Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program · 2014
CIA Detainees Subjected to EITs Validated CIA Sources
CIA Detainees Subjected to EITs Validated CIA Sources
¶[Redacted] enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to validate CIA sources. The claim was based on one CIA detainee—Janat Gul—contradicting the reporting of one CTA asset.."73 Contrary to the Study's claim, the representations cited by the Study do not assert that enhanced interrogation techniques helped to validate sources. Rather, the representations only make reference to "detainee information" or detainee "reporting." Also contrary to the Study's claim, we found evidence in the documentary record where the CIA representations about Janat Gul also contained additional examples of source validation. Moreover, the three items of information that the Study asserts should have been included in the Janat Gul asset validation representations were not "critical" and their inclusion does not alter the fact that Gul's persistent contradiction of the asset's claims did help the CIA "validate" that particular asset.
541¶The Identification of Bin Ladin's Courier f F [Redacted] ) Tbe Study asserts, "the 'tipoff on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002 did not come from the interrogation of CIA detainees and was obtained prior to any CIA detainee reporting."76 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 389. However, CIA documents show that detainee information served as the "tip-off' and played a significant role in leading CIA analysts to the courier Abu Ahmad al- Kuwaiti. While there was other information in CIA databases about al-Kuwaiti, this information was not recognized as important by analysts until after detainees provided information on him. Specifically, a CIA paper in November 2007 noted that "over twenty mid to high-value detainees have discussed Abu Ahmad's ties to senior al-Qa'ida leaders, including his role in delivering messages from Bin Ladin and his close association with former al-Qa'ida third-in-command Abu Faraj al-Libi."77 CIA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2. The report highlighted specific reporting from two detainees, Hassan Ghul and Ammar al-Baluchi, who both identified Abu Faraj al-Libi's role in communicating to bin Ladin through Abu Ahmad. It was this and similar reporting from other detainees that helped analysts realize Abu Faraj's categorical denials that he even knew anyone named Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, "almost certainly were an attempt to protect Abu Ahmed," thus showing his importance.78 CIA Intelligence Assessment. Al-Qa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,. November 23,2007, p. 2. f F [Redacted] F } The Study also asserts, "the most accurate information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti obtained from a CIA detainee [Hassan Ghul] was provided by a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,"79 SSCI Study, Execudve Summary, December 3, 379. _ We found, however, that Detainees who provided useful and accurate information on Abu Ahmad al- Kuwaiti and bin Ladin had undergone enhanced interrogation prior to providing the information. Specifically, Ammar al-Baluchi, who appears to be the first detainee to mention Abu Ahmad al- Kuwaiti's role as a bin Ladin courier and a possible connection with Abu Faraj al-Libi, provided this information at a CIA black site during a period of enhanced interrogation.80 See CIA, WASHINGTON [Redacted] DC] Ammar al-Baluchi attemt ited to recant his earlier description of Abu Ahmad as a Bin Ladin courier. CIA DIRECTOR [Redacted]
542¶( T - S ^ ^ B H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ g N P ) Additional CIA-fact checking explained that Ghul offered more details about Abu Ahmad's role after being transferred from COBALT and receiving enhanced interrogation. Specifically, the CIA stated:
After undergoing enhanced techniques, Gul stated that Abu Ahmad specifically passed a letter from Bin Ladin to Abu Faraj in late 2003 and that Abu Ahmad had "disappeared" from Karachi, Pakistan in 2002. This information was not only more concrete and less speculati ve, it also corroborated information from Ammar that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was lying when he claimed Abu Ahmad left al-Qa'ida in 2002.81
¶Ghul stated that while he had "no proof," he believed that Abu Faraj was in contact with Abu Ahmad and that Abu Ahmad might act as an intermediary contact between Abu Faraj and Bin Ladin. Ghul said that this belief "made sense" since Abu Ahmad had disappeared and Ghul had heard that Abu Ahmad was in contact with Abu Faraj.82 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 38 (citing CIA, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Months later, Ghul also told his interrogators that he knew Abu Ahmad was close to Bin Ladin, which was another reason he suggested that Abu Ahmad had direct contact with Bin Ladin as one of his couriers.83 CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] The role of other detainees who had undergone enhanced interrogation, but were believed to be untruthful about knowing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, was described by CIA analysts as being very significant in their understanding of the courier as well. CIA documents make clear that when detainees like Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Abu Faraj al- Libi—who had undergone enhanced interrogation and were otherwise cooperative—denied knowing Abu Ahmad Kuwaiti or suggested that he had "retired," it was a clear sign to CIA analysts that these detainees had something to hide, and it further confirmed other detainee information that had tipped them off about the true importance of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.84 CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted] CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, dated September 2012, pp. 9-10 (DTS 2012-3826); CIA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2.
¶Conclusion 6 (CIA Impeded Congressional Oversight)
¶[Redacted] Conclusion 6 states: "[t]he CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program."85 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5. In reality, the overall pattern of engagement with the Congress shows that the CIA attempted to keep the Congress informed of its activities. From 2002 to 2008, the CIA provided more than 35 briefings to SSCI members and staff, more than 30 similar briefings to HPSCI members and staff, and more than 20 congressional notifications.86 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 35. xvni [Redacted] urn ' . i i III i M B B W I ^ B M ^ M 'in I> II A II in i • i Because the Study did not interview the participants in these restricted briefings, it is impossible to document how much information the CIA provided to Committee leadership during those briefings. Often, the Study's own examples contradict the assertion that the CIA tried to avoid its overseers' scrutiny. For example, the Study notes that the CIA reacted to Vice Chairman Rockefeller's suspicion about the agency's honesty by planning a detailed briefing on the Program for him.87 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3, 2014. p. 441.
543¶The Study claims, "[t]he CIA did not brief the Senate Intelligence Committee leadership on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been approved and used."88 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3,2014, p. 5, We found that the CIA provided information to the Committee in hearings, briefings, and notifications beginning shortly after the signing of the Memorandum of Notification (MON) on September 17, 2001. The Study's own review of the CIA's representations to Congress cites CIA healing testimony from November 7, 2001, discussing the uncertainty in the boundaries on interrogation techniques.89 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 437 n.2447. See also SSCI Transcript, Briefing on Covert Action, November 7, 2001, p. S6 (DTS 2002-0611). The Study also cites additional discussions between staff and CIA lawyers in February 2002.90 ee SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 437; Email from: Christopher Ford, SSCI Staff, to: [Redacted] Cleared SSCI staff; subject: Meeting yesterday with CIA lawyers on [Redacted] date: February 26, 2002 (DTS 2002-0925). The Study seems to fault the CIA for not briefing the Committee leadership until after the enhanced interrogation techniques had been approved and used. However, the use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques began during the congressional recess period in August, an important fact that the Study conveniently omitted.91 See CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB Bj. June 27, 2013, p. 36. The CIA briefed HPSCI leadership on September 4, 2002. SSCI leadership received the same briefing on September 27,
¶[Redacted] 2002.92 CIA Study Response. Conclusions (TAB B). June 27,2013, p. 36. efforts by then-Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV, to investigate the program, including by refusing in 2006 to provide requested documents."93 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3,2014, pp. 5-6. However, we determined that the CIA provided access to the documents requested. On January 5, 2006, the Director of National Intelligence's Chief of Staff wrote a letter to Vice Chairman Rockefeller which denied an earlier request for full Committee access to over 100 documents related to the Inspector General's May 2004 Special Review.94 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 442. However, this denial of "full Committee access," did not mean that the documents were not made available to the CIA's congressional overseers. In fact, the Chief of Staffs letter stated, "Consistent with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, the White House has directed that specific information related to aspects of the detention and interrogation program be provided only to the SSCI leadership and staff directors."95 Letter from David Shedd to Andy Johnson, January 5, 2006 (DTS 2006-0373). The letter concluded by advising Vice Chairman Rockefeller that the documents "remain available for review by SSCI leadership and staff directors at any time through arrangements with CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs."96 Letter from David Shedd to Andy Johnson, January 5. 2006 (DTS 2006-0373). [Redacted] , In support of this erroneous conclusion that the CIA impeded congressional oversight, the Study notes that the "CIA restricted access to information about the program from members of the Committee beyond the Chairman and Vice Chairman until September 6, 2006."97 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 6. Although we agree that the full Committee should have been briefed much earlier, the CIA's limitation of access to sensitive covert action information is a longstanding practice codified in Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
544¶[Redacted] The Study notes that the CIA briefed a number of additional Senators who were not on the Select Committee on Intelligence.98 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2014. p. 443. The National Security Act permits the President to provide senators with information about covert action programs at his discretion, without regard to Committee membership. Moreover, providing a briefing to inform key senators working on legislation relevant to the CIA's program is inconsistent with the narrative that the CIA sought to avoid congressional sera tiny.
¶Conclusion 7 (CIA Impeded White House Oversight)
¶Conclusion 7 states, "[t]he CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making."99 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions. December 3. 2014, p. 6. It is important to place this serious allegation within its proper context—the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was conducted as a covert action.100 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3. 2014. p. 11. "On September 17, 2001, six days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action MON to authorize the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to 'undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities."' (emphasis added). Covert action is the sole responsibility of the White House, a principle enshrined in law since the National Security Act of 1947.101 In 1974, the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created the requirement for presidential "Findings" for covert action. The Intelligence Oversight Acts of 1980 and 1988 amended the Finding process, and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991 replaced Hughes-Ryan with the current Finding process. See William Daugherty, Executive Secrets, Covert Action and the Presidency, The University Press of Kentucky 2004 pp. 92-98. The President, working with his National Security Staff, approves and oversees all covert action programs. The congressional intelligence committees also conduct ongoing oversight of all covert actions and receive quarterly covert action briefings. Given this extensive covert action oversight regime, this conclusion seems to imply falsely that the CIA was operating a rogue intelligence operation designed to "impede" the White House. We rejcct this unfounded implication.
¶[Redacted] officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss, briefed the President on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before April 2006. By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques."102 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3,2014, p. 6. [Redacted] We found that the CIA records are contradictory and incomplete regarding when the President was briefed, but President Bush himself says he was briefed in 2002, before any techniques were used.103 See George W. Bush, Decision Points, Broadway Paperbacks. New York, 2010, p. 169.
545¶: . The Study claims that, "[t]he information provided connecting the CIA's detention and interrogation program directly to [the "Dirty Bomb" Plot/Tall Buildings Plot, the Karachi Plots, Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot, and the Identification/Capture of Iyman Faris] was, to a great extent, inaccurate."ltM We found, however, the information provided to the White House attributing the arrests of these terrorists and the thwarting of these plots to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was accurate.105 - See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Cobum, June 20, 2014, The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Talt Buildings Plot cuid the Capture of Jose Padilla, pp. 33-36; The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots, pp. 44-47; The Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots, pp. 47-49; and The Arrest and Prosecution of lyman Faris. pp. 58-60. Conclusion 8 (CIA Impeded National Security Missions of Executive Branch Agencies)
¶Conclusion 8 states, "[t]he CIA's operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies."106 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 7. As noted in the CIA response to the Study, "the National Security Council established the parameters for when and how CIA could engage on the program with other Executive Branch agencies."107 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 11. The CIA was not responsible nor did it have control over the sharing or dissemination of information to other executive branch agencies or members of the Principals Committee itself. That responsibly rested solely with the White House.
¶[Redacted] The Study claims, "[tjhe CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign policy decision-making and diplomatic activities."108 SSCI Study, l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ g ^ ^ t e c e m b e r 3, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] However, the Study does not provide any evidence that the CIA deliberately impeded, obstructed or blocked the State Department from obtaining information about the Program inconsistent with directions from the White House or the National Security Council. CIA officers were in close and constant contact with their State Department counterparts where detention facilities were located and among senior leadership to include the Secretary of State and the OS. Deputy Secretary of State. For example, leading to the establishment of a facility in Countr[Redacted] the Study notes that the chief of station (COS) was coordinating activities with the ambassador. Because the Program was highly compartmented, the ambassador was directed by the National Security Council not to discuss with his immediate superior at headquarters due to the highly compartmented nature of the covert action. Instead, the COS, sent feedback from the ambassador through CIA channels, to the NSC, whereby the Deputy Secretary of State with the knowledge of the Secretary, would discuss any issues or concerns with the ambassador in country.109 While the process was less direct, the security precautions to protect sensitive information did not impede the national security mission of the State Department.
546¶^ ^ V H f f i N The Study also claims, "Mhe CIA denied specific requests from FBI Director Robert Mueller, III, for FBI access to CIA detainees diat the FBI believed was necessary to understand CIA detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. Homeland.'"10 While the FBI's participation in the interrogation of detainees was self-proscribed, the Bureau was still able to submit requirements to the CIA and received reports on interrogations. Recognizing the need for FBI access to detainees, both agencies finalized a memorandum of understanding in the fall of 2003 that detailed how FBI | agents would be provided access to detainees [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] inaccurate and incomplete information about the program, preventing the ODNI from effectively carrying out its statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters."112 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. We do not agree with this assertion. The updated Study treats this assertion differently than it did in the version that was adopted by the Committee during the 112th Congress. In the original Study, the assertion sought to dispute claims regarding the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and disruption of several plots. However, the updated Study drops the direct reference to coercive measures and instead focuses on the Detention and Interrogation Program in general.113 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. The 2006 press release from the Office of Director of National Intelligence114 ODNI Press Release, September 6,2006, "Infonnation on the High Value Terrorist Detainee Proeram.' • SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 4. does not reference the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, but states unequivocally: "The detention of terrorists disrupts—at least temporarily—the plots they were involved in." To assert that the detention and interrogation of terrorists did not yield intelligence of value is simply not credible.
¶Conclusion 5 (CIA Provided Inaccurate Information to the Department of Justice)
¶Conclusion 5 states, "[t]he CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice, impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's detention and Interrogation Program."115 II6 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5. Our analysis of the claims used in support of this conclusion revealed that many were themselves inaccurate or otherwise without merit.
¶[Redacted] . The Study falsely claims that "CIA attorneys stated that 'a novel application of using the necessity defense' could be used 'to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives."'116 We found that the draft CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) legal appendix cited by the report contained a cursory discussion of the necessity defense that did not support the use of such defense in the context of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.117 See CIA Office of General Counsel draft Legal Appendix: Paragraph S-Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers, November 26^2001," pp. 5-6 (CIA, Draft Appendix on Neces^y Defense). This ^ XXII document is attached as Appendix IV to the SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn, June 20, 2014. p. IV-1. Specifically, the claim here altered the meaning of the quoted text in draft legal appendix by separating portions of the text and inserting its own factually misleading text, which was not supported by the legal analysis, to achieve the following result: "CM attorneys stated that a novel application of the necessity defense could be used to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved lives."118 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5 (Erroneous text indicated by italics). Fortunately, this erroneously doctored quotation only appears once in the Study- -in this Conclusion.
547¶[Redacted] Also in support of this conclusion, the Study makes a number of claims related to the accuracy of the information provided by the CIA about Abu Zubaydah to OLC. First, the Study asserts that the OLC "relied on inaccurate CIA representations about Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's 'certain[ty]' that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks."119 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5. We found that the information relied upon by the Study to criticize the CIA's representations about Abu Zubaydah withholding information about planned terrorists attacks neglected to include important statements from within that same intelligence cable, which supported those representations by the CIA. Specifically, the Study cites an email from the CIA's interrogation team that included the sentence: "[ojur assumption is the objective of this operation [the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah] is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided,"120 CIA, [REDACTED^3208, July 23, 2003, p. 3; Email from: CIA staff officer; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] subject: Addendum from GREEN, [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: July 23, 2004, at 07:56:49 PM. See also email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR date: Auuust 8, 21, 2002, at 10:21 PM. However, this carefully chosen text omits critical statements from later in the same cable: "[t]here is information and analysis to indicate that subject has information on terrorist threats to the United States" and "[h]e is an incredibly strong willed individual which is why he has resisted this long."121 CIA, [REDACTED1^3208Jjiily 23, 2003, p. 3: email from: CIA staff officer; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED), [Redacted] subject: Addendum from GREEN, [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: July 23, 2004, at 07:56 PM. See also Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR: date: August 8, 21, 2002, at 10:21 PM. f F [Redacted] F ) Second, the Study asserts the CIA assessment that Abu Zubaydah was the "third or fourth man" in al-Qa'ida was "based on single-source reporting that was recanted prior to the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum."122 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 410 (emphasis added). The CIA was in possession of multiple threads of intelligence supporting Abu Zubaydah's prominent role in al-Qa'ida.123 See CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 32. [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] However, the level of detail that [Redacted] LI.NL | I I M Is pirn U L U L I AI I I K I J IL,ili undermined his later attempts to retract his earlier admissions about his involvement in future terrorist attacks [Redacted]
548¶I and his denials about meeting with Abu Zubaydah.124 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio. and Cobum, June 20, 2014, p. 91. *"CIA^LEC [Redacted] CIA. ALEC [Redacted] Abu [Redacted] accounts differ as to the location of this meeting(s). I2 « SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 410 (emphasis added). 117 CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16, 2006, p. 2 (emphasis added). ). Tliis document is attached as Appendix I to the SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn. June 20. 2014, p. 1-1 128 1 See SSCI Study. Volume III, March 31, 2014, pp. 282-283. 123 CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16 2006, D i (DTS 2006-3254). ' ' ,J0 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 411. 131 See Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to John Helgerson, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, June 18, 2004, Addendum o 2 (DTS 2004-2730). Moreover, Abu Zubaydah himself admitted to at least one meeting with H H which undermines KtoMMiflflM denials about such meetings.125
¶[Redacted] . Third, the Study incredibly claims that "[t]he CIA later concluded that Abu Zubaydah was not a member of al-Qa 'irfa."126 We found that the one document cited by the Study did not support this unbelievable and factually incorrect assertion. Specifically, a text box in this cited intelligence product makes the following assertions:
A common misperception in outside articles is that Khaldan camp was run by al- Qa'ida. Pre-911 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a "senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant," which led to the inference that the Khaldan camp he was administering was tied to Usama Bin Ladin
Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and that Khaldan was not overseen by Bin Ladin's organization.127
¶The Study fails to state that the interrogation of this supposed "non-member" resulted in 766 sole-source disseminated intelligence reports by the Study's own count.128 Ironically, this intelligence product was written based on "information from detainees and captured documents"—including from Abu Zubaydah.129
¶[Redacted] In further support of this conclusion, the Study correctly asserts that "the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques to numerous other CIA detainees without seeking additional formal legal advice from the OLC."'30 However, the CIA appropriately applied the legal principles of the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum to other CIA detainees. Specifically, the fact that the CIA felt comfortable enough with OLC's August 1, 2002, legal opinion to apply the same legal principles to other detainees does not constitute an impediment to DOJ's legal analysis of the Program. In fact, the Attorney General later expressed the view that "the legal principles reflected in DOJ's specific original advice could appropriately be extended to allow use of the same approved techniques (under the same conditions and subject to the same safeguards) to other individuals besides the subject of DOJ's specific original advice."131
549¶The Study asserts that the CIA made inaccurate representations to DOJ that Janat Gul and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani were high-value al Qaeda operatives with knowledge of a pre-election plot against the United States when seeking legal guidance on whether the use of four additional interrogation techniques might violate U.S. law or treaty obligations.132 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary. December 3, 2014. pp. 416-418. Contrary to the Study's claim, the CIA believed the representations to be true at the time it made them to the OLC. The CIA did not learn that some of these representations had been fabricated by a sensitive CIA source until months after OLC had approved the use of enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani. Also, the Study claims that "the threat of a terrorist attack to precede the November 2004 U.S. election was found to be based on a CIA source whose information was questioned by scniO|^^TCofficialsat the time. The same CIA source admitted to fabricating the information in after [Redacted] [Redacted] 0 c t o b e r 2004."133 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 417. However, the email relied upon by the Study does not support the proposition that senior CTC officials questioned the veracity of the sensitive CIA source. While the source did admit to fabricating information about a meeting that never occurred, the Study does not acknowledge that the Chief of Base believed (hat the source was generaU^njthW^bouU^ on the pre-election threat, despite the source's
¶[Redacted]on that issue.
¶[Redacted] The Study also repeats its other claims that the CIA's "representations of 'effectiveness' were almost entirely inaccurate and mirrored other inaccurate information provided to the White House, Congress, and the CIA inspector general."134 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 426. Based upon our examination of the "effectiveness" case studies, we assess that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, to include the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, was effective and yielded valuable intelligence. The Study's exaggerated and absolute claims about inaccurate "effectiveness" representations by the CIA have been largely discredited by these minority views and the CIA's June 27, 2013, response to the Study. For the most part, we found that the CIA acknowledged those representations that were made in error or could have benefited from the inclusion of additional clarification.
¶Conclusion 9 (CIA Impeded Oversight by CIA Office of Inspector General)
¶Conclusion 9 states, "[t]he CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General."135 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p, 8. However, we found that the Study itself is replete with examples that lead to the opposite conclusion—that the CIA did not significantly impede oversight by the CIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG), The law requires the CIA Inspector General to certify that "the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of his function."136 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(1)(D). Yet, during the timeframe of the Program, the Inspector General certified in every one of its semiannual reports that it had "full and direct access to all CIA information relevant to the performance of its oversight duties."137 See CIA OIG, Semi-Ann toil Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. July-December 2006. p. 5 (DTS 2007-0669); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. January-June 2006, p. 5 (DTS 2006-3195); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director. Central Intelligence Agency. July-December 2005, p. 5 (DTS 2006-0678); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. January- June 2005, p. 5 (DTS 2005-3140); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director of Central Intelligence. January- June 2004, p. 5 (DTS 2004-3307); and CIA OIG. Semi-Annual Report to the Director of Central Intelligence. January-June 2003, p. 5 (DTS 2003-3327); CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, pp. 4-6; and 10; and CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, pp 7-9 The law also requires the Inspector General to immediately report to the congressional intelligence committees if the Inspector General is "unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection or audit "138 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(3)(E). Again, we are not aware of any such report being made to the SSCI during the relevant time period. We do know, however, that John Helgerson, the CIA Inspector General, testified before SSCI prior to the commencement of the SSCl's review of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program in February 2007 and did not complain of access to Agency information.139 See SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Rendition Program. February 14 2007 p 24 (DTS 2007-1337). Instead, he said that, during 2006, the IG took a comprehensive look at the operations of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and conducted a separate comprehensive audit of detention facilities. General Helgerson also testified,
550[W]e look carefully at all cases of alleged abuse of detainees. The first paper of this kind that came to the Committee was in October 2003, not long after these programs had begun, when we looked at allegations of unauthorized interrogation techniques used at one of our facilities. It proved that indeed unauthorized techniques had been used. I'm happy to say that the processes worked properly. An Accountability Board was held. The individuals were in fact disciplined. The system worked as it should.
On this subject, Mr. Chairman, I cannot but underscore that we also look at a fair number of cases where, at the end of the day, we find that we cannot find that there was substance to the allegation that came to our attention. We, of course, make careful record of these investigations because we think it important that you and others know that we investigate all allegations, some of which are borne out, some of which are not.140 SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Rendition Program, February 14, 2007, p. 25 (DTS 2007-1337).
¶Another possible indicator of impeded oversight would be evidence that the CIA OIG was blocked from conducting or completing its desired reviews of the Program. The Study itself acknowledges the existence of at least 29 OIG investigations on detainee-related issues, including 23 that were open or had been completed in 2005.141 SSCI Study, Volume 1, April 1, 2014, p. 899 n.6257. The CIA asserts that the "OIG conducted nearly 60 investigations" related lo the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and that the OIG found the initial allegations in 50 of these investigations to be unsubstantiated or did not make findings warranting an accountability review. Of the remaining 10 investigations, one resulted in a felony conviction, one resulted in the termination of a We would also expect to see indications in completed OIG reports that the investigation was hampered by limited access to documents, personnel, or site locations necessary for completing such investigations. Again, according to the OIG's own reports, we found evidence that the OIG had extensive access to documents, personnel, and locations. For example, in ks May 2004 Special Review of the RDI program, the CIA OIG reported that it was provided more than 38,000 pages of documents and conducted more than 100 interviews, including with the DCI, the Deputy Director of the CIA, the Executive Director, the General Counsel, ancUh^eput^irectorofOperations. The OIG made site visits to two interrogation facilities I H H I I ^ H M B H I and reviewed 92 videotapes of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The CIA IG's 2006 Audit is another good example of extensive access to documents, personnel, and locations. During this audit, the OIG not only conducted interviews of current and former officials responsible for CIA-controlled detention facilities, but it also reviewed operational cable traffic in extremely restricted access databases, reports, other Agency documents, policies, standard operating procedures, and guidelines pertaining to the detention program. The OIG also had access to the facilities and officials responsible for managing and operating three detention sites. The OIG was able to review documentation on site, observe detainees through closed-circuit television or one-way mirrors, and the IG even observed the transfer of a detainee aboard a transport aircraft. They even reviewed the medical and operational files maintained on each detainee in those locations.142
551¶Conclusion 10 (The CIA Released Classified Information on EITs to the Media)
¶Conclusion 10 asserts, "ftjhe CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."143 This conclusion insinuates that there was something improper about the manner in which the CIA managed the process by which information about the Detention and Interrogation Program was disclosed to the media. We found the National Security Council Policy Coordinating Committee determined that the CIA would have "the lead" on the "Public Diplomacy issue regarding detainees."144
¶The Study also repeats one of its main faulty claims—that the CIA released inaccurate information about the Program's effectiveness. Our examination of the record revealed that the CIA's disclosures were authorized and that the CIA's representations about the Program were largely accurate. Specifically, we found that the Study's flawed analytical methodology cannot negate the reality that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program set up an effective cycle of events whereby al-Qa'ida terrorists were removed from the battlefield, which had a disruptive effect on their current terrorist activities and often permitted the Intelligence Community to collect additional intelligence, which, in turn, often led back to the contractor and the revocation of his security clearances, and six led to Agency accountability reviews. CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 7. M2
¶"CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification." July 14, 2006, APPENDIX A, page 1-2, DTS 2006-2793. wi
¶.SSCI Study, FimUng^ndConclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. I4 1 E m a i l f r G m :
¶' • [Redacted] : CIA attorney; subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 15, 2005, at 1:00 PM.
552¶capture of more terrorists. We also found, with a few limited exceptions, that the CTA generally did a good job in explaining the Program's accomplishments to policymakers.
CONCLUSION
¶The CIA called the detention program a "crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, aiding intelligence and law enforcement operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots, and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa'ida target."'45 We agree. We have no doubt that the CIA's detention program saved lives and played a vital role in weakening al- Qa' ida while the Program was in operation. When asked about the value of detainee information and whether he missed the intelligence from it, one senior CIA operator [Redacted] [Redacted] told members, "I miss it every day."146 We understand why.
¶^ I g u g e Reporting PirotaHb^he War Against al-Qa'ida, June I, 2005, p. i.
