Reports that Matter

Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program · 2014

MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN CHAMBLISS, SENATORS BURR, RISCH, COATS, RUBIO, AND COBURN*

Section 50 of 55

MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN CHAMBLISS, SENATORS BURR, RISCH, COATS, RUBIO, AND COBURN*

June 20, 2014

{(Revised for Redaction on Decembers, 2014]]*

  • When these minority views were initially written in response to the original Study approved by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on December 13, 2012, the following members of the Committee signed on to them: Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Blunt, and Rubio, ' [(Please note that the double-bracketed text in this document is new explanatory text necessitated by substantive modifications to die Study's Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions that were made after our June 20, 2014, Minority Views were submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency for the declassification review. We also note that these Minority Views are in response to, and at points predicated upon, the research and foundational work that underlie the Study's account of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. These Views should not be treated as an independent report based upon a separate investigation, but rather our evaluation and critique of the Study's problematic analysis, factual findings, and conclusions.]]
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[Redacted]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I

  • INTRODUCTION — 1

  • THE STUDY'S FLAWED PROCESS — 2

  • Failure to Interview Witnesses — 3

  • Insufficient Member Review of the Approved Study — 5

  • Insufficient Initial Fact Checking — 6

  • The CIA Response — 7

  • The Summer Meetings — 8

  • The Clash Over the Panetta Review — 9

  • The Declassification Review Business Meeting — 10

THE STUDY'S PROBLEMATIC ANALYSIS , 10

  • Inadequate Context — 11

  • Inadequate Objectivity — 12

  • Indications of Political Considerations — 15

Lack of Timeliness.. 16

  • Inadequate Use of Available Sources of Intelligence — 17

  • Exhibits Poor Standards of Analytic Tradecraft — 17

  • Inadequately Describes the Quality and Reliability of Sources — 17

Inadequate Caveats About Uncertainties or Confidence in Analytic

  • Judgments — 18

  • Inadequate Incorporation of Alternative Analysis Where Appropriate — 19

Based on Flawed Logical Argumentation... 19

  • ERRONEOUS STUDY CONCLUSIONS — 20
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  • Conclusion 1 (The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not effective) — 21

Conclusion 2 (CIA's Justification for EITs Rested on Inaccurate

  • Effectiveness Claims) — 24

  • The Study's Flawed Analytical Methodology — 25

Our Analytical Methodology,,.... '. 26

Re-organization of the "Effectiveness" Case Studies.. 27

  • The Domino Effect — 28

  • The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as the Mastermind of the 9/11 Attacks and His "Mukhtar" Alias — 29

The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla

  • The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh — 37

  • The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad — 41

  • The Disruption of the Karachi Hotels Bombing Plot — 45

  • The Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots — 47

The Capture of Hambali.,.. 50

The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plots and Discovery of the Al-

  • Ghuraba Group — 53

  • Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar — 56

  • The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri — 57

  • The Arrest and Prosecution of Iyman Faris — 58

The Arrest and Prosecution of Uzhair Paracha and the Arrest of Saifullah Paracha ,

  • Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan — 64

  • The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting — 67

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  • CIA Detainees Subjected to EITs Validated CIA Sources — 69

  • Timing of the CIA's Briefings on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques — 78

  • Access to Documents — 79

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[Redacted]

Conclusion 10 (The CIA Released Classified Information on EITs to the

  • Media) — 103

  • CONCLUSION — 106

APPENDIX I: CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in

Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16,2006 : 1

APPENDIX II: CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting,

August 2005 j

A P P E N D I X I I [Redacted] f [Redacted]

[Redacted] [ [Redacted] subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [source name REDACTED!?;

[Redacted] [Redacted]

[Redacted] [Redacted] C T E D ] ,

[Redacted] subject: Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and

  • [source name REDACTED]?; date: M a r c [Redacted] 2004, at 7:52:32 AM — 1

APPENDIX IV: CIA, Office of General Counsel draft Legal Appendix:

November 26, 2002

[Redacted]

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MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN CHAMBLISS, SENATORS BURR, RISCH, COATS, RUBIO, AND COBURN1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In March 2009, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("SSCI" or "Committee") decided, by a vote of 14-1, to initiate a Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, (the Study). 2 On August 24, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder decided to re-open the criminal inquiry related to the interrogation of certain detainees in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Detention and Interrogation Program ("the Program" or "the Detention and Interrogation Program").3 Shortly thereafter, the minority withdrew from active participation in the Study when it determined that the Attorney General's decision would preclude a comprehensive review of the Program, since many of the relevant witnesses would likely decline to be interviewed by the Committee. Three years later, on August 30, 2012, Attorney General Holder closed the criminal investigation into the interrogation of certain detainees in the Detention and Interrogation Program.4 At the end of the 112,h Congress, on December 13, 2012, the Committee approved the adoption of the Study's three-volume report, executive summary, and findings and conclusions by a vote of 9-6. 5 On April 3, 2014, by a vote of 11-3. the Committee approved a motion to send updated versions of the Study's executive summary and findings and conclusions to the President for declassification review. 6

