these records. It states, however, that "[w]hile Agency records on the subject are admittedly incomplete, former President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the program, including the use of enhanced techniques, with DCIA Tenet in 2002, prior to application of the techniques on Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." A subsequent memoir by former CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo (published January 7,2014) states, "The one senior U.S. Government national security official during this time—from August 2002 through 2003—who I did not believe was knowledgeable about the E.I.T.s was President Bush himself. He was not present at any of the Principal Committee meetings ... and none of the principals at any of the E.I.T. sessions during this period ever alluded to the President knowing anything about them."Show full note Prepared "Questions and Answers" for the National Security Council principals in connection with the disclosure of the program in September 2006 and subsequent media outreach also suggest that the president was not briefed at the outset about the CIA's interrogation techniques. In response to the potential question: "What role did the President play.. .Was he briefed on the interrogation techniques, and if so when?" the proposed answer did not assert that the president was briefed, but rather that the "President was not of course involved in CIA's day to day operations - including who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are made or overseen by CIA Directors."¹⁷⁸¹⁷⁸ Included in the packet of CIA information was the following: "Question: 'What role did the President play in authorizing this program? Did he select detainees held by CIA or direct their interrogation? Was he briefed on the interrogation techniques, and if so when?' Answer: 'In the days after 9/11, the President directed that all the instruments of national power, including the resources of our intelligence, military, and law enforcement communities, be employed to fight and wi ' '" '"'"'iates, within the bounds of the law. This included important, new roles for CIA in detaining and questioning terrorists. [He was periodically updated by CIA Directors on significant captures of terrorists, and information obtained that helped stop attacks and led to capture of other terrorists.] [The President was not of course involved in CIA's day to day operations - including who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are made or overseen by CIA Directors].'" See Draft Questions and Proposed Answers, attached to Memorandum from National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley; for: the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; cc: chief of staff to the President, Counsel to the President, Assistant to the President for National Security, White House Spokesman, dated September 2, 2006. Brackets in the original.Show full note

¶CIA records indicate that the first CTA briefing for the president on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques occurred on April 8, 2006.¹⁷⁹¹⁷⁹ See April 16, 2008, CIA "Backgrounder: Chronology of Interrogation Approvals, 2001-2003" (noting that "CIA documentation and discussions with Presidential briefers and individuals involved with the interrogation program at the time suggest that details on enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were not shared with the President" in the 2001-2003 timeframe); CIA Q&A, Topic: Waterboarding ("The information we have indicates the President was not briefed by CIA regarding the specific interrogation techniques until April 2006, and at that time DC1A Goss briefed him on the seven EITs proposed at that time for the post-Detainee Treatment Act CIA interrogation program."). As described, in the April 2006 briefing the President "expressed discomfort" with the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper^an^forced to go to the bathroom on himself." See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.Show full note CIA records state that when the president was briefed, he expressed discomfort with the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself."¹⁸⁰¹⁸⁰ Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.

9. The CIA Uses the Waterboard and Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah

¶On August 3, 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the interrogation team at DETENTION SITE GREEN that it had formal approval to apply the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, against Abu Zubaydah. According to CIA records, only the two CIA contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, were to have contact with Abu Zubaydah. Other CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN - including CIA medical personnel and other CIA "interrogators with whom he is familiar" - were only to observe.¹⁸¹¹⁸¹ Increased Pressure in the Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogations, Attachment to email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Increased Pressure Phase - for DCI Sensitive Addendum; date: July 10, 2002.

From August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected

¶Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced interrogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. After Abu Zubaydah had been in complete isolation for 47 days, the most aggressive interrogation phase began at approximately 11:50 AM on August 4, 2002.¹⁸²¹⁸² 110586 [Redacted] (041559Z AUG 02) Mil I I III I [Redacted]TWFTmN Security personnel entered the cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his towel (Abu Zubaydah was then naked). Without asking any questions, the interrogators placed a rolled towel around his neck as a collar, and backed him up into the cell wall (an interrogator later acknowledged the collar was used to slam Abu Zubaydah against a concrete wall).¹⁸³¹⁸³ See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] subject: Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today; date: March 28, 2007, at 04:42 PM, which states Abu Zubaydah claims "a collar was used to slam him against a concrete wall. While we do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at the site at the time confirmed that this did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at the site after the walling on the concrete wall."Show full note The interrogators then removed the hood, performed an attention grab, and had Abu Zubaydah watch while a large confinement box was brought into the cell and laid on the floor.¹⁸⁴¹⁸⁴ 110644 (201235Z AUG 02) A cable states Abu Zubaydah "was unhooded and the large confinement box was carried into the interrogation room and paced [sic] on the floor so as to appear as a coffin."¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁵ 10586 (041559Z AUG 02) The interrogators then demanded detailed and verifiable information on terrorist operations planned against the United States, including the names, phone numbers, email addresses, weapon caches, and safe houses of anyone involved. CIA records describe Abu Zubaydah as appearing apprehensive. Each time Abu Zubaydah denied having additional information, the interrogators would perform a facial slap or face grab.¹⁸⁶¹⁸⁶ [Redacted] 10586 (041559Z AUG 02); [Redacted] 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) At approximately 6:20 PM, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded for the first time. Over a two-and-a- half-hour period, Abu Zubaydah coughed, vomited, and had "involuntary spasms of the torso and extremities" during waterboarding.¹⁸⁷¹⁸⁷ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) Detention site personnel noted that "throughout the process [Abu Zubaydah] was asked and given the opportunity to respond to questions about threats" to the United States, but Abu Zubaydah continued to maintain that he did not have any additional information to provide.¹⁸⁸¹⁸⁸ 110586 (041559Z AUG 02). CIA contractor DUNBAR later told the CIA OIG that "[t]heir instructions from [chief of Base] were to focus on only one issue, that is, Zubaydah's knowledge of plans to attack the U.S." According to the OIG's record of the interview, "[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT] could ask that question in a number of ways, but it was the only theme they were authorized by [chief of Base] to use with [Abu] Zubaydah." (See February 10, 2003, interview report of Hammond DUNBAR, Office of the Inspector General.) The acting chief of Station in Country [Redacted] in an interview with the CIA OIG, stated that "there were days at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] when the team had no requirements from Headquarters," and that CTC did not give the chief of Base (COB) the "flexibility as COB to ask other questions" besides those related to threats to the United States. (See May 28, 2003, interview report of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General.) The chief of Support Services at the CIA Station stated that "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] were frustrated that they kept beating Zubaydah up on the same question while getting the same physiologic response from hiin." (See May 21, 2003, interview report of [Redacted] Office of die Inspector General.) Other interviewees described how analytical assumptions about Abu Zubaydah drove the interrogation process. (See May 22, 2003, interview report of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General; and February 27,2003, interview report [Redacted] [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General.) Chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, told the OIG that "CTC subject matter experts" pointed to intelligence that they said indicated that Abu Zubaydah knew more than he was admitting and thus disagreed with the assessment from DETENTION SITE GREEN that Abu Zubaydah was "compliant." According to the OIG's record of the Jose Rodriguez interview, "disagreement between the analysts and interrogators can be healthy, but in this case Rodriguez believes that the analysts were wrong." (See interview of Jose Rodriguez, Office of the Inspector General, March 6, 2003.)Show full note In an email to OMS leadership entitled, "So it begins," a medical officer wrote:

"The sessions accelerated rapidly progressing quickly to the water board after large box, walling, and small box periods. [Abu Zubaydah] seems very resistant to the water board. Longest time with the cloth over his face so far has been 17 seconds. This is sure to increase shortly. NO useful information

so far.. ..He did vomit a couple of times during the water board with some beans and rice. It's been 10 hours since he ate so this is surprising and disturbing. We plan to only feed Ensure for a while now. I'm head[ing | back for another water board session."¹⁸⁹¹⁸⁹ Emphasis in the original. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: So it begins; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09AM. CIA Director Hayden informed the Committee in 2007 that "in the section [of the ICRC report] on medical care, the report omits key contextual facts. For example, Abu Zubaydah's statement that he was given only Ensure and water for two to three weeks fails to mention the fact that he was on a liqui^die^jmte appropriate because he was recovering from abdominal surgery at the time."Show full note

