D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

¶'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,³³²³³² For more information on al-Nashiri, see detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III. assessed by the CIA to be an al- Qa'ida "terrorist operations planner" who was "intimately involved" in planning both the USS Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United Arab Emirates in mid-October 2002.³³³³³³ A L [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 11357 ( 0 2 I 2 4 2 Z D E C 0 2 ) [Redacted] [Redacted] 367.101 He provided information while in the custody of a foreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf,³³⁴³³⁴ See [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] L E C [Redacted] j [Redacted] For disseminated inli Mil i in i i i [Redacted] o a [Redacted] I [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] IIA [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] I A [Redacted] For other reporting from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody, see mi 11 in i [Redacted] i mi inn i and was then rendered by the

¶CIA to DETENTION SITE COBALT in Country [Redacted] on November [Redacted] 2002, where he was held for [Redacted] days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November [Redacted] 2002.³³⁵³³⁵ 335 | |29768 [Redacted] [Redacted]NOV 02); [Redacted] [11243 ([Redacted] [NOV 02) At DETENTION SITE GREEN, al-Nashiri was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including being subjected to the waterboard at least three times.³³⁶³³⁶ [Redacted] [Redacted] NOV 02); [Redacted] See, for example, 11246| [Redacted] O V 02); [Redacted] 112581 11263 [Redacted] O V 02); [Redacted] |11270 [Redacted] NOV 02) [Redacted]112841 [Redacted] NOV 02); [Redacted] 11294| [Redacted] NOV 02); [Redacted] 1112931 [Redacted] NOV 02); [Redacted]11 322 [Redacted] NOV I11352| [Redacted] [Redacted] DEC 02); [Redacted] 113591 [Redacted] DEC 02); [Redacted]11 322[Redacted] [Redacted]Show full note In December 2002, when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were rendered to DETENTION SITE BLUE.³³⁷³³⁷ 178275 [Redacted] ( [Redacted] E C 02)

¶In total, al-Nashiri was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques during at least four separate periods, with each period typically ending with an assessment from on-site interrogators that al-Nashiri was compliant and cooperative.³³⁸³³⁸ Al-Nashiri's time at DETENTION SITE COBALT is not well documented in CIA records. As described elsewhere, standard operating procedure at COBALT at the time included total light deprivation, loud continuous music, isolation, and dietary manipulation. Based on CIA records, the other four "enhanced interrogation" periods of al-Nashiri took place at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December 5-8, 2002; December 27,2002-January 1, 2003; January 9-10, 2003; and January 15-27, 2003. See [Redacted] 0 3 0 (111541Z DEC 02); [Redacted] 10078 (211733Z D E C 0 2 [Redacted] 1 4 0 ( 0 3 1 7 2 7 Z J A T ^ r A L E [Redacted] (191729Z JAN 03). 339 [Redacted] [Redacted] Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] follow-up; date: December 15, 2002. _ _ _Show full note Officers at CIA Headquarters disagreed with these assessments, with the deputy chief of ALEC Station, [Redacted] commenting that DETENTION SITE BLUE interrogators should not make "sweeping statements" in cable traffic regarding al-Nashiri's compliance.339 Officers at CIA Headquarters sought to reinstate the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques based on their belief that al-Nashiri had not yet provided actionable intelligence on imminent attacks.³⁴⁰³⁴⁰ See, for example, ALEC [Redacted] 2 3 1 5 Z DEC 02); ALEC [Redacted] 0 3 5 2 Z DEC 02); ALEC [Redacted] (180247Z DEC 02); ALEC [Redacted] 9 1 7 2 9 Z JAN 03); CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29,2003. See also CIA Office of Inspector General report, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), released on May 7, 2004.Show full note

¶Shortly after al-Nashiri arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE, CIA interrogators at the detention site judged al-Nashiri's cooperation and compliance by his engagement and willingness to answer questions, while CIA Headquarters personnel judged his compliance based on the specific actionable intelligence he had provided (or the lack thereof). For example, in December 2002, interrogators informed CIA Headquarters that al-Nashiri was "cooperative and truthful," and that the "consensus" at the detention site was that al-Nashiri was

[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 70866| [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] For disseminated intelligence, see [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [Redacted]

¶"a compliant detainee" who was not "withholding important threat information."³⁴¹³⁴¹ [Redacted] 10030(1115412 DEC 02) Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station at CIA Headquarters responded:

"it is inconceivable to us that al-Nashiri cannot provide us concrete leads.... When we are able to capture other terrorists based on his leads and to thwart future plots based on his reporting, we will have much more confidence that he is, indeed, genuinely cooperative on some level."³⁴²³⁴² ALEC [Redacted] (180247Z DEC 02)