¶[Redacted] [Redacted]'conversation between SSCI members and CIA officers. [Redacted]
553MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN CHAMBLISS, SENATORS BURR, RISCH, COATS, RUBIO, AND COBURN1
¶INTRODUCTION
¶In January 2009, as one of his first official acts, President Obama issued three Executive orders relating to the detention and interrogation of terror suspects, one of which ended the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Detention and Interrogation Program ("the Program" or "the Detention and Interrogation Program"). At the same time, there were ongoing calls from critics of the Program for the appointment of a special committee or independent commission to review the Program and "hold accountable" those involved. Against this backdrop, in March 2009, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("SSCI" or "Committee") decided, by a vote of 14-1, to initiate a Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, hereinafter "the Study," and adopt Terms of Reference.2 SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss andRevote on the Terms of Reference for the Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, March 5, 2009, pp. 10-11 (DTS 2009-1916). While most minority members supported the Study in the hope that a fair, objective, and apolitical look at the Program could put calls for an "aggressive"3 See e.g.. SSCI Transcript. Business Meeting to Discuss the Committee's Investigation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, February 11, 2009, p. 69 (DTS 2009-1420) (description by Majority member of potential commission on this matter). and burdensome Commission to rest and might result in thoughtful and helpful recommendations for detention and interrogation policy going forward, Senator Chambliss was the sole Committee member to vote against the Committee conducting this review.4 SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss and Revote on the Terms of Reference for the Committee's Study of the CIA ' J Detention and Interrogation Program, March 5, 2009, p. 10 (DTS 2009-1916). 1 He believed then, as today, that vital Committee and Intelligence Community resources would be squandered and the Committee's ability to conduct effective intelligence oversight would be jeopardized by looking in the rear-view mirror and debating matters that were, in practice, already settled by Congress, the executive branch, and the Supreme Court.
¶Indeed, by the time the Study began, Congress had passed two separate acts directly related to detention and interrogation issues, specifically the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The executive branch had terminated the CIA's program, ordered the closure of the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, detention facility within one year, directed a review of detention and interrogation policies, and required that—except for the use of authorized, non-coercive interrogation techniques by federal law enforcement agencies—future interrogations be conducted in accordance with the U.S. Army Field Manual on
554¶Interrogation. The Supreme Court had decided Rasul i>. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), which established that detainees were entitled to habeas corpus review and identified certain deficiencies in both the DTA and MCA.
¶Nonetheless, a majority of Committee members agreed to review the Program, and after its inception, the Study proceeded in a bipartisan manner until August 24, 2009, when Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had re-opened a preliminary review into whether federal criminal laws were violated in connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations.5 DOJ, Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees August 24, 2009, p. 1. Once the Attorney General made this announcement, the minority correctly predicted that the criminal investigation would frustrate the Committee's efforts to conduct a thorough and effective review of the Program. Absent a grant of immunity, key CIA witnesses would likely follow the inevitable and understandable advice of counsel and decline to participate in any Committee interviews or hearings. This situation would make it very difficult for the Committee to comply with one of the key requirements in the Terms of Reference adopted for the Study, which specifically called for interviews of witnesses and testimony at hearings.
¶Without interviews, the Study was essentially limited to a cold document review with more questions likely raised than answered. Although in a prior, related review of the destruction of CIA's interrogation video tapes, the Committee had wisely suspended its own review rather than forego interviews or potentially jeopardize a criminal investigation, inexplicably, this precedent was not followed in the case of the Study. When Chairman Feinstein decided to continue the Study despite these impediments to a full and accurate review, then-Vice Chairman Bond informed her that he had directed the minority staff to withdraw from further active participation.
¶On August 30, 2012, Attorney General Holder announced the closure of the criminal investigation into the interrogation of certain detainees in the Detention and Interrogation Program.6 See DOJ, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees, August 30, 2012, p. 1. This provided the Committee a window of opportunity to invite relevant witnesses in for interviews, but that course of action was not pursued.
¶THE STUDY'S FLAWED PROCESS
¶Now, five years later, the minority's prediction has come to pass. With the decision not to conduct interviews, the latest version of the Study is a [[6,682]]-page interpretation of documents that, according to the CIA, has cost the American taxpayer more than 40 million dollars and diverted countless CIA analytic and support resources.7 CIA, Letter from V. Sue Bromley, Associate Deputy Director, November 6, 2012, p. I (DTS 2012-4143). After expending tens of thousands of Committee and CIA staff working hours, this Study does not even offer a single recommendation for improving our intelligence interrogation practices—even though the Terms of Reference expressly contemplated both findings and recommendations.8 See SSCI Review of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (SSCI Study) December 13. 2013 (SSCI Study), Volume 1, pp. 1214-1215. Rather, the Study purports to serve intelligence oversight interests by proffering 20 questionable and inflammatory conclusions attacking the CIA's integrity and credibility in developing and implementing the
555¶Program. To us, this Study appears to be more of an exercise of partisan politics than effective congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community.
¶It is important to understand that the Executive Summary and the Findings and Conclusions which the Committee recently sent to the executive branch for a declassification review are not the same documents that were approved by the Committee during the 112th Congress or even at the April 3,2014, declassification review business meeting. The original Executive Summary had 282 pages; the updated business meeting version had 479 pages; and the updated version transmitted to President Obama had 488 pages. Conversely, the original' Findings and Conclusions shrank down from 95 pages to 31-page updated business meeting version, only to shrink further to the 20-page updated version that was transmitted to the President. The 20 conclusions originally approved by the Committee during the 112th Congress are not the same as the 20 conclusions sent for declassification review. For example, two of the original conclusions—Conclusions 2 and 11—were dropped and two other conclusions- Conclusions 9 and 19—were split in a manner that kept the total number of conclusions at 20. Although some remnants of Conclusions 2 and 11 can still be found in the Study, we believe that these conclusions were properly dropped as headline conclusions. While there have been numerous and repeated calls for the declassification of the Study since it was adopted on December 13, 2012,9 On December 12, 2012, 26 retired generals and admirals urged the Committee to adopt the Study and make it public with as few redactions as possible. In early January 2013, Senators Feinstein, Levin, and McCain criticized the movie Zero Dark Thirty for its portrayal of the decade-long hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, because they believed it suggested that information obtained by torturing al-Qa'ida detainees aided in locating him. On November 26, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit under (he Freedom of Information Act to compel the CIA to release the SSCI Study and the CIA's June 27,2013. response. On December 13, 2013, the Center for Victims of Torture released a statement supporting the release of the Study signed by 58 retired generals and admirals, national security experts, foreign policy experts, and religious leaders. these individuals and groups did not understand that they were calling for the release of a report that was still being re-written more than 15 months after it was first approved by the Committee.
¶Failure to Interview Witnesses
¶Although the Study asserts that it "is the most comprehensive review ever conducted of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,"10 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 9. It would'be more precise-to assert that the SSCI Study is the most comprehensive documentary review ever conducted of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. it began to experience serious problems when the Attorney General decided to re-open the criminal inquiry into the Program in 2009. The Attorney General's decision resulted in the Committee's inability to interview key witnesses during the pendency of that inquiry and led to significant analytical and factual errors in the original and subsequently updated versions of the Study, a point we made in our original minority views and one that was strongly echoed in the CIA response.
556¶In a Washington Post opinion piece published on April 10, 2014, the current and former Chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence admitted that:
Although the committee was not able to conduct new interviews, it had access to and used transcripts from more than 100 interviews conducted by the CIA inspector general and other agency offices while the program was ongoing and shortly after it ended. Many of these transcripts were from interviews of the same people the committee would have talked to, with answers to the same questions that would have been asked. This included top managers, lawyers, counterterrorism personnel, analysts, interrogators and others at the CIA.11 http://www.washingtonpoijl.com/opinions/thc-senate-report-on-the -cias-intetToeation-program-should-be-niade publie/20l4/04/10/eeeb237a-c0c3-l Ie3-bcec-b7 leeI'0e9bc3_story.html.
¶While these statements are true and might lead someone to infer that these interview transcripts may have been adequate substitutes for conducting new interviews of these key personnel, the Study itself appears to reach the opposite conclusion:
There are no indications in CIA records that any of the past reviews attempted to independently validate the intelligence claims related to the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques that were presented by CIA personnel in interviews and documents. As such, no previous review confirmed whether the specific intelligence cited by the CIA was acquired from a CIA detainee during or after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques or if the intelligence acquired was otherwise unknown to the United States government ("otherwise unavailable"), and therefore uniquely valuable.12 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 179.
¶We suppose that this critique is leveled against the CIA IG Special Report, at least in part, because the special report concluded that:
The detention of terrorists has prevented them from engaging in further terrorist activity, and their interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of terrorists, warned of terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world, and supported articles frequently used in the finished intelligence publications for senior policymakers and war fighters. In this regard, there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the effectiveness of EITs, however, is more subjective process and not without some concern.13 CIA, Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. (September 2001 - October 2003), May 7, 2004, p. 85 (DTS 2004-2710) (emphasis added). 29
¶The CIA OIG Special Report also noted that George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), said he believed, "the use of EITs has proven to be extremely valuable in obtaining enormous amounts of critical threat information from detainees who had otherwise believed they were safe from any harm in the hands of Americans."14 CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), May 7.2004, p. 88-89 (DTS 2004-2710).
557¶The Study cannot have it both ways. Either the CIA IG Special Review interview transcripts were adequate substitutes for new interviews or they were not. Conclusion 9 of the Study states that the "CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General."15 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. Specifically, the Study alleges that "[djuring the OIG reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG with inaccurate information on the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."16 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. This conclusion seems to establish that the prior interview transcripts were inadequate substitutes for new interviews. While we do not agree with Conclusion 9, or any of the other conclusions examined in these views, it seems pretty clear that the lack of new interviews has prevented the Committee from conducting the comprehensive review that was envisioned in the original Terms of Reference. Unlike the Study, we are willing to acknowledge that our own analysis in these views was similarly hampered by the inability to interview key personnel who might be able to shed light on any documentary inconsistencies or inaccurate interpretations. Regardless, we remain convinced that the minority's non-partisan decision to withdraw from further active participation in the Study was the correct decision.
¶Insufficient Member Review of the Approved Study
¶Our concerns about the quality of the Study's analysis drove our efforts, before and during the Committee's business meeting on December 13, 2012, to implore the majority to give members sufficient opportunity to review the Study and submit it for review and comment by the Intelligence Community prior to a vote. Unfortunately, members were only given a little over three weeks to review the 2,148 pages released in the last tranche of the draft Study prior to the vote for adoption at the scheduled business meeting. This material provided the first look at the majority's analysis of the effectiveness of the interrogation program and became the core of the report adopted by the Committee, This last tranche contained nearly all of the most consequential analysis and—with the 282-page Executive Summary and the 95 -pages of Findings and Conclusions provided to members for the first time just three days prior to the business meeting—comprised 40 percent of the adopted Study. The day before the December 13, 2012, business meeting, the Committee members received another "final version" of the report that made extensive changes to Study text, including the conclusions.17 See SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Consider the Report on the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, December 13, 2012. p. 25 (DTS 2013-0452). This unreasonably short time-period to review thousands of pages of text essentially precluded the possibility of formulating and offering amendments to the Study—had such an opportunity even been afforded to our Committee members.
558¶Aside from the sheer volume of the material, underlying the request for more time was the fact that almost all of the source material used to write the Study was located 40 minutes from Capitol Hill and thus not readily accessible to members and staff during the busiest month of the 112th Congress, when the Committee was simultaneously working on the Study, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act reauthorization, and its review of the Benghazi attacks. Nevertheless, the Chairman denied the Vice Chairman's request both prior to, and during, the Committee's business meeting for more time to review the draft Study.
¶Insufficient Initial Fact Checking
¶The 2,148-page tranche release, which specifically addressed the intelligence acquired from the Program and the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the Program, also made serious allegations attacking the honesty and integrity of the CIA as an institution and of many of its senior and junior officers. In preparing this part of the Study, the majority selected 20 cases in which they claim the CIA inaccurately described information' acquired from the interrogation program. This is ironic, since we found the Study itself consistently mischaracterized CIA's analysis. In each of these 20 cases, the Study absolutely and categorically dismissed any correlation previously drawn by the CIA between the Detention and Interrogation Program and the capture of terrorists, thwarting of terrorist plots, or the collection of significant intelligence. There is no ambiguity in the Study's indictment: in every one of these cases, the CIA and its officers lied—to Congress, to the White House, to the Department of Justice, and ultimately to the American people.
¶We believe that the serious nature of these original conclusions required, as the Committee has done in the past with reports of such magnitude, submitting the Study to the Intelligence Community for review and comment before the vote. This deviation not only hampered the Committee's efforts to approve a factually accurate report, but it deprived the Intelligence Community of its traditional opportunity to provide important feedback to the Committee prior to the approval of the Study. Moreover, the near absence of any timely interviews of relevant Intelligence Community witnesses during the course of this Study was a warning flag that should have signaled the increased need for initial fact-checking prior to the Study's adoption.
¶The Committee has a long-standing practice of sending reports to the executive branch for review dating back to the Church Committee reports in 1975.18 See Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation. University Press of Kentucky Lexington, 1985, p. 108. More recently, in 2004, the Committee provided the draft report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq to the Intelligence Community for fact-checking. The Committee wanted to ensure that a report of that magnitude, which purported to tell the Intelligence Community why years of analysis on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs was wrong, needed to be unquestionably accurate and not subject to challenge by the Intelligence Community. Only after the Intelligence Community provided its feedback and after the Committee held a hearing with the Director of Central Intelligence to give him the chance to comment on the record, did the Committee vote on the report. Thus, both the Committee and the Intelligence Community had a full and fair opportunity to review and check the report before a vote and before members provided additional or minority views. Also, unlike this Study, the Committee had conducted over 200 interviews with Intelligence Community witnesses who, over the course of a year, provided the investigative staff with information, insight, and clarification that could not be found in the documents alone.
559¶Unfortunately, in spite of a specific request at the December 2012 business meeting to follow these precedents, the majority refused to do so. Adhering to our established precedent for a report of this importance would have sent a clear signal to the entire Intelligence Community that the Committee's primary goal was to provide an accurate accounting of the Detention and Interrogation Program. Had the CIA been allowed to do so, the Study could have been modified, if necessary, or if not, members would at least have had the benefit of understanding the CIA's perspective prior to casting their votes. Yet, because the Committee approved the Study as final, before the Study had been sent to the Intelligence Community for review, the CIA was placed in the unenviable position—not of fact-checking—but of critiquing the Study of its own oversight Committee. In doing so, the Committee significantly undermined and diminished its own credibility.
¶The CIA Response
¶On June 27, 2013, the CIA provided a 130-page response to the original Study approved during the 112th Congress. The CIA also provided a two-page response to our initial minority views.19 We modified these minority views based upon the CIA's input. The purpose of the CIA response was to focus "on the Agency's conduct of the RDI program, in the interest of promoting historical accuracy and identifying lessons learned for the future, with the ultimate goal of improving the Agency's execution of other covert action programs."20 CIA Study Response. Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, p. 1. The CIA noted, however, that a comprehensive review of the Study's almost 6,000 pages was an impossible task given the time allotted. They chose to concentrate their efforts on the Study's 20 conclusions and that part of the Study that assessed the value of the information derived from the CIA's RDI activities. When the CIA was able to review certain portions of the Study in detail, it found that the Study's accuracy "was encumbered as much by the authors' interpretation, selection, and contextualization of the facts as it was by errors in their recitation of the facts, making it difficult to address its flaws with specific technical correction."21 CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, pp. 1-2.
¶Consistent with our own observations, the CIA response found that, while the Study has all the appearances of an authoritative history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and contains an impressive amount of detail, it fails in significant and consequential ways to correctly portray and analyze that detail. The CIA attributed these failures to two basic limitations on the authors: (1) a methodology that relied exclusively on a review of documents with no opportunity to interview participants; and (2) an apparent lack of familiarity with some of the ways the CIA analyzes and uses intelligence.22 CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, p. 2. 29
560¶Unlike the Study, the CIA response actually offered eight specific recommendations for improving future covert actions: (1) improve management's ability to manage risk by submitting more covert action programs to the special review process currently used [Redacted] • • H I (2) better plan covert actions by explicitly addressing at the outset the implications of leaks, an exit strategy, lines of authority, and resources; (3) revamp the way in which CIA assesses the effectiveness of covert actions; (4) ensure that all necessary information is factored into the selection process for officers being considered for the most sensitive assignments; (5) create a mechanism for periodically revalidating Office of Legal Counsel guidance on which the Agency continues to rely; (6) broaden the scope of accountability reviews; (7) improve recordkeeping for interactions with the media; and (8) improve recordkeeping for interactions with Congress.23 CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, pp. 17-18. We believe the CIA should implement these recommendations.
¶The Summer Meetings
¶During the summer and early fall of 2013, SSCI staff spent about sixty hours with CIA personnel who had led and participated in the preparation of the CIA's response to the Study. The purpose of these meetings was to discuss factual discrepancies and areas of disagreement between the SSCI Study and the CIA Study Response. These exchanges would have been much more productive if they had occurred before the Study was approved by the Committee in December 2012.
¶The majority staff did not start these sessions with discussions about the substance of the Study or the CIA's response. Rather, they began by spending an inordinate amount of time questioning the CIA personnel about the process by which the CIA had prepared its response to the Study. Eventually, the discussions turned to more substantive issues. Prior to each session, the majority staff typically determined the order in which the Study conclusions would be discussed. Although the CIA and minority staff expressed repeated interest in discussing some of the more problematic conclusions and underlying "effectiveness" case studies, the majority staff proceeded with discussions of the least controversial portions of the Study.
¶Our staff reported to us that the general tenor of these sessions was "unpleasant." Instead of giving the CIA an opportunity to help improve the Study by explaining the errors and factual inaccuracies identified in their response, the majority staff spent the vast majority of these sessions in "transmit" rather than "receive" mode. When the discussions finally turned to the "effectiveness" case studies, the majority staff spent a significant portion of the remaining time explaining its "methodology" and reading large portions of the report into the record. The CIA initially made arrangements to have certain key analysts participate in these discussions to help the Committee understand the meaning of certain parts of the historical documentary record. Unfortunately, these analysts were often kept waiting outside of the meeting room while the majority staff plowed through its set agenda with the senior CIA personnel. Some of those waiting analysts never received an opportunity to participate. Seeing the writing on the wall, the lead CIA personnel eventually stopped bringing the pertinent analysts along, which did not seem to concern the majority staff. The most problematic case studies were summarily discussed in just a few hours during the very last session.
561¶Given the unproductive manner in which these meetings were conducted, the Committee missed a significant opportunity to improve its Study through a better understanding of the CIA's analytical and operational practices that produced the documentary record upon which the Study was based. We commend the CIA personnel who patiently and professionally participated in these unproductive sessions and thank them for their dedicated service to our Nation.
¶The Clash Over the Panetta Review
¶On January 15, 2014, Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss met with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), John Brennan, at his urgent request. At this meeting, Director Brennan disclosed that the CIA conducted a "search"24 of a CIA computer network used by the Committee. The CIA established this network at a CIA facility in 2009 pursuant to written agreements between the Committee and then-Director Leon Panetta. It is the understanding of thc Committee that the CIA conducted the "Panetta Internal Review" for thc purpose of summarizing for CIA leadership the contents of documents likely to be reviewed by the Committee during its review.
¶Typically, matters such as these are handled discreetly through the accommodation process and would1 involve internal investigations or joint inquiries. These options were not available in this situation. Presently, the Department of Justice, the CIA Inspector General, and the U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms are conducting ongoing investigation into these matters. Nonetheless, for the purpose of these Views, it is worth noting the following observations:
First, Committee majority staff knowingly removed the Panetta Internal Review, a highly classified, privileged CIA document, from a CIA facility without authorization and in clear violation of the existing agreed-upon procedures by the Committee and the CIA.
¶M
¶The 2009 written agreement permitted CIA access to the network for technical support, but at the time of this writing, the forensic details of the CIA "search" are unknown.
562Second, although the Committee certainly needs to understand the facts and circumstances of whether the CIA acted inappropriately when it allegedly "searched" a Committee shared drive on certain CIA computers, this issue is separate and distinct from the earlier incident involving the unauthorized removal of the Panetta Internal Review document from the CIA facility. The subsequent "search" does not excuse or justify the earlier staff behavior or vice versa.
Third, the Panetta Internal Review document that was brought back to Committee spaces was not handled in accordance with Committee protocols. Committee Rule 9.4 states, "Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access to all papers and other material received from any source." It appears that the existence, handling, and the majority's possession of this privileged document were not disclosed to the minority for months, and might never have been revealed but for the public disclosures about the document which led to the January, meeting with Director Brennan.
Finally, given the CIA's repeated assertions of privilege concerning the document since the January meeting with Director Brennan, at no time has a minority member or staff handled the document or reviewed its contents.
¶The Declassification Review Business Meeting
¶The majority's practice of providing insufficient time for member review of the report's contents was repeated just prior to the Committee's April 3, 2014, business meeting to consider whether to send the report to the executive branch for a declassification review. On April 1, 2014, updated versions of the Study's three volume report, totaling 6,178 pages, were made available on a Committee shared drive. The majority staff did not release its third updated versions of the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions until the day before the business meeting. Finally, four days after the business meeting, the Chairman transmitted to President Obama one last revised version of the updated Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions.25 The citations to the updated Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions in these minority views have been revised to match up with the versions that were transmitted to the President. The citations to the updated three- volume report are keyed to the versions that were placed on the Committee's shared drive. _ _ _ 10 iniin ii I IIII ii [Redacted] 1 < M M I
¶THE STUDY'S PROBLEMATIC ANALYSIS
¶As previously discussed, the flawed process used for the approval of the original Study and this updated version resulted in numerous factual errors. These factual errors were further compounded by the Study's numerous analytical' shortfalls, which ultimately led to an unacceptable number of incorrect claims and1 invalid conclusions. This section will generally highlight many of the analytical shortcomings we found in the Study. The next section will then specifically examine some of the Study's most problematic conclusions, including our analysis of the factual premises, claims, and flawed analytical methodology upon which many of these faulty conclusions were based.
563¶When this Committee reviews the Intelligence Community's analytic products, it does so with die expectation of adherence to certain analytic integrity standards.26 In 2004, the SSCI was instrumental in including in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. P.L. 108-458, a provision mandating that the Director of National Intelligence "ensure the most accurate analysis" by implementing policies and procedure "to encourage sound analytic tradecraft." These standards "act as guidelines and goals for analysts and managers throughout the Intelligence Community who strive for excellence in their analytic work practices and products."27 Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 1. Although these specific analytic standards do not technically apply to this Committee's oversight reporting, the aspirational analytical values they represent are applicable to the Committee's analytical expectations for its own oversight work product. The examples offered in this section illustrate some of the Study's general analytic deficiencies concerning objectivity, independence from political considerations, timeliness, the use of all available intelligence sources, and consistency with proper standards of analytic tradecraft. These examples also serve as a useful backdrop for our specific analysis and critique of some of the Study's erroneous conclusions and claims.28 See Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2.
¶Inadequate Context
¶[Redacted] begin, however, with a review of the context in which the CIA Program was initiated and operated. Although there is no specific, Intelligence Community analytic standard addressing context, it is important in any analysis or report to provide appropriate context so that the reader is able to understand why events transpired as they did. The Study does very little to provide such context—it is entirely silent on the surge in terrorist threat reporting that inundated the intelligence Community following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by al-Qa'ida, and it makes no mention of the pervasive, genuine apprehension about a possible second attack on the United States that gripped the CIA in 2002 and 2003. Rather, the Study begins by coldly describing the September 17, 2001, covert action Memorandum of Notification (MON) signed by the President authorizing the CIA to detain "persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities," as if the attacks that had killed nearly 3,000 Americans just six days prior, were incidental to the extraordinary authorities granted under the MON, and all other events described in the Study.29 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3. 2014, p. II. They were not. In our collective view, to depict judgments and decisions arising from the administration of this program as having been made in a vacuum, or somehow in isolation of these events, is both unrealistic and unfair.
¶During our review of the materials provided by the CIA for the Study, we could clearly discern a workforce traumatized by an intelligence failure that had left thousands of Americans dead, but also galvanized by the challenge of working on the frontline to ensure such an attack never occurred again. In the early years of this effort, there were constant threats of new attacks, and endless leads to track down. CIA and other Intelligence Community personnel worked relentlessly, day in and day out, to follow up on every one.
564¶There is no doubt that the CIA P r o g r a m — e x e c u t e d hastily in the aftermath o f the worst terrorist attack in our Nation's history—had flaws. T h e C I A has admitted as m u c h in its June 2 7 , 2 0 1 3 , r e s p o n s e to the Study. H o w e v e r , the Study's c o n c l u s i o n that the use o f enhanced interrogation techniques w a s ineffective d o e s not c o m p o r t with a m a s s i v e documentary record that clearly demonstrates a series of significant counter-terrorism operational s u c c e s s e s . That s a m e documentary record also undercuts the S t u d y ' s f l a w e d c o n c l u s i o n s that the C I A "impeded" c o n g r e s s i o n a l and e x e c u t i v e branch oversight of the Program, as w e l l as the counterterrorism and diplomatic m i s s i o n s o f other federal entities. Our r e v i e w of the record revealed this c o n c l u s i o n — o n e the Study twists itself in knots to avoid—that the CIA Program w a s a vital source o f critical intelligence that led to the detention o f multiple terrorists and helped k e e p A m e r i c a safe.
¶Whether the CIA should operate a clandestine detention program and whether it is in America's interests to interrogate suspected terrorists using m e t h o d s b e y o n d those in the U . S . A r m y Field Manual are valid questions worthy o f serious debate. Unfortunately, the utility of S t u d y ' s c o n s i d e r a b l e work product in such a debate is seriously undermined by its disregard of the Program's historical context and its reliance upon an unrealistic analytical m e t h o d o l o g y , w h i c h appears to h a v e been d e s i g n e d to e x c l u d e from consideration any inconvenient facts not fitting within the S t u d y ' s preconceived v i e w that such enhanced m e t h o d s produced nothing of intelligence value. Although there are a number of findings in the Study with w h i c h w e agree, our o w n r e v i e w o f the documentary record c o m p e l l e d u s to focus our discussion in these minority v i e w s on these inconvenient facts that invalidate m u c h of the revisionist histoiy that is being advocated by many of the Study's findings and c o n c l u s i o n s .
¶Inadequate Objectivity
¶[Redacted] The standard o f objectivity requires that analysts perform their analytic f u n c t i o n s from an unbiased p e r s p e c t i v e — a n a l y s i s "should be free o f e m o t i o n a l content, g i v e due regard to alternative perspectives, and a c k n o w l e d g e d e v e l o p m e n t s that necessitate adjustments to analytic judgments." 3 0
¶[Redacted] . W e w e r e disappointed to find the updated version o f the Study still contains e v i d e n c e of strongly held biases by the authors—a point e m p h a s i z e d by John Brennan prior to his confirmation as the Director of the C I A , w h e n h e told V i c e Chairman C h a m b l i s s that, b a s e d on his reading of the originally approved E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y and the Findings and C o n c l u s i o n s , the Study w a s "not objective" and w a s a "prosecutor's brief," "written with an e y e toward finding problems." W e still agree with Director Brennan's a s s e s s m e n t s . W e a l s o agree with the criticism he relayed from Intelligence C o m m u n i t y officials that it w a s written with a "bent on the part o f the authors" with "political motivations." W e similarly f o u n d these problems, but more importantly, w e found that those biases w e r e not only present, but they resulted in faulty analysis, serious inaccuracies, and misrepresentations of fact in the Study.