¶The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques— including "walling, attention grasps, slapping, facial hold, stress positions, cramped confinement, white noise and sleep deprivation"—continued in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day" for 17 straight days, through August 20, 2002.¹⁹⁰¹⁹⁰ [Redacted] 10644 (201235Z AUG 02). For the first 17 days, the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used against Abu Zubaydah in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day." The "aggressive phase," as defined by the CIA, continued for an additional three days. The CIA continued to use its enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah until August 30, 2002. When Abu Zubaydah was left alone during this period, he was placed in a stress position, left on the waterboard with a cloth over his face, or locked in one of two confinement boxes. According to the cables, Abu Zubaydah was also subjected to the waterboard "2-4 times a day... with multiple iterations of the watering cycle during each application."¹⁹¹¹⁹¹ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

¶The "aggressive phase of interrogation" continued until August 23, 2002.¹⁹²¹⁹² 10667 (231206Z AUG 02); [Redacted] 110672 (240229Z AUG 02) Over the course of the entire 20 day "aggressive phase of interrogation," Abu Zubaydah spent a total of 266 hours (11 days, 2 hours) in the large (coffin size) confinement box and 29 hours in a small confinement box, which had a width of 21 inches, a depth of 2.5 feet, and a height of 2.5 feet. The CIA interrogators told Abu Zubaydah that the only way he would leave the facility was in the coffin-shaped confinement box.¹⁹³¹⁹³ [Redacted] 10615 (120619Z AUG 02)

¶According to the daily cables from DETENTION SITE GREEN, Abu Zubaydah frequently "cried," "begged," "pleaded," and "whimpered," but continued to deny that he had any additional information on current threats to, or operatives in, the United States.¹⁹⁴¹⁹⁴ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

¶By August 9, 2002, the sixth day of the interrogation period, the interrogation team informed CIA Headquarters that they had come to the "collective preliminary assessment" that it was unlikely Abu Zubaydah "had actionable new information about current threats to the United States."¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁵ 10604 (091624Z AUG 02) On August 10, 2002, the interrogation team stated that it was "highly unlikely" that Abu Zubaydah possessed the information they were seeking.¹⁹⁶¹⁹⁶ [Redacted] 10607 (100335Z AUG 02) On the same day, the interrogation team reiterated a request for personnel from CIA Headquarters to travel to the detention site to view the interrogations. A cable stated that the team believed that a "first-hand, on-the-ground look is best," but if CIA Headquarters personnel could not visit, a video teleconference would suffice.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁷ 197 [Redacted] 10607 (100335Z AUG 02). On August [Redacted] 2002, a video-conference between DETENTION SITE GREEN and CIA Headquarters occurred, which included an interrogation video described by the interrogation team as "quite graphic" and possibly "disturbing to some viewers." After the video-conference, CIA Headquarters instructed DETENTION SITE GREEN to continue the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, but agreed to send two CIA Headquarters officers to the detention site to observe the interrogations first-hand. On August [Redacted] 2002, a team from CIA Headquarters, including [Redacted] Legal [Redacted] and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] visited DETENTION SITE GREEN and observed die use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. Th^aggressive phase^interrogation" ended [Redacted] days after the arrival of the officers from CIA Headquarters. See [Redacted] 6 1 6 i [Redacted] AUG 02); A L E [Redacted] [Redacted] AUG 02); [Redacted] 10643 [Redacted] AUG 0 2 ) [Redacted] 6 6 7 (231206Z AUG 0 2 ) j _ a n [Redacted] 6 7 2 ( 2 4 0 2 2 9 Z AUG 02).Show full note DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel also informed CIA Headquarters that it was their assessment that the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "approaching] the legal limit."¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁸ [Redacted] 10607 (100335Z AUG 02) The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, responded:

"Strongly urge that any speculative language as to the legality of given activities or, more precisely, judgment calls as to their legality vis-a-vis operational guidelines for this activity agreed upon and vetted at the most senior levels of the agency, be refrained from in written traffic (email or cable traffic). Such language is not helpful."¹⁹⁹¹⁹⁹ Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002, with attachment of earlier email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED].

¶DETENTION SITE GREEN cables describe Abu Zubaydah as "compliant," informing CIA Headquarters that when the interrogator "raised his eyebrow, without instructions," Abu Zubaydah "slowly walked on his own to the water table and sat down."²⁰⁰²⁰⁰ 10614 (111633Z AUG 02) [Redacted] When the interrogator "snapped his fingers twice," Abu Zubaydah would lie flat on the waterboard.²⁰¹²⁰¹ 10614 (111633Z AUG 02) Despite the assessment of personnel at the detention site that Abu Zubaydah was compliant, CIA Headquarters stated that they continued to believe that Abu Zubaydah was withholding threat information and instructed the CIA interrogators to continue using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.²⁰²²⁰² See, for example, A L E C [Redacted] 0 1 7 2 8 AUG 02); ALEC [Redacted] |(130034Z AUG 02); ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] AUG 02); and [Redacted] 10700 (280820Z AUG 02).

¶At times Abu Zubaydah was described as "hysterical"²⁰³²⁰³ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) and "distressed to the level that he was unable to effectively communicate."²⁰⁴²⁰⁴ [Redacted] 10643 (191518Z AUG 02) Waterboarding sessions "resulted in immediate fluid intake and involuntary leg, chest and arm spasms" and "hysterical pleas."²⁰⁵²⁰⁵ 10643 (191518Z AUG 02) In at least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah "became completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth."²⁰⁶²⁰⁶ The description of the episode stated that "on being righted, he failed to respond until the interrogators gave him a xyphoid thrust (with our medical folks edeingtowanlthe room)." This passage was included in multiple emails, to include emails from t h e [Redacted] M S , [Redacted] S e e email from: [Redacted] to: [DETENTION SIT^BLUE] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; date: March 7, 2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: [Redacted] OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; and email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Discussion with Dan Levin- AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM.Show full note According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah remained unresponsive until medical intervention, when he regained consciousness and expelled "copious amounts of liquid." This experience with the waterboard was referenced in emails, but was not documented or otherwise noted in CIA cables.²⁰⁷²⁰⁷ Email [Redacted] OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; date: March 7,2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^jubiect: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Discussions with Dan Levin - AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM.Show full note When two CIA Headquarters officers later compared the Abu Zubaydah interrogation videotapes to the cable record, neither commented on this session. A review of the catalog of videotapes, however, found that recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions, were missing.²⁰⁸²⁰⁸ CIA Inspector General's Special Review on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities issued on May 7,2004. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

¶CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN reported being disturbed by the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah. CIA records include the following reactions and comments by CIA personnel:

August 5, 2002: "want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly not a place he's ever been before in his medical career...It is visually and psychologically very uncomfortable."²⁰⁹²⁰⁹ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5, 2002, at 05:35AM. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

August 8, 2002: "Today's first session.. .had a profound effect on all staff members present.. .it seems the collective opinion that wc should not go much further.. .everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to continue.. .wc cannot guarantee how much longer."²¹⁰²¹⁰ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [Redacted] and [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly affected... some to the point of tears and choking up."²¹¹²¹¹ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [Redacted] and [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.

August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer" away from the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.²¹²²¹² Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date: August 9, 2002, at 10:44:16 PM. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu Zubaydah on video "has produced strong feelings of futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining the pressure." Per viewing the tapes, "prepare for something not seen previously."²¹³²¹³ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] a n d [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002, at 09:45AM.

¶After the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques ended, CIA personnel at the detention site concluded that Abu Zubaydah had been truthful and that he did not possess any new terrorist threat information.²¹⁴²¹⁴ See, for example, [Redacted] 10672 (240229Z AUG 02).

