C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured Terrorists"

¶Before the CIA took custody of its first detainee, CIA attorneys researched the limits of coercive interrogations and the legal definitions of torture. On November 26, 2001, CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorneys circulated a draft legal memorandum entitled "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers."¹⁰⁶³¹⁰⁶³ N o v e m b e r 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers." This document includes information regarding Paragraph 4. The memorandum listed interrogation techniques considered to be torture by a foreign government and a specific nongovernmental organization, including "cold torture," "forced positions," "enforced physical exhaustion," "sensory deprivation," "perceptual deprivation," "social deprivation," "threats and humiliation," "conditioning techniques," and "deprivation of sleep."¹⁰⁶⁴¹⁰⁶⁴ November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers." See Volume I for additional information. The draft memorandum described various prohibitions on torture and the potential use of "necessity" as a legal defense against charges of torture, stating:

"[i]t would, therefore, be a novel application of the necessity defense to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives... A policy decision must be made with regard to U.S. use of torture in light of our obligations under international law, with consideration given to the circumstances and to international opinion on our current

¶See: (1) CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004; (2) May 12,2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from

¶[Redacted] Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Divisions via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program"; and (3) Blue Ribbon Panel Review, including a September 2, 2005, Memorandum from [Redacted] [Redacted] t o Director Porter Goss, CIA, entitled "Assessment of EITs Effectiveness," and a September 23, 2005, Memorandum from [Redacted] to the Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, entitled, "Response to request from Director for Assessment of EIT effectiveness."

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campaign against terrorism—states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives."¹⁰⁶⁵¹⁰⁶⁵ Italics added. November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers," at 1. The CIA would later repeat both claims, representing to senior officials and the Department of Justice that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced intelligence that "saved lives," and that this intelligence was otherwise unavailable. Further, on August 1, 2002, OLC issued an unclassified, but non-public opinion, in the form of a memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, analyzing whether certain interrogation methods would violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. The memorandum provides a similar rationale for the necessity defense, stating, "certain justification defenses might be available that would potentially eliminate criminal liability. Standard criminal law defenses of necessity and self-defense could justify interrogation methods needed to elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United States and its citizens." The memorandum later concludes: "even if an interrogation method might violate Section 2340A, necessity or self-defense couk^jrovideiustifications that would eliminate any criminal liability."Show full note

¶On February 1, 2002, a CTC attorney researched the impact of the application of the Geneva Conventions (GC) on future CIA interrogation activities.¹⁰⁶⁶¹⁰⁶⁶ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] and [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and Questioning"; date: February 1, 2002. The attorney wrote:

"If the detainee is a POW and enjoys GC coverage, then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention, but ultimately saves lives. I believe that [a named CIA attorney]'s papers reflecting on necessity and anticipatory self defense are the two most obvious defenses available."¹⁰⁶⁷¹⁰⁶⁷ Italics added. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] and [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and Questioning"; date: February 1, 2002. In response to a request from the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), the CIA provided two memoranda - one dated November 7,2001, the other undated - neither of which discussed the necessity defense. The OPR report states: "Although the CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) told us that these were the only CIA memoranda in its possession on interrogation policy, some of the information we obtained from the CIA suggested otherwise. In an internal email message dated February I, 2002, from CTC attorney [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] referred to '[CIA Attorney [REDACTED]] papers reflecting on necessity and anticipatory self defense.'" See Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report. Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009, pp. 31-32.Show full note

¶The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) included the "necessity defense" in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House Counsel, determining, among other things, that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture.¹⁰⁶⁸¹⁰⁶⁸ Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay C. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, "Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C 2340-2340A," the U.S. Federal Torture Statute. The OLC memorandum states:

"It appears to us that under the current circumstances the necessity defense could be successfully maintained in response to an allegation of a Section 2340A violation. ...Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess

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information that could enable the United States to prevent attacks that potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could take hundreds or thousands of lives."¹⁰⁶⁹¹⁰⁶⁹ Italics added. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales. Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, pp. 39-41. On December 30, 2004, the OLC issued a new memorandum superseding the August 1, 2002, memorandum in its entirety. The OLC wrote that "[b]ecause the discussion in [the August 1, 2002] memorandum concerning the President's Commander-in-Chief power and the potential defenses to liability was - and remains—unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the analysis that follows. Consideration of the bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive that United States personnel not engage in torture." (See Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A). No CIA detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques between the issuance of the December 2004 memorandum and May 2005, when the OLC opined on the application of the federal prohibition on torture to the techniques.Show full note

¶According to a report by the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), released in July 2009, Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo "acknowledged that the CIA may have indirectly suggested the new sections [related to Commander-in-Chief authority and possible defenses, including the necessity defense] by asking him what would happen in a case where an interrogator went 'over the line' and inadvertently violated the statute." Yoo also told the OPR that he drafted those relevant sections. Another senior Department of Justice lawyer at the time, Patrick Philbin, informed the OPR that when he told Yoo that the sections were superfluous and should be removed, Yoo responded, "They want it in there." The CIA's former Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo told the OPR that the CIA did not request the addition of the sections.¹⁰⁷⁰¹⁰⁷⁰ Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29,2009, p. 51. In his response to the OPR report, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee stated that the "ticking time bomb" that could justify the necessity defense was, in fact, a "real world" scenario. According to Bybee, "the OLC attorneys working on the [August 1, 2002] Memo had been briefed on the apprehension of Jose Padilla on May 8, 2002. Padilla was believed to have built and planted a dirty bomb."¹⁰⁷¹¹⁰⁷¹ Bybee response, at 74, n. 6, cited in the OPR Report at fn. 171. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to tlie Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009. The August 1, 2002, memorandum states that the "[interrogation of captured al Qaida operatives allegedly allowed U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to track Padilla and to detain him upon his entry into the United States."¹⁰⁷²¹⁰⁷² Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. This information was inaccurate.¹⁰⁷³¹⁰⁷³ See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla.

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¶With the issuance on August 1, 2002, of a second OLC memorandum specific to Abu Zubaydah,¹⁰⁷⁴¹⁰⁷⁴ Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1,2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 1). the CIA initiated the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. After the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah and other CIA detainees to the techniques, the CIA made increasingly stronger assertions about the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program, eventually asserting that the CIA interrogation program "saved lives,"¹⁰⁷⁵¹⁰⁷⁵ Among other documents, see CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27,2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004; and the September 6, 2006, CIA-vetted speech by the President on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.Show full note and that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was necessary, as the intelligence obtained could not have been acquired in any other way.¹⁰⁷⁶¹⁰⁷⁶ See, among other examples, interview of James Pavitt, by [Redacted] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003; Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities; and a June 27, 2003, Inspector General interview of the Chief of Operations CTC, [Redacted] Th e record of that interview states: " [Redacted] stated that the Agency's AI-Qa'ida program has been very effective. [Redacted] views the intelligence as the main criteria forjudging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent terrorist attacks. This is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."Show full note

¶Many of the representations made by the CIA about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were first made in the spring of 2003 and evolved over the course of the year and into early 2004. In April 2003, CIA officers told the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) that KSM, who had been subjected to the techniques between March [Redacted] 2003, and March 25, 2003, was still not fully cooperative. For example, on April 3, 2003, more than a week after the CIA had discontinued the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, thc deputy chief of ALEC Station, [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] informed the OIG that KSM had made "remarkable progress," but there was "a lot more to be done." [Redacted] did not cite any specific intelligence obtained from KSM in this context.¹⁰⁷⁷¹⁰⁷⁷ Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. On April 21, 2003, a CTC analyst told the IG that KSM "has not provided anything significant to date." (See interview [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 21, 2003.) On April 30, 2003, one of KSM's interrogators pointed to "information on hijackings, bridges in New York, and nuclear plants," and information on hidden uranium, which was never found. See interview of [Redacted] [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.Show full note