565¶m H H V F ) For example, there were instances when detainees told their interrogators that they had provided everything they knew or denied that they were terrorists, and the Study seems to take them at their word. In June 2002, Abu Zubaydah told his interrogators, "What 1 have, I give it a l l . . . I have no more."31 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 113: CIA, [Redacted] 10487, June 18, 2002, p 4 The Study seems to have bought into this lie when it subsequently concluded, "At no time during or after the aggressive interrogation phase did Abu Zubaydah provide the information that the CIA enhanced [interrogations] were premised upon, specifically, 'actionable intelligence about al-Qa'ida operatives in the United States and planned al-Qa'ida lethal attacks against U.S. citizens and U.S. interests.'"32 SSCI Study, Volume I. March 31, 2014. p. 146.
¶In fact, Abu Zubaydah did provide actionable intelligence that helped disrupt planned al-Qa'ida lethal attacks against U.S. citizens and interests following his June 2002 denials of having more information. Although our review of the documentary record revealed that Abu Zubaydah's first period of "aggressive" interrogation actually began on April 15, 2002,33 See infra, p. 34. he certainly provided valuable intelligence after his second period of aggressive interrogation began on August 4, 2002.34 See CIA, [Redacted] 10586, August 4, 2002, pp. 2-5. For example, on August 20, 2002,35 See CIA, Captures Resulting From Detainee information: Four Cttse Studies, November 26, 2003, p. 2; CIA, ALEC [Redacted] g u s t 29, 2002, pp. 2-7. Abu Zubaydah provided information about how he would go about locating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates in Karachi. This information caused [Redacted] k i s t a n i authorities to intensify their efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al-Qa'ida associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002."36 See infra, pp. 38-41. These arrests effectively disrupted a then ongoing plot to bomb certain named hotels in Karachi, Pakistan.37 See infra, pp. 45-47. In April 2002, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) confirmed the hotels plot had been directed against U.S. citizens and interests when he told his interrogators that the hotels had been selected because they were frequented by American and German guests.38 See [REDACTED] 34513, March 5,2003, p. 2.
¶[Redacted] acceptance as factual those CIA documents that support its findings and conclusions, and the dismissal of documents contradictory to its findings and conclusions as being "inaccurate" or "misrepresentations." For example, the Study cites to a finished intelligence product published in 2006 as support for its stunning claim that the "CIA later concluded that Abu Zubaydah was not a member of al-Qa'ida."39 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 410 n.2301. In fact, the product states: "Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and that Khaldan was not overseen by Bin Ladin's organization."40 CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16. 2006, p. 2 (DTS 2006-3254) (emphasis added). ). This document is attached as Appendix I, see infra, p. 1-1. See SSCI Study, Volume III, March 31.2014, pp. 282-283. The Study fails to state that the interrogation of this supposed "non-member" resulted in 766 sole-source disseminated intelligence reports by the Study's own count.41
566¶Ironically, this intelligence product was written based on "information from detainees and captured documents"—including from Abu Zubaydah.42 CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16, 2006, p i (DTS 2006-3254).
¶Another indication of the Study's lack of objectivity is its tendency to state its conclusions in such a manner as to be technically accurate, but factually misleading. For example, in the Executive Summary, the Study authors state,
a review of CIA records found no connection between Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture. CIA records indicate that Ramzi bin al-Shibh wa^aptoedunexpectedly—on September 11, 2002, . when Pakistani authorities, [Redacted] were conducting raids targeting Hassan Ghul in Pakistan."43 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 318.
¶The implication is that none of the information Zubaydah provided pursuant after enhanced interrogation led to al-Shibh's capture. What is ignored here is the exact expression of Zubaydah's role in al-Shibh's apprehension, captured in a CIA internal communication, where it is made clear, "[Zubaydah's] knowledge of al-Qa'ida lower-level facilitators, modus operandi and safehouses, which he shared with us as a result of EITs . . . played a key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh."44 CIA Memo from Pavitt to CIA IG on Draft Special Review, February 27, 2004, pp. 13-14. For a more detailed examination of this issue, see infra, pp. 38-42. Zubaydah's reporting on how to locate terrorists in Pakistan, by trying to find another terrorist, is what led to bin al-Shibh's arrest45 See CIA, ALEC [Redacted] g u s t 29, 2002, pp. 2-3; CIA, ALEC [Redacted] September 11, 2002, p. 2.
¶[Redacted] The Study's uneven treatment of key U.S. officials throughout the report, attacking the credibility and honesty of some, while making little mention of others, also lacked objectivity. For example, former Director George Tenet led the CIA at the outset of the Program, during a period the Study contends was characterized by mismanagement. Tenet authorized the enhanced interrogation techniques, and if the Study is to be believed, headed an organization that withheld information from and misled policymakers in the executive branch and Congress. He is mentioned 62 times in the updated version of the Study's Executive Summary. By comparison, former Director Michael Hayden joined the CIA in 2006, after all but two detainees entered the Program and the most severe EITs were no longer in use. He was also the only Director to brief the Program to all members of the congressional oversight committees. Yet, Director Hayden is mentioned 172 times in the Executive Summary, where he is disparaged numerous times. For example, in Conclusion 18, which alleges the CIA marginalized criticisms and objections concerning the Detention and Interrogation Program, the Executive Summary states: "CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that 'numerous false allegations of physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRCJ report undermine its overall credibility.'"46 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 15. The Study also states:
567After multiple Senators had been critical of the program and written letters expressing concerns to CIA Director Michael Hayden, Director Hayden nonetheless told a meeting of foreign ambassadors to the United States that every Committee member was 'fully briefed,' and that '[tjhis is not CIA's program. This is not the President's program. This is America's program.'47 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 448.
¶Beyond the imbalance with which some officials are treated in the Study, we are particularly concerned that such treatment will send the perverse message to future CIA Directors and the CIA that they will face less criticism if they keep information limited to only a few members.
¶Indications of Political Considerations
¶The analysis and products of the Intelligence Community are supposed to remain independent of political consideration, leaving policy and political determinations to the policymakers and politicians. It follows that, Intelligence Community analysts "should provide objective assessments informed by available information that are not distorted or altered with the intent of supporting or advocating a particular policy, political viewpoint, or audience."48 Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2. Although some might think that this analytic standard would have little applicability to Congress, which is an inherently political body, in the context of congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community, our Committee was designed to function in a bipartisan manner. Thus, this analytical standard is useful in assessing whether a particular Committee oversight report was crafted in a bipartisan manner or suffers from indications of political considerations.
¶[Redacted] uses quotes from minority members out,of context to suggest they supported positions in the Study, that they in fact did not, and entirely omits contradictory comments. For example, the Study selectively quotes from a February 11, 2009, meeting organized around the discussion of a report prepared by majority staff, evaluating the detention and interrogation of two detainees. The Study indicates that "a Committee staff' presented the report, and quotes Chairman Feinstein saying the review represented, "the most comprehensive statement on the treatment of these two detainees."49 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 1211. What the Study fails to note, however, is that Vice Chairman Bond clarified the draft was "the work of two majority staff members," and that neither he, "nor any minority staff was informed of the work going into the memo over the course of the last year." He also noted that the minority had offered some input, but had not been able to review the document thoroughly, or fact check it, and therefore did not view the report as a bipartisan document. Moreover, he noted that the minority staff had just received the remarks the majority staff had prepared, several points of which were subsequently disputed by minority staff during the meeting.50 See SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss the Committee's Investigation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, February 11, 2009, pp. 6-7 and 33-34 (DTS 2009-1420), f F [Redacted] The Study also claims that a minority member's comments during the meeting, "expressed support for expanding the Committee investigation to learn more about the program."51 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31. 2014, p. 1213. In fact, the member was explaining to two majority members, who were already talking about declassifying a report they had just seen, why he would like to know a lot more "before I pass judgment" on the CIA officers described in the document. Suggesting doubt about the allegations in the document, he commented, "It's hard to believe, and 1 can't help but think that there isn't more here."52 SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss the Committee's Investigation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, February 11, 2009, pp. 48-51 (DTS 2009-1420).
568¶Lack of Timeliness
¶The analytic integrity standard of timeliness is predicated on maximizing the impact and utility of intelligence, and it encourages the Intelligence Community to produce relevant analysis that effectively informs key policy decisions.53 See Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2. The "effectively informs" aspect of this notion means that intelligence products which are published too near to a decision point, let alone after it, are of diminishing or negligible value. This same susceptibility holds true for intelligence oversight reports.
¶[Redacted] On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13491, which required the CIA to "close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently operates and . . . not operate any such detention facility in the future." The Executive Order prohibited any U.S. government employee from using intenogation techniques other than those in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on Human Intelligence Collector Operations.54 Executive Order 13491, "Ensuring Lawful Interrogation," January 22, 2009, Section 3(b), p. 2. The Terms of Reference for the Study were approved by the Committee on March 5, 2009.53 However, the original Study was adopted by the Committee on December 13, 2012— approximately three years and nine months after the approval of the Terms of Reference.56 See SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Consider the Report on the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, December 13, 2012, p. 74 (DTS 2013-0452). On April 3, 2014—more than five years after the Terms of Reference were approved—the Committee sent updated versions of the previously approved Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions to the executive branch for a declassification review.
¶[Redacted] This Study purports to represent "the most comprehensive review ever conducted of the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program."57 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2004, p. 9. A more accurate statement would have been, "the most comprehensive documentaiy review ever conducted of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program." Certainly, there is some utility in the exercise of studying an intelligence program so expansive and intricate, that the document production phase alone lasted more than three years, and produced more than six million pages of material.58 SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2004, p. 9. Normally, a review of this magnitude might be expected to yield valuable lessons learned and best practices, which might then be applied to future intelligence programs. However, no version of the Study has ever contained any recommendations.59 Moreover, there are no lessons learned, nor are there any suggestions of possible alternative measures. This absence of Committee recommendations is likely due to the fact that the key policy decisions about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were decided years ago by President Obama in 2009. Despite its massive size, the Study does little to effectively inform current policymakers, but rather makes a number of inaccurate historical judgments about the CIA's Program. For these reasons, we conclude that the Study is not timely.
569¶Inadequate Use of Available Sources of Intelligence
¶Despite the millions of records available for the Study's research, we found that important documents were not reviewed and some were never requested. We were surprised to learn that the e-mails of only 64 individuals were requested to support the review of a program that spanned eight years and included hundreds of government employees. Committee reviews of this magnitude typically involve interviewing the relevant witnesses. Here, these relevant witnesses were largely unavailable due to the Attorney General's decision to re-open a preliminary criminal review in connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations. When DOJ closed this investigation in August 2013, however, the Committee had a window of opportunity to invite these relevant witnesses in for interviews, but apparently decided against that course of action. The lack of witness interviews should have been a clear warning flag to all Committee members about the difficulty of completing a truly "comprehensive" review on this subject.
¶<U) Exhibits Poor Standards of Analytic Tradecraft
¶Compounding its disconcerting analytic integrity challenges, the Study's content is littered with examples of poor analytic tradecraft, across several critical measures of proficiency for authoring intelligence products. Here we provide some examples of the Study's poor analytic tradecraft.
¶Inadequately Describes the Quality and Reliability of Sources
¶[Redacted] Analysis that adheres to Intelligence Community tradecraft standards properly describes the quality and reliability of sources. Analysis that misrepresents or misinterprets the quality of source material compromises the integrity of the resulting analysis. At points, the Study relies upon "draft talking points" documents as being authoritative.60 Doing so raises questions about the credibility of the assessment being drawn based on such a source, because draft talking points are prepared by staff for a senior leader and it is often difficult to ascertain, absent interviews, whether all, some, or none of the information contained in talking points was even used by the senior leader. 39
¶At least the CIA's June 27, 2013, response to the Study identified eight recommendations derived from the lessons it had learned related to the Detention and Interrogation Program. See CIA Study Response, Comments (Tab A), June 27, 2013, pp. 16-17. 40
¶SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 143 and 196.
570¶We found frequent examples of citations that pointed to documents that did not discuss the material in question, were taken out of context, or did not accurately reflect the contents of the cited source documents—in some cases changing the meaning entirely. For example, the Study states that a review by the CIA Inspector General (IG) "uncovered that additional unauthorized techniques were used against" a detainee, but the Inspector General report actually said it "heard allegations" of the use of unauthorized techniques and said, "For all of the instances, the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative determination about the facts."61 Compare'SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 229, with CIA Office of Inspector General. Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), May 7.2004, p. 41 (DTS 2004-2710). [[This tradecraft error was partially corrected in the November 26. 2014. version of the Executive Summary by editing the offending sentence to read, "The Office of Inspector General later described additional allegations of unauthorized techniques used against . . . ." (emphasis added). Compare SSCI Study, Executive Summary, April 3. 2014, p. 67 with SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 70.]] In another case, the Study states: "By early October 2002, the CIA completed a search of the names identified in the 'perfume letter* in its databases and found most of the individuals who 'had assigned roles in support of the operation' were arrested by Pakistani authorities during the raids."62 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 242. The Study cites to CIA, ALEC 188560, October 3, 2002, but the quoted language actually appears in CIA, ALEC 188565, October 3, 2002, p. 2. This inaccurate paraphrase is different from the actual language of the quote, which states, "it appears that most of the detainees arrested on [September 11, 2002], had assigned roles in support of the operation outlined in the 'perfume" letter."63 CIA, A L E C [Redacted] c t o b e r 3, 2002, p. 2. After explaining that a detainee had already admitted that "purchasing perfumes" likely referred to purchasing or making poisons, the cable states that, "[0]ur concern over this letter is heightened because of the identities of the individuals involved in the operation it outlines."64 CIA, ALEC [Redacted] t o b e r 3,2002, pp. 2-3. The Study's inaccurate paraphrase appears to minimize the remaining threat, while the cable itself indicates heightened concern. In hindsight, it appears that while the September 11, 2002, safe house raids helped to derail the Karachi hotels plot, the threat evolved into a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi by Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, who were not captured during the September 2002 safe house raids.65 CIA, CIA CABLE 45028. [Redacted] A , [CIA CABLE] 38405, May 17. 2003, p. 4-7. See infra, pp. 45-47.
¶Inadequate Caveats About Uncertainties or Confidence in Analytic Judgments f F [Redacted] F ) Proper tradecraft requires that the strength of an analytic judgment should be expressed when appropriate, through confidence level statements and the identification of uncertainty. This is an important check on analytical judgments that provides a key safeguard for policy makers. Many of the Study's conclusions and underlying claims are offered as matters of unequivocal fact. As an example, the Study asserts "CIA officers conducted no research on successful interrogation strategies during the drafting of the MON, nor after it was issued."66 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 20. IB inn i 11 i [Redacted] nun Proving a negative is often very difficult, and in this particular case it is difficult to understand how such an absolute assertion can be made without interviewing the affected witnesses or even citing to one documentary source that might support such a claim.
571¶Inadequate Incorporation of Alternative Analysis Where Appropriate
¶Analysts are generally encouraged to incorporate alternative analysis into their production where they can. Sometimes this exercise helps identity weaknesses in the analysis or highlights intelligence collection gaps. The Study is replete with uncited and potentially unknowable assertions like "there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts"67 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 317. or' [Redacted] [Redacted] n e v e r visited the site."68 SSCI Study, Volume I. March 31, 2014, p. 227. Alternate analysis would certainly have been helpful in disproving the first claim and may have been helpful in the determination of whether the second assertion could really be established by records alone. With respect to the first claim, Abu Zubaydah did provide locational information about bin al-Shibh. As discussed below, Zubaydah made four separate photographic identifications of bin al-Shibh and placed him in Kandahar, Afghanistan, during the November to December 2001 timeframe and provided sufficient information for interrogators to conclude that bin al-Shibh was subsequently with KSM in Karachi, Pakistan.69 See infra, p. 38. With respect to the absolute claim that [Redacted] never visited a particular site, alternative analysis may have demonstrated a need for additional information beyond that contained in the documentary record. That alternative analysis may have counseled in favor of modifying the assertion to something like, "it appears that no [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] visited the site during that timeframe" or dropping the assertion in its entirety.
¶(UJ Based on Flawed Logical Argumentation
¶[Redacted] Proper tradecraft entails understanding of the information and reasoning underlying analytic judgments. Key points should be made effectively and supported by information and coherent reasoning. Substandard analysis presents unsupported assertions that appear contrary to the evidence cited or in violation of common sense. We found instances where claims were supported more by rhetorical devices than sound logical reasoning. For example, in support of the Study's conclusion that the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not effective, the Study stated:
572At least seven detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques almost immediately after being rendered into CIA custody, making it impossible to determine whether the information they provided could have been obtained through non-coercive debriefing methods,"70 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3,2014, p. 2 (emphasis added). {'[This false reasoning was tempered in the December 3,2014, version of the Executive Summary by editing the sentence to read, "CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques." Compare SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3, 2014, p. 2 with SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions. December 3. 2014. p. 2.|]
¶This statement is a rhetorical attempt to persuade the reader that non-coercive techniques may have been equally or even more successful than the enhanced techniques. It is little more than an appeal to unknowable facts and is not based upon logical reasoning.71 For a more detailed analysis of this unsupported claim, see infra, p. 22.
¶We also found instances where the Study undermined its own claims by citing to documents that contradicted those claims. For example, while discussing testimony given by then CIA Director Hayden on the Program, the Study states, "Hayden's testimony includedthe representation that Abu Zubaydah had a religious basis for cooperating after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques .. .Research Note: CIA records do not support this representation related to Abu Zubaydah .. . .''72 SSCI Study, Volume 1. iMarch 31,2014, p. 1130 (emphasis added). The Study also asserted, "Abu Zubaydah explained that he informed trainees at the training camp that '"no brother' should be expected to hold out for an extended time," and that captured individuals will provide information in detention. For that reason, the captured individuals, he explained, should "expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when someone with knowledge is captured."73 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 469 (citing C I A [Redacted] 10496, February 1'6, 2003, p. 2). However, in the same intelligence report cited for the above proposition, Abu Zubaydah revealed, that as his conditions in CIA detention worsened.
[H]e became increasingly concerned for his long-term wellbeing. He said that this process eventually became an 'unbearable weight' that Allah would no longer require him to cany. Under these conditions, Allah would have mercy and forgive him ('As Jesus forgave Peter for denying him three times')/or revealing to the Americans what he knew about al Qa 'ida and the brothers.74 [Redacted] CIA, 10496, February 16,2003, p. 3 (emphasis added).
¶This one admission by Abu Zubaydah, unexplainably omitted from the Study, completely contradicts the flawed logic of the Study's claim that religion played no role in his cooperation with the Americans. The criticism of Director Hayden here is unwarranted.
ERRONEOUS STUDY CONCLUSIONS
¶We were only given 60 days to prepare our initial minority views in response to the more than 6,000-page Study, which was approved by the Committee at the end of the 112th Congress. In those initial views, we successfully endeavored to describe the major fallacies and problematic findings that we had time to identify in the Study. Despite the fact that the CIA response and the summer staff meetings essentially validated our criticisms of the original Study, it appears that the updated version of the Study largely persists with many of its erroneous analytical and factual claims. We have used these past eleven weeks to update our own minority views and focus our attention on eight of the Study's most problematic conclusions.75 We will address these eight conclusions in the following order: (1) Conclusion 1; (2) Conclusion 2; (3) Conclusion 6; (4) Conclusion 7; (5) Conclusion 8; (6) Conclusion 5; (7) Conclusion 9; and (8) Conclusion 10. 20 ii IIII i W W — M H W 1 [Redacted] mi inn i
573¶Conclusion 1 (The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not effective)
¶The First of these updated conclusions asserts that the "CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees."76 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. The first and second conclusions in the updated Findings and Conclusion had been combined in Conclusion 9 of the original Study. The Study attempts to validate this apparently absolute conclusion by relying upon a number of faulty premises.
¶The first faulty premise is that "seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA custody."77 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. The assertion of "produced no intelligence" as used by the Study reflects that the interrogations of these detainees resulted in no intelligence reports. This 18 percent "failure rate" statistic may encourage some readers to jump to the hasty judgment that enhanced interrogation techniques were not an effective means of acquiring intelligence, because they failed to produce intelligence from every detainee against whom they were used. Such a judgment seems unreasonable, given that, in most human endeavors, 100 percent success rates are pretty rare, especially in complex processes like the ones involved here. If the Study's statistic is true, then it is just as true that 32 of the 39 detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques did produce some intelligence while in CIA custody. That is an "effectiveness" rate of 82 percent for obtaining intelligence from detainees who were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. While an 82 percent effectiveness rate in obtaining some information sounds pretty good, this claim suffers from the same analytical defect as the Study's 18 percent failure rate, in that it does not provide any real insight about the qualitative value of the intelligence information obtained. The true test of effectiveness is the value of what was obtained—not how much or how little was obtained.
¶As long as we are considering quantitative assessments of whether detainee interrogations led to the creation of intelligence reports, it might be useful to look at the "failure" and "effectiveness" rates for those detainees who were not subjected to enhanced interrogation. Using some of the Study's own numbers, a total of 119 detainees were in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Of these detainees, the interrogations of 41 of them resulted in no disseminated intelligence reports.78 See SSCI Study, Volume II. April 1,2014, pp. 420-421. If true, we can deduce that 80 detainees were not subjected to enhanced interrogation and that the interrogations of 34 of these same detainees resulted in no disseminated intelligence reports.79 Subtracting the 39 detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation from 119 total detainees equals 80 detainees not subjected to enhanced interrogation. We know that seven of the detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation resulted in no intelligence reports. Subtracting these seven from the 41 total detainees whose interrogation did not result in disseminated intelligence reports leaves 34 detainees whose information did not result in disseminated intelligence products, even though they were not subjected to enhanced interrogation. Turning to the failure rate first, 34 of 80 CIA detainees who were not subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA custody. That is a 42.5 percent failure rate, more than double the 18 percent failure rate for the detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. Conversely, 46 of 80 detainees who were not subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques produced some intelligence while in CIA custody. That is a 57,5 percent effectiveness rate, which is also considerably lower than the 82 percent effectiveness rate for the detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation.
574¶Unlike the above measures, there are some quantitative statistics in the Study that are useful in comparing the relative "productivity" of certain detainees. The Study estimates that a total of 5,874 sole source disseminated intelligence reports were produced from the interrogation of 78 of the 119 detainees. Of these, 4266 reports (72.6 percent) were produced from the interrogation of 32 of the 39 detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation.80 See SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, p. 421. Thus, 1608 reports (27.4 percent) were produced from the interrogation of 46 of the 90 detainees not subjected to enhanced interrogation.81 Subtracting the 4,266 reports produced from the interrogation of detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation from the 5,874 total number of reports equals 1,608 reports (27.4 percent) produced from the interrogation of detainees not subjected to enhanced' interrogation. The Study also credits Abu Zubaydah and KSM with 1597 (27.1 percent) of the total number of disseminated reports.82 See SSCI Study, Volume II. April 1, 2014, p. 421. While these statistics cannot be used to assess the qualitative value of the specific intelligence in these disseminated reports, they do seem to provide insight into the CIA's perceived value of the information being produced by the detainees who were subjected to enhanced interrogation, especially Abu Zubaydah and KSM. Given that the vast majority of these intelligence reports came from detainees selected for enhanced interrogations, these statistics seem to indicate that the CIA was proficient at identifying those detainees who might possess information worthy of dissemination.
¶The second faulty premise states:
At least seven detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques almost immediately after being rendered to CIA custody, making it impossible to determine whether the information they provided could have been obtained through non-coercive debriefing methods. By contrast, other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been, subjected to these techniques.83 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3,2014, p. 2 (emphasis added). ([This false reasoning was tempered in the December 3. 2014, version of the Executive Summary by editing the sentence to read, "CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques." Compare SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3, 2014, p. 2 with SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2.|| 22
¶This premise is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the premise itself admits that it is based upon ignorance—we will never know whether less coercive techniques would have provided the same amount of intelligence from these seven detainees as was obtained by using enhanced interrogation. It is troubling that the very first conclusion in this Study is based, at least in part, upon an appeal to unknowable facts. Second, this appeal to ignorance is linked to an observation that other detainees provided "significant accurate intelligence" without having been subjected to enhanced interrogation, in an apparent effort to persuade us that the use of less coercive techniques might have also resulted in "significant accurate intelligence." While this second observation is factually correct, it is misleading. We know from our earlier examination of the "productivity" statistics that the group of detainees who were not subjected to enhanced interrogation only provided 27.4 percent of the disseminated intelligence reporting, which undercuts the very inference raised by this empty premise.
575¶The third faulty premise of this ineffective means conclusion focuses on the fact that "multiple" detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques "fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence."84 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. Like the first faulty premise, this premise only tells one side of the story. It implies that only detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation provided fabricated information. Not surprisingly, our review of the documentary record revealed that "multiple" detainees whose non-enhanced interrogations resulted in at least one sole source intelligence report also provided fabricated information to their interrogators.85 Our review examined the first 15 of the 46 detainees whose non-coercive interrogations had resulted in at least one sole-source intelligence report. See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 462. We found documentary evidence supporting the proposition that 11 of these 15 detainees provided deceptive or fabricated information to their interrogators. The 11 deceptive detainees were: Zakariya (CIA, [CIA CABLE] 22576, [Redacted] [Redacted] CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted] [Redacted] j C I A CABLE [Redacted] [Redacted] Janial Eldin Boudraa, (CIA, [CIA CABLE] [Redacted] CIA [CIA CABLE] 21520, [Redacted] Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah (CIA, [CIA CABLE] [Redacted] CIA CABLE 13756, [Redacted] [Redacted] ' i l Aziz Alimad al-Mithali (CIA. CIA CABLE 1 3 7 [Redacted] u s a b Umar Ail al-Mudwani (CI'A, CIA CABLE l 3 7 5 [Redacted] w q i Awad (CIA, CIA CABLE 1 5 6 [Redacted] a r Faruq. aka Abu al-Faruq al-Kuwaiti (CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted] [Redacted] :iA, CIA CABLE 12313[Redacted] CABLE] [Redacted] [DETAINEE R] (CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted] Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani (CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted] and Haji Ghalgi (CIA, CIA CABLE > 9 1 [Redacted] • [Redacted] We, were unable to find docunientaiy evidence supporting any deception or fabrication by the following four detainees: Abbar al-Hawari. aka Abu Sufiyan: Hassan bin Attash; Said Saleh Said, aka SaidSalih Said; and Hayatullah Haqqani. Fabrication is simply not a good measure of "effectiveness," because detainees are often strongly motivated to protect the identities of their terrorist colleagues and the details of their terrorist operations. We train our own military personnel to resist against providing sensitive information to their captors during the inevitable interrogation process. We understand that such resistance may occasionally lead our personnel to provide fabricated information to their interrogators, This is an ancient and well-recognized occupational hazard of war.
¶Another problematic aspect of this third faulty premise is that it ignores the fact that fabricated information can sometimes turn out to be highly significant. One of the best examples of this concept can be found in our discussion about how the courier who led us to Bin Ladin's hideout was finally located.86 See infra, pp. 73-76. Specifically, many of the senior al-Qa'ida detainees lied to protect the identity and importance of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. Abu Zubaydah and Abu Faraj al-Libi both lied when they claimed that they did not know anyone named Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. KSM fabricated a story that Ahmad had retired from al-Qa'ida. When compared against other detainee information, these fabrications were clear signals to CIA analysts that these three detainees were trying very hard to keep Ahmad hidden.87 See CIA. DIRECTOR [Redacted] CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence. Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, dated September 2012, pp. 9-10 (DTS 2012-3826); CIA Intelligence Assessment, Al- Qa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2.