¶As noted, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided die information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and approved: information on the next terrorist attack and operatives in the United States. Furthermore, as compared to the period prior to August 2002, the quantity and type of intelligence produced by Abu Zubaydah remained largely unchanged during and after the August 2002 use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.²¹⁵²¹⁵ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for details on Abu Zubaydah's intelligence production. As noted, Abu Zubaydah was taken into CIA custody on March [Redacted] 2002, and was hospitalized until April 15, 2002. During the months of April and May 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on life support and unable to speak, the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah produced 95 intelligence reports. Abu Zubaydah spent much of June 2002 and all of July 2002 in isolation, without being asked any questions. The CIA reinstituted contact with Abu Zubaydah on August 4, 2002, and immediately began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—including the waterboard. During the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah produced 91 intelligence reports, four fewer than the first two months of his CIA detention. CIA records indicate that the type of intelligence Abu Zubaydah provided remained relatively constant prior to and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics." See also CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005, as well as "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document, "Preparedon9Augus^006."Show full note Nonetheless, CIA Headquarters informed the National Security Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used against Abu Zubaydah were effective and were "producing meaningful results."²¹⁶²¹⁶ On August 30, 2002, [Redacted] Legal, [Redacted] m e t w i t h N S C Legal Adviser John Bellinger to discuss Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002; ALEC [Redacted] (052227Z SEP 02). In his email documenting the meeting, [Redacted] "noted that we had employed the walling techniques, confinement box, waterboard, along with some of the other methods which also had been approved by the Attorney General," and "reported that while the experts at the site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the recent sessions, it did appeal" that the current phase was producing meaningful results." (See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002.) The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described to Bellinger with respect to either the use of the techniques or the "results" of the interrogation. It is unclear from CIA records whether the CIA ever informed the NSC Legal Adviser or anyone else at the NSC or the Department of Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about future attacks against the United States or operatives tasked to commit attacks in the U.S. during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. [Redacted]Show full note A cable from DETENTION SITE GREEN, which CIA records indicate was authored by SWIGERT and DUNBAR, also viewed the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah as a success. The cable recommended that "the aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be used as a template for future interrogation of high value captives,"²¹⁷²¹⁷ [Redacted] 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) not because the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced useful information, but rather because their use confirmed that Abu Zubaydah did not possess the intelligence that CIA Headquarters had assessed Abu Zubaydah to have. The cable from the detention site stated:

"Our goal was to reach the stage where we have broken any will or ability of subject to resist or deny providing us information (intelligence) to which he had access. We additionally sought to bring subject to the point that we confidently assess that he does not/not possess undisclosed threat information, or intelligence that could prevent a terrorist event."²¹⁸²¹⁸ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

¶The cable further recommended that psychologists—a likely reference to contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR — "familiar with interrogation, exploitation and resistance to interrogation should shape compliance of high value captives prior to debriefing by substantive experts."²¹⁹²¹⁹ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

¶From Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002, to his transfer to Department of Defense custody on September 5, 2006, information provided by Abu Zubaydah resulted in 766 disseminated intelligence reports.²²⁰²²⁰ The Committee uses sole-source intelligence reporting in this summary. While CIA multi-source intelligence reports are included in the full Committee Study, the focus of the Committee analysis is on sole-source intelligence reporting, as these reports were deemed to more accurately reflect useful reporting from individual CIA detainees. As background, multi-source intelligence reports are reports that contain data from multiple detainees. For example, a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA detainees at a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able to identify or provide information on the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (202255Z JUN 06), which states that from January 1,2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hambali was "used in the dissemination of three intelligence reports, two of which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay detainees," and the third of which "detailed [Hambali's] statement that he knew of no threats or plots to attack any world sporting events." Sole-source reports, by contrast, are based on specific information provided by one CIA detainee.Show full note According to CIA documents, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics."²²¹²²¹ CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Same information included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." As noted, this type of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah before, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. At no time during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques

¶According to CIA records, on September 27, 2002, the CIA briefed the chairman and the vice chairman of the Committee, Senators Graham and Shelby, as well as the Committee staff directors, on Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. The CIA's memorandum of the briefing indicates that the chairman and vice chairman were briefed on "the enhanced techniques that had been employed," as well as "the nature and quality of reporting provided by Abu Zubaydah." See (DIRECTOR [Redacted] (252018Z OCT 02).

¶did Abu Zubaydah provide information about operatives in, or future attacks against, the United States.²²²²²² See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

10. A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

¶Although CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN agreed that Abu Zubaydah was compliant and cooperative, personnel at CIA Headquarters prepared a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) in October 2002 that, according to a cable, "accurately reflect[ed] the collective HQS view of the information provided [by Abu Zubaydah] to date."²²³²²³ ALEC [Redacted] (181439Z OCT 02) The October 2002 PDB stated Abu Zubaydah was still withholding "significant threat information," including information on operatives in the United States, and that Abu "Zubaydah resisted providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of improving his living conditions."²²⁴²²⁴ ALEC (181439Z OCT 02) — The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques or the counter-assessment from the detention site interrogation team indicating that Abu Zubaydah was cooperative and not withholding information.²²⁵²²⁵ Among other documents, s e [Redacted] 10667 (231206Z AUG 02); [Redacted] 10672 (240229Z AUG 02); and email from: [REDACTED] ( [Redacted] i i e f o f Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN); to: CIA Headquarters; subject: "Assessment to Date" of Abu Zubaydah; date: October 6, 2002, at 05:36:46 AM.

¶CIA documents identified the "key intelligence" acquired from Abu Zubaydah as information related to suspected terrorists Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammad, information on English-speaking al-Qa'ida member Jaffar al-Tayyar, and information identifying KSM as the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks who used the alias "Mukhtar."²²⁶²²⁶ See "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and KSM," dated February 2008, updated for briefings on several dates, including for a 2009 briefing to Director Leon Panetta, as well as the "Effectiveness Memo" provided to the Department of Justice, testimony provided by CIA Director Michael Hayden, and other documents discussed in detail in Volume II. For example, see ODNI September 2006 press release stating: "During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal."Show full note All of this information was acquired by FBI special agents shortly after Abu Zubaydah's capture.²²⁷²²⁷ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details. 11 ii 11111 [Redacted] I II I II

¶The CIA has consistently represented that Abu Zubaydah stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to gain his cooperation. For example, the CIA informed the OLC that:

"As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques, 'brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide

information when they believe they have 'reached the limit of their ability to withhold it' in the face of psychological and physical hardships.'"²²⁸²²⁸ Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). This OLC memorandum citesCIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of Justice, dated March 2,2005, from [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."Show full note

¶As is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, CIA records do not support the CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah made these statements²²⁹²²⁹ OTiil^hei^jre no records of Abu Zubaydah making these statements, the deputy chief of ALEC Station, [Redacted] to d l the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the "best information [the CIA] received on howtohandle die [CIA] detainees came from a walk-in [a source [Redacted] [Redacted] to volunteer information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told us we were underestimating Al-Qa'ida. The detainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because they got a big show trial. When they were turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so they talked. Allah apparently allows you to talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the U.S. and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of." See [Redacted] Memorandum for the Record; subiect^eeting with deputy chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.Show full note CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always intended to talk and never believed he could withhold information from interrogators.²³⁰²³⁰ [Redacted] 1°496 (162014Z FEB 03). For more information, see a March 7, 2005, cable describing Abu Zubaydah^xplanations more fully ( [Redacted] 1 6 6 (070647Z MAR 05)). In February 2003, Abu Zubaydah told a CIA psychologist that he believed prior to his capture that every captured "brother" would talk in detention and that he told individuals at a terrorist training camp that "brothers should be able to expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when someone with knowledge is captured."²³¹²³¹ [Redacted] 0 4 9 6 (162014Z FEB 03) For additional details on this matter, see Volume IJ, specifically the section on information provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice.

11. The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

¶Tn contrast to relatively open communications that the CIA had with the Committee following the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON, the CIA significantly limited its communications with the Committee on its detention and interrogation activities after Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002.²³²²³² The information provided by the CIA to the Committee on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is summarized later in this document, and described in greater detail in Volume IL In responses to three different sets of Committee Questions for the Record addressed to the CIA regarding the MON authorities in the spring and summer of 2002, the CIA provided no indication that the CIA had established DETENTION SITE GREEN, or was using, or considering using, coercive interrogation techniques.²³³²³³ See Volume II, specifically the section on CIA representations to Congress. [Redacted]

¶On September 27, 2002, CIA officials provided a briefing on Abu Zubaydah's interrogation only to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, Vice Chairman Richard Shelby, and their staff directors. After this briefing Chairman Graham made multiple and specific requests for additional information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Internal CIA emails include discussion of how the CIA could "get... off the hook on the cheap" regarding Chairman Graham's requests for additional information.²³⁴²³⁴ Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H. Moseman; cc: Scott Muller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached document] Re: Graham request on interrogations; date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM. In the end, CIA officials simply did not respond to Graham's requests prior to his departure from the Committee in January 2003.

¶C. Interrogation in Country [Redacted] and the January 2003 Guidelines

1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge

¶Plans for a specialized CIA detention facility in Country [Redacted] began in April 2002, with the intention that it would be "totally under [Redacted] S t a t i o n Control."23'' On June 6, 2002, CIA Headquarters approved more than $200,000 for the construction of the facility, identified in this summary as "DETENTION SITE COBALT."²³⁶²³⁶ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (062212Z JUN 02) In a 2003 interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, Associate Deputy Director for Operations [Redacted] described his views of this facility and "stated that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] was opened because there needed to be a detention site in [Country [Redacted] for those detainees enroute [Redacted] t o [DETENTION SITE GREEN]. It was not a place for the use of EITs."²³⁷²³⁷ Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] September 9, 2003.