The latest version of the updated Study is a [[6,682]]-page interpretation of documents that, according to the CIA, has cost the American taxpayer more than 40 million dollars and diverted countless CIA analytic and support resources.7 CIA, Letter from V. Sue Bromley, Associate Deputy Director, November 6, 2012, p. 1 (DTS 2012-4143). Contrary to the Terms of Reference, the Study does not offer any recommendations for improving intelligence interrogation practices, intelligence activities, or covert actions. Instead, it offers 20 conclusions, many of which attack the CIA's integrity and credibility in developing and implementing the Program. Absent the support of the documentary record, and on the basis of a flawed analytical methodology, these problematic claims and conclusions create the false impression that the CIA was actively misleading policy makers and impeding the counterterrorism efforts of other federal government agencies during the Program's operation.

The'following members of the Committee signed on to the minority views drafted in response to the original Study approved by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on December 13, 2012: Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Blunt, and Rubio. [[Please note that the double-bracketed text in this document is new explanatory text necessitated by substantive modifications to the Study's Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions that were made after our June 20,2014, Minority Views were submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency for die declassification review. We also note that these Minority Views are in response to, and at points predicated upon, the research and foundational work that underlie the Study's account of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. These Views should not be treated as an independent report based upon a separate investigation, but rather our evaluation and critique of the Study's problematic analysis, factual findings, and conclusions.]] 2

SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss and Revote on the Terms of Reference for the Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, March 5, 2009, p. 10 (DTS 2009-1916). 3

DOJ, Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees August 24, 2009, p; 1. ' 4

See DO J, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees. August 30. 2012. p. 1, 5

SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Consider the Report on the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program d 74 (DTS 2013-0452). 6

SSCI Transcript. Hearing to Vote on Declassification of the SSCI Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, April 3, 2014, pp. 8-9 (DTS 2014-1137).

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THE STUDY'S FLAWED PROCESS

We begin with an examination of the procedural irregularities that negatively impacted the Study's problematic claims and conclusions. First, the Committee's decision not to interview key witnesses led to significant analytical and factual errors in the original and subsequent updated versions of the Study. Second, over the objection of the minority, the Committee did not provide a copy of the draft Study to the Intelligence Community for initial fact-checking prior to the vote to adopt the Study at the end of the 112th Congress. Third, Committee members and staff were not given sufficient time to review the Study prior to the scheduled vote on December 13, 2012. Fourth, the Committee largely ignored the CIA's response to the Study on June 27, 2013, which identified a number of factual and analytical errors in the Study. Fifth, during the summer and early fall of 2013, SSCI majority staff failed to take advantage of the nearly 60 hours of meetings with some of the CIA personnel who had led and participated in the CIA's study response. Instead of attempting to understand the factual and analytical errors that had been identified by the CIA, the majority staff spent a significant portion of these meetings criticizing the CIA's study response and justifying the Study's flawed analytical methodology. Sixth, the production and release of the updated Study was marred by the alleged misconduct of majority staff and CIA employees in relation to a set of documents known as the "Panetta Internal Review." Finally, Committee members and staff were not given sufficient time to review the updated Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions prior to the scheduled vote on April 4, 2014.

With the exception of the decision not to interview relevant witnesses, most, if not all, of these procedural irregularities could have been avoided. As will be seen below, the updated Study still contains a significant number factual inaccuracies and invalid claims and conclusions. We believe that many of these problems could have been corrected if the Committee had simply adhered to our established procedural precedents for a report of this importance.

THE STUDY'S PROBLEMATIC ANALYSIS

We found a number of analytical deficiencies in the Study beginning with an inadequate discussion of the context that led to the implementation and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Also, as an oversight body, this Committee reviews the Intelligence Community's analytic products with an expectation that they will follow certain analytic integrity standards. While these standards do not technically apply to this Committee's oversight products, the values behind these standards are useful in assessing our own analytic tradecraft. When applied to the Study, these standards were helpful in identifying some of the Study's general analytic deficiencies concerning objectivity, independence from political considerations, timeliness, the use of all available intelligence sources, and consistency with proper standards of analytic tradecraft.

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Inadequate Context

The Study does very little to provide the context in which the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was initiated and operated. It is entirely silent on the surge in terrorist threat reporting that inundated the Intelligence Community following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by al-Qa'ida. It also makes no mention of the pervasive, genuine apprehension about a possible second attack on the United States that gripped the CIA in 2002 and 2003. During our review of the documentary record, we could clearly discern a workforce traumatized by the thousands of lives lost as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, but also galvanized by the challenge of working to ensure such an attack never occurred again.