¶On June 27, 2003, more than three months after the CIA had ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, CTC Chief of Operations

¶[Redacted] told the OIG that he was convinced that KSM "knows more and is just waiting for us to ask the right [Redacted] questions."¹⁰⁷⁸¹⁰⁷⁸ [Redacted] told the OIG that KSM was asked about the plan to hijack an airplane in Malaysia and fly it into the Library Tower in Los Angeles, which the CIA had learned from another detainee. That detainee was Masran bin Arshad, who was in foreign government custody. [Redacted] told the OIG that KSM "provided information on the Heathrow/Canary Wharf option, buUioHmtiUersonnel at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] asked him about a picture he drew of an I-beam." See [Redacted] Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of O p e r a t i [Redacted] Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.Show full note then provided two examples of information that KSM had not provided until he was asked specifically about the matters by CIA interrogators: information on the "tallest building in California" plot (also known as the "Second Wave" plot), and the inclusion of a building in Canary Wharf as a target in the plotting against Heathrow Airport.¹⁰⁷⁹¹⁰⁷⁹ [Redacted] e m o r a n d u m for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, [Redacted] Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group, and the Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting. Asked if he could think of any instances in which information from CIA detainees had led to the arrest of a terrorist, [Redacted] stated only that Majid Khan provided information that led to the arrest of Iyman Faris by the FBI.¹⁰⁸⁰¹⁰⁸⁰ [Redacted] Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. This information was inaccurate, as Majid Khan was not in CIA custody when he provided information on Iyman Faris.¹⁰⁸¹¹⁰⁸¹ See section of this summary and Volume 11 on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris.

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¶[Redacted] represented to the OIG that the CIA's interrogation program was "very effective," and that the intelligence obtained from CIA detainees was "the main criteria forjudging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent terrorist attacks." [Redacted] also told the OIG that the information obtained from CIA interrogations was "information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."¹⁰⁸²¹⁰⁸² [Redacted] Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, [Redacted] Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.

¶On June 26, 2003, President Bush issued a statement for the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. That statement—referenced in multiple news articles— relayed that the:

"United States is committed to the world-wide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example. 1 call on all governments to join with the United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and unusual punishment."¹⁰⁸³¹⁰⁸³ June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.html. m i 11 i i i i [Redacted] i mi mil I

¶The following day, after the Washington Post published an article on the Administration's detainee policy, CIA Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo called John Bellinger, the legal advisor to the National Security Council. According to an email from Rizzo to other senior CIA officers, Rizzo called Bellinger to:

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"express our surprise and concern at some of the statements attributed to the Administration in the piece, particularly the Presidential statement on the UN International Day in Support of Victims of Torture as well as a quote from the Deputy White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan that all prisoners being held by the USG are being treated 'humanely.'"¹⁰⁸⁴¹⁰⁸⁴ Email from: John Rizzo; to: John [Redacted] cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003.

¶While Rizzo expressed the view that the presidential statement did not appear to contain anything "we can't live with," Rizzo conveyed to senior CIA leaders that it "might well be appropriate for us to seek written reaffirmation by some senior White House official that the Agency's ongoing practices... are to continue. >1085

¶On July 3, 2003, DCT George Tenet sent a memorandum to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice seeking reaffirmation of the Administration's support for the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices. The memorandum stated that the reaffirmation was sought because:

"recent Administration responses to inquiries and resulting media reporting about the Administration's position have created the impression that these [interrogation] techniques are not used by U.S. personnel and are no longer approved as a policy matter."1086

¶While the CIA was preparing to meet with the White House on the reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program, CIA personnel provided additional inaccurate information about the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG, as well as to senior CIA leadership. These inaccurate representations described the "thwarting" of specific plots and the capture of specific terrorists attributed to the interrogation of CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

[Redacted] ?) On July 16, 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] [Redacted] was interviewed again by the OIG. In this interview [Redacted] asserted that KSM

¶"provided information that helped lead to the arrest o f ' Iyman Faris, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al- Marri, Majid Khan, and Ammar al-Baluchi.¹⁰⁸⁷¹⁰⁸⁷ Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, [Redacted] Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. These representations were almost entirelyJ

¶1AJJO inaccurate.

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¶[Redacted] [Redacted] also informed the OIG that information from CIA detainees "provided a wealth of information about Al-Qa'ida plots," including: a terrorist plot in Saudi Arabia against Israel; a plot against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; a plot against Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf; a plot to derail trains; a plot against subways; a gas station plot; a plot against the "tallest building" in California; a plot against suspension bridges; and a plot to poison water supplies.¹⁰⁸⁹¹⁰⁸⁹ [Redacted] [Redacted], Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. Much of this information was inaccurate.¹⁰⁹⁰¹⁰⁹⁰ See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots; the Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting; the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Paris; the Capture of Majid Khan; the Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group; and the KSM detainee review in Volume III. 1 0 [Redacted] t e d Majid Khan (gas station and poison plotting), lyman Faris (the suspension bridge plot, as well as a possible shopping mall plot), Khallad bin Attash (the Heathrow plot), Masran bin Arshad (the "tallest building" plot), and Ammar al-Baluchi (the plot against the U.S. consulate in Karachi). See relevant sections of tliis summary and Volume II for additional information.Show full note According to OIG records, "[o]n the question of whether actual plots had been thwarted, [ [Redacted] opined that since the operatives involved in many of the above plots had been arrested, [CTC had], in effect, thwarted the operation[s]." [Redacted] provided a list to the OIG of terrorists^aptured and the plots with which they were associated. None of the individuals listed by [Redacted] were

¶1091 captured as a result of reporting from CIA detainees.

¶During this same period in 2003, CIA officers were compiling similar information for CIA leadership. On July 18, 2003, die chief of ALEC Station, [Redacted] [Redacted] wrote an email to ALEC Station officers requesting information on the "value and impact" of CIA detainee information on behalf of the CIA Renditions Group (RDG),¹⁰⁹²¹⁰⁹² As noted, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," "RD1," and "RDG" in CIA records. which he stated was being compiled for senior CIA [Redacted] leadership.¹⁰⁹³¹⁰⁹³ [Redacted] Email from: [Redacted] to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM. wrote that "[o'Jne way to assist now is to provide input to RDG on highlights of intel and ops reporting from the detainees," in particular "reporting that helped reveal or stop plots, reporting that clinched the identity of terrorist suspects, etc."¹⁰⁹⁴¹⁰⁹⁴ Email from: [Redacted] to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM. The first portion ofthcresponse^ompiled by ALEC Station, was drafted by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] who wrote that CIA detainee reporting "plays a key role in our ability to identify and capture al-Qa'ida terrorists^ including those who were planning to attack inside the United States." In an email, [Redacted] wrote that "[t]he ability of the detainees to identify many operatives previously unknown to us or to the FBI resulted in the successful capture/detention of several terrorists," and that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "key" to acquiring this information on these operatives. As examples of operatives "previously unknown" to the CIA and the FBI and identified by CIA detainees, [Redacted] cited Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed, Majid Khan,

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¶Iymai^aris, and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.¹⁰⁹⁵¹⁰⁹⁵ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted], [REDACTED] [Redacted] [ R E D A C [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] T E D ] , [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 PM; email from:] [Redacted] [Redacted] DO_CTC_ALEC Chiefs Groups, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM.Show full note These representations were inaccurate.¹⁰⁹⁶¹⁰⁹⁶ See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla; the Capture of Majid Khan; the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris; and the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha. [Redacted] email concluded:

"Simply put, detainee information has saved countless American lives inside the US and abroad. We believe there is no doubt al-Qa'ida would have succeeded in launching additional attacks in the US and that the information obtained from these detainees through the use of enhanced measures was key to unlocking this information. It is our assessment that if CIA loses the ability to interrogate and use enhanced measures in a responsible way, we will not be able to effectively prosecute this war."¹⁰⁹⁷¹⁰⁹⁷ Italics added. Email from: [Redacted] l o [Redacted] DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] ; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM.