576¶T h e final faulty premise used in support of this " e f f e c t i v e n e s s " conclusion w a s that "CIA o f f i c e r s regularly called into question whether the C I A ' s e n h a n c e d interrogation techniques w e r e e f f e c t i v e , assessing that the use o f the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence." 8 8 W h i l e the opinions o f these unidentified CIA o f f i c e r s m a y happen to c o i n c i d e with the S t u d y ' s first c o n c l u s i o n , there were at least three other C I A o f f i c i a l s w h o held the opposite v i e w — D i r e c t o r s Tenet, G o s s , and Hayden. DCI Tenet stated that he "firmly believes that the i n t e n o g a t i o n program, and s p e c i f i c a l l y the use of EITs, has s a v e d m a n y lives." Tenet added that the use o f the C I A ' s e n h a n c e d interrogation techniques w a s "extremely valuable" in obtaining "enormous amounts of critical threat information," and h e did not b e l i e v e that the information could have been gained any other w a y . 8 9 Director G o s s told our C o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s that
T h i s program has brought us incredible information. It's a program that could continue to bring us incredible information. It's a program that c o u l d continue to operate in a very professional way. It's a program that I think if y o u s a w h o w it's operated y o u w o u l d agree that you w o u l d be proud that it's d o n e right and w e l l , with proper safeguards." 9 0
¶C I A Director H a y d e n also told our Committee that the C I A ' s i n t e n o g a t i o n Program existed "for o n e p u r p o s e - i n t e l l i g e n c e , " and that the Program "is about preventing future attacks In that purpose, preventing attacks, disabling al-Qa'ida, this is the most s u c c e s s f u l program being c o n d u c t e d by A m e r i c a n intelligence today." 91
¶In our opinion, the reasons cited by the Study to support this c o n c l u s i o n that the C I A ' s use of e n h a n c e d interrogation techniques w a s not an e f f e c t i v e m e a n s of acquiring intelligence or g a i n i n g cooperation from detainees are largely invalid. T h e faulty premises upon w h i c h the c o n c l u s i o n is based are more rhetorical than analytical. Our r e v i e w of the facts contained in the documentary record has led us to Che opposite c o n c l u s i o n — t h a t the C I A ' s D e t e n t i o n and Interrogation Program, including the use of enhanced interrogation, w a s an e f f e c t i v e m e a n s of gathering significant intelligence information and cooperation f r o m a majority o f these C I A detainees. Our conclusion, h o w e v e r , should not be read as an endorsement of any o f these particular e n h a n c e d interrogation techniques.
¶Conclusion 2 (CIA's Justification for EITs Rested on Inaccurate Effectiveness Claims)
¶C o n c l u s i o n 2 states, "[t]he C I A ' s justification for the use o f its enhanced i n t e n o g a t i o n t e c h n i q u e s rested on inaccurate c l a i m s of their e f f e c t i v e n e s s . " 9 2 T h e Study c o n t i n u e s to rely upon 2 0 separate case studies to support this erroneous c o n c l u s i o n . In our
¶SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2.
577¶original minority views, we only had time to identify the significant flaws in seven of these case studies. Prior to our receipt of the June 27, 2013, CIA response, we identified significant problems with four more of the case studies. Ultimately, the CIA response validated our critique of the original seven case studies and identified additional issues with the remaining case studies. We have decided to address 17 of these ease studies in our examination of this conclusion.93 We have combined the KSM as the "mastermind" of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks case study with the KSM "Mukhtar" alias case study. We did not have time to adequately address the Majid Khan, Sajid Badat, and Dhiren Barot case studies. Although one may have individual views on the relative effectiveness of the enhanced interrogation techniques; it is important for the public to understand that these flawed case studies are insufficient to establish that the CIA's justification for the use of enhanced interrogation techniques rested upon inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.
¶The Study's Flawed Analytical Methodology
¶In general, the Study essentially refuses to admit that CIA detainees, especially CIA detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, provided intelligence information which helped the United States government and its allies neutralize numerous terrorist threats. On its face, this position does not make much sense, given the vast amount of information gained from these interrogations, the thousands of intelligence reports that were generated as a result of them, the capture of additional terrorists, and the disruption of the plots those captured terrorists were planning.
¶We reviewed 17 of the 20 cases studies that the Study relies upon to support this flawed conclusion. We examined these case studies in logical groupings (e.g., related to information provided by Abu Zubaydah) using chronological order rather than the Study's confusing "primary" and "secondary" effectiveness representations. This approach helped us better understand how the intelligence resulting from these detainee interrogations was used by the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots and identify, capture, and sometimes prosecute other terrorists.
¶The Study developed an analytical methodology to examine the effectiveness of the information obtained from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program that we found to be both confusing and deeply flawed. Usually, effectiveness is measured by establishing performance metrics that require the collection of pertinent data and the subsequent analysis of such data. For example, in the context of counterterrorism such metrics might include: (1) increased understanding of terrorist networks; (2) identification of terrorists and those providing material support; (3) terrorist captures; (4) terrorist interrogations; (5) disruption of terrorist operations and financing; (6) disruption of terrorist recruitment; (7) reduction in terrorist safe- havens; (8) development of counterterrorism assets; (9) intelligence gathering of documents, computer equipment, communications devices, etc.: (10) improved information sharing; and (11) improved foreign liaison cooperation against terrorism. Such metrics could then be compared against the information provided by CIA detainees to assess the relative effectiveness of the Program.
578¶Instead of performance metrics, the Study's analytical methodology creates artificial categories that are used to exclude certain detainee information from being considered in an effectiveness assessment of the Program. For example, if the Study found that a detainee subjected to enhanced interrogation had provided similar information during an earlier non-enhanced interrogation, then such information could not be used for assessing the effectiveness of the program. This category appears to have been developed in an attempt to exclude much of the intelligence information provided by Abu Zubaydah after he was subjected to enhanced interrogation in August 2002, since some of the information Abu Zubaydah provided during those interrogations was similar to information he had provided prior to August. However, it turns out that this category is largely inapplicable to Abu Zubaydah's case, because he was subjected to enhanced interrogation by the CIA when he was released from the hospital on April 15, 2002.94 See infra, pp. 33-36.
¶Another category of information that the Study's flawed analytical methodology excludes is corroborative information. If a detainee subjected to enhanced interrogation provided information that was already available to the CIA or other elements of the Intelligence Community from another source, then the methodology dictates that such information cannot be considered to support a CIA effectiveness representation. This result occurs even in situations in which the detainee's information clarified or explained the significance of the prior information. Another exclusion category applies if the Study determined that there was no causal relationship between the information obtained from a detainee after the use of enhanced interrogation and the operational success claimed by the CIA. In these case studies, we often found documentary evidence that supported direct causal links between such detainee information and the operational success represented by the CIA. The final category excludes detainee information about terrorist plots when there was a subsequent assessment by intelligence and law enforcement personnel that such plots were infeasible or never operationalized.
¶This flawed analytical methodology often forced the Study to use absolute language such as, "no connection," "no indication," "played no role," or "these representations were inaccurate." Our review of the documentary record often found valid counter-examples that disproved such absolute claims. We also found that when we invalidated the claims in the initial case studies, there was often a cascading effect that further undermined claims in the subsequent case studies. Here we summarize the claims for the case studies we examined and our alternate analysis of those claims.
¶Our Analytical Methodology
¶Our analytical methodology simply focuses on the significant inherent weaknesses contained in the analytical categories of the Study's methodology. For example, in case studies where the Study claims there was no relationship between the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and the operational success, it often uses absolute language such as, "no connection," "no indication," "played no role," or "these representations were inaccurate." This greatly simplified our analytical task, because the main problem with absolute claims is that it usually only takes one valid counter-example to disprove the claim. We did not have too much difficulty using the documentary record to: establish connections; find indications; identify the roles; and demonstrate the accuracy of certain representations. We suspect that this task would have been even easier if there had been an opportunity to speak to the relevant witnesses.
579¶The same can be said with respect to the Study's treatment of the "otherwise available categories." In these case study claims, the Study would point to documents that "provided similar information" or contained "corroborative" information. The usual problem with these claims is that they failed to analyze the weight and significance of the information provided by the particular detainee. We found documentary evidence indicating that the CIA often had not understood or properly exploited previously acquired intelligence information until after its significance was clarified by a particular detainee or detainees.
¶Also, we were less inclined to dismiss the significance of certain plots and threats just because there was documentary evidence indicating that some intelligence professionals found them infeasible or had not yet become operational. Often, the most difficult part of a terrorist plot is getting the terrorists into a position where they can attack. If the terrorists are not neutralized, they have additional time to refine their plans, adjust to new targets, or gain access to better weapons and equipment. The evolving nature of the Karachi terrorist plots demonstrates this point quite well.95 See infra, pp. 45-47. _ 2 7 [Redacted] 11111 inn 11 mi i W H M B B B B B M I
¶Re-organization of the "Effectiveness" Case Studies
¶In general, we have tried to organize our analysis of these case studies sequentially into six logical and chronological groupings. For example, since Abu Zubaydah was the first CIA detainee subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, we begin with the case studies which examine the significant intelligence information that he disclosed to his interrogators. Despite claims made by the Study, we found that, over time, information obtained from Abu Zubaydah was very useful in the subsequent interrogation of other detainees and sometimes even helped lead to the capture of other terrorists, which in turn, often disrupted developing terrorist plots.
¶<U) The next logical grouping of case studies centers geographically in Pakistan during the March 2002 through April 2003 time-frame and concerns the Intelligence Community's efforts to locate and capture the al-Qa'ida terrorists in that country. For example, we trace how Abu Zubaydah's information helped ' [Redacted] Pakistani authorities conduct important raids on several key safe houses in Karachi on September 10-11, 2002, which resulted in a treasure trove of collected physical evidence and intelligence information, as well as the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abu Badr, Abdul Rahim Gulam Rabbani, Hassan Muhammad, Ali bin Attash, and other al-Qa'ida members. We turn next to the capture of KSM in Rawalpindi in March 2003 and then examine the various Karachi terrorist plots, which were largely neutralized by the September 2002 safe house raids, but were not finally disrupted until the capture of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali and Khallad bin Attash on April 29, 2003, in Karachi. This grouping ends with our discussion of the Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots, which were fully disrupted with the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, KSM, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Khallad bin Attash.
580¶The third grouping takes us briefly to Southeast Asia and our analysis of how detainee information helped lead to the capture of Riduan Isamuddin, also known as "Hambali" in Thailand during August 2003, the disruption of the Second Wave plots, and the capture of his Al-Ghuraba Group in Karachi, Pakistan.
¶Our fourth grouping consists of the case studies that primarily involved information provided by KSM. We begin with an analysis of four case studies where KSM provided helpful information during 2003: the critical intelligence on Jaffar al-Tayyar (also known as Adnan el- Shukrijumah); the arrest of Saleh al-Marri; the capture of Iyman Faris; and the identification and arrests of Uzhair and Saifuilah Paracha.
¶The fifth grouping examines three case studies that are factually unrelated but depend upon detainee information that was provided in 2004. The first involves the tactical intelligence provided on Shkai, Pakistan, by Hassan Ghul. The second involves the thwarting of the Camp Lemonier plotting in Djibouti and the third examines how CIA detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation provided information useful in the validation of CIA sources.
¶Our final chronological group covers the identification of Usama Bin Ladin's courier. Here, we demonstrate that detainee information played a significant role in leading CIA analysts to the courier Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who in turn, led the Intelligence Community to Usama Bin Ladin.
¶The Domino Effect
¶Our reorganization of these case studies away from the Study's confusing primary and secondary "effectiveness representations" frame of reference into a more traditional chronological analytical framework clearly exposes the fatal flaw in the structure of the Study's current analysis. In essence, the Study's analysis resembles a very large and carefully lined-up set of dominoes. The claims made in those first few dominoes are absolutely crucial in maintaining the structure and validity of many of the claims made and repeated in the dominoes that follow. Our analysis demonstrates that the claims in these initial case studies are simply not supported by the factual documentary record. This led to an analytical chain reaction in which many of the Study's subsequent claims became invalid, in part, because of their dependence on the first few factually inaccurate claims.
¶[Redacted] incorrect claim made by the Study that the use of enhanced interrogation techniques played "no role" in the identification of Jose Padilla, because Abu Zubaydah provided the information about Padilla during an interrogation by FBI agents who were "exclusively" using "rapport-building" techniques against him more than three months prior to the CIA's "use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques."96 SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 230-231 and 230 n. 1315; see infra, pp.33-36. - 28 II<11 11 I I I I i [Redacted] minim The facts demonstrate, however, that Abu Zubaydah had been subjected to "around the clock" interrogation that included more than four days of dietary manipulation, nudity, as well as a total of 126.5 hours (5.27 days) of sleep deprivation during the 136-hour (5.67 day) period by the time the FBI finished up the 8.5-hour interrogation shift which yielded the identification of Jose Padilla.97 See infra, pp. 33-36. Since these three enhanced interrogation techniques were used in combination with the FBI's "rapport building" technique during this particular interrogation, it is simply absurd to claim that they played "no role" in obtaining the information about Padilla from Abu Zubaydah. Consistent with the "Domino Effect" analogy, when this factually incorrect claim falls, it can no longer be cited as support for other claims. This specific factually incorrect claim, sometimes used in slightly different variations, is repeated at least 19 times throughout the Study.98 "8 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 209-210. 230, 230 n.1314,234; SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31.2014, pp. 624 and 636; and SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1. 2014, pp. 57, 75. 75 n.274. 79, 343, 349. 358, 409. 445 n.2245, 530,532. 535, and 1089.
581¶Ultimately, our analysis of these case studies leads us to conclude that there are simply not enough "dominoes" left standing to support the Study's explosive conclusion—that the "CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness." It is very disappointing that the Study has leveled such serious accusations against the personnel involved in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, when so many of the Study's own claims are demonstrably false.
The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as the Mastermind of the 9/11 Attacks and His "Mukhtar" Alias
¶Study Claim: f [Redacted] ) "On at least two prominent occasions, the CIA
represented, inaccurately, that Abu Zubaydah provided [information identifying KSM as the mastermind of 9/11] after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."99 *w SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,20'14, p. 312.
[Redacted] "In at least one instance in November 2007 . . . the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as 'Mukhtar' after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."100 "I0 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 315.
[Redacted] 'There is no evidence to support the statement that Abu Zubaydah's information—obtained by FBI interrogators prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and while Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized—was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the 'mastermind' of the 9/11 attacks."101 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 313.
¶Fact: (U) Neither of the occasions cited with respect to the "Mastermind of 9/11"
582information were "prominent." The first occasion was not even a CIA representation, but rather a mistake made by the Department of Justice in one of its legal opinions.102 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3, 2014, p. 313, n.1748. The second occasion was a set of November 2007 documents and talking points for the CIA Director to use in a briefing with
the President. Although these briefing materials did contain some erroneous information about KSM's interrogation, the Study fails to demonstrate whether this erroneous information was "represented" to the President during that timeframe.103
The one instance where the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as "Mukhtar" after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques was contained in the same November 2007 briefing materials used by the CIA Director to brief the President.104 Again, the Study fails to demonstrate whether this erroneous information was "represented" to the President during this timeframe.
There is considerable evidence that the information Abu Zubaydah provided identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the mastermind of 9/11 was significant to CIA analysts, operators, and FBI interrogators. Both the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 Attacks and the 9/11 Commission discussed the importance of this information to the Intelligence Community in understanding KSM's role in the attacks and in the al-Qa'ida organization.
¶We have combined our analysis of these two case studies because they share common facts and analytical issues. The Study's claims with respect to the CIA's alleged misrepresentations about KSM's "Mukhtar" alias and being the mastermind of 9/11 are themselves inaccurate. Also, the Study's absolute claim that "there is no evidence" that Abu Zubaydah's information was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the mastermind of 9/11 is contradicted by the documentary record and publicly available information.
¶Our analysis of the Study's erroneous claims about the supposed CIA "representations" is dispositive. For the first "prominent" occasion, the Study mistakenly alleges that the CIA made an inaccurate representation about Abu Zubaydah providing information identifying KSM as the mastermind of 9/11 after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.105 It turns out that this particular inaccurate representation was not made by the CIA, but rather was expressed in a written legal opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department Justice (DOJ).106 The Study confirms its own mistake by pointing out that the CIA briefing notes provided to DOJ in support of their request for the OLC opinion correctly stated, "Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida's organization structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. It was also Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, ,0J
¶See DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard, 06 November 2007, pp. 1 -3. This document was sent to DCIA on November 6 in preparation for a meeting with POTUS. ""•See DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard, November 6. 2007, pp. 1-3. ,os
¶See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 312-313. IM
¶See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo from Steven Bradbury, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees, May 30, 2005, p. 10.
583¶who identified KSM as the mastermind of 9/1!. "mi DOJ is accountable for this negligible mistake, not the CIA.
¶With respect to the second "prominent" occasion, the CIA does admit that "in one instance—a supporting document for a set of DCIA talking points for a meeting with the President—we mischaracterized the information as having been obtained after the application of enhanced interrogation techniques."108 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 20. However, while this information in Director Hayden's briefing materials about KSM was inaccurate, the Study fails to explain how the CIA supposedly "represented" these inaccuracies to the President or other executive branch officials during this November 2007 timeframe. Without talking to witnesses, we have no proof that any such inaccurate representation ever occurred. What we do know is that President Bush got this issue right in a speech that he delivered nearly a year before this particular error was inserted into Director Hayden's briefing materials. Specifically, President Bush said,
After he recovered, Zubaydah was defiant and evasive. He declared his hatred of America. During questioning, he at first disclosed what he thought was nominal information—and then stopped all cooperation. Well, in fact the 'nominal' information he gave us turned out to be quite important. For example, Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—or KSM—was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, and used the alias 'Muktar.'103
¶The President's speech is the "representation" that mattered most, regardless of whether the erroneous information in Director Hayden's briefing materials was discussed during a classified Presidential briefing one year later. We conclude that if there was any error here, it was harmless.
¶The Study's claim in the second case study is essentially identical to the first, except that Director Hayden's briefing materials for the November 2007 meeting with the President contained an erroneous assertion that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as "Mukhtar" after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.110 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 315. Analytically, this is a distinction without a difference and we reach the same conclusion—if there was any error here, it was harmless.
¶[Redacted] Turning now to the Study's "no evidence" claim, numerous Intelligence Community documents show that Intelligence Community analysts believed that Zubaydah's information identifying KSM as the mastermind of 9/11 was important. Soon after the interrogation that revealed KSM as the mastermind of 9/11 and identification as "Mukhtar," the CIA disseminated an intelligence report, [Redacted] within the Intelligence Community [Redacted] detailing the information.1" Respoi indicated they followed up and requested more information [Redacted]
584¶Zubaydah's FBI inten-ogator Ali Soufan also described the information from Zubaydah on KSM as significant. In 2008, Soufan told Committee staff that when Zubaydah provided that information, "we had no idea at the time that Mukhtar was the KSM from 9/11 Because we had been working so diligently on trying to figure out the puzzles of 9/11 and who is Mukhtar, and when Abu Zubaydah said that, I think the picture was complete."113 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28. 2008 (DTS 2008-2411). On May 13, 2009, Soufan also told the Senate Judiciary Committee that prior to Zubaydah providing information on KSM's role as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, "we had no idea of KSM's role in 9/11 or of his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure."114 Ali Soufan, Statement for the Record, before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 13, 2009.
¶Moreover, a summary of the Program released publicly by the Director of National Intelligence in 2006 explained both the significance of this information and how other previously collected intelligence had not stood out to analysts until the information from Zubaydah. According to the summary, "during initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that KSM was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker "Mukhtar." This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter- leads that eventually resulted in his capture."115 Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, p. 1. f [Redacted] F ) The Senate and House Intelligence Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, adopted with the support of four members who also voted in favor of the Study, said that "although the Intelligence Community knew of KSM's support for terrorism since 1995 and later learned of his links to al-Qa'ida, he was not recognized as a senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant. In April 2002, the Intelligence Community learned that KSM and his group conceived the September 11 plot."116 The Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September II, 2001, December 2002, p. 310. If there is any doubt that the report was referring to the information from Zubaydah, CIA operational cable traffic from April 2002 confirms: "[Abu Zubaydah] stated the idea of September 11 was conceived by [KSM] and his group."117 CIA, [Redacted] 10065, April 18,2002, p. 3.
¶The 9/11 Commission Report also made clear that the Intelligence Community did not recognize KSM's importance prior to 9/11. "KSM, who had been indicted in January 1996 for his role in the Manila air plot, was seen primarily as another freelance terrorist, associated with Ramzi Yousef."118 9/11 Commission Report, p. 276. The Commission noted that because KSM was being targeted for arrest, responsibility for tracking him was in CIA's Renditions Branch, which did not focus on analytic connections. "When subsequent information came, more critical for analysis than for tracking,
¶CIA, [Redacted] no unit had the job of following up on what the information might mean."119 9/11 Commission Report, p. 276. As one of ten '•Operational Opportunities" that were missed prior to 9/11, the Commission wrote, "August 2001, the CIA does not foeus on information that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is a key al Qaeda lieutenant or connect information identifying KSM as the 'Mukhtar' mentioned in other reports to the analysis that could have linked 'Mukhtar' with Ramzi Binalshibh and Moussaoui."120 9/1 1 Commission Report, p. 356, The 9/11 Commission adds:
585The final piece of the puzzle arrived at the CIA's Bin Ladin unit on August 28 [2001] in a cable reporting that KSM's nickname was Mukhtar. No one made the connection to the reports about Mukhtar that had been circulated in the spring. This connection might have also underscored concern about the June reporting that KSM was recruiting terrorists to travel, including to the United States. Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that Mukhtar/KSM had communicated with a phone that was used by Binalshibh, and that Binalshibh used the same phone to communicate with Moussaoui.121 121 9/11 Commission Report, p. 277. The CIA acknowledged that this intelligence report identified KSM as "Mukhtar" prior to Aba Zubaydah's information. After reviewing its records, the CIA concluded that "our officers simply missed the earlier cable." CIA Study Response, Cose Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 22.
¶Finally, the 9/11 Commission notes that the information connecting KSM to the Binalshibh phone came from detainee interviews with Binalshibh in late 2002 and 2003 and with KSM in 2003, well after Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as Mukhtar and the 9/11 mastermind.122 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 7, n.163. It is also worth noting that, like this information, all of the information for chapters 5 and 7 of the 9/11 Commission report, which explain what the Commission knew about al-Qa'ida's planning for the 9/11 attacks, "reifies] heavily on information obtained from captured al Qaeda members," mostly in CIA's interrogation program.123 9/11 Commission Report, p. 146.
The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla
¶Study Claim: {T[Redacted]^} "A review of CIA operational cables and other
CIA records found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of 'Jose Padilla' or the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records indicate that:... (3) Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI officers who were using rapport-building techniques, in April 2002, more than three months prior to the CIA's 'use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques,'.,. ."124 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 229-231.
¶Fact: ( T [Redacted] F ) CIA records clearly indicate that sleep
586deprivation played a significant role in Abu Zubaydah's identification of Jose Padilla as an al-Qa'ida operative tasked to carry out an attack against
the United States. Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI agents during an interrogation session that began late at night on April 20, 2002, and ended on April 21,2002. Between April 15,2002 and April 21,2002, Abu Zubaydah was deprived of sleep for a total of 126.5 hours (5.27 days) over a 136 hour (5.6 day) period—while only being permitted several brief sleep breaks between April 19,2002 and April 21,2002, which totaled 9.5 hours.
¶[Redacted] This particular Study claim gives the false impression that enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in obtaining important threat information about Jose Padilla during the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah on April 20-21, 2002, and implies that such information was really just the result of the "rapport-building" techniques used by the FBI agents that evening.
¶[Redacted] The CIA documentary record is clear that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to an extended period of sleep deprivation and other enhanced interrogation techniques during his interrogation between April 15, 2002 and April 21, 2002.125 See CIA, [Redacted] 10043, April 15. 2002. p. 2; [Redacted] 10047, April 16, 2002, p. 2. Specifically, during this time period when FBI agents and CIA officers were working together in rotating, round-the-clock shifts, some of the interrogation techniques used on Abu Zubaydah included nudity,126 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28. 2008. p. 22. (DTS 2008-2411) liquid diet,127 See C I A [Redacted] 10090, April 21, 2002, p. 5. _ _ sensory deprivation,128 See 10116, April 25, 2002,pp. 3-4; C l / V H p | 10016, April 12, 2002, pp. 4-5. and extended sleep deprivation.129 See CIA, 10094, April 21,2002, p. 3; CIA, [Redacted] l , April 19. 2002, p. 2; CIA, [Redacted] 10091, April 21, 2002, p. 2. Dietary manipulation, nudity, and sleep deprivation (more than 48 hours) were also subsequently authorized as enhanced interrogation techniques by the Department of Justice. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS 2009-1810, Tab-11).
¶[Redacted] , The sleep deprivation of Abu Zubaydah began on April 15, 2002.130 See FBI Letter to Pasquale J. (Pat) D' Amuro, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, April 16. 2002, p. 2 ("The interview with ABU ZUBAYDA is continuing around the clock and we will advise you of any further information ASAP"). By April 19, 2002, Abu Zubaydah had been subjected to 76 straight hours of sleep deprivation in the form of intensive interrogation sessions and his ability to focus on questions and provide coherent answers appeared to be compromised to a point where sleep was required.131 See CIA, [Redacted] 0 0 7 1 , April 19, 2002, p. 2. Abu Zubaydah was allowed three hours of sleep at that time.132 See CIA, 10071, April 19, 2002, p. 2. On April 20, 2002, the FBI began its late-night interrogation shift at approximately 10:30 p.m. with Abu Zubaydah and continued until about 7:00 a.m. the next morning. During that shift, Abu Zubaydah was given a two-hour sleep break; time for prayer, food, and water; and a medical check-up.133 See FBI Draft Report on Abu Zubaida interview session from approximately 10:30 p.m., April 20, 2002, to about 7:00 a.m., on April 21, 2002, p. 1. By April 21, 2002, the day he identified Jose Padilla as a terrorist inside the United States, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah had only been permitted several brief sleep breaks between April 19, 2002 and April 21, 2002, which only totaled 9.5 hours of sleep over a 136-hour period.134 See CIA, [Redacted] 10094. April 21. 2002, p. 2; CIA Assessment of the accuracy of facts stated in the SSCI Minority's response to the Studv of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program. June 27, 2013, p. 1. That means Abu Zubaydah had been sleep deprived for a total of 126.5 hours (5.27 days) over a 136-hour (5.6 day) period by the time his FBI interrogators were finished with him at the end of that shift.