¶Later, after multiple follow-up debriefings, DETENTION SITE BLUE officers again wrote that they had "reluctantly concluded" that al-Nashiri was providing "logical and rational explanations" to questions provided by CIA Headquarters and therefore they recommended "against resuming enhanced measures" unless ALEC Station had evidence al-Nashiri was lying.³⁴³³⁴³ 343 10085 (230906Z DEC 02) A cable from the detention site stated:

"without tangible proof of lying or intentional withholding, however, we believe employing enhanced measures will accomplish nothing except show [al-Nashiri] that he will be punished whether he cooperates or not, thus eroding any remaining desire to continue cooperating.... [The] bottom line is that we think [al-Nashiri] is being cooperative, and if subjected to indiscriminate and prolonged enhanced measures, there is a good chance he will either fold up and cease cooperation, or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by the statute. Therefore, a decision to resume enhanced measures must be grounded in fact and not general feelings."³⁴⁴³⁴⁴ 344 [Redacted] 10085 (230906Z DEC 02)

2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill

¶After the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base sent two interrogators back to the United States because of "prolonged absences from family" and the "facUha^nhanced measures are no longer required for al-Nashiri," CIA Headquarters sent [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2], a CIA [Redacted] officer who had not been trained or qualified as an interrogator, to DETENTION SITE BLUE to question and assess al-Nashiri.³⁴⁵³⁴⁵ 10040 (122122Z D E C 0 2 ^ r i o r to [Redacted] tCI A OFFICER 2's] deployment, CIA records ancl included numerous concerns about [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2's] anger management, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] For more information on [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] and other CIA personnel in the program with similar alarming issues in their background, see Volume III. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that: [Redacted] some of the [Redacted] officers mentioned in the [Redacted] — ^ excluded—much of the derogatory information was not in fact available to senior managers making assignments [Redacted] [Redacted] [." NotwithstandingtheCIA's June 2013 assertion, as detailed in Volume HI, senior managers were aware of concerns related to [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] prior to his deployment.Show full note

¶In late December 2002, following a meeting at CIA Headquarters to discuss resuming the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, [Redacted] the chief of RDG³⁴⁶³⁴⁶ As described, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records.—the entity that managed the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program—objected to sending [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] to the detention site because he "had not been through the interrogation training" and because [Redacted] "had heard from some colleagues that [ [Redacted] I A O F F I C E R 2]] was too confident, had a temper, and had some s e c u r i t y i s s u e s [Redacted] later learned from other CIA officials that "[CTC chief of operations [Redacted] [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2]] at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] over the holidays." [Redacted] d t h e Office of Inspector General that "his assessment is that the Agency management felt that the [RDG] interrogators were being too lenient with al-Nashiri and that [ [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2]] was sent to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] to 'fix' the situation."³⁴⁷³⁴⁷ Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] February 23, 2003.

¶[Redacted] 2) [Redacted] [ c i a OFFICER 2] arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December [Redacted] 2002, and the CIA resumed the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Nashiri shortly thereafter, despite the fact that [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] had not been trained, certified, or approved to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

¶[Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] wrote in a cable to CIA Headquarters that "[al]-Nashiri responds well to harsh treatment" and suggested that the interrogators continue to administer "various degrees of mild punishment," but still allow for "a small degree of 'hope,' by introducing some 'minute rewards.'"³⁴⁸³⁴⁸ [Redacted] 10140 (031727Z JAN 03) from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] subject: EYES ONLY - [Redacted] ONLY

It was later learned that during these interrogation sessions, [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2], with the permission and participation of the DETENTION SITE

¶BLUE chief of Base, who also had not been trained and qualified as an interrogatoi^ised a series of unauthorized interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri. For example, [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] placed al-Nashiri in a "standing stress position" with "his hands affixed over his head" for approximately two and a half days.³⁴⁹³⁴⁹ MEMORANDUM FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22,2003. In an April 12, 2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, Senator Carl Levin asked the CIA Director if the CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[prolonged stress standing position, naked, arm[s] chained above the head...." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs, and nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator." See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing Transcript, dated April 12,2007 (DTS #2007-3158).Show full note Later, during the course of al-Nashiri's debriefings, while he was blindfolded, [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] placed a pistol near al- Nashiri's head and operated a cordless drill near al-Nashiri's body.³⁵⁰³⁵⁰ See, for example, CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003; email from: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] COB [Redacted] to: [Redacted] subject: EYES ONLY - [Redacted] ONLY - MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003. Al-Nashiri did not provide any additional threat information during, or after, these interrogations.³⁵¹³⁵¹ For additional details, see Volume III.