¶[Redacted] £) DETENTION SITE COBALT, constructed with CIA funding, opened in Country [Redacted] in September 2002.²³⁸²³⁸ For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume 1 and Volume III. The specific date has been generalized at the request of the CIA. According to CIA records, the windows at DETENTION SITE COBALT were blacked out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The

¶[Redacted] guards monitored detainees using headlamps and loud music was played constantly in the facility. While in their cells, detainees were shackled to the wall and given buckets for human waste. Four of the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of the cell.²³⁹²³⁹ [Redacted] 28246 [Redacted] Later reports describe detainees being shackled to the bar with their hands above their heads, forcing them to stand, and therefore not allowing the detainees to sleep.²⁴⁰²⁴⁰ For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume 111, and among other documents: [Redacted] 31118 [Redacted] D l R E C T [Redacted] [Redacted] email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] D A C T E D ] ; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5, 2002; Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from [Redacted] January 28,2003, Subject: [Redacted] OIG that "[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is a n E I T ^ ( 5 e e Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] May 8, 2003.)Show full note

¶The CIA officer in charge of DETENTION SITE COBALT, [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1 ], was a junior officer on his first overseas assignment with no previous experience or training in handling prisoners or conducting interrogations. [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1] was the DETENTION SITE COBALT manager during the period in which a CIA detainee died and numerous CTA detainees were subjected to unapproved coercive interrogation techniques.²⁴¹²⁴¹ See April 27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee [Redacted] April 7, 2005, Memorandum for John Helgerson, Inspector General, from Robert Grenier, Subject: Comments on Draft Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee [Redacted] (2003-7402-IG). A review of CIA records found that prior to [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER l's] deployment and assignment as the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT manager, other CIA officers recommended [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1] not have continued access to classified information due to a "lack of honesty, judgment, and maturity."²⁴²²⁴² [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1 [Redacted] [Redacted] According to records, "the chief of CTC told [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]] that he would not want [him] in his overseas station."²⁴³²⁴³ [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1 [Redacted] [Redacted] A supervising officer assessed that [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]:

"has issues with judgment and maturity, [and his] potential behavior in the field is also worrisome. [The officer] further advised that [ [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]] was only put into processing for an overseas position so that someone would evaluate all of the evidence of this situation all together. [The officer further noted that [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]] might not listen to his chief of station when in the field."244

2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in Country [Redacted]

¶Detainees held in Country [Redacted] were detained under the authority of the MON; however, CIA officers conducted no written assessment of whether these detainees

¶DeatMnvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; and CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee [Redacted] told [Redacted] (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. One senior interrogator, [Redacted] the CIA OIG that "literally, a detainee could go for days or weeks without anyone looking at him," and that his team found one detainee who, "'as far as we could determine,' had been chained to the wall in a standing position for 17 days." According to the CIA interrogator, some of the CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT "'literally looked like a dog that had been kenneled.' When the doors to their cells were opened, 'they cowered.'" (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Revie^Hnterrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] April 30, 2003.)

¶t o l d tlle The chief of interrogations, [Redacted] CIA OIG that "[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is good for interrogations because it is the closest thing he has seen to a dungeon, facilitating the displacement of detainee ions." (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] [Redacted] April 7, 2003.) An analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT told the CIA

¶"pose[d] a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or... | we]re planning terrorist activities." The CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in Country [Redacted] during this period that the CIA remains unable to determine the number and identity of the individuals it detained. The full details of the CIA interrogations there remain largely unknown, as DETENTION SITE COBALT was later found to have not reported multiple uses of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and "rough treatment" of CIA detainees.²⁴⁵²⁴⁵ The full Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. While there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard at COBALT, the waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two tliirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of the waterboard. In meetings between the Committee Staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at COBALT.Show full note

3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country [Redacted] Use the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar

¶Ridha al-Najjar was the first CIA detainee to be held at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Najjar, along with Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr amU number of other individuals, was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, after raids conducted [Redacted] by

¶246 [Redacted] i s t a [Redacted] in late May 2002. Al-Najjar was identified by the CIA as a former bodyguard for Usama bin Laden,²⁴⁷²⁴⁷ [Redacted] [Redacted] and was rendered with Abu Bakr to CIA custody at a Country [Redacted] [Redacted] detention facility on June [Redacted] 2002.²⁴⁸²⁴⁸ [Redacted] [Redacted] Ridha al-Najjar was transferred to DETENTION SITE COBALT on S e p t e m b [Redacted] 2 0 0 2 . 2 4 9

¶While the CIA was describing to the Department of Justice why it needed to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, a parallel internal discussion at the CIA was taking place regarding Ridha al-Najjar. An ALEC Station cable from a CTC officer stated that, on June 27, 2002:

"ALEC/HQS held a strategy session regarding the interrogation of high priority [Redacted] detainee Ridha Ahmed al-Najjar in [Country [Redacted] The goal of the session was to review the progress of the interrogation to date and to devise a general plan as to how best to proceed once the new [Country [Redacted] [Redacted] detention/debriefing facility [i.e., DETENTION SITE COBALT] is completed."²⁵⁰²⁵⁰ A L E C [Redacted] 6 2 1 3 5 Z J U L 02). Although the plans at the time were for DETENTION SITE COBALT to be owned and operated by the Country [Redacted] government, the detention site was controlled and overseen by the CIA and its officers from the day it became operational in September 2002. [Redacted]

¶The meeting participants included individuals who were also involved in discussions related to Abu Zubaydah's interrogation, including deputy chief of ALEC Station, [Redacted] [Redacted] T C Legal [Redacted] and the the [Redacted] followed on 2002, to the CIA Station in Country [Redacted] suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use against Ridha al-Najjar, including:

utilizing "Najjar's fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit," with the cable explicitly stating that interrogators could not "threaten his family with imminent death";

using "vague threats" to create a "mind virus" that would cause al-Najjar to believe that his situation would continue to get worse until he cooperated;²⁵²²⁵² The term "mind virus" first appeared in the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. See [Redacted] 10086 (201900Z APR 02).

manipulating Ridha al-Najjar's environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and

employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations.²⁵³²⁵³ Referenced July 16, 2002, cable is ALEC [Redacted] (162135Z JUL 02).

¶The cable went on to note that the "possibility that [al-Najjar] may have current threat or lead information demands that we keep up the pressure on him,"²⁵⁴²⁵⁴ ALEC (162135Z JUL 02) With the exception of a brief mention of "diminished returns from the most recent interviews of al- Najjar," and references to the detainee's complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers no evidence al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators.²⁵⁵²⁵⁵ [Redacted] ALEC (162135Z JUL 02)

¶Ten days later, on July 26, 2002, CIA officers in Country [Redacted] none of whom had been trained in the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, proposed putting al-Najjar in isolation²⁵⁶²⁵⁶ At this time, July 26,2002, Abu Zubaydah was in isolation at DETENTION SITE GREEN. Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation on June 18, 2002, and remained in isolation for 47 days, until the CIA began subjecting him to its enhanced interrogation techniques on August 4, 2002. and using "sound disorientation techniques," "sense of time deprivation," limited light, cold temperatures, and sleep deprivation.²⁵⁷²⁵⁷ 107 (260903Z JUL 02) [Redacted] The CIA officers added that they felt they had a "reasonable chance of breaking Najjar" to get "the intelligence and locator lead information on UBL and Bin Ladin's family."²⁵⁸²⁵⁸ 25107 (260903Z JUL 02) The plan for al-Najjar was circulated to senior CIA officers as part of the Daily DCI Operations Update.²⁵⁹²⁵⁹ Email from: [REDACTED]MoJJuzz^Crongard, John O. Brennan, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], John H. Moseman, [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTE[Redacted] [Redacted] Jose R o d r i g u [Redacted] p h n P. Mudd, [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], mi 11 III i [Redacted] [Redacted] 11111111111 IREDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: ABU ZUBAYDAH - SENSITIVE ADDENDUM TO DCI DAILY 1630 OPS UPDATE - 2 6 JULY; date: July 26,2002.Show full note

¶On August 5, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA Headquarters authorized the proposed interrogation plan for al-Najjar, to include the use of loud music (at less than the level that would cause physical harm such as permanent hearing loss), worse food (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and hooding.²⁶⁰²⁶⁰ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (052309Z AUG 02). The OLC opinion that reviewed and approved the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, signed on August 1, 2002, was specific to Abu Zubaydah. The Office of Legal Counsel did not produce legal opinions for al-Najjar or other detainees held by or for the CIA until August 2004.