587¶11 in ii i ii ii ii M ^ B M W I U H I H i l nuiinmi
¶{ T [Redacted] F ) A CIA chart, not included in the Study, which describes both the standard and enhanced techniques used on Abu Zubaydah, notes for April 21, 2002, "two sessions; sleep deprivation (136 hours)" under the heading "enhanced techniques."135 CIA, Interrogations Using Standard and Enhanced Techniques, Abu Zubaydah, undated, p. 1. Moreover, the FBI interrogator, identified in the press as [Redacted] who was questioning Zubaydah at the time he provided the Padilla information, told the OIG that "during the CIA interrogations Zubaydah 'gave up' Jose Padilla and identified several targets for future al-Qaeda attacks."136 Department of Justice Inspector General, A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Obsen>ations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay. Afghanistan, and Iraq, May 2008, p. 69 (DTS 2008-2188). In other words, while Special Agent [Redacted] the information on Padilla, it was during a period that the FBI and CIA officers were using the CIA's techniques.
¶f f [Redacted] When the CIA and FBI interrogators entered the room late on the night of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was totally naked.137 See SSCI Transcript. Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28,2008, p. 22. (DTS 2008-2411). He had been subjected to at least four days of dietary manipulation and had been deprived of 126,5 hours of sleep during the past 136 hours.138 See CIA. j [Redacted] 10094, April 21. 2002. p. 2; [Redacted] 10090, April 21,2002, p. 5. According to FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, they gave him a towel. They took some Coke and tea into the room and "started talking about different things." Sometime during the next morning, Abu Zubaydah "came back to his senses and he started cooperating again. And this is when he gave us Padilla."139 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008, p. 19. (DTS 2008-2411). Rather than concede that Abu Zubaydah was being subjected to a combination of at least three enhanced interrogation techniques while the FBI agents were using an additional rapport-building technique, the Study includes this perplexing footnote text: "While Abu Zubaydah was subjected to nudity and limited sleep deprivation prior to this date by the CIA, he had been allowed to sleep prior to being questioned by the FBI officers, who were exclusively using rapport-building interrogation techniques when the information was acquired."140 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, April 3, 2014, p. 226 n. 1292 (emphasis added). But see FBI Draft Report on Abu Zubuida interview session from approximately 10:30 p.m.. April 20, 2002, to about 7:00 a.m., on April 21, 2002, p. 1. It appears from this draft report that Abu Zubaydah was permitted a two-hour sleep break sometime during the FBI shift, which seems to clearly demonstrate that the FBI interrogators were aware that Abu Zubaydah was being subjected to sleep deprivation. [[The December 3,2014, revision of footnote 1292 in the April 3.2014 version of the Executive Summary continues to misrepresent the events surrounding Abu Zubaydah's interrogation by editing the footnote to read, "While Abu Zubaydah was subjected to sleep deprivation and nudity prior to this date by the CIA, he had been allowed to sleep shortly prior to being questioned on this matter by the FBI special agents, who were exclusively using rapport-building interrogation techniques when this information was acquired from Abu Zubaydah (who was covered with a towel)." (emphasis added). Compare SSCI Study, Executive Summary, April 3, 2014, p. 226 n.1292 with SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 230. n.1315.]] Like the claim in this case study, this footnote is simply at odds with what really happened.
588¶There is no reasonable way to reconcile these facts with the claim that enhanced interrogation techniques played "no role" in Abu Zubaydah's identification of lose Padilla. Sleep deprivation for 126.5 hours over a 136-hour period—which was hardly "limited"—was an enhanced interrogation technique regardless of whether the Department of Justice formally labeled it as such a couple of months later. The Study cannot dismiss the use of these enhanced interrogation techniques simply because they were used before the Department of Justice eventually approved them. The Study's assertion that the FBI was "exclusively" using rapport-building techniques fails to recognize the reality that this interrogation technique was used in combination with at least three other enhanced interrogation techniques. In judging what caused Abu Zubaydah to give up valuable intelligence, including information on Jose Padilla, it is impossible to separate or disaggregate enhanced interrogation techniques from rapport-building techniques after enhanced techniques are applied. Enhanced interrogation techniques are designed to compel detainees to cooperate with questioning and are used in conjunction with traditional questioning methods or interrogation techniques. The simple fact is that Abu Zubaydah gave up Padilla during that interrogation, after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. It is simply not factually accurate for the Study to claim that Abu Zubaydah gave up the information on Padilla before he was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. Nor is it factually accurate to claim that enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in identifying Padilla as a terrorist threat.
¶[Redacted] The direct refutation of this Study claim illustrates the Study's flawed analytical methodology. As we detail in many of the case studies below, Zubaydah provided much of the key initial information that caused the Intelligence Community to recognize the significance of certain events, future threats, terrorist networks, and even potential assets. The Study repeatedly and incorrectly alleges that the FBI obtained this information prior to the application of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.141 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary. December 3, 2014, pp. 209-210, 230,230 n.1314,234; SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, pp. 624 and 636; and SSCI Studv, Volume II, April 1, 2014, pp. 57, 75, 75 n.274, 79, 343, 349, 358,409, 445 n.2245, 530, 532,535, and 1089. As a result, this mistaken allegation is taken as a settled premise in the Study's analysts of other case studies and related issues, which has the practical effect of undermining the Study's analyses of those matters.
¶f l P [Redacted] t P ) Under its flawed methodology, the Study was able to disregard the significance of the large amount of information provided by Abu Zubaydah between April 15, 2002 and August 4, 2002, by incorrectly categorizing it as not being obtained from the use enhanced interrogation techniques. We now know that all of the information obtained from Abu Zubaydah on and after April 15, 2002, was provided after he had been subjected to enhanced interrogation. The practical result of this fact is that infonnation obtained from Abu Zubaydah after April 15, 2002, can no longer be disregarded by the Study and must be factored into the assessment of the executive branch's effectiveness claims concerning the enhanced interrogation techniques along with the significant amount of important information obtained from Zubaydah following his second period of enhanced interrogation, which began on
589¶August 4 , 2 0 0 2 , G i v e n the breadth o f the information provided by Abu Zubaydah after April 15, 2 0 0 2 , and its attendant impact on subsequent intelligence efforts by the U n i t e d States g o v e r n m e n t and its allies, w e conclude that this information supports the C I A ' s specific representations about the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of its Detention and Interrogation Program, including the use of e n h a n c e d interrogation techniques, in relation to the thwarting o f the Dirty Bomb/Tall B u i l d i n g s plot and the capture of Jose Padilla.
¶The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh
¶Study Claim: [Redacted] "A review of CIA records found no connection
between Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al- Shibh's capture... While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, there is no indication that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts. Further, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."142
¶Fact: f F [Redacted] 1 ^ CIA records demonstrate that Abu Zubaydah
was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques during two separate periods in April 2002 and August 2002. During these timeframes, Abu Zubaydah made several photographic identifications of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and provided information that bin al-Shibh had been in Kandahar at the end of 2001, but was then working with KSM in Karachi, Pakistan. More important, Abu Zubaydah provided information about how he would go about locating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates in Karachi. This information caused [Redacted] Pakistani authorities to intensify their efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al- Qa'ida associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11,2002.
¶[Redacted] T h e claim made in this c a s e study relies, in part, upon the factually incorrect premise that Abu Zubaydah w a s not subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques until A u g u s t 4, 2 0 0 2 . 1 4 3 A s previously demonstrated, A b u Zubaydah w a s first subjected to the e n h a n c e d interrogation techniques o f sleep deprivation, nudity, and dietary
¶SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 318.
¶1 2
¶Compare SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 323 with supra, pp. 33-36. 29 manipulation on April 15, 2002.144 See supra, pp. 33-36. The CIA began subjecting Abu Zubaydah to monitored sleep deprivation on April 15, 2002, the day he was discharged from the hospital. He was continued on a liquid diet and subjected to nudity. All three of these interrogation techniques were subsequently and formally categorized by the Department of Justice as "enhanced interrogation techniques." See CIA, H B f 10043, April 15, 2002, p. 2; CIA, [Redacted] 10047, April 16, 2002, p. 2; Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, May 30. 2005., Re; Application of United States Obligations under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS 2009-1810, Tab- 11). ^ ^ Abu Zubaydah's second period of enhanced interrogation, which included the use of the waterboard, began on August 4, 2002.145 See CIA, [Redacted] 10586, August 04, 2002, p. 4.
590¶The Study also incorrectly claims that "there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts."146 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 318. While the CIA Study Response appears to concede this point unnecessarily,147 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C). June 27, 2013, p. 23 ("It is true that Abu [Zubaydah] provided no information specifically on Bin al-Shibh's whereabouts . . ..") (emphasis added). CIA and FBI records establish that Abu Zubaydah did provide locational information about Ramzi bin al-Shibh. Specifically, he noted that he had seen bin al-Shibh in Kandahar, Afghanistan, at the end of 2001, and that he was aware that bin al-Shibh was presently working with KSM in Karachi, Pakistan.
¶[Redacted] enhanced interrogation, an FBI interrogator showed him a photograph of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. According to the FBI, Abu Zubaydah said that he knew the man in the photograph as "Ramzi bin al-Shiba" and that he had seen him with a group of Arabs shortly after a missile strike in Kandahar, Afghanistan, on the house of Taib Agha, Mullah Omar's secretary.148 See FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. April 18, 2002, 6:1© a.m. to 10:40 a.m., p 1. This information appears to place bin al-Shibh in Kandahar in the November 2001 timeframe, roughly five months prior to this interview with Abu Zubaydah. On June 2, 2002, the FBI again showed Abu Zubaydah a photograph of bin al-Shibh. This time Abu Zubaydah provided some additional information, stating that he knew this man as "Al-Sheeba," whom he saw with KSM in Kandahar around December 2001, near the end of Ramadan. He also noted that al-Shibh speaks Arabic like a Yemeni and that he had seen al-Shibh in the media after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.149 See FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. June 3, 2002, 4:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m., p 3; CIA, [Redacted] 2 8 J u n e 7, 2002, p. 5. On August 21, 2002, during his second period of enhanced interrogation, Abu Zubaydah "immediately recognized the photograph of Ramzi bin al Shibh."150 CIA, [Redacted] 10656, August 21, 2002, p. 2. See also C I A [Redacted] 10654, August 21, 2002, p. 1-2. Abu Zubaydah mentioned that he had heard "that al-Shibh had stayed at the secret guest house in Qandahar that Mukhtar had established for the pilots and others destined to be involved in the 9/11 attacks."151 CIA, [Redacted] 10656, August 21, 2002, p. 3.
¶[Redacted] identified a picture of bin al-Shibh as "al-Shiba" and "noted that he is always with (KSM)"m If that assertion was true, then Abu Zubaydah was essentially suggesting that bin al-Shibh was with KSM in or around Karachi, Pakistan, because he had also informed his interrogators that KSM was located in or around Karachi.153 The draft report of this interview states: (1) "Abu Jafar told [Abu ZubaydahJ that he and his friend had to get to Karachi because they had business with Muhktar"; (2) "This [group of 11 Filipinos or Malaysians] was on their way to Karachi to meet up with Muhktar"; (3) "the American and Kenyan [Zubaydah] sent to Muhktar in mid-March 2002 . . . [Zubaydah] actually sent them to Hassan Ghul and Aiiumullah (in Karachi) who would have then arranged for them to be taken to Muhktar"; and (4) "Subject advised that, prior to his arrest he was trying to coordinate a trip to Karachi to meet with Muhktar." FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 20, 5:25 p.m. to 8:40 p.m., pp. 3 and 5. Abu Zubaydah confirmed this association while being subjected to enhanced interrogation on August 21, 2002, when he stated that bin al-Shibh was "one of the operatives working for Mukhtar aka Khalid Shaykh Mohammad,"154 CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted] u s t 26, 2002, p. 4. again suggesting that bin al-Shibh was likely in Karachi.
591¶[Redacted] The Study's claim that it found "no connection" between Abu Zubaydah's reporting and Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture is the result of poor analysis. On August 20, 2002, during his second period of enhanced interrogation, when asked how he would find his former al-Qa'ida associates if he were set free, Abu Zubaydah told CIA interrogators that he would contact the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul, who could put him in touch with Hassan Ghul and other senior al-Qa'ida members.135 The Study frames this interchange much more narrowly. It asserts that "Abu Zubaydah was asked specifically how he would find Hassan Ghul. In response, Abu Zubaydah provided corroborative reporting: that Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through a well-known associate."156 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 323. This narrow framing of the question and response enables the Study to conclude incorrectly that the capture of bin al-Shibh was an "unexpected" result of the raids that failed to capture Hassan Ghul.157 See SSCI Study, Executive Summitry, December 3. 2014. pp, 75,318, and 320. The Study's approach fails to understand the causal link between Abu Zubaydah's information and the successful Karachi safe house raids of September 11, 2002, which resulted in the collection of important intelligence information and the capture of 11 al-Qa'ida associates, including Ramzi bin al- Shibh.
¶[Redacted] About six weeks before Abu Zubaydah identified the significance of the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul, Pakistani a u t h o r i t i [Redacted]
12ar [Redacted] raided the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul's home [Redacted] ty July
¶2002. The well-known associate of Hassan Ghul was interviewed on the spot and cooperated authori[Redacted] The known associate of III in I [Redacted] illi lln I1 il i I Ill i in nli mil a home where Hassan Ghul formerly resided.158 See CIA, CIA CABLE 11755[Redacted] The CLA officers observed that the location was "extremely close to (if not an exact match)" to a location where KSM once resided, according to a June 18, 2002, report from the FBI.159 See CIA, CIA CABLE 11755[Redacted]
592¶The Study dismisses Abu Zubaydah's identification of the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul as mere ''corroborative reporting," and does not attach the appropriate significance to this information because of its rigid adherence to its flawed analytical methodology, which presumes that anything corroborative cannot be considered as "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence."160 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 323. The facts tell a different story. Abu Zubaydah was a recognized senior member of al-Qa'ida who had direct ties to multiple high-ranking terrorists, including Usama Bin Ladin. The CIA was focused on Hassan Ghul, another well-connected senior member of al-Qa'ida, and "other" al-Qa'ida associates of Abu Zubaydah. Therefore, Abu Zubaydah's disclosures were deemed by the CIA as significant and actionable intelligence. When Abu Zubaydah identified the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul as the first person he would contact to reconnect with Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates, it is very likely that collecting additional intelligence from the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul became a top operational priority for U.S. and Pakistani officials.
[Redacted] It is not surprising that CIA Headquarters [Redacted] on [Redacted] August 29, 2002, to request that Pakistani officials "reinterview the well-known
¶associateofllassaii Ghul for additional intelligence on Hassan Ghul."161 CIA, ALEC [Redacted] g u s t 29, 2002, p. 3. On September 3, 2002, [Redacted] reported that Pakistani officials had re-interviewed the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul an unknown number of times and that these officials noted that at times the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul contradicted himself.162 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12207, September 5, 2002, p. 2. On September 9, 2002, Pakistani officials returned to the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul's home and interviewed another well-known associate of Hassan Ghul who had recently returned t o [Redacted] The other well-known associate of Hassan Ghul cooperated and disclosed t h e l o c a t i o [Redacted] Hassan Ghul's apartment, which was promptly raided but found to be empty.163 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12249, September 9, 2002, p. 2. Pakistani authorities interviewed [Redacted] n i 1 learned that while Hassan Ghul had vacated the apartment, he was scheduled to return to the complex [Redacted]
593¶M u h a m m a d Ali bin Attash, and other a l - Q a ' i d a m e m b e r s . 1 6 7 T h e s e raids a l s o resulted in the c o l l e c t i o n o f important a l - Q a ' i d a operational d o c u m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g f i n a n c i a l records a n d the c o d e d " p e r f u m e letter." 1 6 8
¶[Redacted] T h e S t u d y ' s c l a i m s with respect to the capture o f R a m z i bin a l - S h i b h d o not h o l d u p under a c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n of the C I A d o c u m e n t a r y record. T h e r e w a s a direct c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y A b u Z u b a y d a h during his s e c o n d p e r i o d o f e n h a n c e d interrogation and bin a l - S h i b h ' s capture. A b u Z u b a y d a h had i n f o r m e d h i s interrogators that b i n a l - S h i b h w a s o n e of K S M ' s o p e r a t i v e s in Karachi. Z u b a y d a h c o n f i r m e d the i m p o r t a n c e the w e l l - k n o w n a s s o c i a t e o f H a s s a n G h u l to l o c a t e H a s s a n G h u l a n d other al- Q a ' i d a a s s o c i a t e s operating in Karachi, i n c l u d i n g bin a l - S h i b h .
¶S i n c e the S t u d y ' s c l a i m s o n this t o p i c d o not h o l d up t o factual scrutiny, its c r i t i c i s m s o f the C I A representations with r e s p e c t to R a m z i b i n a l - S h i b h a n d President B u s h ' s r e f e r e n c e s t o b i n a l - S h i b h in h i s S e p t e m b e r 6 , 2 0 0 6 , s p e e c h o n the C I A ' s D e t e n t i o n and Interrogation P r o g r a m are not valid. T h e C I A said A b u Z u b a y d a h ' s " k n o w l e d g e o f a l - Q a ' i d a l o w e r - l e v e l facilitators, m o d u s operandi and s a f e h o u s e s . . . p l a y e d a k e y role in the ultimate capture o f R a m z i bin a l - S h i b h . " 1 6 9 Far f r o m a "misrepresentation," that statement w a s c o m p l e t e l y accurate and c o n s i s t e n t with the c i r c u m s t a n c e s that l e d to bin a l - S h i b h ' s ultimate capture. S i m i l a r l y , the text in President B u s h ' s S e p t e m b e r 6, 2 0 0 6 , s p e e c h o n the C I A ' s D e t e n t i o n and Interrogation Program noting that "the i n f o r m a t i o n Z u b a y d a h p r o v i d e d h e l p e d l e a d to the capture o f B i n a l s h i b h " w a s also a c c u r a t e . 1 7 0
T h e capture o f R a m z i bin al-Shibh and the other a l - Q a ' i d a terrorists during [Redacted] [Redacted] raids o f S e p t e m b e r 10-11, 2 0 0 2 , w e r e stunning operational s u c c e s s e s , m a d e
¶p o s s i b l e , in part, b y the C I A ' s D e t e n t i o n and Interrogation Program.
¶The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad
¶Study Claim: ^ d [Redacted] ) "£T]here are no CIA records to support the
assertion that Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other CIA detainee played any role in the 'the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.'"171 SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 327. ' 41 inn 11 III I [Redacted] MI IMI'I
¶Fact: f F [Redacted] [Redacted] P ^ Information obtained from CIA detainee Abu
Zubaydah was essential to furthering the CIA's understanding of KSM's role in the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks and helped lead to the
¶167 '"7 See CIA, ALEC [Redacted] e m b e r 11, 2002, pp. 2-3. Madni informed the arresting officers that Abu Badr was a "major al-Qa'ida [facilitator!." See also CIA, CIA CABLE 12267, September 11, 2002, pp. 2-4. He also gave [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] I information about the locations of al- ja'ida-affiliated residences and safe houses in Karachi. CIA, CIA CABLE 12251, September [Redacted] 0 0 2 , p. 2; CIA, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] September [Redacted] 2002, pp. 3-4.
594capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] interrogations of bin al-Shibh and DETAINEE R provided key insights about K . S [Redacted] S S ^ H H S B H E Information produced through detainee interrogation was pivotal to the retention of a key CIA asset whose cooperation led directly to the capture of KSM.
¶[Redacted] The Study almost exclusively attributes the capture of KSM to a "unilateral CIA asset."172 We agree with the Study that this asset provided information that was crucial to KSM's capture in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on March 1, 2003.173 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 20'14, p. 327. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] We also acknowledge that the CIA had met with the asset as early as fall 2001 and that the asset had provided good intelligence information related to KSM. However, the Study fails to acknowledge the cascading sequence of revelations that began with Abu Zubaydah's identification of the importance of the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul and culminated in the information provided by the asset which led directly to the capture of KSM. Moreover, the Study does not recognize that, but for the fortuitous intervention of a CIA officer—who was aware of recently obtained detainee information which corroborated the asset's claims concerning KSM—the asset would have been terminated as a CIA source prior to providing the crucial pre-capture information about KSM.174 See CIA Oral History Program. Interview of/REDACTED] by (REDACTED], October 14, 2004, pp. 5-7.
¶[Redacted] As stated previously, information obtained from Abu Zubaydah about KSM prior to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques was key to the CIA's realization of KSM's operational significance. The CIA disseminated an intelligence report, [Redacted] within the Intelligence Community [Redacted] detailing KSM's identification as "Mukhtar" and his role as the mastermind of 9/11.175 See CIA, [Redacted] R c . s p o n [Redacted] indicated they followed up and requested more information [Redacted] on him.176 See CIA, [Redacted] Zubaydah's FBT interrogator Ali Soufan also described the information from Zubaydah on KSM as significant. In 2008, Soufan told Committee staff that when Zubaydah provided that information, "we had no idea at the time that Mukhtar was the KSM from 9/11. . . . Because we had been working so diligently on trying to figure out the puzzles of 9/11 and who is Mukhtar, and when Abu Zubaydah said that, I think the picture was complete,"177 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent, Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008 (DTS 2008-2411). Also, on May 13, 2009, Soufan told the Senate Judiciary Committee that prior to Zubaydah providing information on KSM's role as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, "we had no idea of KSM's role in 9/11 or of his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure."178 Ali Soufan, Statement for the Record, before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Mav 13, 2009.
¶!
595¶The chain of events leading to KSM's capture begins in earnest with Zubaydah's interrogation on August 20, 2002, when, during his second period of being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, he was asked how he would go about locating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates if he were to be released."9 Zubaydah responded to this question by stating that he would reach out to [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul] [Redacted] t o reconnect with Ghul and others.180 See CIA. ALEC [Redacted] |August 29,2002, p. 2-4. As explained in greater detail in our discussion about the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, this information from Zubaydah caused [Redacted] Pakistani authorities to intensify their investigative efforts [ the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul] w ho ha^beeryareviously located, interviewed, and survcillcd.181 18t See supra, pp. 37-41. These investigative efforts resulted in [Redacted] [Redacted] t a n i raids of safe houses in Karachi on September 10-11, 2002.182 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12251, September [Redacted] 2002, p. 2; CIA, CIA 468392 [Redacted] September [Redacted] Ramzi bin al-Shibh was among those captured during these raids.
¶[Redacted] Ramzi bin al-Shibh becomes one of the next links in the effort to track down and capture KSM. Shortly after his capture in Karachi, bin al-Shibh was transferred [Redacted] In late [Redacted] 2002|
¶| Ramzi indicated [Redacted] that the best way to find KSM is to f i n [Redacted] m m a f who is also in Karachi."183 pp. 3-4. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] A few days later, in a photographic identification, bin al-Shibh confirmed that 9/11 financier, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, was Ammar al-Baluchi, [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 8 4 The Study that "Ammar Baluchi played no role in the operation that captured KSM, which centered a r o u [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] 185 While Ammar might not have played a direct role in the "operation" that captured KSM, bin al-Shibh's key insights about Ammar clarified his importance such that Alec Station highlighted bin al-Shibh's photo-identification of Ammar al-Baluchi as a breakthrough.186 See CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] Moreover, according to the CIA, bin al-Shibh's information about Ammar al Baluchi was used to interrogate DETAINEE R.1S7This claim is supported by a CIA requirements cable which contained numerous questions concerning KSM [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] DETAINEE R provided background and physical details on KSM [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶DETAINEE [Redacted] [Redacted]
596¶1190 [Redacted] T h e n e x t day | the CTA interrogators c o n t i n u i n g their q u e s t i o n i n g of D E T A I N E E R o n the topic o f KS?
¶E T A I N E E R providec
¶In late 2 0 0 2 • • • • • • • i D E T A I N E E R w a s r e n d e r e d i n t o O ^ u s t o d ^ n d subjected t t ^ i r f u i n c e d i n t e ^ g a t i o n t e c h n i q u e s . H H H S B H • 9 R 9 9 C I [Redacted] reported that [Redacted] "said in n o uncertain terms that n o n e o f the i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y D E T A I N E E R has b e e n o f any u s e and | E w a s t e d t i m e here c h a s i n g p e o p l e and p l a c e s that are probably b o g u s . " C I A [Redacted] j u r g e d interrogators to r e a d d r e s ^ h ^ s s u e s w i d i D E T A I N E E R and acquire m o r e — a n d m o r e a c c u r a t e — i n f o r m a t i o n . 1 9 2 [Redacted] A I N E E R w a s a s k e d to p r o v i d e as m u c h Ideational i n f o r m a t i o n as p o s s i b l e o n I [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] This brings us to A S S E T X , w h o w a s initially undervalued b y the C I A , d e s p i t e h i s repeated c l a i m s that h e c o u l d h e l p l o c a t e K S M in Pakistan. In [Redacted] 2 0 0 1 the a s s e t d e c l i n e d to w o r l ^ v i t h the C I A b e c a u s e h i s p r o p o s e d f i n a n c i a l c o m p e n s a t i o n p a c k a g e had b e e n rejected. In [Redacted] 0 0 2 , the Counterterrorism C e n t e r directed recruiters to reconnect with A S S E T X.194 o f that s a m e [Redacted] year, h e w a s a s s i g n e d to a n e w c a s e o f f i c e r . T h e c a s e o f f i c e r w a s unfamiliar with A S S E T X ' s potential to p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n that m i g h t l e a d to the l o c a t i o n o f K S M , and the c a b l e s he sent to C I A Headquarters in pursuit o f g u i d a n c e in h a n d l i n g the asset w e n t unread and u n a n s w e r e d w h e n they w e r e re-routed to a c o m p a r t m e n t e d t e a m w h i c h had b e e n d i s b a n d e d . 1 9 5
¶[Redacted] H a v i n g heard n o t h i n g back f r o m C I A Headquarters, the c a s e o f f i c e r w a s o n the verge o f terminating the C I A ' s relationship w i t h the a s s e t in [Redacted] 2 0 0 2 . W h e n the c a s e o f f i c e r m e t with his C h i e f o f B a s e to d i s c u s s the termination, b y c h a n c e , another C I A o f f i c e r w i t h prior operational c o n t a c t w i t h the a s s e t 1 9 6 o v e r h e a r d their c o n v e r s a t i o n a ^ ^ w a s w a i t i n g to m e e t w i t h the C h i e f o f B a s e . T h i s other C I A o f f i c e r [Redacted] [Redacted]in^orriejTo^ [Redacted] that reported i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m D E T A I N E E R [Redacted]
597¶A l t h o u g h A S S E T X ' s contributions w e r e clearly important tn K S M ' s c a p t u r e , the true linchpin in the operation w a s the visiting o f f i c e r ' s familiarity with the c r u c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n that the d e t a i n e e s had p r o v i d e d about K S M . I n f o r m a t i o n f r o m D E T A I N E E R background a n d | ^ H H H I I I H I infonnation on K S M H H 0 | l i e s a t t h e c n d o f a c a u s a l chain that traces b a c k through R a m z i bin a l - S h i b h and A b u Z u b a y d a h . A b s e n t this c o l l e c t i v e b ^ j ^ n n f o r m a t i o n , the requisite understanding o f K S M ' s activities, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l stature, H H H H H H H i w o u l d h a v e e l u d e d analysts, to m a k e n o t h i n g o f the fact A S S E T X ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the C I A w o u l d h a v e b e e n terminated in [Redacted] 0 2 ; m o n t h s in a d v a n c e o f K S M ' s M a r c h 2 0 0 3 capture.
