Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program · 2014
D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah
D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah
¶In late 2005, the CIA decided to cooperate again with Douglas Jehl of the New York Times, despite his intention to publish information about the program. A CIA officer wrote about Jehl's proposed article, which was largely about the CIA's detention and interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, "[t]his is not necessarily an unflattering story."2279 Email from: [Redacted] to [Redacted] John A. Rizzo, [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], Robert L. Grenier; subject: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 2005, at 02:04 PM. Jehl, who provided the CIA with a detailed outline of his proposed story, informed the CIA that he would emphasize that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques worked, that they were approved through an inter-agency process, and that the CIA went to great lengths to ensure that the interrogation program was authorized by the White House and the Department of Justice.2280 g m a j | fVom: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] John A. Rizzo, [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], Robert L. Grenier; subject: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs, date: December 15, 2005, at 02:04 PM. CIA records indicate that the CIA decided not to dissuade Jehl from describing the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques because, as [Redacted] T C Legal [Redacted] o t e d , "[t]he EITs have already been out tfiere."2281 Email f r [Redacted] : [REDACTED], [REDACTED]J [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] subject: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 2005, at 02:10 PM. Another CIA officer added "I don't like so much talk about EIT's, but that particular horse has long left the barn...." See email from: [Redacted] : [Redacted] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T E D [Redacted] [ R E D A C T E [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Re: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 2005, at 03:03 PM. 11ii 11111 [Redacted] m m The CIA's chief of A L E C S t a t i o [Redacted]
[Redacted], who wondered whether cooperation with Jehl would be "undercutting our complaint [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Programagainst those leakers," nonetheless suggested informing Jehl of other examples of CIA "detainee exploitation success."2282 Email from: [Redacted]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: Re: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 2005, at 8:50:36 PM.
406¶While the New York Times did not publish Jehl's story, on September 7, 2006, the day after President Bush publicly acknowledged the program, David Johnston of the New York Times called the CIA's OPA with a proposed news story about the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In an email with the subject line, "We Can't Let This Go Unanswered," the CIA's director of public affairs in OPA, Mark Mansfield, described Johnston's proposed narrative as "bullshit" and biased toward the FBI, adding that "we need to push back."2283 cc: Paul Email from: Mark Mansfield; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Gimigliano, [Redacted] subject: We Can't Let This Go Unanswered; date: September 7, 2006, at 01:12 PM. While it is unclear if Mansfield responded to Johnston's proposed story, Mansfield later wrote in an email that there was "[n]o need to worry."2284 Email from: Mark Mansfield; to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] r R e : re Abu On September 10, 2006, the New York Times published an article by Johnston, entitled, "At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics," that described "sharply contrasting accounts" of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The article cited officials "more closely allied with law enforcement," who stated that Abu Zubaydah "cooperated with F.B.I, interviewers," as well as officials "closely tied to intelligence agencies," who stated that Abu Zubaydah "was lying, and things were going nowhere," and that "[i]t was clear that he had information about an imminent attack and time was of the essence." The article included the frequent CIA representation that, after the use of "tougher tactics," Abu Zubaydah "soon began to provide information on key Al Qaeda operators to help us find and capture those responsible for the 9/11 attacks."2285 Re: Fw: We Can't Let This Go Unanswered; date: September 7, 2006, at 3:14:53 PM. 22 85 i ^ t a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics," New York Times, David Johnston, September 10, 2006. This characterization of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation is incongruent with CIA interrogation records.2286 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III and sections on CIA claims related to the "Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" in this summary and Volume II. CTC stated that the article resulted in questions to the CIA from the country [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] and assessed that "[disclosures of this nature could adversely [have an] impact on future joint CT operations with... [Redacted] partners."2287 C Y 2005 & CY 2006 CTC Media Leaks; September 21, 2006. The document described "the more serious CTC media leaks that occurred in CY 2005 and 2006." There are no indications that the CIA filed a crimes report in connection with the article.2288 Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo urged that his colleagues determine whether OPA cooperated with the aiticle "[b]efore we get DOJ or FBI too cranked up on this." See email from: John A. Rizzo; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] cc: [REDACTEDL [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] : [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] Re: Fw: Request for Crimes Reports on NYT and Time Magazine Leaks on Interrogation Activities [REDACTED]; date: September 12, 2006, at 5:52:10 PM. [Redacted]
¶In early 2007, the CIA cooperated with Ronald Kessler again on another book. According to CIA records, the purpose of the cooperation was to "push back" on Kessler's proposed accounts of intelligence related to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the inteiTOgation of Abu Zubaydah,2289 Sametime communication between [Redacted] [Redacted] , 28/Feb/07 09:51:10 to 19:00:42. which a CIA officer noted "give undue credit to the FBI for CIA accomplishments/'2290 Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: Fact Check on Ron Kessler draft; date: March 13, 2007, at 05:59 PM. After another CIA officer drafted information for passage to Kessler,2291 lo: [Redacted] Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] BBBBBBicc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Fact Check on Ron Kessler draft; date: March 14,2007, at 6:03:45 PM. ^ ^ ^ ^ [Redacted] Legal, [Redacted] o t e , "|o]f course being the lawyer, I would recommend not telling Kessler anything." [Redacted] then wrote that if, "for policy reasons," the CIA decided to cooperate with the author, there was certain information that should not be disclosed. [Redacted] then suggested that "if we are going to do this," the CIA could provide information to Kessler that would "undercut the FBI agents," who [Redacted] stated had
407¶2292 "leaked that they would have gotten everything anyway" from Abu Zubaydah.