Inadequate Objectivity

With respect to the standard of objectivity, we were disappointed to find that the updated Study still contains evidence of strongly held biases. John Brennan emphasized this point prior to his confirmation as the Director of the CIA, when he told Vice Chairman Chambliss that, based on his reading of the originally approved Executive Summary and the Findings and Conclusions, the Study was "not objective" and was a "prosecutor's brief," "written with an eye toward finding problems." We agree with Director Brennan's assessments. We also agree with the"criticism he relayed from Intelligence Community officials that it was written with a "bent on the part of the authors" with "political motivations,"

We found that those biases led to faulty analysis, serious inaccuracies, and misrepresentations of fact in the Study. For example, the Study states, "At no time during or after the aggressive interrogation phase did Abu Zubaydah provide the information that the CIA enhanced interrogation were premised upon, specifically, 'actionable intelligence about al- Qa'ida operatives in the United States and planned al-Qa'ida lethal attacks against U.S. citizens and U.S. interests.'"8 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 146. Specifically, our review of the documentary record revealed that Abu Zubaydah provided actionable intelligence, after he was subjected to "aggressive" interrogation in April9 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Riseh, Coats, Rubio and Coburn June 20, 2014, p. 33. and August10 See CIA, [Redacted] 10586, August 4, 2002, pp. 2-5. [Redacted] 2002, that helped lead to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al- Qa'ida associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002. These captures effectively disrupted the al-Qa'ida plot to bomb certain named hotels in Karachi, Pakistan, that had been selected because they were frequented by American and German guests.

The Study's lack of objectivity is also evidenced by the uneven treatment of key U.S. officials throughout the report, attacking the credibility and honesty of some, while making little mention of others. For example, former Director George Tenet led the CIA at the outset of the Program, during a period the Study contends was characterized by mismanagement. Tenet authorized the enhanced interrogation techniques, and if the Study is to be believed, headed an organization that withheld information from and misled policymakers in the executive branch and Congress. He is mentioned 62 times in the updated version of the Study's Executive Summary. By comparison, former Director Michael Hayden—who joined the CIA in 2006, after all but two detainees entered the Program and the most severe EITs were no longer in use—is mentioned over 200 times in the Executive Summary and disparaged numerous times. Notably, he was also the only Director to brief the Program to all members of the congressional oversight committees.

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Indications of Political Considerations

Ideally, oversight reports should not be distorted or altered with the intent of supporting or advocating a particular policy, political viewpoint, or specific audience."11 We found indications of political considerations within the Study. For example, the Study uses out- of-context quotes from certain minority members to suggest incorrectly that they supported certain positions taken by the Study. The Study omits additional comments by these same members which contradict the out-of-context statements.

Lack of Timeliness

The analytic integrity standard of timeliness centers on the need to effectively inform key policy decisions. The same could be said for intelligence oversight reports. The updated version of the Study was released for declassification review on April 3, 2014—more than five years after the Terms of Reference were approved. No version of the Study, updated or otherwise, has ever contained any recommendations. Moreover, there are no lessons learned, nor are there any suggestions of possible alternative measures. This absence of Committee recommendations is likely due to the fact that the key policy decisions about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were decided by President Obama in 2009. Since it does little to effectively inform current policymakers, we found that the Study is not timely.

Inadequate Use of Available Sources of Intelligence

Despite the millions of records available for the Study's research, we found that important documents were not reviewed and some were never requested. We were surprised to learn that the e-mails of only 64 individuals were initially requested to support the review of a program that spanned eight years and included hundreds of government employees. Committee reviews of this magnitude typically involve interviewing the relevant witnesses. Here, these relevant witnesses were largely unavailable due to the Attorney General's decision to re-open a preliminary criminal review in connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations. When DOJ closed this investigation in August 2013, however, the Committee had a window of opportunity to invite these relevant witnesses in for interviews, but apparently decided against that course of action. The lack of witness interviews should have been a clear warning flag to all Committee members about the difficulty of completing a truly "comprehensive" review on this subject.

1 ' Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2.

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Poor Standards of Analytic Tradecraft

We found numerous examples of poor analytic tradecraft in the Study. There were instances where the Study did not accurately describe the quality and reliability of the sources of information supporting its analysis. For example, the Study states that a review by the CIA Inspector General (IG) "uncovered that additional unauthorized techniques were used against" a detainee, but the Inspector General report actually said it "heard allegations" of the use of unauthorized techniques and said, "[F]or all of the instances, the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative determination about the facts."12 Compare SSCI Study. Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 229 with CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003). May 7, 2004, p. 41 (DTS 2004-2710). [[This tradecraft error was partially corrected in the November 26, 2014, version of the Executive Summary by editing the offending sentence to read, "The Office of Inspector General later described additional allegations of unauthorized techniques used against... ," (emphasis added). Compare SSCI Study, Executive Summary, April 3,2014, p. 67 with SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 7011 The Study rarely included caveats about uncertainties or confidence in its analytic judgments. Many of the Study's conclusions and underlying claims are offered as matters of unequivocal fact. As an example, the Study asserts "CIA officers conducted no research on successful interrogation strategies during the drafting of the [Memorandum of Notification], nor after it was issued."13 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 20. Proving a negative is often very difficult, and in this particular case it is difficult to understand how such an absolute assertion can be made without interviewing the affected witnesses or even citing to one documentary source that might support such a claim.