¶The Disruption of the Karachi Hotels Bombing Plot
¶Study Claim: [Redacted] "[T]he CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques—to include the waterboard—played no role in the disruption of the Karachi Plot(s)."198 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 242.
¶Fact: (U) CIA documents show that key intelligence collected through the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program, including information obtained after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, played a major role in disrupting the Karachi hotels bombing plot.
¶[Redacted] A s the S t u d y notes, the r e f e r e n c e to the "Karachi P l o t ( s ) " ii < i i h i mi i I H M H I H W I 'in »i I Mini terrorist plotting ascarly as September 11, 2002, in the form of the "perfume letter," which was obtained during a M B raid [Redacted] S f l ^ ^ U f f i S S S f f i i o f a s a f e house in Karachi, Pakistan.201 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 242; CIA, ALEC [Redacted]October 03, 2002, p. 2; and CIA, ALEC [Redacted] o b e r 3, 2002, pp. 2-4. What the Study fails to point out, however, is that Abu Zubaydah provided crucial information which played a big role in leading to the H | raids of the al-Qa'ida safe houses on September 11, 2002—the samcraids that yielded the "perfume letter" and disrupted the Karachi hotels plot. Specifically, [Redacted] raids were the direct result of information provided by Abu Zubaydah on August 20, 2002, during his second period of enhanced interrogation. 2 0 2
598¶[Redacted] When asked how he would go about finding his former al- Qa'ida associates if he were set free, Abu Zubaydah told CIA interrogators that he would contact a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul who could put him in touch with Ghul and other senior al-Qa'ida members.203 S e e C I A , Captures Resulting From Detainee Information: Four Case Studies, November 26, 2003. p.2; CIA, [Redacted] 10644. A u g u s ^ ^ M 2 ^ ^ 2 ^ C l A ^ L E C B [Redacted] g u s t 29.2002. : pp. 2-3. CIA officers then asked Pakistani officials to question the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul, who on September 7, 2002, provided vague information the Pakistanis assessed was untruthful.204 See CIA, A L E [Redacted] A CABLE 12207. September 05.2002, pp. 2-3. The Pakistanis continued to watch the residence and, when another well-known associate of Hassan Ghul returned to the residence, questioned the other well-known associate of Hassan Ghul as well. The other well-known associate of Hassan Ghul cooperated and provided the location of Ghul's last apartment.205 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12249, September 09; 2002, p. 2. This information led to the arrest, on September 9, 2002, of an individual thought to be Ghul206 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12251, September[Redacted] 2002, p. 2., but who turned out to be another al- Qa'ida terrorist.207 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12254, September 10, 2002. p. 4; CIA, ALEC [Redacted] Abu Zubaydah then positively identified this terrorist as Abu Badr, "KSM's driver and KSM's man in Karachi," facilitating the movement of al-Qa'ida operatives.208 CIA, ALEC [Redacted] Badr's driver, who was also arrested, identified information about several al-Qa'ida safehouses and residences in Karachi.209 See CIA. CIA CABLE 12251, September[Redacted] 2002, p. 2.
[Redacted] Based on this information, on September 11, 2002, [Redacted] [Redacted] conducted [Redacted] raids, which resulted in the arrests of several terrorists and
¶key documents, including one dubbed the "perfume letter" because the word "perfumes" was used as a codeword.210 See CIA. CIA CABLE 12267, September 11,2002, p. 2; CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted] t o b e r 03, 2002. p. 2. In this May 2002 letter, KSM told Hamza Zubayr, a terrorist killed in the same raids, he would provide him with $30,000, with another $20,000 available upon request, and that "we have acquired the green light that is strong for the [hotels]" clearly indicating a plot of some kind.2'1 More troubling, the ietter suggested "[increasing] the number to make it three instead of one."212 CIA, CIA CABLE 33804, September 1<9, 2002, p. 4. ' 46 Were it not for Abu Zubaydah's original information about the significance o f the w e l l - k n o w n a s s o c i a t e o f Hassan Ghul, w h i c h led to the Karachi s a f e h o u s e raids, it is u n c l e a r i f the " p e r f u m e letter" w o u l d e v e r h a v e b e e n f o u n d .
599¶p r o v i d i n g the true s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the w e l l - k n o w n a s s o c i a t e o f H a s s a n G h u l . Z u b a y d a h s u b s e q u e n t l y translated the "perfume letter" for the C I A , i d e n t i f i e d the k e y w o r d in the l e t t e r — " h o t e l s " — t h a t h a d not b e e n p r e v i o u s l y translated, and told the C I A that the r e f e r e n c e to " K h a l l a d " in the letter m a y b e the "one l e g g e d Y e m e n i . " A C I A analyst n o t e d that the o n e - l e g g e d Y e m e n i w a s terrorist Khallad b i n Attash, w h o w a s later arrested and admitted to his i n v o l v e m e n t i n the p l o t . 2 1 3
¶[Redacted] B y early O c t o b e r 2 0 0 2 , the C I A had c o m p l e t e d a search o f the i n d i v i d u a l s i d e n t i f i e d in the "perfume letter" a n d c o n c l u d e d that m o s t o f t h o s e w h o had b e e n a s s i g n e d r o l e s in support o f the h o t e l s operation had b e e n arrested or k i l l e d b y the Pakistani authorities d u r i n g the S e p t e m b e r 11, 2 0 0 2 raids. 2 1 4 A l t h o u g h the Karachi h o t e l s plot had b e e n thwarted b y t h e s e raids, at least o n e o f the i n d i v i d u a l s i d e n t i f i e d by A b u Z u b a y d a h in the letter, KhallacH3ii^ttasMHmowiK^ r e m a i n e d at large. 2 1 5 E v e n t u a l l y , on April 2 8 , 2003, [Redacted] w a s a b l e to capture several a l - Q a ' i d a operatives, i n c l u d i n g A m m a r a l - B a l u c h i and bin Attash, [Redacted] a l s o s u c c e s s f u l l y c o n f i s c a t e d e x p l o s i v e s , detonators, and a m m u n i t i o n as part of the capture o p e r a t i o n . 2 1 6
¶[Redacted] O n M a y 17, 2 0 0 3 , Khallad bin Attash c o n f i r m e d that A m m a r a l - B a l u c h i had intended to use the e x p l o s i v e s stashed for that operation to target the U . S . C o n s u l a t e . 2 1 7 T h e n e x t d a [Redacted] indicated its c l e a r understanding o f h o w t h e s e interrelated Karachi plot e v e n t s had i m p r o v e d the U . S . security posture in the area w h e n it noted that a l t h o u g h its o p t i o n s to e n h a n c e security:
m a y appear limited . . , [Redacted] a n d w h a t w e h a v e s e e n o v e r past m o n t h s as an increased a g g r e s s i v e n e s s o f local authorities h a v e p r o v i d e d s o m e protection f r o m these threats. W e p o i n t s p e c i f i c a l l y t o the 11 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 2 raids in Karachi, the 1 M a r c h 2 0 0 3 t a k e - d o w n o f K S M , and to the r e c e n t arrests of a l - B a l u c h i and ba Attash as e x a m p l e s of. h o w [Redacted] have thwarted a t t a c k s . 2 1 8
¶The Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots
¶Study Claim: f F [Redacted] [Redacted] F ) "[C]ontrary to CIA representations, information
600acquired during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in 'alert[ing]' the CIA to the threat to—or the
¶""ii i i ii i i M M M f f l H l l W B I M I ii »»i inn 11
'disrupting]' the plotting against—Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf."219 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 297-298.
¶Fact: f ^ ^ V B H H I ^ ^ H H ^ ) The CIA interrogation program played a key role in disrupting the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plotting.
¶Despite its claim that information acquired during or after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques played "no role" in the disruption of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plots, the Study twice concedes these plots were "fully disrupted" with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin Attash.220 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 295 and 299. The Study then incorrectly asserts that "ftjhere are no CIA records to indicate that any of the detainees was captured as a result of CIA detainee reporting."221 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 299. -m As we have previously demonstrated, information obtained from the CIA interrogation program played a key role in the capture of al-Shibh and KSM.222 See supra, pp. 37-45. Also, Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided information about Ammar al-Baluchi and Abu Zubaydah provided information about Khallad bin Attash prior to their arrests.223 See supra, pp. 43 and 47. The same detainee information that helped lead to the capture of these terrorists also played a key role in fully disrupting the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plots.
¶[Redacted] Thus far, the following analytical dominoes have fallen in relation to the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plots: (1) "There is considerable evidence that the information Abu Zubaydah provided identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the mastermind of 9/11 was significant to CIA analysts, operators, and FBI interrogators";224 See supra, pp. 29-33. (2) "Abu Zubaydah provided information about how he would go about locating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates in Karachi. This information caused [Redacted] Pakistani authorities to intensify their efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al-Qa'ida associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002";225 See supra, pp. 37-41. (3) "Information produced through detainee interrogation was pivotal to the retention of a key CIA asset whose cooperation led directly to the capture of KSM";226 See supra, pp. 41-45. (4) Zubaydah told the CIA that the reference to "Khallad" in the letter may be the "one legged Yemeni";227 E-mail from: CIA analyst; to: [Redacted]: subject: Re: AZ on the perfume letter; date: October 10, 2002, at 9:50 AM, p. 6. and (5) Pakistan's arrest of al- Qa'ida terrorists Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad Bin Attash disrupted the al-Qa'ida plot to attack the U.S. Consulate in Karachi.228 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (Tab C), p : 6. Taken together, these significant operational accomplishments, most of them resulting from information obtained from CIA detainees, also had the added bonus of disrupting the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plots.
¶[Redacted] interrogation program played no role in the disruption of the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plotting almost immediately after its narrative on the plots begins. The Study says "records indicate the Heathrow Airport plotting had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages when the operation was fully disrupted with the detention of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (detained on September 11, 2002), KSM (detained on March 1, 2003), Ammar al-Baluchi (detained on April 29, 2003), and Khallad bin Attash (detained on April 29, 2003)."229 SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, pp. 1000-1062. As we explained previously, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was detained as a result of information provided by Abu Zubaydah during a period of enhanced interrogation.230 See supra pp. 37-41. By asserting that the detention of Ramzi bin al-Shibh played a role in the disruption of the plot, certainly the detainee information that led to his detention also played a role in the plbt's disruption.
601¶[Redacted] Additionally, while the Study claims that the CIA already had information in its possession prior to the detention and interrogation of those detainees the CIA credits with providing information on the plot (KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin Attash), much of that reporting, including identification of Heathrow airport as the target, came fronwnterTogations of Ramzi bin al-Shibh occurring prior to CIA custody. Again, [Redacted] "
¶[Redacted] were only able to detain and question Ramzi bin al-Shibh because information provided by Abu Zubaydah in CIA detention led to bin al-Shibh's arrest.
¶[Redacted] While the Study cites a CIA document to support its claim that the plot "was fully disrupted" with the arrests of the four previously mentioned terrorists, the CIA document says that the plot was "disrupted," not "fully disrupted."231 SSCI Study, Volume 11, April 1, 2014, pp. 976-78. Perhaps for that reason, the CIA continued to interrogate detainees about the plot, long after the arrests of both Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM, to uncover more details about the plot and any operatives. For example, the CIA confronted Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM about e-mail addresses found in KSM's computer that belonged to the two Saudi-based operatives who could have been used in the plot, Ayyub and Azmari.232 See SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, p. 983. Although the Study notes that these two operatives were "unwitting" of the Heathrow plot, they appear to have been willing terrorist operatives, as the CIA learned that Ayyub participated in a suicide attack in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on May 12, 2003, that killed 36 individuals and injured more than 160 others. Azmari was arrested on July I, 2003 for his connections to the attack.233 SSCI Study, Volume II, p. 983 n.4387.
¶[Redacted] Additionally, as noted in several papers and briefings by the CIA, in mid-March 2003, the CIA questioned KSM about a hand-drawn illustration in his notebook of what appeared to be an I-beam with the term "Wharf" written in English, and "Cannery Wharf' in Arabic.234 CIA. WASHINGTON DC [Redacted] CIA. [Redacted] 110787, March 13,2003, p. 3. KSM told interrogators it was part of the "Heathrow program" to target Canary Wharf in London as well, a target that had not been previously discussed by other detainees,235 See CIA. [Redacted] 10787. March 13, 2003, p. 3. f F ^ I H ^ O H i B ^ A t t e r the detention in April 29, 2003, of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi, debriefers used the reporting from KSM and bin al-Shibh to confront them. In a document explaining the value of detainee reporting provided to the Department of Justice, CIA explained:
602Khallad admitted to having been involved in the plot and revealed that he directed group leader Hazim al-Sha'ir to begin locating pilots who could hijack planes and crash them into the airport. Khallad said he and operative Abu Talha al-Pakistani considered [Redacted] countries as possiblejaunch sites for the hijacking attempts and that they narrowed the options to the [Redacted] Khallad's statements provided leverage in debriefings of KSM. KSM fleshed out the status of the operation, including identifying an additional target in the United Kingdom, Canary Wharf.236 CIA, Briefing Notes on the. Value of Detainee Reporting, April 8, 2005, 10:47am, p. 4. In the years that followed the initial arrest of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, CIA officers
¶continued to unravel the details of this plotting and provided information that helped lead to the detention and questioning of several other individuals involved in the plot.237 See SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, pp. 1000-1062. In light of the information cited above, the Study's assertion that the CIA interrogation program played "no role" in the disruption of this plotting makes little sense, especially when the Study's own 62- page chart identifying the intelligence on the Heathrow plot devotes most of the pages to information from detainees in CIA's program or to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was captured because of CIA detainee information.238 See SSCI Study. Volume II, April 1,2014, pp. 1000-1062.
¶The Capture of Hambali
¶Study Claim: [Redacted] "A review of CIA operational cables and other
records found that information obtained from KSM during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the capture of Hambali."239 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 305.
¶Fact: [Redacted] CIA documents show that the interrogation of
KSM and al-Qa'ida operative Zubair, during and after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on both individuals, played a key role in the capture of Hambali. S ^ y ' s ; claim that the enhanced interrogation of KSM
¶played "no role" in the capture of Hambali is not accurate, because two detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM and Mohd Farik bin Amin, a senior member of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and more commonly known as "Zubair,240 The Study acknowledges that Zubair was immediately subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques upon being transferred into CIA custody on June[Redacted]Q03. See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 309. It attempts to downplay this fact by noting that: (I) "CIA records indicate that Thai authorities were unilaterally following investigative leads related to Hambali and Zubair" and that "[i|t is unknown what specific investigative steps were taken by Thai authorities (or the CIA) between early June 2003 and July 16, 2003, to provided significant information that helped lead to the capture of Hambali.
603¶( - T S g H ^ ^ H g g g g N F ) The claim that the enhanced interrogation of KSM played "no role"' in the capture of Hambali ignores the fact that KSM provided the crucial piece of information permitting the CIA to recognize the significance of, and act upon, previously known connections that would ultimately lead to Hambali's capture. The Study correctly points out that on March 6, 2003, Majid Khan told foreign government H f l H H interrogators about his travel to Bangkok in December 2002 and provision of $50,000 to an individual named "Zubair" at the behest of al-Qa'ida.241 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 307-308. While the Study would like the reader to infer that Majid Khan provided a sufficient connection to Hambali, the Study ignores the fact that Khan never mentioned that the money was destined for Hambali. Moreover, the Study excludes the CIA's answer to the following question for the record: "Was there enough other information linking Zubair and Hambali?" The CIA's answer states:
No. We assess, and believe the documentary record indicates that otherwise available intelligence was not sufficient to enable officers at the time to conclude Zubair was a targeting inroad to Hambali. A targeting study on Hambali in the late December timeframe, for example, lists a number of potential inroads but not Zubair. A look at the contemporaneous records as well as a plot summary from years later provide no evidence that Zubair played a role in the Bali Bombings.242 CIA Response to SSCI Request for Information. October 25, 2013, p. 4 (DTS 2013-3152). This answer contradicts the assertion by the Study that "[bly this time, the CIA had significant information—prior to KSM's capture—indicating that a 'Zubai^)lavedacentrul supporting role in the JI, was affiliated with al-Qa'ida figures like KSM. had expertise in [Redacted] i n Southeast Asia, and was suspected of playing a role in Hambali's October 12, 2002, Bali bombings." SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3,2014, p. 306-307.
¶While Majid Khan's information was still an important piece of the puzzle, it is clear that something more was needed to help locate. Hambali. That "something more" would come from KSM several days later.
¶f K [Redacted] KSM had been rendered into CIA custody on March [Redacted] 2003, and immediately subjected to enhanced interrogation.243 See CIA. [CIA CABLE] 34491, March 5, 2003, pp. 1-3. On March 11, 2003, KSM admitted to providing Hambali with $50,000 to conduct a terrorist attack in "approximately November 2002." KSM reported, however, that the money was "necessary materials" for a Hambali operation that was approaching "zero hour," information that created a sense of urgency for the CIA to uncover more about Hambali's location.244 CIA, [Redacted] 7 5 5 , March 11, 2003. During this interrogation, KSM made no reference to Majid Khan or Zubair.245 See C I A [Redacted] [Redacted] 10755. March 11, 2003. pp. 1-3. [Redacted] On March 13, 2003, [Redacted] sem investigate [BUSINESS Q] [Redacted] [Redacted] a n d tlle C I A has never represented "to policymakers that the information obtained from Zubair after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to Hambali's capture." See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 309, n. 1737. Although we might not know what specific "unilateral" steps were taken by the Thai authorities related to [Redacted] records provide a good description of the information provided b w ^ u b a i t ^ i f t e a h e u ^ techniques and the subsequent steps taken by the CIA, including [Redacted] 1 0 track down and capture Hambali. The absence of a CIA representation about Zubair does not invalidate the assertion that the information he provided after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques may have helped lead to the capture of Hambali, especially since this assertion is supported by the CIA documentary record.
604¶cable saying that in light of KSM's information that he arranged to send $50,000 to Hambali in November 2002 to procure materials for an operation that was approaching "zero hour," "we view [the information] from Majid Khan on his trip to Bangkok for an alleged money transfer between 26-29 December with ever greater concern."246 CIA, CIA CABLE, 81697 [Redacted] Moreover, the same cable makes clear that at the time of KSM's reporting, the CIA did not know whether the information from KSM and Majid Khan were about the same transaction. The cable says, "KSM's information and Majid's 'story' may be urn-elated, but it appears too premature to judge at this juncture, and we must assume they possibly are until additional facts are learned."247 See CIA, CIA CABLE, 81697 [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] On March 17, 2003, KSM was questioned about the Majid Khan network. KSM positively identified a picture of Majid Khan as "Majid aka Yusif, the al- Qa'ida courier" KSM used to deliver the $50,000 for the next big Hambali operation, through "Hambali representatives in Thailand."248 CIA, [Redacted] 0 8 6 5 , March 17, 2003, p. 3. Significantly, KSM said that Khan had not been informed that the money was ultimately for Hambali and that KSM did not know who Hambali's intermediary was.249 See C I A [Redacted] 10865, March 17, 2003, p. 3, Days later, CIA officers still seemed to be trying to understand the connection between the KSM and the Majid Khan reporting. According to a March 20,2003, cable, KSM's reporting that he used Majid Khan as a courier to transport al-Qa'ida funds to Hambali, "appears to confirm station [sic] earlier concerns that the $50,000 transfer involving KSM and Hambali may be one in the same with the $50,000 al-Qa'ida transfer facilitated by Khan.250 CIA, CIA CABLE 81990, March 20. 2Q03, p. 2. Questioned again on March 22, 2003, Khan acknowledged that his trip to Thailand to deliver the $50,000 was at KSM's request.251 See CIA. CIA CABLE 13890, [Redacted]
¶While it would be difficult to know conclusively without talking to the analysts involved, CIA documents indicate it was the combination of reporting from KSM and Majid Khan that led to the efforts to find Hambali through Zubair. A CIA summary of Hambali's capture timeline states, while "numerous sources had placed Hambali in various Southeast Asian countries, it was captured al-Qa'ida leader KSM who put [Redacted] on Hambali's trail"—contradicting the Study's claim that the KSM interrogation played "no role."252 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date. p. 6
¶[Redacted] On June 8, 2003, Zubair was detained by the Government ofThailand. [Redacted] Zubair on [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] corroborated reporting on Business Q, 2 " OiTkine[Redacted]pOO^Zubair was transferred into CIA custody and was immediately subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.254 See CIA [CIA CABLE] 40568, [Redacted] Zubair told his interrogators about [Redacted]
¶I.255 See CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 7; CIA, [CIA CABLE] 40915 [Redacted] [Redacted] CIA, [CIA CABLE] 41017, [Redacted] [Redacted] Zubair
605[Redacted] [Redacted] (the CIA planned an operation to find Hambali by w a t c h i [Redacted] n d
¶waiting for Hambali's [Redacted] It appears that Zubair provided key information about these Hambali facilitators after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, CIA documents show that analysts assessed that it would be "Zubair cohoit and former roommateLili[Redacted] "per thc Zubair now anc ( "findin^ilie, therefore, may be tantamount to finding [Redacted] Hambali."258 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 2. [Redacted] Hambali associate Amer, who actually [Redacted] s tracked and Zubair identified a picture of him and speculated that "Lilie likely tasked [Amer] to handle [Redacted] thus following Amer would likely lead to finding Lilie."259 CIA, Hambali, Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 5. Amer was arrested on August 11, 2003, and cooperated in locating Lilie hours later.260 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 5. Lilie was found to have a key fob in his possession imprinted with an address, which Lilie said was the address of two apartments he used for Hambali's activities, one of which was Hambali's residence.261 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 6. Hambali was captured at the address found on the key fob several hours later.262 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 5. It appears that Zubair's cooperation after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques played a significant role in the capture of Hambali through Amer and Lilie.
¶The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plots and Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group
¶Study Claim: [Redacted] "A review of CIA operational cables and other
606documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the 'discovery' or thwarting of either 'Second Wave' plot. Likewise, records indicate that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the 'discovery' of a 17-member 'cell tasked with executing the 'Second Wave.""263 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 251. This claim has been modified from the version that appeared in Ihe report that was approved by the Committee at the end of the 112th Congress. For example, it no longer claims that the CIA's interrogation program, excluding the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, did not play a role in the thwarting of die al-Ghuraba Group. It also substitutes the words "discovery or thwarting" in place of the original "identification and disruption." (emphasis added).
¶Fact: [Redacted] (TSWWlHWIiWIWIIHMII i The CIA interrogation program played a k e y
role in disrupting the "Second Wa ve" plot and led to the capture of the 17- m e m b e r al-Ghuraba group.
¶The Study asserts that because Hambali's brother, Gun Gun Ruswan Gunawan, first identified a group of 17 Malaysian and Indonesian Jemaah Islamiya (JI) affiliated students in Karachi, "the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali did not result in the 'discovery' of 'the Ghuraba Cell' that was 'tasked with executing the 'Second Wave' plotting."'264 -M SSCI Stud' Ay, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 255-256. While Gunawan did identify the group of JI students in Karachi, the Study ignores that KSM, who had also been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, provided information months earlier on this same group of JI students and their lbcation in Karachi—information that had helped lead to the capture of Gunawan himself. The Study also ignores information provided by other detainees in CIA's interrogation program.
¶[Redacted]
¶Gunawan's role in Karachi as a communications conduit between Hambali and al-Qa'ida and reported that he was living in the dormitory where he was enrolled at Abu Bakr-Sadeeq University.265 See CIA 11192. April 8, 2003, p. 3. •166 [Redacted] See CIA, 11212, April 11,2003, p.. 2. KSM also drew a map with the location of a house he called "Colony Gate" where he met Gunawan, where he said a group of JI students would meet.266 According to CIA information, while the CIA was already aware of Gunawan, "KSM's identification of his role as Hambali's potential successor prioritized his capture. Information from multiple detainees, including KSM, narrowed down [Gunawan's] location and enabled his capture in September 2003."267 CIA, Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida, June 1, 2005, p. 2 (DTS 2009-1387). This information was excluded from the Study. Hambali provided very similar
-
¶
- information after his capture in August [Redacted] 20031 — 268
¶[Redacted] On August 20, 2003, CIA headquarters provided information on Gunawan [Redacted] "which solidly ties Rusman Gunawan to al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida's terrorist attacks' [Redacted] [Redacted] 2 6 9 The information provided was largely from interrogations of KSM, including information about Gunawan working as a communications conduit for Hambali and al-Qa'ida, his location in Karachi, a description of Gunawan, but also provided information from another detainee in CIA custody, Ammar al-Baluchi.270 CIA, ALEC | Gunawan was arrested on [Redacted] a t the Abu Bakr Madrassa, locational information first provided by KSM, along with most of JI student group.271 See CIA, CIA CABLE 15252, [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] After Gunawan's arrest he was caught trying to send a coded message which he admitted was intended to warn the group of Jl-affiliated students about his arrest.272 larticipating in the interrogation recognized Gunawan's information about this group of mostly Malaysian students as similar to intelligence reporting provided previously by KSM that he was planning to recruit Malaysians in a "next wave of attacks."273 CIA, CIA CABLE 15359, [Redacted] The officers asked that Hambali be questioned about the reporting.274 See CIA, CIA CABLE 15359, [Redacted]
607¶1//NOFQRN
¶During a CIA interrogation of Hambali days later. Hambali, now in CIA custody and undergoing enhanced interrogation, provided more information about the group, identifying them as the "al-Ghuraba" group and describing how they were set up by Hambali and sent to Karachi because of its "proximity to Afghanistan and the availability of military-style training facilities there."275 CIA, [CIA CABLE] 45915, September 14, 2003, p. 2. He said the Program was designed to "give a select few the opportunity for military-style training to prepare them for jihad" and identified two who were ready for operations.276 CIA, [CIA CABLEI 45915, September 14, 2003, p. 2. Hambali provided information about the identities and backgrounds of several of the al-Ghuraba group members and described conversations he had with KSM about possible future attacks on the United States.277 See CIA, [CIA CABLE] 45915, September 14.2003. p. 2. In a subsequent interrogation, Hambali said the group was not yet ready for operations, but may be in 2003-2004 (it was already late 2003 when he provided this information) and he named individuals who were being groomed as suicide and other operatives.278 CIA, [CIA CABLE] 45953, September 15, 2003, p. 3.
¶[Redacted] [ [Redacted] arrested the members of the al- Ghuraba group during raids on [Redacted] A cable describing the arrests said, "[W]e captured this cell based on the debriefings of captured senior al-Qa'ida operatives, who stated that some members of this cell were to be part of senior al-Qa[']ida leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSMM's] [']second wave['] operation to attack the United States using the same modus operandi as was used in the September 11, 2001 attacks."279 CIA, CIA CABLE 52981, [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] z) In a seeming effort to suggest CIA's assessment of the threat posed by the al-Ghuraba group had diminished over time, the Study identified an October 27, 2006, CIA cable that stated, "[Ajll of the members of the former al-Ghuraba cell have now been released."280 CIA, CIA CABLE 131396, October 27, 2006, p. 2. It also cited an April 18, 2008, CIA intelligence report focusing on the Jemaah Islamiya and referencing the al-Ghuraba group that makes no reference to the group serving as potential operatives for KSM's 'Second Wave' plotting."281 See CIA, Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan, April 18, 2008.
