D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific CIA Detainees

¶While the CIA made numerous general representations about the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA representations on specific detainees focused almost exclusively on two CIA detainees, Abu Zubaydah, detained on March 28, 2002, and KSM, detained on March 1, 2003.¹¹⁸⁰¹¹⁸⁰ See Volume II for additional information on CIA representations.

¶/. Abu Zubaydah

¶As described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA provided significant information to policymakers and the Department of Justice on the CIA's decision to use the newly developed CIA "enhanced interrogation techniques" on Abu Zubaydah and the effects of doing so. These representations were provided by the CIA to the CIA OIG,¹¹⁸¹¹¹⁸¹ Among other documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Int *' ' '•' the White House,¹¹⁸²¹¹⁸² Among otlier documents, see Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003." Memorandum prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides entitled,"CIA Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; and Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." ____Show full note the Department of Justice,¹¹⁸³¹¹⁸³ Among otlier documents, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. Congress,¹¹⁸⁴¹¹⁸⁴ Among other documents, see CIA classified statement for the record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." Director Hayden stated: "Now in June [2002], after about four months of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and he shut down. He would not talk at all to the FBI interrogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value."Show full note and the American public.¹¹⁸⁵¹¹⁸⁵ p o r example, see CIA "Questions and Proposed Answers" 9/2/2006, Tab 2 of CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, September 6,2006. ^^^ The representations include that: (1) Abu Zubaydah told the CIA he believed "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary";¹¹⁸⁶¹¹⁸⁶ [Redacted] See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." (2) Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with U.S. government personnel using traditional interrogation techniques;¹¹⁸⁷¹¹⁸⁷ Sec, for example, ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information diat he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel.Show full note (3) Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in critical information on terrorist operatives and plotting;¹¹⁸⁸¹¹⁸⁸ As detailed in DIRECTOR [Redacted] (031357Z AUG 02). See also Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated August 1, 2002, and entitled "Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative," which states: "The interrogation team is certain [Abu Zubaydah] has additional information that he refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is withholding information regarding terrorist networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the United States or against our interests overseas."Show full note and (4) the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in eliciting critical intelligence from Abu Zubaydah.¹¹⁸⁹¹¹⁸⁹ Among other documents, see Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program," September 6, 2006; and CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterroris" T ' "" These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.

205

¶The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah "expressed [his] belief that the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals" is not supported by CIA records.¹¹⁹⁰¹¹⁹⁰ See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." On August 30, 2006, a CIA officer from the CIA's al-Qa'ida Plans and Organization Group wrote: "we have no records that 'he declared that America was weak, and lacking in resilience and that our society did not have the will to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals.'"¹¹⁹¹¹¹⁹¹ from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] subject: "Suggested language change for AZ"; date: August 30, 2006, at 06:32 PM. In a CIA Sametime communication that same day, a CIA ALEC Station officer wrote, "I can find no reference to AZ being deifant [sic] and declaring America weak... in fact everything I have read indicated he used a non deifiant [sic] resistance strategy." In response, the chief of the [Redacted] [Redacted] Department in CTC, [Redacted]

206

¶[Redacted] wrote: "I've certainly heard that said of AZ for years, but don't know why...." The C I ^ A O i ^ S t a t i o n officer replied, "probably a combo of [deputy chief of ALEC Station, [Redacted] and l [Redacted] . . I'll at that." The chief the [Redacted] Department completed the exchange, writing "yes, believe so... and agree, we shall pass over in silence."¹¹⁹²¹¹⁹² Sametime communication, [Redacted] a n d [Redacted] 30/Aug/06 13:15:23 to 19:31:47.

¶The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with debriefers using traditional interrogation techniques is also not supported by CIA records.119-1 In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled [Redacted] "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attendtopcrsonal matters [Redacted] " as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu Zubaydah [Redacted] with officers from CIA Headquarters.¹¹⁹⁴¹¹⁹⁴ [Redacted] 10424 (070814Z JUN 02) As a result, Abu Zubaydah spent much of June 2002, and all of July 2002,47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques, including the waterboard.¹¹⁹⁵¹¹⁹⁵ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, to include CIA email [REDACTED] dated March 28, 2007, 04:42 PM, with the subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today." Prior to this isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.¹¹⁹⁶¹¹⁹⁶ See reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated March 2005. The same information was included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." Abu Zubaydah provided the same type of information prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.¹¹⁹⁷¹¹⁹⁷ See reporting charts in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume 111. 11ii ii iii i [Redacted] Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States—and operatives in the United States—provided the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to become "compliant" and reveal the information that CIA Headquarters believed he was withholding. The CIA further stated that Abu Zubaydah could stop the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, like the waterboard, by providing the names of operatives in the United States or information to stop the next attack.¹¹⁹⁸¹¹⁹⁸ See [Redacted] 10586 (04.1559Z AUG 02), which states: "In truth, [Zubaydah] can halt the proceedings at any time by providing truthful revelations on the threat which may save countless lives." At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type of information.¹¹⁹⁹¹¹⁹⁹ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume i n .