¶T h e information relayed from ALEC Station to RDG in July 2003 for CIA leadership also included information from a CIA assessment entitled "Significant Detainee Reporting."¹⁰⁹⁸¹⁰⁹⁸ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] , DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] cc: subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM. See CIA document "Significant Detainee Reporting." That document included information that was largely congruent with CIA records. It stated that KSM provided details on the Heathrow Airport Plot and the Karachi Plots only after being confronted with the capture of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al- Baluchi;¹⁰⁹⁹¹⁰⁹⁹ See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots, and the KSM detainee review in Volume III. that with regard to plots inside the United States, KSM had only admitted to plots that had been abandoned or already disrupted; that KSM fabricated information in order to tell CIA interrogators "what he thought they wanted to hear"; and that KSM generally only provided information when "boxed in" by information already known to CIA dcbriefers." 00 This information was not included in CIA representations to policymakers later that month.

¶On July 29, 2003, as a result of DCI Tenet's July 3, 2003, request seeking reaffirmation of the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices, Tenet and CIA General Counsel Scott Muller conducted a briefing for a subset of the National Security Council principals." 01 According to a CIA memorandum, Muller represented that CIA "detainees subject to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives."¹¹⁰²¹¹⁰² CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.

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¶The CIA briefing provided the "results" of using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in briefing slides with the heading: "RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO." The slides represented that KSM provided information on "[ajttack plans against US Capitol, other US landmarks"; "[a]ttacks against Chicago, New York, Los Angeles; against towers, subways, trains, reservoirs, Hebrew centers, Nuclear power plants"; and the "Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot." The slides also represented that KSM identified Iyman Faris, the "Majid Khan family," and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.¹¹⁰³¹¹⁰³ CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29,2003, presented to senior White House officials. These representations were largely inaccurate.¹¹⁰⁴¹¹⁰⁴ CIA records indicate that the "attacks," "attack plans," and "targets" discussed by KSM were well known to the Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, or were merely ideas for attacks that were proposed, but never operationalized. The CIA briefing slides made no mention of KSM withholding or fabricating information during and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II, as well as the KSM detainee review in Volume III.Show full note

¶The CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee 'Abd al- Rahim al-Nashiri regarding "US Navy Ships in the Straits of Hormuz." This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts.¹¹⁰⁵¹¹⁰⁵ CIA records indicate that al-Nashiri provided details on multiple terrorist plots—including plans to target ships in the Strait of Hormuz—prior to his CIA detention and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. With regard to the targeting of ships in the Strait of Hormuz, this information was provided by al-Nashiri while he was still in foreign government custody and was disseminated in CIA intelligence r e p o i t s p ^ r t o l u s C I ^ d e t e n t i w i . {See [Redacted] 6 5 9 [Redacted] [Redacted] 7 2 6 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] For disseminated i n t e l l i g e n c e T r [Redacted] Z I A [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] For other reporting from al-Nashiri while in foreign government custody [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 70868 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] disseminated intelligence, see [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] e e a h o detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III. 11111111111Show full note The CIA slides further indicated that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh—specifically that bin al-Shibh "[identified Hawsawi" and provided "major threat" information on "[a]ttacks against Nuclear Power Plants, Hebrew Centers." This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts.¹¹⁰⁶¹¹⁰⁶ Al-Hawsawi was linked to the September 11,2001, attacks and targeted by the CIA and other intelligence agencies p r i o ^ ^ i r ^ ^ h i b h | s c a p t u r e . (See WASHINGTON [Redacted] 3 2 0 1 2 Z M A Y 02), CIA [Redacted] (032022Z AP^02); [Redacted] 17743 (051408Z MAR 02); DIRECTOR [Redacted] 1 7 5 6 Z APR 02); ALEC [Redacted] (16182.1Z JUL 03^A1-Hawsawi's arrest on March 1, 2003, was unrelated to any reporting from CIA detainees. (See ALEC [Redacted] (161821Z JUL 03).) With regard to the referenced "attacks," no operational plots targeting the sites referenced were ever identified by the CIA. Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005 that the "most significant" intelligence derived from Ramzi bin al-Shibh was obtained prior to his rendition to CIA custody and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the "most significant" reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh on future attacks was background information related to al- Qa'ida's plans to attack Heathrow Airport. (See ALEC [Redacted] (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the majority of this information in mid-October 2002, while in the custody of a foreign government and prior to being transferred to CIA custody. (See CIA [Redacted] [Redacted] See also detainee review of Ramzi bin al- Shibh in Volume III.Show full note

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¶In the context of "[m]ajor threats [that] were countered and attacks averted," the CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash on an "[a]ttack against U.S. Consulate in Karachi." This representation was inaccurate.¹¹⁰⁷¹¹⁰⁷ See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots. CIA officers in [Redacted] wrote of the referenced reporting from bin Attash: "[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling-[CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous information or through interviews of al-Baluchi and Ba Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi." This cable also stated, "[a]s noted in severalprevious cables, in December 2002 [Redacted] n s u l a t e became aware of the threat to Consulate officials." See [Redacted] 1 4 5 [Redacted] .Show full note The CIA slides further represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, resulting in the "[identification of [Jose] Padilla, Richard Reid," as well as information on "[a]ttacks on banks, subways, petroleum and aircraft industries." These representations were inaccurate.¹¹⁰⁸¹¹⁰⁸ For information on the "[identification of [Jose] Padilla," see the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla. Richard Reid was arrested in December 2001, prior to Abu Zubaydah's capture. See multiple open source reporting and Department of Justice materials, including, United States v. Richard Reid Indictment, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, January 16, 2002. Abu Zubaydah provided information on potential places al-Qa'ida might target, including banks and subways, shortly after his capture to FBI interrogators, months prior to the use of the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" in August 2002. See Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939). See also Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 11ii 11111 [Redacted] III IIIShow full note

¶The briefing slides, which contained additional inaccuracies detailed in Volume II of the Committee Study, were used, at least in part, for CIA briefings for Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,¹¹⁰⁹¹¹⁰⁹ Memorandum for the Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September 27, 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50088). Slides, CIA Interrogation Program, 16 September 2003. The Memorandum for the Record drafted by John Bellinger refers to a "detailed handout" provided by the CIA. See John B. Bellinger, ID, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Bxiefing of Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld regarding Interrogation of High-Value Detainees; date: September 30, 2003.Show full note as well as for Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith.¹¹¹⁰¹¹¹⁰ Scott W. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack Goldsmith; date: 16 October 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50097). " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ subsequent interviews of CIA personnel, the OIG received information that contradicted other CIA representations about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The chief of the [Redacted] Branch of thc UBL Group at CTC described at length how the arrests of Majid Khan and lyman Faris were unrelated to reporting from CIA detainees.11,1 The deputy director for law enforcement for the FBI's Counterterrorism Division told the OIG how Uzhair Paracha and FBI operational activities were ultimately responsible for the capture of Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.¹¹¹²¹¹¹² Interview of [Redacted] by [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, August 5, 2003. The chief of targeting and special requirements for CTC's al-Qa'ida Department and former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, [Redacted]

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¶[Redacted] told the OIG that "the often-cited example of Zubaydah identifying Padilla is not quite accurate."¹¹¹³¹¹¹³ August 19, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General. According to [Redacted] "[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah^iot tell us who Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla." [Redacted] [Redacted] stated that the Pakistanis had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and his partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair, relaying, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky."¹¹¹⁴¹¹¹⁴ August 19,2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General. This information was not included in the IG Special Review.