¶[Redacted] These statements are misleading in several ways. The April 18, 2008 intelligence report was about Jemaah Islamiya in Pakistan, not the al-Ghuraba group, and provided only a minor description of the "al-Ghuraba cell in Karachi," but did mention that its leader was in direct contact with Hambali and "al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad."282 O A , Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan, April 18, 2008, p. 1. The Study omitted a report focused on Jemaah Islamiya's al-Ghuraba group published five months later that said "members of the cell had also been identified by Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, the mastermind of the attacks of 11 September 2001, and senior al- Qa' ida and JI operative Hambali as candidates for post-11 September attacks against the U.S. Homeland," including for "second wave suicide hijacking operations in the Unites States and Europe."283 CIA, Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiya's Al-Ghuraba Cell Coalescing, September 17, 2008, pp. I and 2. Far from suggesting the CIA was unconcerned about the al-Ghuraba group, this report devoted 20 pages to describing the threat from its members including their "jihad activities" and the caution that "as this group of radicalized militants reconnects and mingles with other young Southeast Asian Muslims, it poses a revived threat to US and Western
608¶[Redacted]
¶[Redacted] interests."284 CIA, Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiya's Al-Ghuraba Cell Coalescing, September 17, 2008, pp. 1-2.
¶Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar
¶Study Claim: [Redacted] 'CIA representations [about detainee reporting
on Jaffar al-Tayyar] also omitted key contextual facts, including t h a t . . . (2) CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided a description and information on a KSM associate named Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI Special Agents in May 2002, prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques... and (5) CIA records indicate that KSM did not know al-Tayyar's true name and that it was Jose Padilla—in military custody and being questioned by the FBI—who provided al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan el-Shukrijumah."286 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 358-359.
¶Fact: f F [Redacted] E ) Abu Zubaydah provided a description of and
information about Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI special agents in May 2002 after being subjected to enhanced interrogation between April 15,2002 and April 21, 2002. Although KSM did not know al-Tayyar's true name, he did report that Padilla might know al-Tayyar's true name. Padilla subsequently confirmed Jaffar's true name as Adnan E! Shukrijumah. [Redacted]
¶provided information on an associate of KSM by the name of Abu Jaffar al-Thayer. Abu^ Zubaydah provided a detailed description of Abu Jaffar al-Thayer, including that he spoke English well and may have studied in the United States.287 See FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 20, 2002, 5:25 p.m. to 8:40 p.m.. p 3. The Study incorrectly claims that this May 20, 2002, interrogation took place prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.288 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 362. Abu Zubaydah had already been subjected to an extended period of sleep deprivation and other enhanced interrogation techniques during his interrogation between April 15, 2002 and April 21, 2002, about one month prior to his May 20 interrogation.289 See supra, pp. 33-36. f ^ S f i S H I ^ G G H H ^ ^ The Study also cites as a key contextual fact omitted from CIA representations that KSM did not know al-Tayyar's true name, and it was Jose Padilla, in military custody and being questioned by the FBI, who provided al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan el-Shukrijumah.290 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 359. However, this omission was rendered moot because, as the Study itself notes a few pages later,291 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 365. the "FBI began participating in the military debriefings [of Padilla] in March 2003, after KSM reported Padilla might know the true name of a US-bound al-Qa'ida operative known at the time only as Jaffar al-Tayyar. Padilla subsequently confirmed Jaffar's true name as Adnan El Shukrijumah,"292 See CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting. April 15, 2005, p. 3 (emphasis added); See also CIA. ALEC [Redacted] a r c h 21, 2003, p. 6 ("Our service has developed new information, based on leads from detained al-Qa'ida operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), that al-Qa'ida operative Jafar al-Tayyar's true name is Adnan Shukri Jumah and he could be involved in an imminent suicide attack in the United States").
609¶The Identification and Arrest ofSaleh al-Marri
¶Study Claim: [Redacted] The Study correctly asserts, "[t]he CIA
represented to the CIA Office of Inspector General that 'as a result of the lawful use of EITs,' KSM 'provided information that helped lead t the arrests of terrorists including... Saleh Almari, a sleeper operative in New York."*291
¶Fact: [Redacted] KSM provided valuable intelligence that helped
to clarify Saleh al-Marri's role in al-Qa'ida operations and played a significant role in al-Marri's prosecution.
¶[Redacted] The Study cites an interview between the OIG and the Deputy Chief of the Counterterrorist Center, in which the deputy chief claims that information from KSM helped lead to the arrest of al-Marri.294 SSCI Study, Exerati^jummary, December 3, 2014, p. 366 n.2064. As the Study makes clear, al-Marri was not arrested based on information from KSM, and could not have been, because al-Marri was arrested in December 2001, before the detention of KSM in March 2003. Two days after the interview with the IG, the deputy chief wrote in an email that al-Marri "had been detained on a material witness warrant based on information linking him to the 9/11 financier Hasawi."295 -,,s Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] et al.; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30 PM. The Study correctly notes that this inaccuracy appears in the final version of the OIG's May 2004 Special Review296 See CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), May 7, 2004, p. 87 (DTS 2004-2710)., as referenced in an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum analyzing the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.297 See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the interrogation of high Value Al Qaeda Detainees, p.9 (DTS 2009-1810, Tab 11). In its response to the Study, the CIA concedes that the agency erred in describing detainee reporting as contributing to al-Marri's arrest. However, the agency stresses that KSM did provide valuable intelligence on al-Marri— intelligence that played a significant role in al-Marri's prosecution.298 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 35.
610¶[Redacted] The Study's focus on this factual error is out of proportion with its significance. The IG's Special Review section on effectiveness contains approximately six pages of discussion, including numerous success stories attributed to intelligence collected from detainees.299 See CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), May 7, 2004, pp. 85-91 (DTS 2004-2710). Incorrectly characterizing the manner in which detainee intelligence was valuable—arrest versus prosecution—for one item in a list of terrorists identified, captured, and prosecuted does not diminish the overall value that detainee intelligence provided in helping to identify, capture, and prosecute terrorists.
¶[Redacted] The Study also notes that the CIA and the FBI had information about al-Marri prior to KSM's interrogation, in an apparent attempt to downplay the importance of the information obtained from KSM.300 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 367-368. It was KSM who identified a photograph of al-Marri and described him as an al-Qa'ida sleeper operative sent to the United States shortly before 9/11. KSM said his plan was for al-Marri, who "had the perfect built-in cover for travel to the United States as a student pursuing his advanced degree in computer studies at a university near New York," was to serve as al-Qa'ida's point of contact to settle other operatives in the United States for follow-on attacks after 9/11.301 CIA, WASHINGTON D C [Redacted] KSM also said that al-Marri trained at the al- Faruq camp and had poisons training and said al-Marri offered himself as a martyr to Bin Ladin.302 See CIA, CIA WASHINGTON DC [Redacted] 3i>: Prior to the information from KSM, al-Marri was charged with credit card fraud and false statements. After the information from KSM, al-Marri was designated as an enemy combatant. In 2009, after being transferred to federal court, al-Marri pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qa'ida. In his plea, he admitted that he attended terrorist training camps and met with KSM to offer his services to al-Qa'ida, who told him to travel to the United States before 9/11 and await instructs—all information initially provided by KSM.
¶The Arrest and Prosecution of Iyman Faris
¶Study Claim: (U) "Over a period of years, the CIA provided the 'identification,' 'arrest,'
'capture,' 'investigation,' and 'prosecution' of Iyman Faris as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate."303 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 276.
¶Fact: (U) CIA, FBI, and Department of Justice documents show that information
611obtained from KSM after he was waterboarded led directly to Faris's arrest and was key in his prosecution.
¶The Study correctly points out that CIA statements implying that detainee information had led to the "identification" or "investigation" of Iyman Faris were inaccurate. However, contrary to the Study's claims, the CIA representations that information obtained from KSM after he was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques directly led to the arrest and prosecution of Iyman Faris were accurate.
¶The CIA has admitted that, in a few cases, it incorrectly stated or implied that KSM's information led to the investigation of Iyman Faris when it should have stated that KSM's reporting informed and focused the investigation.304 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C); June 27, 2013, p. 13. The CIA's mistake is somewhat understandable, given that the CIA only began to focus on Iyman Faris in March 2003 and was not aware that the FBI had opened and closed a preliminary investigation on Faris back in 2001. In essence, Faris was a new investigative target to the CIA in March 2003.305 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C)\ June 27, 2013, p. 14, Regardless, the CIA's representation concerning the identification and initial investigation of Faris is much less important than the details that led to his arrest and prosecution.
¶On March 5, 2003, Majid Khan, an al-Qa'ida operative directly subordinate to KSM, was taken into custody by Pakistani authorities.306 See CIA, CIA CABLE 13658, March 5, 2003, pp. 1 -2. That same day, the FBI's authorized electronic surveillance of Majid Khan's residence in Maryland indicated [Redacted] Majid Kahn's [Redacted] made a suspicious call to an individual, later confirmed to be Iyman Faris. They spoke about the possible arrest of Majid Khan and [Redacted] [Redacted] s suspicions that he was under FBI surveillance. [Redacted] asked Faris whether he had been approached or questioned and warned Faris not to contact anyone using his phone.307 CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted] M a r c h 6, 2003, p. 4. The FBI reopened its international terrorism investigation on Iyman Faris soon thereafter.308 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 280; FBI information confirmed by the FBI on November 30, 2010, SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 280, n. 1581.
¶[Redacted] On March 10, 2003, in response to a requirements cable from CIA Headquarters reporting that al-Qa'ida was targeting U.S. suspension bridges,309 CIA, ALEC [Redacted] r c h 7,2003. p. 1. 3i0 KSM stated that any such plans were "theoretical" and only "on paper." He also stated that no one was currently pursuing such a plot.310 _C|[Redacted] 10752, March 10,2003, p. 2; CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted] arch 12, 2003, p. 5. See also [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] On March 11, 2003, Majid Khan identified a photograph of Iyman Faris before he was in CIA custody. Among other details, Khan said that Faris was a 35[Redacted]
¶)ld truck dri ver of Pakistani origin who was a "business partner of his [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶. 3 n The next day, Majid Khan described Faris as "an Islamic extremist."312 CIA, CIA CABLE 13765,[Redacted] On March 14, 2003, Majid Khan provided the following additional details on Faris: (I) Faris was a mujahedeen "during the Afghan/Soviet period"; (2) Faris was a close associate of Maqsood Khan, a known al-Qa'ida associate in contact with senior al-Qa'ida members and Majid's uncle; and (3) Faris had contacted Majid Khan's family after the capture of KSM became public and requested that the family pass a message to Maqsood Khan regarding the status of KSM,313 CIA, CI A CABLE 13785, [Redacted]
612¶[Redacted] On March 16, 2003, when asked again about the targeting of U.S. suspension bridges, KSM repeated his earlier assertions, noting that, while Usama Bin Ladin officially endorsed attacks against suspension bridges in the United States, he "had no planned targets in the [United States] which were pending attack and that after 9/11 the [United States!| had become too hard a target."314 CIA, 10858. March 9, 2003, p. 2. KSM never referenced Iyman Faris during his March 10 and March 16 interrogations. Thus far, none of the information collected by the U.S. Intelligence Community would have been sufficient to prosecute Iyman Faris on charges of material support to terrorism.
¶[Redacted] On March 17 and 18, 2003, the CIA questioned KSM about Majid Khan's family and KSM stated that another Khan relative, whom he identified from a picture of Faris, was a "truck driver in Ohio."315 [Redacted] 110886, March 18,2003, pp 5-6. On March 18, 2003, KSM told interrogators he tasked the truck driver to procure specialized machine tools that would be useful to al-Qaida in loosening the nuts and bolts of suspension bridges in the United States. KSM said he was informed by an intermediary that Faris could not find the tools.316 , March 18.2003, pp 5-6. This revelation would turn out to be a key piece of incriminating evidence against Iyman Faris.
¶[Redacted] The Study excluded information found in CIA documents which shows that, immediately after obtaining information from KSM and Majid Khan regarding Faris, the CIA queried the FBI for "additional details" on Faris, "including a readout on his current activities and plans for FBI continued investigation."317 [Redacted]. Information from KSM on Majid Khan, The cable specifically noted that "KSM seems to have accurately identified" Faris from a photograph as the "truck driver in Ohio;" On March 20, 2003, the FBI picked Faris up for questioning and conducted a consent search of his apartment, seizing his laptop. When our staff asked the FBI why Faris was picked up, they cited the cables from CIA.318 8 Phone call from the FBI responding to Staff questions from a document review, January 25, 2013. The FBI investigators went into this interview armed with the information revealed by KSM and Majid Khan, which enabled them to explore Faris's ties with KSM and al-Qa'ida plotting in the United States.319 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27. 2013, p. 13; FBI WASH 040537Z, April 4, 2003, p. 2. The Study notes that when approached by law enforcement, Iyman Faris voluntarily provided information and self-incriminating statements.320 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 283-284. This gives a false impression that the information provided by KSM was unnecessary to securing the arrest and prosecution of Faris by omitting the important context that the FBI questioned Faris armed with incriminating information obtained from KSM on March 17 and 18, 2003.321 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, Decembers, 2014, pp. 281-282. I I III II III I [Redacted] III I llll I
613¶(II) There is further proof that the incriminating revelations obtained from KSM after he was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques led directly to the successful arrest and prosecution of Iyman Faris—On May 1, 2003, Faris pled guilty to "casing a New York City bridge for al Qaeda, and researching and providing information to al Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible attacks on U.S. targets," the exact terrorist activities described by KSM.
The Arrest and Prosecution of Uzhair Paracha and the Arrest of Saifullah Paracha
¶Study Claim: f l P [Redacted] F ) "The CIA represented that information
obtained through the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable intelligence that led to the identification and/or arrest of Uzhair Paracha and his father Saifullah Paracha (aka, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha). These CIA representations included inaccurate information and omitted significant material information, specifically a body [of] intelligence reporting—acquired prior to CIA detainee reporting—that linked the Parachas to al-Qa'ida-related terrorist activities."322 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 352.
¶Fact: ( T [Redacted] [Redacted] Information obtained from KSM during his
enhanced interrogation on March 25,2003, about alleged explosives smuggling into the United States, attacks on U.S. gas stations, and related material support to al-Qa'ida, motivated the FBI to track down and arrest Uzhair Paracha in New York a few days later on March 31,2003. The Intelligenc^omm^ who was later arrested [Redacted] on July 2003. Among other charges, Uzhair was successfully convicted on November 23,2005, of providing material support to al-Qa'ida and sentenced to 30 years in prison. KSM's description of Uzhair's involvement in the gas station plots and his claim that Uzhair may have provided other logistical support for Majid's entry into the United States was consistent with the press release's description of some of the evidence used during Uzhair's trial.
¶[Redacted] On March 25, 2003, while being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided U.S. domestic threat information concerning Saifullah Paracha and his son, Uzhair Paracha. KSM stated that Saifullah Paracha was a Pakistani businessman in Karachi, who owned a textile business with a branch in New York City. KSM alleged that his nephew,. Ammar al-Baluchi, and Majid Khan had discussed a plan with Saifullah to use his textile business to smuggle explosives into the United States. According to this plan, the explosives would be shipped in containers that Saifullah used to ship the clothes that he sold in the United States. KSM stated that Saifullah agreed to the plan, but he was unclear how much Uzhair Paracha knew about it.323 CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted] KSM added that Majid Khan planned to rent a storage space in whatever area of United States he chose, not necessarily close to New York City, and that the explosives would be used in al-Qa'ida's campaign against economic targets in the United States.324 CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted]
614¶KSM was also aware that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan had approached Saifullah and Uzhair to help resettle Majid Khan in the United States, where Majid had plans to blow up several gas stations. KSM stated that Ammar was hoping that Paracha could sponsor Majid's entry into the United States, if necessary. KSM also told his interrogators that"Uzhair may have provided other logistical support for Majid's entry into the United States."125 Finally, KSM noted that Saifullah owned a media company in Pakistan and had traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1999 to meet with Usarna Bin Ladin for the purpose of offering al-Qa'ida the services of his media company.326 [Redacted] CIA, DIRECTOR During a subsequent interrogation, KSM provided additional incriminating information about Saifullah Paracha. The cable reports that "[i]n light of Paracha's past history of handling money for al-Qa'ida, (KSM1 approached Paracha with approximately U.S. $260,000-275,000 in cash and asked him to hold it for al-Qa'ida. [KSM| told Paracha not to invest the money in any business ventures and instructed him to keep the money in a safe at his office." KSM had received these funds from Usama Bin Ladin CIA, [Redacted] 11123, April 3,2003, p. 3.
Subject: Sayf Al-Rahman Paracha's Possible Involvement in Plot to Smuggle Explosives to the United States. It has come to our attention that one Sayf al- Rahman Paracha, a Pakistani businessman and owner of an import-export textile business in Karachi, Pakistan, may be involved in a plan to smuggle explosives to the United States for al-Qa'ida terrorist related activities. There is a possibility that Mr. Paracha's son Uzhair may be involved as well. Our information indicates that Uzhair traveled from Pakistan to the U.S. circa 17 February 2003. We seek your assistance in providing any information you may have regarding these individuals, their activities, and personalities. Your cooperation and assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.327 FBI, WASH 261909Z, March 26, 2003, pp. 2-3.
¶In the same c a W ^ q u e s M h ^ B ^ i o t e c h t o records checks and that
¶Parachas [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] The FBI arrested Uzhair in New York on March 31, 2003. The CIA was able tojgvglop an operation that lured Saifullah Paracha out of Pakistan, which resulted in his arrest [Redacted] on July 6, 2003.324 On November 23, 2005—after a two-week jury trial—Uzhair was convicted on all charges in the five-count indictment of providing material support to al-Qa'ida and sentenced to 30 years in prison.330 DOJ, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Pakistani Man Convicted of Providing Material Support to At Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison. July 20, 2006, p.l. The press release announcing the trial results stated,
615The evidence at trial proved that PARACHA, 26, agreed with his father, Saifullah Paracha, and two al Qaeda members, Majid Khan and Ammar Al-Baluchi, to provide support to al Qaeda by, among other things, trying to help Khan obtain a travel document that would have allowed Khan to re-enter the United States to commit a terrorist act. Statements from Khan admitted at trial revealed that, orice inside the United States, Khan intended to carry out an attack on gasoline stations.331 DOJ, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Pakistani Man Convicted of Providing Material Support r to to Al Al Qa Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison, July 20, 2006, p. 2. I
¶The decision to conduct the "late night" interrogation session with KSM on March 25, 2003, was made after reviewing recent intelligence obtained from Majid Khan and Iyman Faris.332 CIA,- [Redacted] 10984, March 24, 2003, p. 2 ("Base decided to hold a late night session with KSM upon reviewing latest Karachi readout on [Majid Khan] debriefs [CIA CABLE 13890] and FBI intel report... from debriefings o f . .. [Iyman Farisl"), The March 22, 2003, interview of Majid Khan was conducted b) [Redacted] [Redacted] The resulting cable from that interview explained the relationship between the Parachas and al-Qa'ida, specifically Majid Khan and Ammar al-Baluchi.334 CIA, CIA CABLE 13890, [Redacted] It also provided details explaining how Uzhair impersonated Majid Khan by using Majid's debit card and a phone conversation between Uzhair and Majid Khan related to Majid's bank account and "calls to the INS."335 CIA, CIA CABLE 13890, [Redacted] This information from the March 22, 2003, interrogation of Majid Khan was consistent with the charges described in Uzhair Paracha's indictment, although it did not include any reference to the gas station attacks mentioned by KSM.336 Compare CIA, CIA CABLE 1 3 8 [Redacted] w i t ! l Indictment, United States v. Uzair Paracha, United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Our review of the initial cables related to the plan to attack gas stations in the United States revealed that on March 18, 2003, Majid Khan was the first to disclose KSM's interest in "operational procedures of U.S. gas stations and the tanker trucks that service them," but provided'no real details about specific plans other than being later tasked by KSM to investigate the procedures for purchasing gas stations in Pakistan. CIA CIA CABLE 13816, March IS, 2003, p. 3. On March 18, 2003, KSM provided incriminating details about his conspiracy with Majid Khan to attack gas stations in the United States. See CIA, [Redacted] 10886, March 18, 2003, pp. 2-4.
¶[Redacted] Based on these facts, we conclude that KSM's allegations of Saifullah Paracha's involvement in a plan to smuggle explosives into the United States motivated the FBI to track down and arrest Uzhair Paracha in New York just a few days later, on March 31, 2003. The CIA was able to develop an operation that lured Saifullah Paracha out of on u Pakistan, which resulted in his arrest in [Redacted] I 'y 6, 2003. There appears to be a direct causal link between the information provided by KSM and the subsequent actions by the Intelligence Community that led to the arrests of Saifullah and Uzhair Paracha. Moreover, KSM's description of Uzhair's involvement in the gas station plots and his claim that Uzhair may have provided other logistical support for Majid's entry- into the United States was consistent with the description of evidence used during Uzhair's trial that was included in the press release announcing the trial results. 3 "
616¶The Study asserts that KSM's allegations of explosives smuggling were inaccurate because Saifullah Paracha and others denied being involved in such a plot and at least one senior CIA counterterrorism official questioned the validity of the smuggling plot.338 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 352. The fact that Saifullah Paracha and his alleged co-conspirators denied their involvement in an explosives smuggling plot is not persuasive. Also, we have no intention of countering the CIA official's speculative judgment about the alleged plot with further speculation of our own. Regardless of whether the allegations of explosives smuggling were true, the allegations alone were sufficient to trigger the immediate responsive actions by the FBI and CIA that helped lead to the capture of these two terrorists.
¶[Redacted] The Study also attempts to lessen the significance of the information provided by KSM by suggesting that the Intelligence Community had sufficient information prior to KSM's reporting to identify and arrest Saifullah and Uzhair Paracha. In support of this assertion, the Study identifies what it considers to be "significant material information" acquired by the Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA detainees.339 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 352-355. Quibbling about the omission of "significant material information,"—including previously obtained information about an individual named Paracha other than Uzhair and Saifullah or contained in un-disseminated FBI case files340 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3. 2014, pp. 354-355; see also, CIA Study Response, Case Studies, June 27, 2013, pp. 31-32.—seems largely tangential to the fact that detainee information, including some information obtained after using enhanced interrogation techniques, helped lead to the successful arrests of both men and was consistent with evidence used in the successful prosecution of Uzhair Paracha.
i Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan
¶[Redacted] The Study asserts that the "CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable tactical intelligence related to Shkai, Pakistan, was provided to senior policymakers and the Department of Justice between 2004 and 2009."341 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 370 (emphasis added). Here is the actual text of the CIA representation at issue:
617Shkai, Pakistan: Thc interrogation of Hassan Ghul provided detailed tactical intelligence showing that Shkai^Pakktanwasan^or Al-Qa'ida hub in the tribal areas. Through [the] use of [Redacted] during t h c Ghul interrogation, we mapped out and pinpointed the residences of key AQ leaders in
¶This intelligence was [Redacted]
¶This representation does not assert that the intelligence was "otherwise unavailable'' tactical intelligence, but rather, "detailed" tactical intelligence. More important, while the Study's paraphrase of the representation is not accurate, the CIA's representation itself was factually accurate.
¶The CIA Response to the Study makes it clear that Ghul provided detailed tactical intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan, after he was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, he sat down with [Redacted] experts and pointed to specific locations where he had met some of the senior al-Qa'ida members who the CIA was trying to find.343 [Redacted] [Redacted] Ghul also revealed his understanding about how Hamza Rabia, a then little- known al-Qa'ida operative, had taken over as the group's lead attack coordinator after the capture of KSM in 2003.344 CIA, CIA CABLE 20397. Februar[Redacted] 2004, p. 5. He used [Redacted] to give more details about the "Bachelor House," the "Ida Khan Complex" and a separate compound used by a group of al-Qa'ida-aligned Uzbeks. He even described the group's evacuation plans in the event of an attack on Shkai.345 CIA, CIA CABLE |, February [Redacted] 2004, pp. 10 and 12; CIA, CIA CABLE 1299, January 2004, pp. 2- During an interrogation on January 28, 2004, Hassan Ghul drew a detailed map of the locations of a training camp/safehouse near Shkai, provided route information to the site, provided a detailed sketch of the compound and specified the rooms where explosives were stored. Ghul was shown
¶[Redacted] the area and located the route [Redacted] 3 4 6 He also identified nine al-Qa'ida members—including Hamza Rabia, Abu Faraj al-Libia, and Spin Ghul—who were located at the safehouse as of June 2003.347 CIA, CIA CABLE February]_ 2004, pp. 10 and 12; CIA, CIA CABLE 1299. January [Redacted] 2004, pp. 2-3.
¶[Redacted] Senior U.S. officials presented the CIA's analysis of Ghul's debriefin [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] [Redacted]
¶CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2,2005, from CIA attorney, [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques" (emphasis added).
618[Redacted] [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] This particular case study has been a bit of a "moving target" since it first appeared in the original Study approved by the Committee during the 112th Congress.351 Compare CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 36 (citing the original Study claims concerning the CIA's representation about Ghul's tactical intelligence on Shkai in the appendix to the Study's original findings and conclusions) with SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 368. Its revised claims seek to undermine the significance of the information provided by Ghul after the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques. These revised claims basically assert that: (1) the "vast majority" of Ghul's information was provided prior to his being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) the C l A ' s [Redacted] s e s s e d that this prior information was sufficient to press the Pakistani [Redacted] and (3) Ghul's information confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai Valley of Pakistan served as al- Qa'ida's command and control center after its exodus from Afghanistan in 2001.352 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 369. These claims are little more than an effort to distract the reader from the previously referenced, significant tactical intelligence provided by Ghul after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques. Again, one of the problems with the Study's flawed analytical methodology is that it often turns a blind eye to information obtained after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques if it cannot readily undermine its significance, because such "inconvenient" facts disprove the Study's main conclusion that the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.
¶[Redacted] In a similar vein, the Study asserts that "CIA records do not indicate that information provided by Ghul during this period, or after, resulted in the identification or capturc of any al-Qa'ida leaders."353 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 376. In fact, prior to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, Hassan Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: (1) could be one of three people with Usama Bin Ladin; and (2>may have handled Bin Ladiri's needs, including sending messages to his gatekeeper, Abu Faraj al-Libi. After the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, Hassan Ghul cooperated by telling his interrogators that Abu Ahmad specifically passed a letter from Bin Ladin to Abu Faraj in late 2003 and that Abu Ahmad had "disappeared" from Karachi, Pakistan, in 2002. This information was not only more concrete than Ghul's earlier speculations, but it corroborated information from another detainee, Ammar al Baluchi, that Abu Ahmad served as a courier for Bin Ladin.354 CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted] While this information technically didn't result in the "identification" or "capture" of Bin Ladin, it most certainly played a crucial role in the U.S. Government's successful efforts to locate and neutralize Bin Ladin in his Abbottabad compound in Pakistan on May 2, 2011.
619¶(II) The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting
¶In a.September 6, 2006 speech, President Bush highlighted the thwarting of a planned strike against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti as an example of the value of information obtained as a part of CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The core claim in this section of the Study is not only inaccurate; it was never made.