207

¶The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in new information on operatives in the United States and terrorist plotting is also incongruent with CIA records. While Abu Zubaydah was in isolation in July 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice and White House officials that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed Abu Zubaydah possessed information on terrorist threats to, and al-Qa'ida operatives in, the United States.¹²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰ As detailed in DIRECTOR [Redacted] (031357Z AUG 02). The CIA further represented: (1) that the enhanced interrogation phase of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation would likely last "no more than several days but could last up to thirty days," (2) "that the use of the [enhanced interrogation techniques] would be on an as-needed basis and that not all of these techniques will necessarily be used," (3) that the CIA expected "these techniques to be used in some sort of escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard, though not necessarily ending with this technique," (4) "that although some of these techniques may be used more than once, that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions," and (5) "that steps will be taken to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these methods." See the Abu Zubaydah detainee review for detailed information for how these statements proved almost entirely inaccurate. See also Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative.Show full note The CIA officials further represented that the interrogation team had concluded that the use of more aggressive methods "is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the critical information needed to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women, and children within the United States and abroad," and warned "countless more Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows."¹²⁰¹¹²⁰¹ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (031357Z AUG 02) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ However, according to CIA cables, the interrogation team at the detention site had not determined that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Abu Zubaydah to provide such threat information. Rather, the interrogation team wrote "[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided."¹²⁰²¹²⁰² [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [Redacted] subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: July 23, 2002, at 07:56:49 PM; [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02). Additional assessments by the interrogation team that Abu Zubaydah was not withholding information axe described in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume 111.

