Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program · 2014

B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed

B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed

[Redacted] [Redacted] asked CTC officers to compile information on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in preparation for interviews of CIA officers by Tom Brokaw of NBC News.2262 Email from: [Redacted] R E D A C T E D ] , [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T E [Redacted] [ R E D A C T [Redacted] J R E D A C T E [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; c c [Redacted] [Redacted] b j e c T F O R IMMEDIATE COORDINATION: Summary of impact of detainee program; date: April 13, 2005, at 5:21:37 PM. As [Redacted] remarked in a Sametime communication with Deputy CTC Director Philip Mudd, during World War II, the Pentagon had an Office of War Information (OWI), whereas the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), did not. [Redacted] then

2263 noted that "we need an OWI, at least every now and then.. ,." According to Mudd, concerns within the CIA about defending the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in the press were misplaced:2264 As detailed in this summary, this exchange occurred the day before an anticipated Committee vote on a proposed Committee investigation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. [Redacted]

"maybe people should know we're trying to sell their program, if they complain, they should know that we're trying to protect our capability to continue, we're not just out there to brag... they don't realize that we have few options here, we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media, congress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes

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up our budget, we need to make sure the impression of what we do is positive... we must be more aggressive out there, we either put out our story or we get eaten, there is no middle ground."2265 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and [Redacted] , April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 19:56:05.

Mudd counseled not to "advertise" the discussions between CIA personnel and the media with the CIA "workforce," because "they'd misread it."2266 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and | j , April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 19:56:05. After

[Redacted] promised to keep the media outreach "real close hold," Mudd wrote:

"most of them [CIA personnel] do not know that when the w post/ny times quotes 'senior intel official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa."2267 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and [Redacted] April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to [Redacted] 19:56:05. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

[Redacted] [Redacted] sent a draft compilation of plot disruptions to [Redacted] [Redacted] T C Legal to determine whether the release of the information would pose any "legal problems."2268 [Redacted] [Redacted] Email from: Chief of Operations. ALEC Station: to: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at 6:46:59 PM; e m a i l & [Redacted] E t [Redacted] c i J [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] E D A C T E D ] [Redacted] J [Redacted] [REDAcrrr] 1 [Redacted] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 J 1 1 1 1 1 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 11111 ( Z [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [ R E D A C T E [Redacted] subject|ReJ3rokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at 6:50:28 PM; email from: [Redacted] o : [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted], cc: John A. Rizzo, [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13,2005,7:24:50 PM. According to CIA attorneys, information on Issa al-Britani posed no problems because it was sourced to the 9/11 Commission. They also determined that information about Iyman Faris and Sajid Badat that was sourced to press stories posed no legal problems because Faris had already pled guilty and Badat was not being prosecuted in the United States.2269 Email f r o r [Redacted] c [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. On April 15, 2005, a CIA officer expressed concerns in an email to several CIA attorneys about the CIA releasing classified information to the media. There are no CIA records indicating a response to the CIA officer's email.2270 E m a i l from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] cc: [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [ R E D A C T E D [Redacted] [Redacted] b j e c t : Re: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 14,2005, at 8:08:00 AM. m i i i III i ' [Redacted] iniiiiiiii

That day, April 15, 2005, the National Security Council Principals Committee discussed a public campaign for the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. After the meeting, ALEC Station personnel informed [Redacted] T C Legal that scheduled interviews with NBC News of Director Porter Goss and Deputy CTC Director Philip Mudd should not proceed so that "we don't get a head [sic] of ourselves...."2271 Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 15, 2005, at 1:00:59 PM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[w]ith regard to information related to covert action, authorization [to disclose information to the media] rests with the White House." CIA records made available to the Committee, however, do not indicate White House approval for the subsequent media disclosures. In the summer of 2013, the Committee requested the CIA provide any such records should they exist. No records were identified by the CIA. On June 24, 2005, however, Dateline NBC aired a program that included on-the-record quotes from Goss and Mudd, as well as quotes from "top American intelligence officials."2272 See "The Long War; World View of War on Terror," Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005. In April 2005, Mudd stated that the program would likely be aired in June. See email from: John P. Mudd; to: [Redacted] subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 18,2005, at 08:31 AM. The program and Dateline NBC's associated online articles included classified information about the capture and interrogation of CIA detainees and quoted "senior U.S. intelligence analysts" stating that intelligence obtained from CIA interrogations "approaches or surpasses any other intelligence on the subject of al-Qaida and the construction of the network."2273 "Th e frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005. The Dateline NBC articles stated that "Al-Qaida leaders suddenly found themselves bundled onto a CIA Gulfstream V or Boeing 737 jet headed for long months of interrogation," and indicated that Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi were "picked up and bundled off to interrogation centers." The articles also stated that the capture of bin al-Shibh led to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin Attash.2274 frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005; "Al-Qaida finds safe haven in Iran," Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005. Notwithstanding this content, the CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[a] review of the NBC broadcast, cited by the Study, shows that it contained no public disclosures of classified CIA information; indeed, the RDI program wax not discussed" (emphasis in the original). In addition to the information described above included in the online articles associated with the broadcast, the broadcast itself described the role of a CIA asset in the capture of KSM and the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi in "joint US/Pakistani actions" ("The Long War; World View of War on Terror," Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005). This information was inaccurate.2275 As described elsewhere in this summary and in more detail in the full Committee Study, the captures of KSM and Khallad bin Attash were unrelated to the capture and interrogation of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. nil Mill [Redacted] 1111 I»111 I Going Public Draft Talking Points-Comments Due to [Redacted] e b y C O B TODAY. Thanks.; date: April 20, 2005, at 5:58:47 PM. There are no CIA records to indicate that there was any investigation or crimes report submitted in connection with the Dateline NBC program and its associated reporting.

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C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the CIA

A f t e r t h e AP™' '5, 2005, National Security Council Principals Committee meeting, the CIA drafted an extensive document describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program for an anticipated media campaign. CIA attorneys, discussing aspects of the campaign involving off-the-record disclosures, cautioned against attributing the information to the CIA itself. One senior attorney stated that the proposed press briefing was "minimally acceptable, but only if not attributed to a CIA official." The CIA attorney continued: "This should be attributed to an 'official knowledgeable' about the program (or some similar obfuscation), but should not be attributed to a CIA or intelligence official." Referring to CIA efforts to deny Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for previously acknowledged information, the attorney noted that, "[o]ur Glomar figleaf is getting pretty thin."2276 Another CIA attorney noted that the draft "makes the [legal] declaration 1 just wrote about the secrecy of the interrogation program a work of fiction. ..."2277 [Redacted] See email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] c c : [REDACTED], | [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Interrogation Program-Going Public Draft Talking Points—Comments Due to [Redacted] e by COB TODAY. Thanks.; date: April 21,2005, at 07:24 AM. [Redacted] was referring to the assault case against David Passaro. The Committee Study does not include an analysis of the accuracy of declarations to U.S. courts by senior CIA officials. [Redacted] T C Legal urged that CIA leadership needed to "confront the inconsistency" between CIA court declarations "about how critical it is to keep this information secret" and the CIA "planning to reveal darn near the entire program.' '.2278

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