¶At the same time, however, CIA personnel provided inaccurate examples of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG. The deputy chief of the Al-Qa'ida Department of CTC told the OIG that "KSM gave us Majid Khan and Uzair Paracha."¹¹¹⁵¹¹¹⁵ Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center Al- Qa'ida Department; date: 28 July 2003. Deputy DCI John McLaughlin told the OIG that information from KSM "led to the capture" of Majid Khan, which in turn led to the capture of Hambali. McLaughlin also represented that "the capture of Richard Reid was a result of modus operandi information obtained from [Abu] Zubaydah."¹¹¹⁶¹¹¹⁶ Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 5, 2003. This information was included in the CIA's July 2003 briefing slides. Richard Reid was arrested in December 2001, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah. These representations were inaccurate.¹¹¹⁷¹¹¹⁷ See the section in this summary and in Volume II on the Capture of Majid Khan; the Capture of Hambali; and the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha. See also the KSM detainee review in Volume III. Richard Reid was arrested prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah.

¶In addition to these specific inaccurate examples, CIA leadership made additional general claims to the OIG about the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation program that highlighted the "critical threat information" that could only be acquired by using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees. Jose Rodriguez, then CTC director, told the CIA OIG that "the use of EITs has saved lives and prevented terrorist operations from occurring."¹¹¹⁸¹¹¹⁸ Interview of Jose E. Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 12, 2003. Deputy DCI McLaughlin told the OIG that he "believes the use of EITs has proven critical to CIA's efforts in the war on terrorism."¹¹¹⁹¹¹¹⁹ Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 5, 2003. DDO Pavitt stated that the program was "invaluable to U.S. national security," that "American lives have been saved as a result of information received from detainees," and that the CIA "has been able to obtain information that would not have been obtained without the use of EITs."¹¹²⁰¹¹²⁰ Pavitt also stated that by "September, October and November" of 2002, "they saw a clear benefit" to the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah (Interview of James Pavitt, by [Redacted] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003). According to OIG records, DCI Tenet stated he "firmly believes that the interrogation program, and specifically the use of EITs, has saved many lives." Tenet added that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "extremely valuable" in obtaining "enormous amounts of critical threat information," and that he did not believe that the information could have been gained any other way.¹¹²¹¹¹²¹ Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 8 September, 2003.

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¶On January 2, 2004, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson provided a draft of the OIG Special Review, entitled "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," to senior CIA officials for comment. The draft Special Review, which was based on numerous interviews of CIA personnel, as well as additional research by the OIG, described the origins of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the detention sites that were operational at the time of the review, and the guidance that had been provided on both interrogation and detention. The draft also identified a number of unauthorized interrogation techniques that had been used,¹¹²²¹¹²² For example, the draft described interrogators placing pressure on a detainee's artery, conducting mock executions, blowing cigarette or cigar smoke into a detainee's face, using cold water to interrogate detainees, and subjecting a detainee to a "hard takedown." In an interview conducted after Gul Rahman's death at DETENTION SITE COBALT, Dr. DUNBAR described a "rough takedown." The interview report stated: "According to [DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door of [a detainee] cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). [The detainee] did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention." DUNBAR stated that after "something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to 'give them something to think about.'" See Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from [Redacted] January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul Rahman, pp. 21-22, paragraph 34.Show full note and concluded that, in a number of cases, CIA interrogations went "well beyond what was articulated in the written DOJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002."¹¹²³¹¹²³ CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), January 2004. The draft report repeated the inaccurate examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that had been conveyed by CIA officers to OIG personnel,¹¹²⁴¹¹²⁴ The Special Review draft stated that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests" of Sayf al- Rahman Paracha, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-Marri, and Majid Khan, and that KSM's information "led to the investigation and prosecution" of Iyman Faris. The draft Special Review also stated that information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the identification" of Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammad. Finally, the draft included the "plots" described by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] during her July 16, 2003, interview. Most of the inaccurate representations would remain in the final version of the Special Review completed in May 2004. See CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123- 1G), January 2004.Show full note but nonetheless concluded:

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"[w]ith the capture of some of the operatives for the above-mentioned plots, it is not clear whether these plots have been thwarted or if they remain viable or even if they were fabricated in the first place. This Review did not uncover any evidence that these plots were imminent."¹¹²⁵¹¹²⁵ CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), January 2004.

¶After reviewing the draft Special Review, including the OIG's qualified conclusions about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques^he CIA's CTC began preparing a highly critical response. In preparation for that response, [Redacted] [Redacted] T C L e g [Redacted] s t e d additional information that could be used as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from CTC personnel. [Redacted] sent an email seeking "a list of specific plots that have been thwarted by the use of detainee reporting that we acquired following the use of enhanced techniques."

¶[Redacted] noted that he would compile the information, "emphasizing that hundreds or thousands of innocent lives have been saved as a result of our use of those techniques.. .." U26 In a separate email, [Redacted] emphasized that it was "critical" that the information "establish direct links between die application of the enhanced interrogation techniques and the production of intelligence that directly enabled the saving of innocent lives," that the intelligence obtained after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques be "significantly different in nature from the intelligence acquired before the use of the enhanced techniques," and that the information be "absolutely ironclad" and "demonstrably supported by cable citations, analytical pieces, or what have [Redacted] you."1127 further noted that "[w]e can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney General, and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely verifiable." He concluded, "[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the future of the program, and the consequent saving of innocent lives, may depend substantially upon the input you provide."¹¹²⁸¹¹²⁸ t0: Email from: [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 10, 2004. As described in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the examples m i 11 i i i i "111111 began: "here is my draft contribution... it's late, I'm tired, so it's not especially elegant... welcome any fact correcting I got wrong, but let's be foward [sic] leaning." The inaccurate information included in the email was used in the CIA's formal response to the OIG.Show full note