¶Based on a report from CTC, the CIA Office of Inspector General conducted a review of these interrogation incidents, and issued a report of investigation in the fall of 2003.³⁵²³⁵² CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29,2003. The Office of Inspector General later described additional allegations of unauthorized techniques used against al-Nashiri by [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] and other interrogators, including slapping al-Nashiri multiple times on the back of the head during interrogations; implying that his mother would be brought before him and sexually abused; blowing cigar smoke in al-Nashiri's face; giving al-Nashiri a forced bath using a stiff brush; and using improvised stress positions that caused cuts and bruises resulting in the intervention of a medical officer, who was concerned that al-Nashiri's shoulders would be dislocated using the stress positions.³⁵³³⁵³ CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004. When interviewed by the Office of Inspector General, the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base stated he did not object to using the gun and drill in the interrogations because he believed [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] was sent from CIA Headquarters "to resolve the matter of al-Nashiri's cooperation" and that he believed [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] had

¶354 permission to use the interrogation techniques. The chief of Base added that his own on-site approval was based on this and "the pressure he felt from Headquarters to obtain imminent threat information from al-Nashiri on 9/11-style attacks."³⁵⁵³⁵⁵ CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETCNTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003. In April 2004, [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER

¶356 2] and the chief of Base were disciplined.

3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Techniques Might "Push [Al-Nashiri] Over The Edge Psychologically, " Refers to the CIA Program As a "Train Wreak [sic] Waiting to Happen "

¶[Redacted] [Redacted]

¶DETENTION SITE BLUE to conduct a "Psychological Interrogation Assessment" to judge al- Nashiri's suitability for the additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and develop recommendations for his interrogation. The resulting interrogation plan proposed that the interrogators would have the "latitude to use the full range of enhanced exploitation and interrogation measures," adding that "the use of the water board would require additional support from" fellow CIA contractor Grayson SWIGERT. According to the interrogation plan, once the interrogators had eliminated al-Nashiri's "sense of control and predictability" and established a "desired level of helplessness," they would reduce the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and transition to a debriefing phase once again.357

¶[Redacted] receiving the proposed interrogation plan for al-Nashiri on J a n u a r y 2 l 7 2 0 0 [Redacted] the CIA's chief of interrogations—whose presence had previously prompted al-Nashiri to tremble in fear358—emailed CIA colleagues to notify them that he had "informed the front office of CTC" that he would "no longer be associated in any way with the interrogation program due to serious reservation[s] [he had] about the current state of affairs" and would instead be "retiring shortly." In the same email, [Redacted] wrote, "[t]his is a train wreak [sic] waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens."³⁵⁹³⁵⁹ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] Despite this notification, [Redacted] [Redacted] drafted a cable for CIA Headquarters to send to DETENTION SITE BLUE raising a number of concerns that he, the chief of interrogations, believed should be "entered for the record." The CIA Headquarters cable—which does not appear to have been disseminated to DETENTION SITE BLUE—included the following:

"we have serious reservations with the continued use of enhanced techniques with [al-Nashiri] and its long term impact on him. [Al-Nashiri] has been held for three months in very difficult conditions, both physically and mentally. It is the assessment of the prior interrogators that [al-Nashiri] has been mainly truthful and is not withholding significant information. To continue to use enhanced technique[s] without clear indications that he [is] withholding important info is excessive and may cause him to cease cooperation on any level. [Al-Nashiri] may come to the conclusion that whether he cooperates or not, he will continually be subjected to enhanced techniques, therefore, what is the incentive for continued cooperation, Also, both C/CTC/RG [Chief of CTC RDG [Redacted] and HVT Interrogator [ [Redacted] w h o departed [DETENTION SITE BLUE] in [Redacted] n u a r y , believe continued enhanced methods may push [al-Nashiri] over the edge psychologically."³⁶⁰³⁶⁰ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] sees [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶The draft cable from [Redacted] also raised "conflict of responsibility" concerns, stating:

"Another area of concern is the use of the psychologist as an interrogator. The role of the ops psychologist is to be a detached observer and serve as a check on the interrogator to prevent the interrogator from any unintentional excess of pressure which might cause permanent psychological harm to the subject. The medical officer is on hand to provide the same protection from physical actions that might harm the subject. Therefore, the medical officer and the psychologist should not serve as an interrogator, which is a conflict of responsibility. We note that [the proposed plan] contains a psychological interrogation assessment by [Redacted] psychologist [DUNBAR] which is to be carried out by interrogator [DUNBAR], We have a problem with him conducting both roles simultaneously."³⁶¹³⁶¹ Email from: [Redacted] t o : [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. As noted above, personnel from CIA's Office of Medical Services raised the same concerns about medical and psychological personnel serving both to assess the health of a detainee and to participate in the interrogation process.Show full note