¶The CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in producing critical threat information on terrorists and terrorist plotting against the United States is also not supported by CIA records. Abu Zubaydah did not provide the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and approved—information on the next attack and operatives in the United States.¹²⁰³¹²⁰³ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. Participants in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah also wrote that Abu Zubaydah "probably reached the point of cooperation even prior to the August institution of 'enhanced' measures - a development missed because of the narrow focus of the questioning. In any event there was no evidence that the waterboard produced time-perishable information which otherwise would have been unobtainable." See CIA Summary and Reflections of [Redacted] Services on OMS participation in the RDI program.Show full note According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics."¹²⁰⁴¹²⁰⁴ CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated March 2005. See also "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." This type of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.¹²⁰⁵¹²⁰⁵ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005; as well as "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide information on al-Qa'ida cells in the United States or operational plans for terrorist attacks against the United States.¹²⁰⁶¹²⁰⁶ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. Further, a quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah's intelligence reporting indicates that more intelligence reports were disseminated from Abu Zubaydah's first two months of interrogation, before the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and when FBI special agents were directly participating, than were derived during the next two-month phase of interrogations, which included the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 24 hours a day for 17 days.¹²⁰⁷¹²⁰⁷ Abu Zubaydah was taken into CIA custody on March [Redacted] 2002, and was shortly thereafter hospitalized until April 15, 2002. Abu Zubaydah returned to DETENTION SITE GREEN on April 15, 2002. During the mondis of April and May 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on life support and unable to speak (Abu Zubaydah communicated primarily with FBI special agents in writing), Abu Zubaydah's interrogations resulted in 95 intelligence reports. In February 2008, the CIA identified the "key intelligence and reporting derived" from Abu Zubaydah. The three items identified by the CIA were all acquired in April and May of 2002 by FBI interrogators. Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation from June 18, 2002, to August 4, 2002, without being asked any questions. After 47 days in isolation, the CIA reinstituted contact with Abu Zubaydah at approximately 11:50 AM on August 4, 2002, when CIA personnel entered the cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his towel, leaving Abu Zubaydah naked. Without asking any questions, CIA personnel made a collar around his neck with a towel and used the collar "to slam him against a concrete wall." Multiple enhanced interrogation techniques were used non-stop until 6:30 PM, when Abu Zubaydah was strapped to the waterboard and subjected to the waterboard technique "numerous times" between 6:45 PM and 8:52 PM. The "aggressive phase of interrogation" using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques continued for 20 days. (See Abu Zubaydah treatment chronology in Volume III.) During the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah's reporting resulted in 91 intelligence reports, four fewer than the first two months of his CIA detention. (See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.) Specifically, for information on Abu Zubaydah's initial walling, see CIA email dated March 28, 2007, at 04:42 PM, with the subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today," which states that Abu Zubaydah claims "a collar was used to slam him against a concrete wall." The CIA officer wrote, "While we do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at the site at the time confirmed that this did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at die site after the walling on the concrete wall." Regarding the CIA's assessment of the "key intelligence" from Abu Zubaydah, see CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from / ' ™ lammad (KSM)" (includes "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," witli associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.").Show full note Nonetheless, on August 30, 2002, the CIA informed the National Security Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and "producing meaningful results."¹²⁰⁸¹²⁰⁸ On August 30, 2 0 0 2 [Redacted] T C Legal, [Redacted] met with NSC Legal Adviser John Bellinger to discuss Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. (See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser, 30 August 2002; date: September 3, 2002; ALEC [Redacted] 052227Z SEP 02.) According to [Redacted] email documenting the meeting, he "noted that we had employed the walling techniques, confinement box, waterboard, along with some of the other methods which also had been approved by the Attorney General," and "reported that while the experts at the site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the recent sessions, it did appear that the current phase was producing meaningful results." (See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser, 30 August 2002; date: September 3,2002.) The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described to Bellinger with respect to either the use of the techniques or the "results" of the interrogation. It is unclear from CIA records whether the CIA ever informed the NSC legal adviser or anyone else at the NSC or the Department of Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about future attacks against the United States or operatives tasked to commit attacks in the U.S., during or after die use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.Show full note Shortly thereafter, however, in October 2002, CIA records indicate that President Bush was informed in a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) that "Abu Zubaydah resisted providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of improving his living conditions." The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.¹²⁰⁹¹²⁰⁹ ALEC [Redacted] (181439Z OCT 02) Subsequently, the CIA represented to other senior policymakers and the Department of Justice that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were successfully used to elicit critical information from Abu Zubaydah.¹²¹⁰¹²¹⁰ These representations were eventually included in the President's September 6, 2006, speech, in which the President stated: "We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking... so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures... Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures, and soon he began to provide information on key al Qaeda operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11"'." These representations were also made to the Committee. On September 6, 2006, Director Hayden testified that, "faced with the techniques and with the prospects of what he did not know was coming, Abu Zubaydah decided that he had carried the burden as far as Allah had required him to carry it and that he could put the burden down and cooperate with his interrogators." (See transcript of briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336).) Director Hayden's Statement for the Record for an April 12, 2007, hearing stated that: "[a]fter the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most important sources of intelligence on al-Qa'ida." See statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).Show full note For example, in a March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum to the Department of Justice, the CIA represented that information obtained from Abu Zubaydah on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and Jose Padilla was acquired only "after applying [enhanced] interrogation techniques."¹²¹¹¹²¹¹ Italics in original document. CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2,2005, from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." This CIA representation was repeated in numerous CIA communications with policymakers and the Department of Justice.¹²¹²¹²¹² Among other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda dated May 30, 2005, and July 20,2007. The July 20, 2007, memorandum - now declassified - states (inaccurately) that: "Interrogations of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two al Qaeda operatives already in the United States and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in Washington, D.C." See Volume II, specifically the section on the "Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot" and die capture of Jose Padilla, for additional details concerning the inaccuracies of this statement. m i ii III i [Redacted] iiiiiiiiiiiShow full note The information provided by the CIA was inaccurate. On the evening of April 20, 2002, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI officers who were using rapport building interrogation techniques.1213

208 209 210

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)

¶As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA provided significant inaccurate information to policymakers on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the interrogation of KSM. These representations were

¶[Redacted] J0091 (210959Z APR 02). Despite requests by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the CIA has never corrected the record on this assertion. On September 8, 2008, the Committee submitted Questions for the Record (QFRs) to the CIA from a hearing on the legal opinions issued by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Because of time constraints, the CIA agreed "to take back several questions from Members that [the CIA was] unable to answer at the hearing." On the topic of the effectiveness of die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the Committee asked "Why was this information [related to Padilla], which was not obtained through the use of EITs, included in the 'Effectiveness Memo?'" CIA records provided for thiju^view contain coinpleteckesponses to these Questions for the Record. The CIA's answer to this question was: [Redacted] Legal [Redacted] simply inadvertently reported this wrong. Abu Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by the FBI [Redacted] 10091)." The Committee never received this response, despite numerous requests. Instead, the CIA responded with a letter dated October 17, 2008, stating that the "CIA has responded to numerous written requests for information from SSCI on this topic [the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program]," and that "[w]e are available to provide additional briefings on this issue to Members as necessary." In a letter to CIA Director Michael Hayden, Chairman Rockefeller wrote, "[t]he CIA's refusal to respond to hearing Questions for the Record is unprecedented and is simply unacceptable." Senator Feinstein wrote a separate letter to CIA Director Michael Hayden stating, "I want you to know that 1 found the October 17, 2008 reply., .appalling." The CIA did not respond. (See: (1) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for the Record submitted to CIA Director Michael Hayden on September 8, 2008, with a request for a response by October 10,2008 (DTS #2008-3522); (2) CIA document prepared in response to "Questions for the Record" submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 8, 2008; (3) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, dated October 29, 2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217); (4) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, dated October 29,2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217); and (5) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee member, Dianne Feinstein, dated October 30, 2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4235).) In February 2004, a senior CIA officer wrote: "AZ never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information. He claimed every plot/operation he had knowledge of and/or was working on was only preliminary. (Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he never really gave actionable to get them)." See email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T E [Redacted] o h ^ ^ u d ^ r r e d a c t e d ] , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T [Redacted] subject: Please Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004).

¶11 ii 1111 i [Redacted] F f t n N provided by the CIA to the OIG,¹²¹⁴¹²¹⁴ Among other documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. the White House,¹²¹⁵¹²¹⁵ Among other documents, see Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," Memorandum prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program," dated July 29,2003, presented to senior White House officials; Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program," and "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."Show full note the Department of Justice,¹²¹⁶¹²¹⁶ [Redacted] Among other documents, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. the Congress,¹²¹⁷¹²¹⁷ Among other documents, see CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." and the American public.¹²¹⁸¹²¹⁸ See, for example, CIA "Questions and Proposed Answers" (related to the President's speech) 9/2/2006; Tab 2 of CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, September 6, 2006; and speech by President Bush on September 6, 2006. The representations include that: (1) KSM provided little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques;¹²¹⁹¹²¹⁹ CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central I n t e l l i g e n c e , ^ u b i e c t ^ ^ ^ "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] subject: on value techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques." CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs." March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.Show full note (2) the CIA overcame KSM's resistance through the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques;¹²²⁰¹²²⁰ CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,'^jubject^^^^ "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] subject: on techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM; CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs."Show full note (3) the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM;¹²²¹¹²²¹ See, for example, transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). (4) KSM "recanted little of the information" he had provided, and KSM's information was "generally accurate" and "consistent";¹²²²¹²²² "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," authored by [REDACTED], CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB; CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday. 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." 11 ii 11111 [Redacted] i II i IIShow full note (5) KSM made a statement to CIA personnel—"soon, you will know"— indicating an attack was imminent upon his arrest; and (6) KSM believed "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary."¹²²³¹²²³ March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.

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¶While the CIA represented to multiple parties that KSM provided little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA records indicate that KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques within "a few minutes" of first being questioned by CIA interrogators.¹²²⁴¹²²⁴ [Redacted] 9 1 (051400Z MAR 03) This material fact was omitted from CIA representations.

¶The CIA represented that the CIA overcame KSM's resistance to interrogation by using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.¹²²⁵¹²²⁵ CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] anc ' [Redacted] subject: on value techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs."Show full note CIA records do not support this statement. To the contrary, there are multiple CIA records describing the ineffectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in gaining KSM's cooperation. On March 26, 2003, the day after the CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, KSM was described as likely lying and engaged in an effort "to renew a possible resistance stance."¹²²⁶¹²²⁶ [Redacted] 11026 (271034Z MAR 03) On April 2, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding information or lying about terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States.¹²²⁷¹²²⁷ "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), April 3, 2003. During and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA repeatedly expressed concern that KSM was lying and withholding information in the context of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) programs,¹²²⁸¹²²⁸ D I R E C T O [Redacted] (121550Z JUN 03) plotting against U.S. interests in Karachi, Pakistan,¹²²⁹¹²²⁹ ALEC [Redacted] 2 2 0 1 2 Z MAY 03) plotting against Heathrow Airport,¹²³⁰¹²³⁰ [Redacted] [Redacted] Memorandum for: [Redacted] [Redacted] |; subject: Action detainee branch; date: 12 June 2003. Abu Issa al-Britani,¹²³¹¹²³¹ [Redacted] ALEC [Redacted] (210159Z OCT 03); email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16,2003, at 5:25:13 PM. as well as the "Second Wave" plotting against the "tallest building in California," which prompted the CIA's ALEC Station to note in a cable dated April 22, 2003, that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."¹²³²¹²³² ALEC [Redacted] (222153Z APR 03)

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¶The CIA repeatedly represented that the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM.¹²³³¹²³³ See, for example, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (SSCI #2007-3158). This representation is not supported by CIA records. Numerous CIA personnel, including members of KSM's interrogation team, expressed their belief that the waterboard interrogation technique was ineffective on KSM. The on-site medical officer told the inspector general that after three or four days it became apparent that the waterboard was ineffective and that KSM "hated it but knew he could manage."¹²³⁴¹²³⁴ Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15,2003. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ KSM debriefer and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] [Redacted] told the inspector general that KSM "figured out a way to deal with [the waterboard],"¹²³⁵¹²³⁵ b Interview [Redacted] y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ and she relayed in a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM... using the Majid Khan stuff... and theemails^in other words b^onfrontin^KSM with information from other [Redacted] sources.¹²³⁶¹²³⁶ Sametime Communication, [Redacted] a n d [Redacted] R E D A C T E D l . ° 2 / M a y / 0 5 ' 14:51:48 to 15:17:39. The "Majid Khan stuff' refers to confronting KSM with the reporting of Majid Khan, then in foreign government custody. 1237 [Redacted] Legal, [Redacted] told the inspector general that the waterboard "was of limited use on KSM."¹²³⁷¹²³⁷ Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20,2003. A KSM interrogator told the inspector general that KSM had "beat the system,"¹²³⁸¹²³⁸ b Interview of [Redacted] y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22, 2003. and assessed that KSM responded to "creature comforts and sense of importance" and not to "confrontational" approaches.¹²³⁹¹²³⁹ [Redacted] 11715 (201047Z MAY 03) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ The interrogator later wrote in a Sametime communication that KSM and Abu Zubaydah "held back" despite the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, adding "I'm ostracized whenever I suggest those two did not tell us everything. How dare I think KSM was holding back."¹²⁴⁰¹²⁴⁰ Sametime Communication, [Redacted] and [Redacted] A u g / 0 6 , 10:28:38 to 10:58:00. The Sametime also includes die following statement from [Redacted] "I think it's a dangerous message to say we could do almost the same without measures. Begs the question- then why did you use them before?" In April 2003, [Redacted] told the inspector general that the waterboard had "not been very effective on KSM." He also "questioned how the repeated use of the waterboard was categorically different from 'beating the bottom of my feet,' or from torture in general."¹²⁴¹¹²⁴¹ ' Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 11 and 13, 2003.

¶The CIA repeatedly represented that KSM had "recanted little of the information" he had provided, and that KSM's information was "generally accurate" and "consistent."¹²⁴²¹²⁴² "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," was authored by [REDACTED], CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/C1A Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security T e a m T u e s d a y J 3 J a n ^ 11:30 a.m." Illl I I III I [Redacted] I H'l Ml IShow full note This assertion is not supported by CIA records. Throughout the period during which KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided inaccurate information, much of which he would later acknowledge was fabricated and recant. Specifically, KSM's fabrications and recantations covered his activities immediately before his capture,1243 the identity of an individual whom he described as the protector of his children,1244 plotting against a U.S. aircraft carrier, a meeting with Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the location of Hassan Ghul.1245 KSM fabricated significant information, which he would later recant, related to Jaffar al-Tayyar, stating that al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together,1246 linking al- Tayyar to Heathrow Airport plotting1247 and to Majid Khan's plotting,1248 and producing what CIA officials described as an "elaborate tale" linking al-Tayyar to an assassination plot against former President Jimmy Carter.1249 KSM later explained that "he had been forced to lie" about al-Tayyar due to the pressure from CIA interrogators.1250 KSM recanted other information about the Heathrow Airport plotting, including information regarding the targeting,1251 additional operatives, and the tasking of prospective pilots to study at flight schools.1252 KSM provided significant information on Abu Issa al-Britani (Dhiren Barot) that he would later recant, including linking Abu Issa al-Britani to Jaffar al-Tayyar and to the Heathrow Airport plot.1253 Under direct threat of additional waterboarding,1254 KSM told CIA interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts.1255 In June 2003, KSM stated he fabricated the story because he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear."1256 KSM also stated that he tasked Majid Khan with recruiting Muslims in the United States,1257 which he