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¶Responding to the request for information, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] sent an email describing intelligence from KSM in which she wrote, "let's be foward [sic] leaning."¹¹²⁹¹¹²⁹ [Redacted] email and the subsequent D D ^ e s p o n s e t o t h e OIG wereusedasthe template for talking points on The content of [Redacted] email would serve as a template on which future justificationsforthe CIA program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were [Redacted] based.¹¹³⁰¹¹³⁰ program. See, for from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: re EDITED Final -- RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector G e n e r a ^ e v i e v ^ o ^ a p e ^ f o ^ o n d o l e e z z ^ i c ^ n Decembe^004); date: December 6, 2004; email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: re EDITED Final - RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector General review for talking points in November 2005); date: November 4, 2005.Show full note email stated that "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's information alone has saved at least several hundred, possibly thousands, of lives." She then wrote that KSM "identified" Iyman Faris, "who is now serving time in the US for his support to al-Qa'ida," and "identified a photograph" of Saleh al-Marri, "whom the FBI suspected of some involvement with al-Qa'ida, but against whom we had no concrete information," adding that al- Marri "is now being held on a material witness warrant." [Redacted] s email stated that KSM "provided information" on Majid Khan, who "is now in custody," "identified a mechanism for al-Qa'ida to smuggle explosives into the US," and "identified" Jaffar [Redacted] al-Tayyar.¹¹³¹¹¹³¹ In response to [Redacted] email, one CIA officer asked whether "re the jaffar al-tayyar stuff, didnt [sic] we alreadWiave th^ulhiairu^frOT See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] c[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] I^HHHH> subject: on KSM/AZ email also represented that "[a]fter the use of enhanced [interrogation techniques], [Abu Zubaydah] grew into what is now our most cooperative detainee," and that Abu Zubaydah's information "produced concrete results that helped saved lives."¹¹³²¹¹³² and measures; date: February 10,2004, at 09:38 AM. Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted]; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. These representations were almost entirely inaccurate.¹¹³³¹¹³³ See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II on the eight primary CIA effectiveness representations and 12 other prominent CIA representations of effectiveness. As she had in an interview with the OIG, [Redacted] former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, refuted this view, writing in an email that Abu Zubaydah "never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information," that Abu Zubaydah discussed Jose Padilla prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "he never really gave us actionable intel to get them."¹¹³⁴¹¹³⁴ Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] R M u d d J R E D ACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T E [Redacted] subject: Re: Please Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report^ate: February 10, 2004. As noted, in an August 19, 2003 ; Memorandum for the Record detailing [Redacted] [Redacted] S interview with the Office of the Inspector General, [Redacted] told the OIG that "the often-cited example of Zubaydah identifying Padilla is not quite accurate," and that "[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us who Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla." Noting that the Pakistani governmentShow full note Separately, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station compiled were provided over the following years to the President, the Congress, the Department of Justice, and the American public. 1128

Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted]; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. [Redacted] email

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¶[Redacted] forwarded additional inaccurate information from CIA personnel in ALEC Station to CTC Legal related to KSM,¹¹³⁵¹¹³⁵ The information forwarded by [Redacted] related to die Heathrow Airport plotting and stated that "[o]nly after enhanced measures" did KSM "admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in fact an illustration that KSM the engineer drew himself to show another AQ operative that the beams in the Wharf - liJce those in the World Trade Center- would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside." The email also stated that KSM "identified the leading operatives involved in both the UK and Saudi cells that would support the operation." These representations were inaccurate. See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting, and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.Show full note al-Nashiri,¹¹³⁶¹¹³⁶ The information forwarded by [Redacted] stated that, "subsequent to the application of enhanced measures," the CIA "learned more in-depth details" about operational planning, "to include ongoing operations against both the US and Saudi interests in Saudi Arabia." This representation omitted key information provided by al-Nashiri in foreign government custody and prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See the 'Abd al-Rahim al- Nashiri detainee review in Volume HI.Show full note and Hambali.¹¹³⁷¹¹³⁷ The information forwarded by [Redacted] stated that, "after die use of enhanced measures [Hambali] provided information that led to the wrap-up of an al-Qa'ida cell in Karachi, some of whose members were destined to be the second wave attack pilots inside the US after 911.... [Tjheir identification and subsequent detention saved hundreds of lives." This representation was inaccurate. See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group. (See email from: [Redacted] t o : [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] multiple cc's; subject: EDITED—Re: Heathrow plot insight from KSM; date: February 10, 2004, at 2:38:36 P h ^ T h e e m a i n n c l u d e d tli^ollowin^ext: "Here is Heathrow." Below this text were forwarded emails from [Redacted] and [Redacted] See email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] u b j ect|H^athro^)lot insight from KSM; date: February 10, 2004, at n| l l l l l II [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: OGCrebuttalpart 5 andfinaNRejal-^shiri; date: February 12, 2004, at 02:59 PM; [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] forwarding email from: [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: Re: al-Nashiri; date: February 10, 2004, at 06:11 PM; email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: **immediate—Hambali Reporting; date: February 10, 2004, at 11:43 AM.Show full note

¶On February 27, 2004, DDO Pavitt submitted his formal response to the OIG draft Special Review in the form of a memorandum to the inspector general. Pavitt urged the CIA OIG not to "shy away from the conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," and to "make it clear as well that the EITs (including the waterboard) have been indispensable to our successes."¹¹³⁸¹¹³⁸ Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. Pavitt's memorandum included an attachment describing the "Successes of CIA's Counterteirorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," and why the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary. The attachment stated:

"Information we received from detained terrorists as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our

¶had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and Ills partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair, [Redacted] stated, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky." This information was not included in the draft or final OIG Special Review. 1,35 was allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties."¹¹³⁹¹¹³⁹ Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.

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¶The attachment to Pavitt's memorandum repeated much of the inaccurate information contained in Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] email about KSM and Abu Zubaydah, as well as the additional information ALEC Station personnel provided on KSM, al-Nashiri, and Hambali. In Pavitt's memorandum, every intelligence success claim was preceded with some version of the phrase, "as a result of the lawful use of EITs."¹¹⁴⁰¹¹⁴⁰ Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. Inaccurate information provided to the OIG during interviews and in the Pavitt memorandum was included in the final version of the OIG's Special Review.¹¹⁴¹¹¹⁴¹ A review of CIA records found that almost all of the information in the Pavitt memorandum was inaccurate and unsupported by CIA interrogation and intelligence records. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that CIA officers "generally provided accurate information [to the Inspector General] on the operation and effectiveness of the program," and that "with rare exceptions, [CIA officers] provided accurate assessments to the OIG."Show full note The relevant portion of the Special Review, including much of the inaccurate information, has been declassified.¹¹⁴²¹¹⁴² The CIA Inspector General Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," was declassified with redactions in May 2008. On August 24, 2009, some portions of the Review that were redacted in May 2008, were unredacted and declassified.

A S [Redacted] m m Legal [Redacted] C [Redacted] C anticipated

¶February 10, 2004, email, much of the information provided to the inspector general on the "effectiveness" of the C I A ' s enhanced interrogation techniques was later provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice as evidence for the effectiveness of the C I A ' s enhanced interrogation techniques.¹¹⁴³¹¹⁴³ [Redacted] wrote in an email: "We can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney General, and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely verifiable." (See email [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 10, 2004.) As detailed in this Study, the CIA consistently used the same "effectiveness" case studies. The eight most frequently cited "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists are examined in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, as are 12 other prominent examples diat the CIA has cited in the context of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.Show full note

¶[Redacted] ?) In late 2004, as the National Security Council was considering "endgame" options for CIA detainees, the CIA proposed a public relations campaign that would include disclosures about the "effectiveness" of the CIA program. CIA talking points prepared in December 2004 for the DCI to use with National Security Council principals stated that "[i]f done cleverly, selected disclosure of intelligence results could heighten the anxiety of terrorists at large about the sophistication of USG methods and underscore the seriousness of American commitment to prosecute aggressively the War on Terrorism."¹¹⁴⁴¹¹⁴⁴ T a l k i n g Points for the DCI: DOD Proposals to Move Forward on Transfer of HVDs to Guantanamo, 16 December 2004. iiii 11 ii 1 1 [Redacted] T O R N The following month, the CIA proposed that the public information campaign include details on the "intelligence gained and lives saved in HVD interrogations."¹¹⁴⁵¹¹⁴⁵ DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor, 12 January 2005; included in email fromOI^ACn^ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Coord on NSC Talkings for 1/14; date: January 11, 2005, at 03:33 PM. There was no immediate decision by the National Security Council about an "endgame" for CIA detainees or the proposed public information campaign.