¶More than a month later, on September 21, 2002, CIA interrogators described al-Najjar as "clearly a broken man" and "on the verge of complete breakdown" as result of the isolation.²⁶¹²⁶¹ [REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 02) The cable added that al-Najjar was willing to do whatever the CIA officer asked.²⁶²²⁶² [REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP

¶In October 2002, officers from the U.S. military conducted a short debriefing of al-Najjar at DETENTION SITE COBALT and subsequently expressed an interest in a more thorough debriefing.²⁶³²⁶³ November [Redacted] 2002, Memorandum for [Redacted] Subject: Legal Analysis of [Redacted] Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION S I T j ^ O B A L T T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ On November [Redacted] 2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited DETENTION SITE COBALT and described it as a "CIA detentior^cility/^ioting that "while CIA is the only user of the facility they contend it is a [Country [Redacted] facility."²⁶⁴²⁶⁴ November [Redacted] 2002, Memorandum for [Redacted] Subject: Legal Analysis of [Redacted] Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). The U.S. military officer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of the facility "has little to no experience with interrogating or handling prisoners." With respect to al- Najjar specifically, the legal advisor indicated that the CIA's interrogation plan included "isolation in total darkness; lowering the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable temperature (cold); [playing music] 24 hours a day; and keeping him shackled and hooded." In addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging—which involved handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his arms—for 22 hours each day for two consecutive days, in order to "'break' his resistance." It was also noted al- Najjar was wearing a diaper and had no access to toilet facilities.²⁶⁵²⁶⁵ November [Redacted] 2002, Memorandum for [Redacted] Subject: Legal Analysis of [Redacted] Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). [Redacted]

¶The U.S. military legal advisor concluded that, because of al- Najjar' s treatment, and the concealment of the facility from the 1CRC, military participation in al-Najjar's interrogation would involve risks for the U.S. military [Redacted] The legal advisor recommended briefing the CIA's detention and interrogation activities to U.S. [Redacted]

[Redacted] [combatant command] to alert the command of the risks prior to the U.S. military [Redacted] being involved in any aspect of the interrogation of al-Najjar.²⁶⁶²⁶⁶ November [Redacted] 2002, Memorandum for [Redacted] Subject: Legal Analysis of [Redacted] r s o n n e l Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). According to the CIA

¶inspector general, the detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar "became the model" for handling other CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT.²⁶⁷²⁶⁷ According to the IG report, "in late July or early August 2002, a senior operations officer on TDY to [Redacted] [Redacted] interrogated a particularly obstinate detainee [Ridha al-Najjar] at [Redacted] detention facility that was used before [COBALT] was opened. The officer drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately, becamethemodel for [COBALT]." See April 27, 2005, report by the CIA Inspector General, Death of a Detainee [Redacted] [Redacted] ( 2 0 0 3 - 7 4 0 2 J G W e e f l ^ n t o v i e w Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism P u i p o s e [Redacted] April 2, 2003.Show full note The CIA disseminated one intelligence report from its detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar.²⁶⁸²⁶⁸ See Volume II and Volume III for additional information.

4. Death of Gul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive Interrogation Techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General Review Reveals Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site

¶In November 2002, ALEC Station officers requested that CIA contract interrogator Hammond DUNBAR, one of the two primary interrogators of Abu Zubaydah in August 2002, travel to DETENTION SITE COBALT to assess a detainee for the possible use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.²⁶⁹²⁶⁹ ALEC [Redacted] While DUNBAR was present at DETENTION SITE COBALT, he a s s i s [Redacted] [ C I A OFFICER 1] in the interrogations of Gul Rahman, a suspected Islamic extremist. As reported to CTA Headquarters, this interrogation included "48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment." CIA Headquarters did not approve these interrogation techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, officers at CIA Headquarters responded that they were "motivated to extract any and all operational information on al-Qa'ida and Hezbi Islami from Gul Rahman" and suggested that "enhanced measures" might be needed to gain Gul Rahman's compliance. CIA Headquarters also requested that a psychological assessment of Rahman be completed.²⁷⁰²⁷⁰ [Redacted] ALEC [Redacted] Prior to DUNBAR's departure from the detention site on November [Redacted] 2002, [a few days before the death of Gul Rahman] DUNBAR proposed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on other detainees and offered suggestions to [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1], the site manager, on the use of such techniques.²⁷¹²⁷¹ [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶On November [Redacted] 2002, [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1] ordered that Gul Rahman be shackled to the wall of his cell in a position that required the detainee to rest on the bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, as [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1] had ordered that Rahman's clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative during an earlier interrogation. The next day, the guards found Gul Rahman's dead body. An internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died from hypothermia—in part from having been forced to sit on the bare concrete floor without [Redacted] pants.²⁷²²⁷² Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from [Redacted] January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN. Other contributing factors were identified as dehydration, lack of food, and immobilit due to "short chaining." ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ [CIA OFFICER l's] initial cable to CIA Headquarters on Rahman's death included a number of misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman's death.²⁷³²⁷³ [Redacted] 30211 [Redacted] See Volume 1 and III for additional details.

¶The death of Gul Rahman resulted in increased attention to CIA detention and interrogation activities in Country [Redacted] by CIA Headquarters. The CTC formally designated the CTC's Renditions Group²⁷⁴²⁷⁴ As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." as the responsible entity for the management and maintenance of all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT, in early December 2002.²⁷⁵²⁷⁵ llll I l Hll [Redacted] n I II DEC02) Despite this change, many of the same individuals within the CIA— including DUNBAR, officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and officers within ALEC Station who had recommended the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul Rahman—remained key figures in the CIA interrogation program and received no reprimand or sanction for Rahman's death. Instead, in March 2003, just four months after the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA Station in Country [Redacted] recommended that [Redacted] 1] receive a "cash award" of $2,500 for his "consistently I ' [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1] remained in his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and continued to be involved in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was waived because of his past experience with interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT.²⁷⁷²⁷⁷ osed no objections to, the confinement conditions and interrogation techniques being imposed on Rahman as late as [Redacted] November. On that date, Headquarters notified [the CIA Station in COUNTRY [Redacted] . . . that it was ' motivated to extract any and all operational information' from Rahman, that it rated achieving Rahman's cooperation to be of 'great importance' and that it acknowledged that Rahman 'may need to be subjected to enhanced interrogation measures to induce him to comply." (See February 10, 2006, Memorandum for [ [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1 ]], CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director, re: "Accountability Decision.") With regard to the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "Most egregiously, we believe that CIA leaders erred in not holding anyone formally accountable for the actions and failure of management related to the death of Gul Rahman at [COBALT] in 2002. We understand the reasoning underlying CIA management's decision to overturn an accountability board recommendation that would have imposed sanctions on the least 11(11111111 experienced officer involved. The most junior in the chain of command should not have to bear the full weight of accountability when larger, systemic problems exist and when they are thrust into difficult battlefield situations by their supervisors and given a risky and difficult task and little preparation or guidance. Still, it is hard to accept that a CIA officer does not bear at least some responsibility for his or her actions, even under trying circumstances."Show full note

¶Later investigations of DETENTION SITE COBALT conducted by the CIA inspector general and the deputy director of operations following the death of Gul Rahman found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—and other coercive interrogation techniques—was more widespread than was reported in contemporaneous CIA cables. Specifically, the interrogation techniques that went unreported in CIA cables included standing sleep deprivation in which a detainee's arms were shackled above his head, nudity, dietary manipulation, exposure to cold temperatures, cold showers, "rough takedowns," and, in at least two instances, the use of mock executions.²⁷⁸²⁷⁸ Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from [Redacted] January 28, 2003, Subiect^eath Investigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee [Redacted] (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. Inspector General records of the interview of a senior CIA debriefer indicated that, "[djuring the two weeks of interrogation training, she heard stories of [COBALT] detainees being 'hung for days on end,' not being fed, mock assassinations, and at least one case of a detainee being repeatedly choked." The senior debriefer also informed the Office of Inspector General that, "[s]he heard that while at [COBALT] [ [Redacted] aka "CIA OFFICER 2"] had hung detainees up for long periods with their toes barely touchimMh^round." (See interview report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] April 5, 2003.) DUNBAR described a "rough takedown" following the death of Gul Rahman at COBALT. "According to [DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door of Rahman's cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him lip and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after his death. Rahman had a number of surface abrasions on his shoulders, p e l v i s ^ n n s j e g s , and face.) At this point, Rahman was returned to his cell and secured. [DUNBAR] stated that [ [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]| [the CIA officer in charge of DETENTION SITE COBALT] may have spoken to Rahman for a few moments, but he did not know what [ [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]] said. [DUNBAR] stated that after something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to 'give them something to think about.'" (See Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from [Redacted] January 28,2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.)Show full note