¶After Kessler provided a draft of his book to the CIA and met with CIA officers, the CIA's director of public affairs, Mark Mansfield, described what he viewed as the problems in Kessler's narrative. According to Mansfield, Kessler was "vastly overstating the FBI's role in thwarting terrorism and, frankly, giving other USG agencies—including CIA— short shrift." Moreover, "[t]he draft also didn't reflect the enormously valuable intelligence the USG gleaned from CIA's intenogation program" and "had unnamed FBI officers questioning our methods and claiming their own way of eliciting information is much more effective." According to Mansfield, the CIA "made some headway" in its meeting with Kessler and that, as a result of the CIA's intervention, his book would be "more balanced than it would have been."2293 Email from: Mark Mansfield; to: Michael V. Hayden, [Redacted] Stephen R.Kappes J Michael J. Morell, [Redacted] J° se Rodriguez, [Redacted] [Redacted] bcc: [Redacted] subject: Session with Author Ron Kessler; date: March 15, 2007, at 6:54:33 PM.
¶Later, in an email to Mansfield, Kessler provided the "substantive changes" he had made to his draft following his meeting with CIA officials. The changes included the statement that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to "coercive interrogation techniques" after he "stopped cooperating." Kessler's revised text further stated that "the CIA could point to a string of successes and dozens of plots that were rolled up because of coercive interrogation techniques." The statements in the revised text on the "successes" attributable to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were similar to CIA representations to policymakers and were incongment with CIA records.2294 Kessler's changes repeated the representation made in the president's September 6, 2006, speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, that Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh "provided information that would help in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." With regard to the Second Wave plotting, Kessler stated that "[i]f it had not been for coercive interrogation techniques used on Abu Zubaydah, CIA officials suggest, the second wave of attacks might have occurred and KSM could be free and planning more attacks." As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volumes II and III, the thwarting of the Second Wave plotting and the capture of KSM were unrelated to reporting from Abu Zubaydah. Kessler's changes also included statements about the training and expertise of CIA interrogators, the Department of 11 ii 11111 [Redacted] I II I II
408¶[Redacted] officials included the statement that many members of Congress and members of the media "have made careers for themselves by belittling and undercutting the efforts of the heroic men and women who are trying to protect us." Kessler's revised text contended that, "[wjithout winning the war being waged by the media against our own government, we are going to lose the war on terror because the tools that are needed will be taken away by a Congress swayed by a misinformed public and by other countries unwilling to cooperate with the CIA or FBI because they fear mindless exposure by the press." Finally, Kessler's changes, made after his meeting with CIA officers, included the statement that "[t]oo many Americans are intent on demonizing those who are trying to protect us."2295 Email from: Ronald Kessler; to: Mark " ^ " •• <••' * i^ch 16, 2007, at 10:52:05.
¶Justice review of the CIA's interrogation techniques, and congressional oversight of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. For example, Kessler wrote, "[b]efore confronting a terrorist, each interrogator was given 250 hours of specialized training." This statement is incongruent with the history of the CIA program. Email from: Ronald Kessler; to: Mark Mansfield; subject: follow-up; date: March 16, 2007, at 10:52:05.
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