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¶[Redacted] [Redacted] asked that information on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program be compiled in anticipation of interviews of CIA personnel by Tom Brokaw of NBC News. The first draft included effectiveness claims relating to the "Second Wave" plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, the Karachi plotting, and the identification of a second shoe bomber.¹¹⁴⁶¹¹⁴⁶ The draft stated that the "Second Wave" plotting "was uncovered during the initial debriefings of a senior al- Qa'ida detainee," that the Heathrow plotting "was also discovered as a result of detainee debriefings," that the Karachi plotting "was revealed during the initial debriefings of two senior al-Qa'ida detainees," and diat the CIA "learned form [sic] detainee debriefings o f ' the second shoe bomber. (See email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted], [ R E D A C T E D [Redacted] E D A C T E D ] , [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: FOR IMMEDIATE COORDINATION: summary of impact of detainee program; date: April 13, 2005, at 5:21:37 PM.) These claims were inaccurate. See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II.Show full note A subsequent draft sought to limit the information provided to what was already in the public record and included assertions about Issa al-Hindi, Iyman Faris, and Sajid Badat.¹¹⁴⁷¹¹⁴⁷ The draft discussed Issa al-Hindi, who had been referenced in the 9/11 Commission Report, stating that "[pjrior to KSM's reporting, the U.S. Government was not aware of Issa's casing activity, nor did we know his true identity." It added that "KSM's reporting was the impetus for an intense investigation, culminating in Issa's identification and arrest." The draft also included two examples that had not been in official public documents, but had been described in press stories. The first was that "KSM led U.S. investigators to an Ohio truck driver named Iyman Faris." The second was that "KSM's confessions were also instrumental in determining the identity of Saajid Badat," the second shoe bomber. (See email from: [Redacted] Chief of Operations, ALEC Station; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] . [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] • [Redacted] , [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at 6:46:59 PM.) As described elsewhere, these claims were incongruent with CIA records. At least one earlier media account of KSM's purported role in the arrest of Iyman Faris was provided in a book by an author who had extensive access to CIA officials. (See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003.). The CIA's cooperation with the author is described elsewhere in this summary, as well as in more detail in the full Committee Study.Show full note That day, Deputy Director of CTC Philip Mudd told [Redacted] that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our budget."¹¹⁴⁸¹¹⁴⁸ Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and [Redacted] April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 19:56:05. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ The following day, the draft was cleared for release to the media.¹¹⁴⁹¹¹⁴⁹ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted]; cc: [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM.

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¶On April 20, 2005, the same examples were circulated as part of an anticipated official public campaigns promote the "effectiveness" of the still-classified CIA program.¹¹⁵⁰¹¹⁵⁰ "so See CIA document entitled, "INTERROGATION PROGRAM DRAFT PRESS BRIEFING," from April 2005. In response, [Redacted] T C Legal, [Redacted] expressed concern that "the examples cited, while true, and perhaps as far as we can go, are not nearly the most striking examples of lives saved." Referencing KSM's reporting on Iyman Faris, [Redacted] noted that "we risk making ourselves look silly if the best we can do is the Brooklyn Bridge - perhaps we should omit specific examples rather than 'damn ourselves with faint praise.'" [Redacted] ' who offered the Heathrow Airport plot as an example, made the following suggestion: "Can [Office of Public Affairs] be more strongly declarative - 'while we can't provide details' (or maybe we can) 'the program has produced intelligence that has directly saved 100's/1000's of American and other innocent lives'?" [Redacted] then attached claims originally compiled in February 2004 for the purpose of responding to the draft OIG Special Review which, he wrote, described "some of the actionable intelligence acquired as a result of the Program and the lawful use of such techniques."¹¹⁵¹¹¹⁵¹ from: [Redacted] [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] h n Rizzo; Interrogation Program-Going Public Draft Talking Points—Com m e n t s D u e t [Redacted] e by COB TODAY Thanks; date: April 20, 2005, at 5:10:10 PM. The examples were inaccurate.¹¹⁵²¹¹⁵² See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash).

¶On June 24, 2005, Dateline NBC aired a program, accompanied by several online articles, which quoted CIA Director Goss and Deputy Director of CTC Mudd, as well as anonymous "top American intelligence officials." Among other claims, NBC reported that the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh "le[d] ultimately" to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin Attash.¹¹⁵³¹¹⁵³ "The frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005. In 2003, Ronald Kessler published a book with which the CIA cooperated that stated "intercepts and information developed months earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh... allowed the CIA to trace [KSM]." The Kessler book also stated that the bin Attash capture was the "result" of interrogations of KSM. This information is incongruent with CIA records. See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003. See also John A. Rizzo; to [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] Scott W. Muller, [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 22, 2004, at 09:28 AM).Show full note This information was inaccurate." 54

¶At the end of 2005, congressional concerns about the treatment of detainees again spurred interest at the CIA for public disclosures on the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, congressional action on the Detainee Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment") prompted a CIA attorney working at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to express concern that legislative support was needed for the CIA to continue to use its enhanced interrogation techniques, and that a public information campaign would be required to garner that support. The CIA attorney described the "striking" similarities between the public debate surrounding the McCain amendment and the situation in Israel in 1999, in which the Israeli Supreme Court had "ruled that several... techniques were possibly permissible, but require some form of legislative sanction," and that the Israeli government "ultimately got limited legislative authority for a few specific techniques."¹¹⁵⁵¹¹⁵⁵ The CIA attorney also described the Israeli precedent with regard to the "necessity defense" that had been invoked by CIA attorneys and the Department of Justice in 2001 and 2002. The CIA attorney wrote that the Israeli Supreme Court "also specifically considered the 'ticking time bomb' scenario and said that enhanced techniques could not be pre-approved for such situations, but that if worse came to worse, an officer who engaged in such activities could assert a common-law necessity defense, if he were ever prosecuted." (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTEDl^ubject: Re: McCain^late^December 19, 2005, at 10:18:58 AM.) At the time, the CIA attorney and were the former [Redacted] T C Legal, [Redacted] working in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The OLC, in its July 20,2007, memorandum, included an analysis of the Israeli court case in the context of concluding that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were "clearly authorized and justified by legislative authority" as a result of the Military Commissions Act. See memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by die CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.Show full note The CIA attorney then wrote:

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"Once this became a political reality here, it became incumbent on the Administration to publicly put forth some facts, if it wanted to preserve these powers. Yet, to date, the Administration has refused to put forth any specific examples of significant intelligence it adduced as a result of using any technique that could not reasonably be construed as cruel, inhuman or degrading. Not even any historical stuff from three or four years ago. What conclusions are to be drawn from the utter failure to offer a specific justification: That no such proof exists? That the Administration does not recognize the legitimacy of the political process on this issue? Or, that need to reserve the right to use these techniques really is not important enough to justify the compromise of even historical intelligence?"¹¹⁵⁶¹¹⁵⁶ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Re: McCain; date: December 19,2005, at 10:18:58 AM.

¶As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the Administration sought legislative support to continue the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and chose to do so by publicly disclosing the program in a 2006 speech by President Bush. The speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, included numerous inaccurate representations about the CIA program and the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA's vetting of the speech is detailed in CIA "validation" documents, which include CIA concurrence and citations to records to support specific passages of the speech. For example, the CIA "Validation of Remarks" document includes the following:

"'...questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that has saved innocent lives by helping us to stop new attacks - here in the United States and across the world.''