¶( T S [Redacted] f t ^ ^ 1 1 N o v e m b e ^ 8 ^ 0 0 2 ^ t a f f f r o m the CIA's Office of Inspector G e n e r a l c o n t a c t e [Redacted] T C Legal, [Redacted] to indicate their interest in being briefed by CTC on the detention facility in Country [Redacted] At their meeting with the DDO and the chief of CTC on November [Redacted] 2002, the OIG staff explained that, while in that country on a separate matter, the staff had overheard a conversation that included references to "war crimes" and "torture" at a CIA detention facility and were therefore seeking to follow-up on this information. According to notes from the meeting, the DDO described the "most recent event concerning Gul Rahman"—his death, which occurred on November [Redacted] 2002.²⁷⁹²⁷⁹ See Notes of November [Redacted] 2002, meeting D/IG [REDACTED]. [Redacted]

¶Tn January 2003, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson began a formal review of the death of Gul Rahman and began a separate review of the entire CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. The resulting Special Review of Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities ("Special Review") found that there were no guidelines for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to December 2002, and that interrogators, some with little or no training, were "left to their own devices in working with detainees."²⁸⁰²⁸⁰ See Office of Inspector General Special Review of Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-October 2003), May 7,2004, p. 52. According to an OIG interview with an analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, "indicative of the lack of interrogators was the fact that [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]] enlisted a [REDACTED] case officer friend... to conducHnterrogatio^ [DETENTION SITE COBALT] after he completed his [REDACTED] business in [Redacted] ." (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for I Ii il I ni|in i [Redacted] May 8, 2003.) Inspector General records of an interview with a senior CIA debriefer indicate that the debriefer, "heard prior to taking the [interrogator] training that people at [COBALT] had debriefed detainees on their own, sometimes going out to the site at night." (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] April 5, 2003.) As described elsewhere, DCI Tenet issued formal interrogation guidelines for the program on January 28, 2003. (See Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.)Show full note

¶The Inspector General's Special Review also revealed the lack of oversight of DETENTION SITE COBALT by CIA leadership. DCI Tenet stated that he was "not very familiar" with DETENTION SITE COBALT and "what the CIA is doing with medium value targets."²⁸¹²⁸¹ Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, memorandum dated, September 8, 2003. Associate Deputy Director of Operations [Redacted] stated that he was unaware that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were being used there.²⁸²²⁸² Interview of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, September 9, 2003. In August 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller relayed that he was under the impression that DETENTION SITE COBALT was only a holding facility and that he had "no idea who is responsible for [COBALT]."²⁸³²⁸³ Interview of Scott Muller, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003. Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo informed the OIG that he knew little about DETENTION SITE COBALT and that his focus was on DETENTION SITE GREEN and DETENTION SITE BLUE.²⁸⁴²⁸⁴ Interview of John Rizzo, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 14,2003. CTC Chief of Operations [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] stated that he had much less knowledge of operations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and that the CIA's GREEN and BLUE detention sites were much more important to him.²⁸⁵²⁸⁵ Interview of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, February 11,2003. Finally, Chief of CTC Jose Rodriguez stated that he did not focus on DETENTION SITE COBALT because he had "other higher priorities."²⁸⁶²⁸⁶ Interview of Jose Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 12, 2003. mi 111ii [Redacted] iBMB^^BB^^MI111111111111

5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the Department of Justice Included in the Training Syllabus

¶The CIA's CTC Renditions Group began preparing for the first CIA interrogator training course in August 2002—during the period in which Abu Zubaydah was being interrogatethjsing the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN. [Redacted] the CIA's chief of interrogations,2*7 a n [Redacted] the CIA officer with OTS who had spent [Redacted] years as a SERE Instructor with JPRA, led the interrogation training. The first interrogation training, conducted with the assistance of JPRA personnel, occurred from November 12, 2002, to November 18, 2002.²⁸⁸²⁸⁸ December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running). The class included eight students who were seeking to become CIA interrogators and three students seeking to support the CIA interrogation process.²⁸⁹²⁸⁹ December 4,2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running), at 15. The CIA training program involved 65 hours of instruction and training on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including at least two interrogation techniques whose legality had not been evaluated by the Department of Justice: the "abdominal slap" and the "finger press." Although a number of personnel at CIA Headquarters reviewed the training materials, there are no CIA records of any CIA officer raising objections to the techniques being included in the syllabus.²⁹⁰²⁹⁰ See, for example, email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: HVT training; date: October 10, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] c : [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HVT trainine^date^ctober 10,2002; November 1,2002, Memorandum for: Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from [Redacted] Chief, Renditions Group, CTC, re: Request for use of Military Trainers in Support of Agency Interrogation Course, REFERENCE: Memo for D/CTC from C/RG/CTC, dtd 26 Aug 02, Same Subject.Show full note

6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen Potential Interrogators in 2002 and 2003

¶On November[Redacted] J 2002 ; after the completion of the first formal t r a i n i n ^ l a s [Redacted] T C Legal, [Redacted] asked CTC attorney [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] to "[m]ake it known that from now on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are enrolled in, observing or teaching - or otherwise associated with - the [Redacted] class."²⁹¹²⁹¹ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] / L G L ; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T E D [Redacted] [Redacted] b j e c t : EYES ONLY; date: November [Redacted] 2002, at 03:13:01 FM. As described above, Gul Rahman likely froze to death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of N o v e m b e r [Redacted] 2002. [Redacted] email, however, appears to have been drafted before the guards had found Gul Rahman's body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211 [Redacted] describing the guards observing Gul Rahman alive in the morning of November [Redacted] 2002. Gul Rahman's death appeared in cable traffic at least [Redacted] after [Redacted] s email. No records could be identified to provide the impetus for [Redacted] email.Show full note added:

"Moreover, we will be forced to Disapprove [sic] the participation of specific personnel in the use of enhanced techniques unless we have ourselves vetted

them and are satisfied with their qualifications and suitability for what are clearly unusual measures that are lawful only when practiced correctly by personnel whose records clearly demonstrate their suitability for that role. The vetting process will not be that dissimilar from the checks that are provided by the OIG, OS, etc. in certain cases before individuals are promoted or receive awards, and the selection and training of aggressive interrogators certainly warrants a similar vetting process."²⁹²²⁹² Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] / L G L ; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [ R E D A C [Redacted] e c t : EYES ONLY; date: N o v e m b e [Redacted] 2 0 0 2 , at 03:13:01 PM.

¶The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, objected to this approach, stating:

"I do not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get into the business of vetting participants, observers, instructors or others that are involved in this program. It is simply not your job. Your job is to tell all what are the acceptable legal standards for conducting interrogations per the authorities obtained from Justice and agreed upon by the White House."²⁹³²⁹³ Email from: Jose R o d r i g u e z T [Redacted] [Redacted]TC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] j e c t : EYES ONLY; date: November [Redacted] 2002, at 04:27 PM.

¶Contrary to statements later made by CIA Director Michael Hayden and other CIA officials that "[a]ll those involved in the questioning of detainees are carefully chosen and screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity,"²⁹⁴²⁹⁴ Transcript of hea CIA records suggest that the vetting sought by [Redacted] did not take place. The Committee reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers and contractors involved in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted interrogations. The Committee identified a number of personnel whose backgrounds include notable derogatory information calling into question their eligibility for employment, their access to classified information, and their participation in CIA interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the derogatory information was known to the CIA prior to the assignment of the CIA officers to the Detention and Interrogation Program. This group of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.²⁹⁵²⁹⁵ The information [Redacted] is described at length in the Committee Study in Volume 111.

