B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

¶During the period in which the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was operational, from 2002 to 2009, there were three reviews that addressed the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: (1) the CIA Office of Inspector General Special Review, released in May 2004; (2) an internal review conducted by two senior CIA officers in 2004; and (3) a 2005 "Blue Ribbon" panel consisting of two individuals not employed by the CIA. According to CIA records, as of the spring of 2007, the CIA had not "conducted any other studies on the effectiveness of interrogation techniques."1060

¶Each of the previous reviews relied on interviews with CIA personnel involved in the program, as well as documents prepared by CIA personnel, which represented that the CIA interrogation program was effective, and that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture

¶Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.) The CIA provided examples of the purported effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in response to a request from the OLC. According to an email from [Redacted] [Redacted] T C Legal [Redacted] Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury explained that "because the standards under Article 16 [of the Convention Against Torture] require a balancing of the government's need for the information, it would be quite helpful if we had any case studies or examples to demonstrate the value of information produced by the program." £ e e e m a i l ^ r o [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; date: March 2, 2005, 2:32 PM. 10.TO Among other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel memoranda dated May 30,2005, and July 20, 2007. The May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum repeats additional CIA representations, including that "enhanced interrogation techniques remain essential to obtaining vital intelligence necessary to detect and disrupt such emerging threats" and that the use of the techniques "led to specific, actionable intelligence." The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum states that the ".. .use of enhanced interrogation techniques is intended to service this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence," citing CIA representations to the President that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced information "we could not get anywhere else," and that "the use of such techniques saved American lives by revealing information about planned terrorist plots." 1060 e l a draft response to Questions for the Record submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence after an April 12, 2007, hearing on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA draft response states the CIA Blue Ribbon Panel, consisting of two outside reviewers, was the only independent review of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "CIA had not conducted any other studies on the effectiveness of [the] interrogation techniques." The final CIA response to die Committee states: "The 2004 CIA Office of the Inspector General report that reviewed CIA's counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities recommended a non-CIA independent experts' review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EIT and a determination regarding the necessity for the continued use of each to technique. As a result, CIA sought and obtained the agreement of Mr. [Redacted] ancl [Redacted]

¶Mr- conduct an independent review, which is also known as the Blue-Ribbon Panel report. Their individual reports are provided at Tabs A and B."

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¶additional terrorists, and collect a high-volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." 1061 CIA personnel represented: "[t]his is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."¹⁰⁶²¹⁰⁶² See, among other examples, a June 27,2003, Inspector General interview w i t h ^ T C ^ h i e f of Operations, [Redacted] The record of that interview (2003-7123-IG) states: " [Redacted] .stated that the Agency's Al-Qa'ida program has been very effective. .. [ [Redacted] views the intelligence as the main criteria forjudging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent terrorist attacks. This is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."Show full note

¶There are no indications in CIA records that any of the past reviews attempted to independently validate the intelligence claims related to the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques that were presented by CIA personnel in interviews and in documents. As such, no previous review confirmed whether the specific intelligence cited by the CIA was acquired from a CIA detainee during or after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, or if the intelligence acquired was otherwise unknown to the United States government ("otherwise unavailable"), and therefore uniquely valuable.