CIA concurs with this assessment. Information from detainees prevented - among others - the West Coast airliner plot, a plot to blow up an apartment

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building in the United States, a plot to attack various targets in the United Kingdom, and plots against targets in Karachi and the Arabian Gulf. These attacks would undoubtedly have killed thousands."¹¹⁵⁷¹¹⁵⁷ Emphasis in original. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15. As described in the relevant sections of this summary, and more extensively in Volume II, these claims were inaccurate.

¶Multiple iterations of the CIA "validation" documents reflect changes to the speech as it was being prepared. One week before the scheduled speech, a passage in the draft speech made inaccurate claims about the role played by Abu Zubaydah in the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the role of Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the capture of KSM, but did not explicitly connect these claims to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In an August 31, 2006, email exchange, CIA officers proposed the following language for the speech:

"That same year, information from Zubaydah led the CIA to the trail of one of KSM's accomplices, Ramzi bin al Shibh. Information from Zubaydah together with information from Shibh gave the CIA insight into al-Qa'ida's 9/11 attack planning and theimportanceof KSM. With the knowledge that KSM was the 'mastermind,' [Redacted] Pakistani partners planned and mounted an operation that resulted in his eventual capture and detention."¹¹⁵⁸¹¹⁵⁸ Email from: [Redacted] ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] I; subject: Source list for our AZ paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.

¶The August 31, 2006, email exchange included citations to CIA cables to support the proposed passage; however, neither the cables, nor any other CIA records, support the assertions.¹¹⁵⁹¹¹⁵⁹ The cited cables describe Abu Zubaydah's June 2002 description of a meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh (acquired prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah), and Abu Zubaydah's August 2002reportinediscussing the same meeting (after the use of the techniques). (See CIA [Redacted] (101514Z JUN 02); [Redacted] 1 August 2002).) Neither cable—or any other CIA record—indicates a connection between Abu Zubaydah's reporting on his meeting with bin al-Shibh and bin al-Shibh's capture. The cited cables also do not include information, which was available to the CIA prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, highlighting KSM's "importance." The cited cable describes Abu Zubaydah's April 2002 reporting, prior to the use of the CIA's enhancecHnterrogation techniques, identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. (See [Redacted] April 2002).) The citations did not include cables referencing information available to the CIA about KSM that was obtained prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, including information on KSM's alias "Mukhtar" and KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as is detailed elsewhere in this summary. The cables also did not support the claim that information provided by Abu Zubaydah or Ramzi bin al- Shibh led to the capture of KSM. One cited cable related to the identification by Ramzi bin al-Shibh, while bin al- Shibh wasui^oreier^overnment custody, of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali as "Ammar." [The cable was cited as [Redacted] 20700 [Redacted] determined later, the actual cable was [Redacted] 20790.] As described elsewhere in this summary, KSM was not captured as a result of information related to Ammar al-Baluchi. The email exchange listed two cables directly related to the capture of KSM. The first cable, from approximately a week before KSM's capture, described the CIA's operational use and value of the asset who led the CIA to KSM. The cable stated that the relationshir^^^ [Redacted] the asset gained access to KSM, was "based on [Redacted] The cable stated that CIA Headquarters continues to be impressed with the evidence of [the asset's] access to [Redacted] S M [Redacted] associates,[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] (See DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted]) The second cable paragraphs', date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.Show full note

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¶Within a few days, the passage in the draft speech relating to the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM was modified to connect the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The updated draft now credited information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh with "help[ing] in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." The updated draft speech stated:

"Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] was questioned using these [interrogation] procedures, and he soon began to provide information on key al-Qaida operatives - including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks of Nine-Eleven. For example, Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] identified one of KSM's accomplices in the Nine-Eleven attacks - a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh [SHEEB], The information Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed."¹¹⁶⁰¹¹⁶⁰ Pronunciation brackets in original draft. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15.

¶An updated CIA "validation" document concurring with the proposed passage provided a modified list of CIA cables as "sources" to support the passage. Cable citations to Abu Zubaydah's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were removed.¹¹⁶¹¹¹⁶¹ The document cited a cable on Abu Zubaydah's August 2002 description of his meeting with Ramzi bin al- Shibh, but not the previously cited June 2002 cable related to Abu Zubaydah's description of the same meeting, which was provided before Abu Zubaydah was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See [Redacted] [Redacted] Like the previous version, the CIA's updated "validation" document did not cite to any cables demonstrating that information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture of [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh."¹¹⁶²¹¹⁶² The information included in the cable describing Abu Zubaydah's August 2002 reportin on his meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh was unrelated to die capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. (Sec [Redacted]-) The CIA document also cited as a "source" a cable describing the capture of bin al-Shibh with no mention of Abu Zubaydah's reporting. (See [Redacted] The details of Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture are described elsewhere in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study. between KSM and al-Aziz (Ammar al-Baluchi). (See DI Serial Flier CTC 2002-30086CH: CIA analytic report, "Threat Threads: Recent Advances in Understanding 11 September.") Finally, the document included a cable that was unrelated to the content of the speech. See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM).Show full note Similarly, none of the cables cited to support the passage indicated that information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was in foreign government custody when he provided the information cited by the CIA) "helped in the described KSM's capture, stating that it was "based on Ideational information" provided by the asset. (See

¶[Redacted] 41351 [Redacted] Neither of the two cables cited to support the claim made any reference to Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other detainee in CIA or foreign government custody. The capture of KSM, including the role of the asset (referred to herein as "ASSET X") is detailed elsewhere in this summary and in g reatcr detail in the full Com mittee Study. Sec e i n a i l f r o [Redacted] 5 , o : [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] b j e c t : Source our AZ planning and execution of the operation that captured [KSM]."J163 As described elsewhere in this summary, there are no CIA records to support these claims.1164

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¶The CIA documents validating the president's speech addressed other passages that were likewise unsupported by the CIA's cited cables. For example, the speech included an inaccurate claim regarding KSM that had been part of the CIA's representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques since 2003. The speech stated:

"Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these procedures, and he soon provided information that helped us stop another planned attack on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about another al Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody - a terrorist named Majid Khan. KSM revealed that [Majid] Khan had been told to deliver $50,000 to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambali, the leader of al Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate known as 'J-I.' CIA officers confronted Khan with this information. Khan confirmed that the money had been delivered to an operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical description and contact number for this operative. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June of 2003, and he soon provided information that helped lead to the capture of Hambali."¹¹⁶⁵¹¹⁶⁵ Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel. " wi CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15; [Redacted] [Redacted] |13678 [Redacted] (070724Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] Further, the June 2003 cable, DIRECTOR [Redacted] (122120Z JUN 03), cited by the CIA as validation, makes no reference to reporting from KSM. Khan was captured on March 5, 2003 and was in foreign government detention until being transferred to CIA custody on May [Redacted] 2003. See details on the detention and interrogation of Majid Khan in Volume III. IMI 11 III [Redacted] I I mi inn iShow full note

¶As support for this passage, the CIA cited a June 2003 cable describing a CIA interrogation of Majid Khan in which Majid Khan discussed Zubair.1166 The CIA "validation" document did not include cable citations from March 2003 that would have revealed that Majid Khan provided this information while in foreign government custody, prior to the reporting from KSM.1167

¶The CIA document included a previous! cited cable relating to the capture of KSM that made no mention of reporting from CIA detainees. (See [Redacted] 41351 [Redacted] The CIA document also included the previously cited cable describing bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar." As described in the section of this summary, as well as in Volume II, on the Capture of KSM, KSM was not captured as a result of information relatedto Ammar al-Baluchi. (The document cited the cable as [Redacted] 20700, as noted, the actual cite was