¶Study Claim: f P [Redacted] ) "The CIA represented that intelligence derived
from the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques thwarted plotting against the U.S. military base, Camp Lemonier, in Djibouti. These representations are inaccurate."355 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 336.
¶Fact: f i [Redacted] 1 ) Representations about the thwarting of an attack
against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, specifically President Bush's 2006 comments that "Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti," were accurate and have been mischaracterized bv the Study.356 President George W, Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2006.
¶[Redacted] In this section of the Executive Summary, the Study fundamentally mischaracterizes two representations attributed to President Bush and the CIA. The first representation, which comes from the President's September 6, 2006, speech, is attributed to the CIA by the Study because of the CIA's vetting of the speech. In his speech, the President stated, "ftterrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti . .. ."357 President George W, Bush, Trying Detainees; Address oil the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2006 (emphasis added).- Contrary to the Study's assertions, the President did not attribute the thwarting of this plot exclusively to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, but information from "| terrorists held in CIA custody." In addition, the President never stated that the plot was disrupted exclusively because of information from detainees in CIA custody. The President was clear that information from detainees "helped" to stop the planned strike. This idea that detainee reporting builds on and contextualizes previous and subsequent reporting is repeated a few lines later in the speech, when the President makes clear, "[t]he information we get from these detainees is corroborated by intelligence . . . that we've received from other sources, and together this intelligence has helped us connect the dots and stop attacks before they occur."358 President George W. Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Militaiy Commissions, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2006. This is another example of where the President and the CIA are pilloried by the Study for representations they actually never made.
¶[Redacted] The second example cited in the Study is pulled from a set of talking points drafted for use in an October 30, 2007, briefing to then-Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, former Congressman John Murtha. In the written talking points, the CIA states, "f A CIA detainee] informed us of an operation underway to attack the U.S, military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. We believe our understanding of this plot helped us prevent the attack."359 " SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 338; DCIA Meeting with Chairman Murtha re Rendition and Detention Programs, October 30, 2007, p. 1. Setting aside the question of whether these talking points were ever actually employed (which is virtually unanswerable, given the passing of Congressman Murtha in 1010 and the Study's failure to interview the relevant intelligence officers), this representation, like the President's 2006 speech, does not include a reference to enhanced interrogation techniques. Moreover, as was previously the case, the CIA does not claim that the attacks were thwarted solely because of detainee information. They clearly point to their "understanding of this plot," which was a mosaic based on many different sources of intelligence, f F [Redacted] The President's claim that "[terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti" was accurate.360 MO President George W. Bush. Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2006. The detention of two terrorists by the CIA, KSM and Guleed Hassan Ahmed, affected al-Qa'ida's ongoing plotting against Camp Lemonier. The March 3, 2003, arrest of KSM came days after a late-February meeting with Abu Yasir, al- Qa'ida's link to affiliated terrorist cells in Somalia and Kenya, and prevented KSM from attending a follow-on meeting, at which he was to discuss the provision of operational funds with al-Qa'ida leaders in East Africa, some of whom were plotting an attack against Camp Lemonier.361 CIA, DIRECTOR[Redacted] 1; CIA, HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] Guleed Hassan Ahmed, who conducted reconnaissance of Camp Lemonier for al- Qa'ida, provided information about the Camp Lemonier plot and al-Qa'ida's Somali support network.362 CIA, CIA [Redacted] [Redacted] The information Guleed provided, both prior to and after being transferred into CIA custody, combined with intelligence derived from other sources and methods, was central in driving CIA's targeting of al-Qa'ida proxies based in East Africa.363 CIA, HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] Although these events are not independently responsible for thwarting the plot against Camp Lemonier, they undoubtedly "helped" or contributed to the disruption of the plot.
620¶[Redacted] Finally, the Study claims that plotting against Camp Lemonier "did not 'stop' because of information acquired from CIA detainee Guleed in 2004, but rather, continued well into 2007," implying that continued terrorist targeting of Camp Lemonier excludes the possibility a planned strike was thwarted.364 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 338. 36? This assertion undervalues Camp Lemonier's appeal as a terrorist target, and is willfully blind to the victory even a single obstructed terrorist plot represents. Camp Lemonier is the only major U.S. military base in sub- Saharan Africa, hosting approximately 1,600 military personnel.365 CIA, CIA CABLE 207044, May 22, 2003, p. 9. It is also located within striking distance of, and an active threat to, al-Qa'ida operatives throughout the Horn of Africa. It stands to reason that Camp Lemonier exists as a target of sustained terrorist focus.
621¶CIA Detainees Subjected to EITs Validated CIA Sources
¶Study Claim: f l S H i H I H H H N ^ "fflhe CIA also represented that its enhanced
interrogation techniques were necessary to validate CIA sources. The claim was based on one CIA detainee—Janat Gul—contradicting the reporting of one CIA asset."366 ;
¶Fact: f F [Redacted] N ^ Contrary to the Study's claim, the CIA
representations cited by the Study do not assert that enhanced interrogation techniques helped to validate sources. Rather, the representations only make reference to "detainee information" or detainee "reporting." Also contrary to the Study's claim, we found evidence in the documentary record where the CIA representations about Janat Gul also contained additional examples of source validation. Moreover, the three items of information thait the Study asserts should have been included in the Janat Gul asset validation representations were not "critical" and their inclusion does not alter the fact that Gul's persistent contradiction of the asset's claims did help the CIA "validate" that particular asset.
¶[Redacted] The Study complains that the CIA justified the use of enhanced interrogation techniques by repeatedly using the same Janat Gul example of detainee reporting to determine that one of its assets had fabricated information. The Study first provides the following representation made by CIA Director Hayden during one of our Committee hearings:
Detainee information is a key tool for validating clandestine sources. In fact, in one case, the detainee's information proved to be the accurate story, and the clandestine source was confronted and subsequently admitted to embellishing or fabricating some or all of the details in his report.367
¶The Study also provides one other example of an asset validation justification:
Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul's most significant reporting helped us validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 pre-election threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between himself and al- Qa'ida's chief of finance, Shaykh Sa'id, a claim that Gul vehemently denied. Gul's reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif al-Masri and Abu Talha al-Pakistani, captured after Gul. With this reporting in hand, CIA
¶"'<' See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 342. 307
¶SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 342 (citing General Michal Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2007, p. 8 (DTS 2007-1563)).
622I the asset, who subsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting about the meeting.368 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 343 (citing CIA. Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." (emphasis in original).
¶Contrary to the Study's claim here, the first observation that should be made about these representations is that they do not contain any reference to the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques." In the first representation, Director Hayden uses the words "detainee information." In the second, the briefing notes simply use the term "reporting."
¶[Redacted] Another part of the Study's claim is also factually inaccurate. The Study asserts that the CIA's representation "was based on one CIA detainee— Janat G u l . . . ,"369 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 4,2014, p. 342 (emphasis added). During our review of the documentary record we found numerous copies of the "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting," that contained the exact representation cited by the Study above, although the version we selected did not place special emphasis on "Janat Gul's most significant reporting"370 CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, August 2005, p. 8, This document is attached as Appendix II, see infra, p. II-1. More important, the representations in the August 2005 version contain the following additional examples under the same heading of "Helping to Validate Other Sources":
In other instances, detainee information has been useful in identifying clandestine assets who are providing good reporting. For example, Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai helped us validate several assets in the field who also told us that al- Qa'ida members had found safehaven at this location....
Sometimes one detainee validates reporting from others. [Redacted] corroborated information from key [Redacted] who were involved in facilitating the movement of al-Qa'ida personnel, money, and messages into and out of [Redacted] For example, I [Redacted] indicated that | [Redacted] yas the link between al-Qa'ida and [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] corroborated that fact when he noted that [Redacted] was the "go-between" for al-Qa'ida a n d [Redacted] 3 7 1
¶Ironically, the Study's omission of these additional examples of source validation from its own analysis deprives the reader of "significant context."
¶[Redacted] The Study seems to imply that the omission of certain "critical" contextual information from the CIA's representations about source validation somehow nullifies the Janat Gul example.372 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 4, 2014, p. 343. 64 Our examination of the three items of contextual information cited by the Study leads us to conclude that the Janat Gul case remains illustrative of detainee information helping to determine that a CIA source had fabricated certain aspects of his reporting.
623¶First, the Study faults the CIA for failing to include in its representations that the asset's reporting about the 2004 pre-election threat was doubted by CIA officers prior to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul.373 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 4, 2014, pp. 343. This concern is easily dismissed because a review of the e-mail reveals that the concerns raised by the CIA officers were not about the credibility of the sources, but more about the possibility that al-Qa'ida might be using this threat information to test the sources who had provided the pre-election threat information. The email raising the concern specifically states, "this is not to say that either ASSET Y or [source name REDACTED] are wrong or that the AQ statement below374 The referenced statement was issued by ai-Qa'ida on March 17, 2004, and asserted that al-Qa'ida would not operate any large-scale operation prior to the election. is anything more than disinformation."375 Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] , [REDACTED] [Redacted] [Redacted] ; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and|[source name REDACTED]?; date: March [Redacted] 2 0 0 4 ^ 0 6 : 5 5 AM; Email f r o [Redacted] t o [Redacted] H t t ^ H c c : [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] j e c t : Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and {source name REDACTED]?: date: March[Redacted] 2004, at 7:52:32 AM. p. 1 (footnote added). This document is attached as Appendix III, see infra, p. III-l. The reply email stated that it was possible the sources were just hearing the same rumors, but recollected that when al-Qa'ida put out similar rumors in the summer of 2001, those turned out to be true.376 from: [Redacted] t o : [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] |; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [source name REDACTED]?; date: March [Redacted] 2004^iH)6:55 AM; Email [Redacted] TO [Redacted] CC: [Redacted] > [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] j e ^ could AQ be testing [ASSET Y1 and [source name REDACTED]?: date: March[Redacted] 2004, at 7:52:32 AM. p. I (footnote added). This email confirms that the sensitive source who subsequently admitted to fabricating information was not the only source providing information related to a possible pre-election terrorist threat. [Redacted] These emails do not support any inference about early suspicions of the source's credibility nor do they dismiss the legitimacy of the threat information provided by the sources.
¶[Redacted] The Study criticizes the asset validation representations by the CIA because they did not acknowledge that the source's fabricated reporting was the reason that Janat Gul was subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques.377 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 4, 2014, p. 343. There are two problems with this criticism. First, the CIA believed that the source's allegations about Janat Gul meeting with Shayk Sa'id, al-Qa'ida's chief of finance, were true when they began to use enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul between August 3, 2004, and August 10,2004, and then again from August 21, 2004, to August 25, 2004.378 [Redacted] 1512. [Redacted] 0 4 j 3 . 2; C I A [Redacted] 1545, [Redacted] , 2004, p. 1; CIA, [Redacted] 1603, [Redacted] 2004, p. 3; and CIA. [Redacted] 632, [Redacted] 0 4 . p. 2. The CIA source did not recant some of the underlying threat information pertaining to Gul until Octobe[Redacted]and[Redacted] 2004, more than two months after Gul's enhanced interrogation began and 15 days after his enhanced interrogation ended. It is also important to understand that the source's information was not the only information that caused the CIA to believe that Gul was an al-Qa"ida facilitator with connections to multiple high value targets. The source's 'information was also not solely responsible for the request and authorization to subject Gul to enhanced interrogation techniques.379 CIA. ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] The CIA cable requesting interrogation authorities makes clear those authorities were being pursued to "collect critical threat, locational, and other high priority information."380 CIA, [Redacted] 1484, [Redacted] This same communication cited a previous cable detailing CIA approval to detain Gul, in which Gul's apprehension was justified on grounds that he was "one of the highest level extremist facilitators remaining in Pakistan, and multiple source reporting indicates that he has connections to various HVTS,"381 CIA, ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted]
624¶[Redacted] Second, the Study does not fully support its claim that the CIA source's representations about the pre-election threat were inaccurate.382 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2014. p. 417. Specifically, the cable reporting the fabrication by one of these sources in October 2004 clearly indicates that some of the source's pre-election threat information was considered to be "generally truthful." The Study states that the source "was deceptive in response to questions regarding . . . the pre-election threat."3S3 This assertion is not entirely accurate. In fact, the cited cabl^ndicateeh^ [Redacted] issue of the pre-election threat [Redacted] Moreover, the assessment paragraph in the cited cable states: "Based on [the source's] seemingly genuine concern and constant return to the issue, COB believes that [the source] is being generally truthful about his discussions . . . on the pre-election threat."385 [Redacted] CIA, CIA CABLE 1411, 2004, p. 5.
¶[Redacted] The Study's final piece of "critical" contextual information that was missing from the CIA representations on this issue was the failure of the CIA to disclose that it eventually concluded that Janat Gul was not a high-level al- Qa'ida figure and never had threat information.386 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3, p. 343. 64 This seems to miscast Janat Gul as a hapless victim of circumstance, when in fact he was a known terrorist facilitator. Beyond that, the question of whether every accusation made against Gul was proven or not, is fundamentally immaterial to the matter of his detainee reporting being used to validate— or, in this instance, invalidate—an intelligence source.
¶f t s [Redacted] i 1 ) Our analysis has demonstrated that this claim suffers from multiple fatal defects: (1) the representations do not reference enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) representations in the documentary record were found to have additional examples of asset validation beyond the Janat Gul example; and (3) including any of the three problematic contextual items raised by the Study would not alter the fact that Janat Gul's persistent contradiction of the asset's claims did help the CIA "validate" that particular asset.
625¶The Identification of Bin Ladin's Courier
¶[Redacted] [Redacted] Shortly after the May 2011 raid on the Usama Bin Ladin compound, current and former CIA employees highlighted the role of reporting from the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program in the operation. These officials represented that CIA detainees provided the "tip-off' information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti (variant Abu Ahmed al- Kuwaiti), the Bin Ladin courier who ultimately led to finding Bin Ladin.387 As we show below, these representations were accurate.
¶Study Claim: [Redacted] '[T]he 'tipofF on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002
did not come from the interrogation of CIA detainees and was obtained prior to any CIA detainee reporting."388 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 389.
¶Fact: ( K [Redacted] CIA documents show that detainee information
served as the "tip-off" and played a significant role in leading CIA analysts to tlie courier Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. While there was other information in CIA databases about al-Kuwaiti, this information was not recognized as important by analysts until after detainees provided information on him. [Redacted]
¶analysts and operators testified before the Committee about how they tracked down Bin Ladin. The CIA described the lead information as being provided by detainees in U.S. custody at CIA secret sites and the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and from detainees in the custody of foreign governments that helped the CIA recognize the importance of Bin Ladin's courier, Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.389 SSCI Transcript, Briefing on the Operation That Killed Usama Bin Ladin, May 2, 2011, pp. 7 and 39 (DTS 2011- 1941). CIA officers were clear that the information was from detainees, but never portrayed the information as originating solely from detainees held by the CIA,
¶[Redacted] . CIA documents show that even before the raid took place, CIA analysts prepared briefings and papers on their analysis of what led them to the courier. These briefings and papers clearly described the key role that detainee reporting played in this analytical and operational process. A CIA paper in November 2007 noted that "over twenty mid to high-value detainees have discussed Abu Ahmad"s ties to senior al-Qa'ida leaders, including his role in delivering messages from Bin Ladin and his close association with former al-Qa'ida third-in-command Abu Faraj al-Libi."390 CIA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa 'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2, The report highlighted specific reporting from two detainees, Hassan Ghul and Ammar al-Baluchi, who both identified Abu Faraj al-Libi's role in communicating to Bin Ladin through Abu Ahmad. It was this and similar reporting from other detainees that helped analysts realize Abu Faraj's categorical denials that he even knew anyone named Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, "almost certainly were an attempt to protect Abu Ahmed," thus showing his importance.391 CIA Intelligence Assessment. Al-Qa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2.
¶SSCI and SASC Transcript. Briefing on Operation Neptune's Spear, May 4, 2011, pp. 53-54 (DTS 2011-2049) (CIA Director Panetta stated, "I want to be able to get back to you with specifics . . . But clearly the tipoff on the couriers came from those pdetainee] interviews."); Scott Hennen radio interview of former CIA Director Michael Hayden, May 3, 2011 (Former Director Hayden stated, "What we got, the original lead information—and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers—began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites").
626¶[Redacted] Additionally, a retrospective prepared by the CIA's Study for the Center of Intelligence after the raid also made clear in its report that detainee information was significant in the identification of the courier. The report noted that High-Value Terrorist analysts, targeters, and their managers told the Center that:
debriefing al-Qa'ida detainees provided them with unparalleled expertise and knowledge of the organization. The ability to cross-check detainee statements against one another—specifically Abu Faraj's with that of numerous other detainees—ultimately led to the assessment that Abu Ahmad was directly serving as Bin Ladin's facilitator and possibly harboring him. In sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin. Nine of the 25 were held in non-CIA custody. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three had given information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), although of the 13 only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded. Even so, KSM gave false information about Abu Ahmad, as did Abu Faraj, who received lesser EITs. Ironically, the falsity of the information was itself important in establishing Abu Ahmad's significance.392 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin. September 2012 D 14 (DTS 2012-3826).
[Redacted] The Study asserts that information acquired in 2002 [Redacted] I [Redacted] was the "tip-off' to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, but this information sat
¶unnoticed in a CIA database for five years.393 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, September 2012 p 9 1 (DTS 2012-3826). ' It was multiple detainee reports about a Bin Ladin courier with the alias Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that triggered a search that uncovered the old information.194 This is another example of the Study's use of hindsight to criticize the CIA for not recognizing the significance of previouslycollecteOuUio^lly-understood, intelligence information. It is also an attempt to use this [Redacted] information to categorize the subsequently collected detainee information as being "otherwise obtainable." Under the Study's flawed analytical methodology, information in that category cannot be used as evidence of the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. We are not similarly constrained.
¶[Redacted] The Study—benefiting from the ability to search a database compiled of only information relevant to its specific task (something intelligence analysts are not able to do) with the advantage of hindsight to understand which names are now important— asserts that prior to receiving information from CIA detainees, the CIA had other critical reporting on the courier. The Study cites Abu Ahmad's phone number and e-mail address, a body of intelligence reporting linking him to KSM's operational planning, and reporting on Abu Ahmad's age, physical appearance, and family—including information the CIA would later cite as pivotal in identifying his true name.395 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 385.
627¶U T | ^ I F I E D
¶[Redacted] f ^ H H H H I H ^ ^ ^ ^ While it is true that the CIA was conducting technical intelligence collection linked to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, CIA fact-checking confirmed that this information was meaningless because: (1) it did not link Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin; (2) Abu Ahmad had stopped using the phone number and e-mail address in 2002; and (3) Abu Ahmad was not linked to that email address in any of his subsequent correspondence.396 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB Cj, June 27,2013, p. 40. According to the CIA,
[t] hat intelligence was insufficient to distinguish Abu Ahmad from many other Bin Ladin associates until additional information from detainees put it into context and allowed us to better understand his true role and potential in the hunt for Bin Ladin,397 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB CJ, June 27, 2013, p. 38; CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, p. 14.
¶Further review of CIA records confirmed that the phone number at issue was an Inmarsat number associated with "Mukhtar" and "Ahmad 'al-Kuwahadi."398 ALEC [Redacted] According to Adam Robinson, the author of Bin Laden Behind the Mask of the Terrorist, "[ajfter a long period of use of the Inmarsat system, Osama learned that this system is open to interception, both for covert observation and possibly for homing in on the signal . . . After he became aware of this, he used the system only periodically for calling his mother."399 Adam Robinson, Bin Laden Behind the Mask of the Terrorist, Arcade Publishing. Inc., New York, 2002. p. 247. If this claim about Bin Ladin's belief is accurate and al-Qa'ida leadership believed that phones were vulnerable, it may explain why this particular phone number was abandoned by KSM and Abu Ahmad.
¶[Redacted] and family details was critical to ultimately identifying al-Kuwaiti's true name, but not until years later—2007 to be exact—after detainee reporting provided enough information about the courier that a search of old records illuminated key information in that reporting. The CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence said such information was "an unnoticed needle in the haystack on an unending plain of haystacks" until that time.400 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama BinLadin, September 2012, n. 9 (DTS 2012-3826). One of the lead CIA analysts called similar information that later turned out to be important "meaningless" until years later when detainee reporting illuminated its importance.401 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, September 2012 p 9 (DTS 2012-3826). ' 75 [Redacted] Thus, this information really only became critical to the CIA after detainee reporting provided enough information about the courier that a search of old records illuminated key information in that reporting.
628¶Study Claim: f ^ S f l H H H I H B ^ F ) "[Tjhe most accurate information on Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti obtained from a CIA detainee [Hassan Ghul] was provided by a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."402 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 379.
¶Fact: [Redacted] Detainees who provided useful and accurate
information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and Bin Ladin had undergone enhanced interrogation prior to providing the information. For example, Hassan Ghul provided more specificity about Abu Ahmad after being transferred from COBALT and receiving enhanced interrogation techniques.
¶The Study disputes statements from current and former CIA officials that information from detainees in CIA's enhanced interrogation program provided valuable information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. For example, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta told ABC News in May 2011, soon after the Bin Ladin raid, that enhanced interrogation techniques were used to extract information that led to the mission's success.403 Interview with CIA Director Leon Panetta, Brian Williams. ABC News, May 3, 2011. Former Director Hayden said in an interview that "the original lead information—and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers—began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites."404 Interview with former CIA Director Michael Hayden, Scott Hennen Show, May 3, 2011. Both of these statements are accurate.
¶[Redacted] While numerous detainees at CIA black sites provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, as noted above, two detainees, Hassan Ghul and Ammar al-Baluchi, in particular were cited by the lead CIA analyst as leading her to search old intelligence files405 CIA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa 'ida Watch. Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23.2007. p. 2. Ammar al-Baluchi, who appears to.be the first detainee to mention Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's role as a Bin Ladin courier and a possible connection with Abu Faraj al- Libi, provided this information at a CIA black site during a period of enhanced interrogation.406 CIA, WASHINGTON D C [Redacted] Ammar al-Baluchi attempted to recant his earlier description of Abu Ahmad as a Bin Ladin courier. CIA. DIRECTOR [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] The second detainee, Hassan Ghul, is described in the Study as providing the "best" and "most accurate" information on the courier. While we are not sure it was the "best" or "most accurate" information, a CIA report on the Bin Ladin raid described Ghul's information as a "milestone in the long analytic targeting trek that led to Bin Ladin."407 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, dated September 2012 p 9 (DTS 2012-3826). Clearly it was important. According the CIA,
629Gul, while in CIA custody-before undergoing enhanced techniques-speculated that Abu Ahmad could be one of three people with Bin Ladin and speculated that
Abu Ahmad may have handled Bin Ladin's needs, including sending messages to his gatekeeper, Abu Faraj al-Libi.408
¶Additional CIA fact-checking explained that Ghul offered more details about Abu Ahmad's role after being transferred from COBALT and receiving enhanced interrogation. Specifically, the CIA stated:
After undergoing enhanced techniques, Gul stated that Abu Ahmad specifically passed a letter from Bin Ladin to Abu Faraj in late 2003 and that Abu Ahmad had "disappeared" from Karachi, Pakistan, in 2002. This information was not only more concrete and less speculative, it also corroborated information from Ammar that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was lying when he claimed Abu Ahmad left al-Qa'ida in 2002.409 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 38 (citing CIA, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶Ghul stated that while he had "no proof," he believed that Abu Faraj was in contact with Abu Ahmad and that Abu Ahmad might act as an intermediary contact between Abu Faraj and Bin Ladin. Ghul said that this belief "made sense" since Abu Ahmad had disappeared and Ghul had heard that Abu Ahmad was in contact with Abu Faraj.410 CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted] Months later, Ghul also told his interrogators that he knew Abu Ahmad was close to Bin Ladin, which was another reason he suggested that Abu Ahmad had direct contact with Bin Ladin as one of his couriers 411 f T [Redacted] F ) CIA documents make clear that when detainees like Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Abu Faraj al-Libi—who had undergone enhanced interrogation and were otherwise cooperative—denied knowing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti or suggested that he had "retired," it was a clear sign to CIA analysts that these detainees had something to hide, and it further confirmed other detainee information that had ripped them off about the true importance of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti412 CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted] CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, dated September 2012, pp. 9-HO (DTS 2012-3826); ClA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2.
¶Conclusion 6 (CIA Impeded Congressional Oversight)
¶[Redacted] Conclusion 6 states: "[t]he CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program."413 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5. In reality, the overall pattern of engagement with the Congress on this issue shows that the CIA attempted to keep the Congress informed of its activities. From 2002 to 2008, the CIA claims to have provided more than 35 briefings to SSCI members and staff, more than 30 similar briefings to HPSCI members and staff, and more than 20 congressional notifications,414 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 35. _ _ 7 7 linn 11 III i [Redacted] MI inn i For some of these briefings, there are no j ^ ^ ^ ^ d y Response, Case Studies (TAB CJ. June 27, 2013, p. 38 (citing CIA, [Redacted] DIRECTOR| [Redacted] transcripts415 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 441., likely because they were limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman/Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees. Because the Study did not interview the participants in these restricted briefings, it is impossible to document how much information the CIA provided to Committee leadership during those briefings. Often, the Study's own examples contradict the assertion that the CIA tried to avoid its overseers' scrutiny. For example, the Study notes that the CIA reacted to Vice Chairman Rockefeller's suspicion about the agency's honesty by planning a detailed briefing on the Program for.him416 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p, 441.
630Timing of the CIA's Briefings on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
¶Study Claim: ( T S f l H ^ H I ^ ^ B ^ " [Redacted] T h e C I A d i d n o t b r i e f t h e Senate Intelligence
Committee leadership on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been approved and used.'"417 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusionsj December 3,2014, p. 5.
¶Fact: f F [Redacted] F ) The CIA provided information to the Committee
in hearings, briefings, and notifications beginning shortly after the signing of the Memorandum of Notification (MON) on September 17,2001.
¶[Redacted] Conclusion 6 opens with the statement that the CIA did not brief the Senate Intelligence Committee leadership on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until after the techniques had been approved and used, setting the tone for a narrative that the CIA actively and systematically concealed information from the Congress. In reality, the CIA began discussing concerns about interrogation with the Committee even prior to the creation of the Program. The Study's review of the CIA's representations to Congress cites CIA hearing testimony from November 7, 2001, discussing the uncertainty in the boundaries on interrogation techniques418 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 437 n.2447. See also SSCI Transcript, Briefing on Covert Action. November 7, 2001, p. 56 (DTS 2002-0611). The Study also cites additional discussions between staff and CIA lawyers in February 2002.419 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 437. See also Email from: Christopher Ford, SSCI Staff, to: [Redacted] e a r e d SSCI staff; subject: Meeting yesterday with CIA lawyers on [Redacted] date: February 26, 2002 (DTS 2002-0925).
¶[Redacted] The Study seems to fault the CIA for not briefing the Committee leadership until after the enhanced interrogation techniques had been approved and used. The CIA briefed HPSCI leadership on September 4, 2002. SSCI leadership received the same briefing on September 27, 2002.420 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B). June 27, 2013, p. 36. The Study does not include information on when the CIA offered briefings to Congress or how long it took to schedule them. Briefing Committee leadership in the month after beginning a new activity does not constitute actively avoiding or impeding congressional oversight.
631