7. Bureau of Prisons "WOW'ed" by Level of Deprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site

¶I" December 2002, the CIA's Renditions Group sent a team of recently trained interrogators to DETENTION SITE COBALT to engage in interrogations. The interrogation plans proposed by that team for at least three detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT included the use of interrupted sleep, loud music, and reduction in food quality and quantity. Less than a month after the death of Gul Rahman from suspected hypothermia, the plans also called for detainees' clothes to be removed in a facility that was described to be 45 degrees Fahrenheit. CIA Headquarters approved the proposals for these detainees, whom the CIA described as "Medium Value."²⁹⁶²⁹⁶ [Redacted] 31118 [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶Prior to this, in November 2002, a delegation of several officers from the Federal Bureau of Prisons conducted an assessment of DETENTION SITE COBALT. Following the November [Redacted] 2002, through November [Redacted] 2002, visit,²⁹⁷²⁹⁷ CIA detainee Gul Rahman died at DETENTION SITE COBALT at the end of the Federal Bureau of Prisons visit to the CIA detention site. CIA officers in Country [Redacted]remarked that the Federal Bureau of Prisons assessments, along with recommendations and training, had "made a noticeable improvement on how the day to day operations at the facility are performed," and made the detention site a "more secure and safer working environment for

¶I officers."²⁹⁸²⁹⁸ [REDACTED] 30589 (271626Z NOV 02) [Redacted]

¶O n December 4, 2002, officers at CIA Headquarters met with individuals from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more about their inspection of DETENTION SITE COBALT and their training of [Redacted] security staff.²⁹⁹²⁹⁹ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002. During that meeting, the Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel described DETENTION SITE COBALT and stated that there was "absolutely no talking inside the facility," that the guards do not interact with the prisoners, and that "[e]verything is done in silence and [in] the dark."³⁰⁰³⁰⁰ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002. According to a CIA officer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons staff also commented that "they were 'WOW'ed'" at first by the facility, because:

"They have never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, i.e., constant white noise, no talking, everyone in the dark, with the guards wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or floor, and the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars). There is nothing like this in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. They then explained that they understood the mission and it was their collective assessment that in spite of all this sensory deprivation, the detainees were not being treated in humanely [sic]. They explained that the facility was sanitary, there was medical care and the guard force and our staff did not mistreat the detainee[s]."³⁰¹³⁰¹ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5,2002.

¶By the end of December 2002, the CIA Renditions Group that had visited DETENTION SITE COBALT had concluded that the detention facility's initial "baseline conditions" involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact on the interrogations. The team thus recommended that "experts and authorities other than the individuals who crafted the process" review the interrogation process and conditions, and that a legal review be conducted.³⁰²³⁰² CIA document entitled Renditions Group Interrogation Team (RGIT), Baseline assessment for MVT, Detainee/Prisoner management, December 30, 2002. The CIA does not appear to have taken action on this recommendation. CIA Headquarters does not appear to have taken action on these recommendations.

8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country [Redacted] Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON Standard for Detention

c [Redacted] ) In the spring of 2003, the CIA continued to hold detainees at

¶facilities in Country [Redacted] who were known not to meet the MON standard for detention. CIA officer [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1] described the arrangement he had with Country [Redacted] officers in an email, writing:

¶[Redacted]

They also happen to have 3 or 4 rooms where they can lock up people discretely [sic]. I give them a few hundred bucks a month and they use the rooms for whoever I bring over - no questions asked. It is very useful for housing guys that shouldn't be in [DETENTION SITE COBALT] for one reason or another but still need to be kept isolated and held in secret detention."³⁰³³⁰³ Email from: [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Thanks and Query re: List of I^HI^^^^^^BdETAINEES;

¶CIA cables indicate that CIA officers transferred at least four detainees to these Country [Redacted] facilities because they did not meet the standard for CIA detention under the MON.³⁰⁴³⁰⁴ [Redacted] date: March 14,2003.

¶In total, four CIA detention facilities were established in Country

¶[Redacted] CIA records indicate that DETENTION SITE COBALT held a total of 64 detainees during the period of its operation between September 2002 a n d [Redacted] 0 0 4 , while DETENTION SITE GRAY held eight detainees between [Redacted] 2003 and [Redacted] 0 3 . The CIA later established two other CIA facilities in Country [Redacted] DETENTION SITE ORANGE, which held 34 detainees between [Redacted] 0 0 4 and [Redacted] 0 6 ; and DETENTION SITE BROWN, which held 12 detainees b e t w e e [Redacted] 2006 and 2008.³⁰⁵³⁰⁵ The cables did not explain any legal basis for detaining individuals who did not meet the detention requirements of the September 17,2001, MON. HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 38836J [Redacted]); [Redacted] HEADQUARTERS! [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] a l e c [Redacted] [Redacted] m ^ ^ m -

9. DCI Tenet Establishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; Formal Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel

¶In late January 2003, in response to the death of CIA detainee Gul Rahman and the use of a gun and a drill in the CIA interrogations of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (described later in this summary), DCI Tenet signed the first formal interrogation and confinement guidelines for the program.³⁰⁶³⁰⁶ See Volume III for additional information. September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003. In contrast to proposals from late 2001, when CIA personnel expected that any detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards, the confinement guidelines signed in January 2003 set forth minimal standards for a detention facility. The confinement guidelines required only that the facility be sufficient to meet basic health needs, meaning that even a facility like DETENTION SITE COBALT, in which detainees were kept shackled in complete darkness and isolation, with a bucket for human waste, and without notable heat during the winter months, met the standard.³⁰⁷³⁰⁷ Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.

¶The guidelines also required quarterly assessments of the conditions at the detention facilities. The first quarterly review of detention facilities covered the period from January 2003 to April 2003, and examined conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT, as well as at DETENTION SITE BLUE in a different country, Country [Redacted] 3 0 8 At that time, DETENTION SITE BLUE, which was initially designed for two detainees, was housing five detainees. Nonetheless, the site review team found that conditions at DETENTION SITE BLUE —including the three purpose-built "holding units"—met "the minimum standards set by the CIA" in the January 2003 guidance. Detainees received bi-weekly medical evaluations, brushed their teeth once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a week. Amenities such as solid food, clothing (sweatshirts, sweatpants, and slippers), reading materials, prayer rugs, and Korans were available depending on the detainee's degree of cooperation with interrogators.³⁰⁹³⁰⁹ CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 22, 2003.

¶The first quarter 2003 review also found that conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT satisfied the January 2003 guidance, citing "significant improvements" such as space heaters and weekly medical evaluations. The review noted that a new facility was under construction in Country [Redacted] to replace DETENTION SITE COBALT, and that this new detention facility, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, "will be a quantum leap forward" because "[it] will incorporate heating/air conditioning, conventional plumbing, appropriate lighting, shower, and laundry facilities."³¹⁰³¹⁰ CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 22, 2003. DETENTION SITE ORANGE opened in [Redacted] 2004. Although some of the cells at DETENTION SITE ORANGE included plumbing, detainees undergoing interrogation were kept in smaller cells, with waste buckets rather than toilet facilities.³¹¹³¹¹ [Redacted] 3741 [Redacted]

¶Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17

¶The DCI's January 2003 interrogation guidelines listed 12 "enhanced techniques" that could be used with prior approval of the director of CTC, including two—use of diapers for "prolonged periods" and the abdominal slap—that had not been evaluated by the OLC. The "enhanced techniques" were only to be employed by "approved interrogators for use with [a] specific detainee." The guidelines also identified "standard techniques"—including sleep deprivation up to 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, use of loud music, isolation, and the use of diapers "generally not to exceed 72 hours"—that required advance approval "whenever feasible," and directed that their use be documented. The "standard techniques" were described as "techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressure." The guidelines provided no description or further limitations on the use of either the enhanced or standard interrogation techniques.³¹²³¹² Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.

¶Although the DCI interrogation guidelines were prepared as a reaction to the death of Gul Rahman and the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques on 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, they did not reference all interrogation practices that had been employed at CIA detention sites. The guidelines, for example, did not address whether interrogation techniques such as the "rough take down,"³¹³³¹³ For a description of the "rough takedown," see Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from [Redacted] [Redacted] January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22. the use of cold water showers,³¹⁴³¹⁴ One cold water shower was described by a CIA linguist: "Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the guards at [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER l]]'s direction. Rahman was so cold that he could barely utter his alias. According to [the on-site linguist], the entire process lasted no more than 20 minutes. It was intended to lower Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons. At the conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one of the four sleep deprivation cells where he was left shivering for hours or overnight with his hand chained over his head." See CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee [Redacted] (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005.Show full note and prolonged light deprivation were prohibited. In addition, by requiring advance approval of "standard techniques" "whenever feasible," the guidelines allowed CIA officers a significant amount of discretion to determine who could be subjected to the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques, when those techniques could be applied, and when it was not "feasible" to request advance approval from CIA Headquarters. Thus, consistent with the interrogation guidelines, throughout much of 2003, CIA officers (including personnel not trained in interrogation) could, at their discretion, strip a detainee naked, shackle him in the standing position for up to 72 hours, and douse the detainee repeatedly with cold water³¹⁵³¹⁵ Water dousing was not designated by the CIA as a "standard" interrogation technique until June 2003. In January 2004 water dousing was recategorized by the CIA as an "enhanced" interrogation technique.—without approval from CIA Headquarters if those officers judged CIA Headquarters approval was not "feasible." In practice, CIA personnel routinely applied these types of interrogation techniques without obtaining prior approval.³¹⁶³¹⁶ See Volume III for additional information.