¶[Redacted] 20790.) The CIA cable also cited an analytical product whose relevance was limited to the connection

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¶On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered the speech based on the CIA-vetted information.1168 On September 8, 2006, the chief of the [Redacted] Department in CTC, [Redacted] who had participated in the CIA's validation of the speech, distributed the "final validation document" for possible updates or changes. In an email, ur e [Redacted] g d the recipients to "[p]lease look very carefully, as this is going to be a very important document."1169

¶On September 11, 2006, a CIA officer responded, questioning the passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM, as well as the relevance of the CIA cables cited in the validation document to support the passage. The CIA officer questioned whether a CIA cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar" supported the claim that bin al-Shibh's reporting helped lead to the capture of KSM. The officer wrote:

"I presume the information in this cable that supports the statement is Ramzi's admission regarding Ammar?? Did that actually help lead us to KSM?? not sure who did this section, but we may want to double-check this and provide additional cables on how this actually 'assisted us'. This also seems to be a point critics in the press seem to be picking on. I will do some digging on my own as well."1170

¶There are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA officer's comments about the inadequate sourcing were further addressed. As described in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, there are no CIA records to support the passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM.

¶After the speech, press accounts challenging aspects of the speech became the subject of internal discussion amongsomeCIAofficers. On September 7, 2006, the chief of the [Redacted] Department in CTC, [Redacted] sent an email stating: "The NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Defending the passage in the speech asserting that, after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,

¶U(i8

¶On April 29, 2009, Marc Thiessen, the speechwriter responsible for President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech, wrote: "This was the most carefully vetted speech in presidential history - reviewed by all the key players from the individuals who ran the program all the way up to the director of national intelligence, who personally attested to the accuracy of the speech in a memo to the president. And just last week on Fox News, former CIA Director Michael Hayden said he went back and checked with the agency as to the accuracy of that speech and reported: 'We stand by our story.'" See Marc Thiessen, "The West Coast Plot: An 'Inconvenient Truth,'" The National Review £pri^^200^ u

¶® Email [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] subject: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! Please verify the attached; date: September 8, 2006, at 06:28 PM. 1,70

Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T E [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] i subject: Re: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!!

¶Please verify the Attached; date: September 11, 2006, at 9:16:15 AM; attachment N l : CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy Final (Draft #15). The email also identified as unrelated one cable that had been cited as a source and corrected a transposed number of the cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar."

¶[Redacted]

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¶Abu Zubaydah provided information "that helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh," [Redacted] explained:

"...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured; however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that—when added into other information—helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh." j m

¶[Redacted] statement, that Abu Zubaydah provided "information on [bin al-Shibh's] recent activities" that "helped [CIA] track him," was not supported by the cables cited in the CIA's "validation" document, or any other CIA record. [Redacted] email did not address the other representation in the president's speech—that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh.1172

¶The New York Times article also challenged the representation in the speech that Abu Zubaydah "disclosed" that KSM was the "mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias 'Mukhtar,"' and that "[t]his was a vital picce of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM." As the New York Times article noted, the 9/11 Commissioijiad pointed to a cable from August 2001 that identified KSM as "Mukhtar." In her email, [Redacted] acknowledged the August 2001 report identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and provided additional information on the drafting of the speech:

"[0]n 28 August, 2001, in fact, [CIA's] [Redacted] [database] does show a report from [a source] stating that Mohammad Rahim's brother Zadran told him that KSM was now being called 'Mukhtar.' Moreover, we were suspicious that KSM might have been behind 9/11 as early as 12 Sept 2001, and we had some reporting indicating he was the mastermind. We explained this latter fact to the White House, although the 28 August report escaped our notice." 1173

¶from: [Redacted] to [Redacted] , [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [ R E D A C T [Redacted] [Redacted] E D A C r E D ] , [REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, 2006. A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8, 2006) in the New York Times, by Mark Mazzetti, entitled, "Questions Raised About Bush's Primary Claims of Secret Detention System" included comments by CIA officials defending the assertions in the President's speech. The article stated: "Mr. Bush described the interrogation techniques used on the C.I.A. prisoners as having been 'safe, lawful and effective,' and he asserted that torture had not been used. .. .Mr. Bush also said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin al- Shibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh's role in the attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah's capture." 1,72

¶There are no CIA records to support these claims. See the section of this summary on the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, as well as a more detailed account in Volume II.

¶from: [Redacted] to [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [ R E D A C T [Redacted] B [Redacted] E D A C T E D ] , [REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, 2006. There are no CIA records indicating what was "explained" to the White House. The CIA validation document provided officially concurred w"' " " " " idation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Di [Redacted] commission, with 20-20 hindsight, thinks we should have known this in August 2001 does not alter the fact that we didn't."¹¹⁷⁴¹¹⁷⁴ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Email from: [Redacted] t 0 1 [Redacted] Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [ R E D A C T [Redacted] H [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, 2006.

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¶[Redacted] [Redacted]

¶I n addition to the New York Times article, the CIA was concerned about an article by Ron Suskind in Time Magazine that also challenged the assertions in the speech about the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM.¹¹⁷⁵¹¹⁷⁵ The Unofficial Story of the al-Qaeda 14; Their torture by the CLA was wrong - in more ways than you might think, Ron Suskind, Time, 18 September 2006. In a September 11, 2006, email, the chief of the [Redacted] Department in CTC, [Redacted] wrote: "[wje are not claiming [Abu Zubaydah] provided exact locational information, merely that he provided us with information that helped in our targeting efforts." [Redacted] email did not address the representations in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh and that the information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture" of bin al-Shibh. With regard to the capture of KSM, [Redacted] s email acknowledged that Suskind's assertion that "the key was a cooperative source" was "correct as far as it goes, but the priority with which we pursued KSM changed once AZ conclusively identified him as the mastermind of 9/11." 1]76 [Redacted] email did not address the representation in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah, along with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, "helped in ttanalanmng and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." [Redacted] s statements about the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM are not supported by CIA records.¹¹⁷⁷¹¹⁷⁷ See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM). In 2007, CIA officers also questioned the passage in the President's September 6, 2006, speech concerning the disruption of plotting against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting for additional information.Show full note

¶The president's September 6, 2006, speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, was the first detailed, formal public representation about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.¹¹⁷⁸¹¹⁷⁸ President Bush made other public statements that relied on inaccurate information provided by the CIA. For example, as described elsewhere in this summary, on March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed legislation that would have limited interrogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. The President's veto message to the House of Representatives stated that "[t]he CIA's ability to conduct a separate and specialized inteirogation program for terrorists who possess the most critical information in the war on terror has helped the United States prevent a number of attacks, including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the Library Tower in Los Angeles and into Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London." (Sec message to the House of Representatives, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). The President also explained his veto in his weekly radio address, in which he referenced the "Library Tower," also known as the "Second Wave" plot, and the Heathrow plot, while representing that the CIA program "helped us stop a plot to strike a U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi..." (See President's Radio Address, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed in this summary, and described more fully h i V o l u m e l l ^ I ^ r e p r e s e r ^ the role of the CIA's llll I I III I [Redacted] I l l l l Mill I enhanced interrogation techniques with regard to the Second Wave, Heathrow, Djibouti and Karachi plots were inaccurate.Show full note The inaccurate representations in the speech have been repeated in numerous articles, books, and broadcasts. The speech was also relied upon by the OLC in its July 20, 2007, memorandum on the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically to support the premise that the use of the techniques was effective in "producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence."" 79

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