¶Rather than releasing the cable that was drafted by [Redacted] CIA Headquarters approved a plan to reinstitute the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, beginning with shaving him, removing his clothing, and placing him in a standing sleep deprivation position with his arms affixed over his head.³⁶²³⁶² DIRECTOR [Redacted] (201659Z JAN 03 DIRECTOR [Redacted] (230008Z JAN 03) CIA cables describing subsequent interrogations indicate that al-Nashiri was nude and, at times, "put in the standing position, handcuffed and shackled."³⁶³³⁶³ 10289 (241203Z JAN 03); [Redacted] 10296 (251I13Z JAN 03), [Redacted] 10306 (261403Z JAN 03) According to cables, CIA interrogators decided to provide al-Nashiri clothes to "hopefully stabilize his physiological symptoms and prevent them from deteriorating,"³⁶⁴³⁶⁴ [Redacted] 10309 (261403Z JAN 03) noting in a cable the next day that al-Nashiri was suffering from a head cold which caused his body to shake for approximately ten minutes during an interrogation.³⁶⁵³⁶⁵ 10312 (270854Z JAN 03)

¶Beginning in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to five different CIA detention facilities before he was transferred to U.S. military custody on September 5, 2006.³⁶⁶³⁶⁶ HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (03I945Z SEP 06); [Redacted] 1242 (050744Z SEP 06); HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (051613Z SEP 06) ^ ^ ^ ^ In the interim, he was diagnosed by some CIA psychologists as having "anxiety" and "major depressive" disorder,³⁶⁷³⁶⁷ See, for example, [Redacted] 2 4 7 (141321Z APR 03); [Redacted] 1_959 (111700Z DEC 04); [Redacted] 2038 (21155? I III! I [Redacted] " " (251133ZMAR 05); [Redacted] 11701 (191640Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 1756 (I90800Z SEP 03). while others found no symptoms of either illness.³⁶⁸³⁶⁸ [Redacted] 1502 (021841Z AUG 04); [Redacted] 2709 (271517Z APR 06); [Redacted] 3910 (241852Z JAN 06); 12709 [Redacted] (271517Z APR 06) He was a difficult and uncooperative detainee and engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including attempts to assault CIA detention site personnel and efforts to damage items in his cell.³⁶⁹³⁶⁹ [Redacted] [Redacted] See, for example, [Redacted] 1029 (291750Z JUN 06); 1142 (041358Z AUG 06); (111600Z AUG 04); [Redacted] 1716 (180742Z SEP 04); [Redacted] 3051 (301235Z SEP 05); [Redacted] (291750Z JUN 06); [Redacted] 2474 (251622Z JUN 05); [Redacted] 2673 (021451Z AUG 05); [Redacted] 1716 (180742Z SEP 04). Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his food, and complained of bodily pain and insomnia.³⁷⁰³⁷⁰ See, for example, [Redacted] 1356 (011644Z JUL 04); [Redacted] 1880(140917Z NOV 04); [Redacted] 1959 (111700Z DEC 04); [Redacted] 1962 (121029Z DEC 04); [Redacted] 1959 (111700Z DEC 04); [Redacted] 2038 (211558Z JAN [Redacted] 1091 (031835Z NOV 03); [Redacted] 1266 (052309Z JAN 04); [Redacted] (271440Z MAR 04). At one point, al-Nashiri launched a short-lived hunger strike that resulted in the CIA force feeding him rectally.³⁷¹³⁷¹ 1203 (231709Z MAY [Redacted] 1202 (231644Z MAY 04)

¶In October 2004, 21 months after the final documented use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract interrogator DUNBAR and another CIA interrogator concluded that al-Nashiri provided "essentially no actionable information," and that "the probability that he has much more to contribute is low."³⁷²³⁷² [Redacted] 1843 (271356Z OCT 04) In the final years of al-Nashiri's detention, most of the intelligence requirements for al-Nashiri involved showing al-Nashiri photographs. In June 2005, the DETENTION SITE BLACK chief of Base suspended even these debriefings because it was "the very, very rare moment" that al-Nashiri would recognize a photograph, and because the debriefings often were the "catalyst" for his outbursts. See [Redacted] 2474 (251622Z JUN 05).Show full note Over the course of al-Nashiri's detention and interrogation by the CIA, the CIA disseminated 145 intelligence reports based on his debriefings. Al-Nashiri provided information on past operational plotting, associates whom he expected to participate in plots, details on completed operations, and background on al-Qa'ida's structure and methods of operation.³⁷³³⁷³ While still in the custody of a foreign government, prior to his rendition to CIA custody, al-Nashiri provided details on multiple terrorist plots in which he was involved prior to his detention, including the attacks against the USS Cole and the MV Limburg, plans to sink oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, plans to attack warships docked at ports in Dubai and Jeddah, and his casing of a Dubai amusement park. This information was disseminated in [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] from al-Nashiri while he was in the [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 70866 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] . For disseminated intelligence, see [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]Show full note Al-Nashiri did not provide the information that the CIA's ALEC Station sought and believed al-Nashiri possessed, specifically "perishable threat information to help [CIA] thwart future attacks and capture additional operatives."³⁷⁴³⁷⁴ ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted]