E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence"

¶The CIA represented that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in the collection of "a high volume of critical intelligence1265 on al- Qa'ida.'" 267 The Committee evaluated the "high volume" of intelligence collected by compiling the total number of sole source and multi-source disseminated intelligence reports from the 119 known CIA detainees.¹²⁶⁸¹²⁶⁸ while CIA multi-source intelligence reports are included in the Committee Study, the quantitative analysis in this summary is based on sole-source intelligence reporting, as these reports best reflect reporting from CIA detainees. Multi-source intelligence reports are reports that contain data from multiple detainees. As described above, a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA detainees at a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able to identify or provide information on the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (202255Z JUN 06), which states that from January 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hambali was "used in the dissemination of three intelligence reports, two of which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay detainees," while the third "detailed [Hambali's] statement that he knew of no threats or plots to attack any world sporting events." Sole-source reports, by contrast, are based on specific information provided by one CIA detainee. [Redacted]Show full note

¶G E S [Redacted] N F ) The CIA informed the Committee that its interrogation program was successful in developing intelligence and suggested that all CIA detainees produced disseminated intelligence reporting. For example, in September 2006, CIA Director Michael Hayden provided the following testimony to the Committee:

Senator Bayh: "I was impressed by your statement about how effective the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information about al-Qa'ida. I think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?"

¶Director Hayden: "Over 8000, sir."

¶Senator Bayh: "And yet this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals."

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¶Director Hayden: "No, sir, 96, aU 96."¹²⁶⁹¹²⁶⁹ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention, Interrogation and Rendition Program, September 6, 2006 (SSCI #2007-1336). At the time this statement was made there had been at least 118 CIA detainees.

¶In April 2007, CIA Director Hayden testified that the CIA's interrogation program existed "for one purpose - intelligence," and that it is "the most successful program being conducted by American intelligence today" for "preventing attacks, disabling al- Qa'ida."¹²⁷⁰¹²⁷⁰ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). At this hearing Director Hayden again suggested that the CIA interrogation program was successful in obtaining intelligence from all CIA detainees.¹²⁷¹¹²⁷¹ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). A transcript of that hearing included the following exchange:

Senator Snowe: "General Hayden. Of the 8000 intelligence reports that were provided, as you said, by 30 of the detainees."

¶Director Hayden: "By all 97, ma'am."¹²⁷²¹²⁷² Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).

¶The suggestion that all CIA detainees provided information that resulted in intelligence reporting is not supported by CIA records. CIA records reveal that 34 percent of the 119 known CIA detainees produced no intelligence reports, and nearly 70 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA records, subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, nearly 20 percent produced no intelligence reports, while 40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. While the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program did produce significant amounts of disseminated intelligence reporting (5,874 sole-source intelligence reports), this reporting was overwhelmingly derived from a small subset of CIA detainees. For example, of the 119 CIA detainees identified in the Study, 89 percent of all disseminated intelligence reporting was derived from 25 CIA detainees. Five CIA detainees produced more than 40 percent of all intelligence reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA records indicate that two of the five detainees were not subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.¹²⁷³¹²⁷³ See detainee intelligence reporting data in Volume TL