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[Redacted] 34513 (052246Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 1139 (051956Z APR 03) 34569 (061722Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 1281 (130801Z JUN 04); [Redacted] |5712 [Redacted] [Redacted] from: [Redacted] o n [Redacted] [REDACTED^

¶[REDACTED iect: planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; date [Redacted] [Redacted]

[Redacted] 10751 (102258Z MAR 0 3 ) [Redacted] 10762 (U2020Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 123796 [Redacted] (121932Z AUG 04); [Redacted] 8 7 3 (08163IZ MAR 04); [Redacted] 8 7 3 (081631Z MAR 04);

¶DIRECTOR [Redacted] (101847Z MAY 04); DIRECTOR [Redacted] 0 1 8 4 7 Z M A Y 04) would later recant.¹²⁵⁸¹²⁵⁸ 11255iU0419382^UG 03); [Redacted] disseminated as [Redacted] On May 3, 2003, CIA officers recommended revisiting the information KSM had provided "during earlier stages of his interrogation process," noting that "he has told us that he said some things during this phase to get the enhanced measures to stop, therefore some of this information may be suspect."¹²⁵⁹¹²⁵⁹ [Redacted] 11487 (031551Z MAY 03). As detailed in Volumes II and III, KSM's claims that he fabricated information appeared credible to CIA officers. Other intelligence collection supported these claims.

¶[10740 [Redacted] (092308ZMAR03), d i s s e m i n a t e [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 0 7 4 1 (100917Z MAR 03);_ALE[Redacted]120134ZMAR03)

¶[Redacted] 10883 (182127ZMAIU)3),disseminated a [Redacted] [Redacted] 7 (201722Z MAY 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 7 7 8 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted]

110894 (191513Z MAR 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) [Redacted] 10959 (231205Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10950 (222127Z MAR 03) 110902 (201037Z MAR 03); 10959 (231205Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10950 (222127Z MAR [Redacted]11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] 110798 [Redacted] (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 114420| [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] (192314Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 11717 (201222Z MAY [Redacted] (03); 112141 (272231Z JUN

110778 [Redacted] (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 12141 (272231Z JUN 03); 122939 [Redacted] (031541Z JUL 04); [Redacted] 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated [Redacted] asj 110828 [Redacted] (151310Z MAR 03), included as part of disseminated intelligence ( [Redacted] l March 17, 2003, interrogation; [Redacted] 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 1171V (201722Z MAY 03), disseminated as [Redacted] . [Redacted] 10941 ( 2 2 1 5 0 6 Z M A R 0 [Redacted] 10950 (222127Z MAR 03) 110942 (2216I0Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 10948 (222101Z MAR

¶03), disseminated as [Redacted]

[Redacted] 112095 (222049Z JUN 03) 110942 (2216I0Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted]

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¶The CIA also repeatedly referred to a comment made by KSM while he was still in Pakistani custody as indicating that KSM had information on an imminent attack. In reports to the inspector general,¹²⁶⁰¹²⁶⁰ Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorisin Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7I23-IG); date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. the national security advisor,¹²⁶¹¹²⁶¹ CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central I n t e l l i g e n c e , ^ u b j e c t ^ ^ ^ "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] subject: on techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. and the Department of Justice,¹²⁶²¹²⁶² March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. among others, the CIA represented that:

"When asked about future attacks planned against the United States, he coldly replied 'Soon, you will know.' In fact, soon we did know - after we initiated enhanced measures."¹²⁶³¹²⁶³ [Redacted] Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] b j e c t : re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-1G); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. ^^^^^^^Show full note

¶Contrary to CIA representations, CIA records indicate that KSM's comment was interpreted by CIA officers with KSM at the time as meaning that KSM was seeking to use his future cooperation as a "bargaining chip" with more senior CIA officers.¹²⁶⁴¹²⁶⁴ «• [Redacted] 41592 (051050Z MAR 03); [Redacted] m 0 5 1 3 2 9 ^ A R 03)

¶Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM, along with Abu Zubaydah, the statement that "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals."¹²⁶⁵¹²⁶⁵ March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve B r a d b u r y f r o [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Countertenorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Couiiterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. 11ii 11111 [Redacted] 'inn There are no CIA operational or interrogation records to support the representation that KSM or Abu Zubaydah made these statements.

¶1258 [Redacted] 13t 148 (171919Z DEC 05); [Redacted] 31147 (171919Z DEC 05), mi 11 in i [Redacted] imi inn i

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