¶The DCI interrogation guidelines also included the first requirements related to recordkeeping, instructing that, for "each interrogation session in which an enhanced technique is employed," the field prepare a "substantially contemporaneous record... setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable."³¹⁷³¹⁷ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] (311702Z JAN 03). Despite the formal record keeping requirement, the CIA's June 2013 Response argues that detailed reporting on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at CIA detention sites was not necessary, stating: "First, the decline in reporting over time on the use of enhanced techniques, which the Study characterizes as poor or deceptive record keeping, actually reflects the maturation of the program. In early 2003, a process was put in place whereby interrogators requested permission in advance for interrogation plans. The use of these plans for each detainee obviated the need for reporting in extensive detail on the use of specific techniques, unless there were deviations from the approved plan." As detailed in the Study, the process put in place by the CIA in early 2003 explicitly required record keeping, including "the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable." That requirement was never revised.Show full note In practice, these guidelines were not followed.³¹⁸³¹⁸ Subsequent to the January 2003 guidance, many cables reporting the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques listed the techniques used on a particular day, but did not describe the frequency with which those techniques were employed, nor did they integrate the specific techniques into narratives of the interrogations. As the CIA interrogation program continued, descriptions of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were recorded in increasingly summarized form, providing little information on how or when the techniques were applied during an interrogation. There are also few CIA records detailing the rendition process for detainees and their transportation to or between detention sites. CIA records do include detainee comments on their rendition experiences and photographs of detainees in the process of being transported. Based on a review of the photographs, detainees transported by the CIA by aircraft were typically hooded with their hands and feet shackled. The detainees wore large headsets to eliminate their ability to hear, and these headsets were typically affixed to a detainee's head with duct tape that ran the circumference of the detainee's head. CIA detainees were placed in diapers and not permitted to use the lavatory on the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft, detainees were either strapped into seats during the flights, or laid down and strapped to the floor of the plane horizontally like cargo. See CIA photographs of renditions among CIA materials provided to the Committee pursuant to the Committee's document requests, as well as CIA detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information on the transport of CIA detainees.Show full note

¶There were also administrative changes to the program. As noted, on December 3, 2002, CTC's Renditions Group formally assumed responsibility for the management and maintenance of all CIA detention and interrogation facilities.³¹⁹³¹⁹ D I R E C T O [Redacted] 3 2 3 3 6 Z D E C 03) Prior to that timc^hcintcrrogation program was "joined at the hip" with CTC's ALEC Station, according to [Redacted] T C Legal, although another CTC attorney who was directly involved in the program informed the CIA OIG that she "was never sure what group in CTC was responsible for interrogation activities."³²⁰³²⁰ b Interview of [Redacted] y [REDACTED], [REDACTED! and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20,2003. Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003. CTC Chief of Operations told the Inspector General that the program was handled by the Abu Zubaydah Task Force. See February 11, 2003, interview report of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General.Show full note Even after the formal designation of the CIA's Renditions Group,³²¹³²¹ As noted, the CIA's Rendition Group is variably known as the "Renditions Group," the "Renditions and Detainees Group," the "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." m i 11 i n i " [Redacted] mi imi i tensions continued, particularly between CTC personnel who supported SWIGERT and DUNBAR's continued role, and the Renditions Group, which designated [Redacted] as the

¶CIA's chief interrogator.³²²³²² Interview of [ [Redacted] [Redacted] b y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. February 21, 2003, interview report, [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General. Hammond DUNBAR told the Office of Inspector General that there was "intrigue" between the RDG and him and SWIGERT, and "there were emails coming to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] that questioned [his] and [SWIGERT]'s qualifications." See Interview of Hammond DUNBAR, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 4, 2003.Show full note As late as June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, operating outside of the direct management of the Renditions Group, were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to both interrogate and conduct psychological reviews of detainees.³²³³²³ Email [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc:J [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] m ^ R e : [Redacted] D G Tasking for IC Psychologists [DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT]; date: June 20,2003, at 5:23:29 P M n [Redacted] M S expressed concern that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the [Redacted] [Redacted] cc: subjects of their enhanced measures." (See email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: Re: [Redacted] 0 0 Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.) The CIA's June 2013 Response states that CIA "Headquarters established CTC's Renditions and Detentions Group CTC/RDG as the responsible entity for all CIA detention and interrogation sites in December 2002, removing any latent institutional confusion."Show full note The dispute extended to interrogation practices. The Renditions Group's leadership considered the waterboard, which Chief of Interrogations [Redacted] was not certified to use, as "life threatening," and complained to the OIG that some CIA officers in the Directorate of Operations believed that, as a result, the Renditions Group was "running a 'sissified' interrogation program."³²⁴³²⁴ [Redacted] Interview by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 21, 2003. The chief of interrogations, [Redacted] t o 'd the Inspector General that the waterboard was overused with Abu Zubaydah and KSM and was ineffective in the interrogations of KSM. (See Interview of [Redacted] [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General, March 27, 2003.) One doctor involved in CIA interrogations using the waterboard interrogation technique stated that [Redacted] "has a huge bias against the waterboard b/c he's not approved to use it. The reverse is true of the contract psy guys [SWIGERT and DUNBAR] who have a vested interest in favor of it." See email from: [Redacted] t o : [Redacted] cc: [REDACTED]; subject: re: More; d a t e ^ p r i m ^ 0 0 3 , at 08:11:07 AM. ^ ^Show full note At the same time, CIA CTC personnel criticized the Renditions Group a n [Redacted] f ° r their use of painful stress positions, as well as for the conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT.³²⁵³²⁵ March 10, 2003, interview report of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General. Interview of [Redacted] [Redacted] R E D ACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 27, 2003. Interview u [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. March 24, 2003, interview report of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General. r ^ e i e w e r e a ' s o c o n c e r n s about possible conflicts of interest related to the contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR. On January 30, 2003, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that "the individual at the interrogation site who administers the techniques is not the same person who issues the psychological assessment of record," and that only a staff psychologist, not a contractor, could issue an assessment of record."³²⁶³²⁶ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (301835Z JAN 03) In June 2003, however, SWIGERT and DUNBAR were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to interrogate KSM, as well as to assess KSM's "psychological stability" and "resistance posture."³²⁷³²⁷ 112168 [Redacted] (301822Z J UN 03) 11 ii 11111 [Redacted] I II I II As described later in this summary, the contractors had earlier subjected KSM to the waterboard and other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques. The decision to send the contract psychologists to DETENTION SITE BLUE prompted an OMS psychologist to write to OMS leadership that "[a]ny data collected by them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as interrogators will always be [Redacted] suspect."³²⁸³²⁸ The email, which expressed concern that SWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere with on-site psychologists, stated that, "[although these guys believe that their way is the only way, there should be an effort to define roles and responsibilitie^efo^dieir arrogance and narcissism evolve into unproductive conflict in the field." See email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: [Redacted]DG Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 16, 2003, at 4:54:32 PM.Show full note then informed the management of the Renditions Group that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced measures."³²⁹³²⁹ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] u b j e c r R e T [Redacted] D G Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM. At the end of their deployment, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided their assessment of KSM and recommended that he should be evaluated on a monthly basis by "an experienced interrogator known to him" who would assess how forthcoming he is and "remind him that there are differing consequences for cooperating or not cooperating."³³⁰³³⁰ [Redacted] 12168 (301822Z JUN 03). The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "In practice, by April 2003, [CIA] staff psychologists had taken over almost all of the provisions of support to the RDI program. As it concerned [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR], however, the appearance of impropriety continued, albeit to a lesser degree, because they were occasionally asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they had not interrogated" (emphasis added). The CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. For example, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided an assessment on KSM, a detainee whom they had interrogated.Show full note In his response to the draft Inspector General Special Review, [Redacted] M S noted that "OMS concerns about conflict of interest... were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the same individuals applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ, judged both its effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique - at a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could not use the technique."³³¹³³¹ Memorandum for Inspector General, Attention: Assistant IG for Investigations, [REDACTED], from [REDACTED], M.D., [Redacted] e d i c a l Services^ [Redacted] re Draft Special Review-Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), at 13.