The Study also engaged in little alternative analysis of its claims and conclusions. In many respects, these minority views provide this necessary alternative analysis. For example, the Study is replete with uncited and absolute assertions like "there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts."14 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3,2014, p. 318. Our review of the documentary record revealed that Abu Zubaydah did provide locational information about bin al-Shibh. As discussed below, Zubaydah made four separate photographic identifications of bin al-Shibh and placed him in Kandahar, Afghanistan, during the November to December 2001 timeframe and provided sufficient information for interrogators to conclude that bin al-Shibh was subsequently with Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) in Karachi, Pakistan.15 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr. Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Cubum, June 20, 2014, pp. 37-38.

Finally, we found instances where claims were supported more by rhetorical devices than sound logical reasoning. For example, in support of the Study's conclusion that the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques were not effective, the Study stated:

At least seven detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques almost immediately after being rendered into CIA custody, making it impossible to determine whether the information they provided could have been obtained through non-coercive debriefing methods."16 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3, 2014, p. 2 (emphasis added). [[This false reasoning was tempered in the December 3, 2014, version of the Executive Summary by editing the sentence to read, "CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques." Compare SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3, 2014. p. 2 with SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2.]]

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This statement is a rhetorical attempt to persuade the reader that non-coercive techniques may have been equally or even more successful than the enhanced techniques. It is little more than an appeal to unknowable facts and is not based upon logical reasoning.17 For a more detailed analysis of this unsupported claim, see infra, SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr. Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Cobum, December 5, 2014, p. 22.

ERRONEOUS STUDY CONCLUSIONS

Despite the fact that the CIA response and the summer staff meetings essentially validated our criticisms of the original Study, it appears that the updated version of the Study largely persists with many of its erroneous analytical and factual claims. We have used these past eleven weeks to update our own Minority Views and focus our attention on eight of the Study's most problematic conclusions.

Conclusion 1 (The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not effective)

This updated conclusion asserts that the "CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees."18 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. The first and second conclusions in the updated Findings and Conclusion had been combined in Conclusion 9 of the original Study. The Study attempts to validate this conclusion by relying upon four faulty premises. The first faulty premise is that "seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA custody."19 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. The assertion of "produced no intelligence" as used by the Study reflects that the interrogations of these detainees resulted in no intelligence reports. If true, that means that 82 percent of detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques produced some intelligence while in CIA custody, which is better than the 57.5 percent effectiveness rate of detainees not subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. Regardless, these statistics do not provide any real insight on the qualitative value of the intelligence information obtained. The true test of effectiveness is the value of what was obtained—not how much or how little was obtained.

We have already discussed the second faulty premise, which involves a rhetorical appeal to ignorance based on the fact that at least seven detainees were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques almost immediately after coming into the CIA's custody. Such speculation is not helpful in assessing whether the enhanced interrogation techniques were effective.

The third faulty premise of this ineffective techniques conclusion focuses on the fact that "multiple" detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques "fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence."20 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. Our documentary review also found that "multiple" detainees who were not subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques also provided fabricated information to their interrogators. The only real inference that can be drawn from these facts is that detainees fabricated information regardless of whether they were subjected to enhanced interrogation.

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The final faulty premise used in support of this "effectiveness" conclusion was that "CIA officers regularly called into question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence."21 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. While the opinions of these unidentified CIA officers may happen to coincide with the Study's first conclusion, there were at least three other CIA officials who held the opposite view—Directors Tenet, Goss, and Hayden.

Conclusion 2 (CIA's Justification for EITs Rested on Inaccurate Effectiveness Claims)

Conclusion 2 states, "[t]he CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness."22 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. While our review of the documentary record did reveal some instances of inaccurate effectiveness claims by the CIA, we found that many of the Study's claims related to this conclusion were themselves inaccurate. We reviewed 17 of the 20 cases studies that the Study relies upon to support this flawed conclusion. We examined these case studies in logical groupings (e.g., related to information provided by Abu Zubaydah) using chronological order rather than the Study's confusing "primary" and "secondary" effectiveness representations. This approach helped us better understand how the intelligence resulting from these detainee interrogations was used by the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots and identify, capture, and sometimes prosecute other terrorists.

The Study developed an analytical methodology to examine the effectiveness of the information obtained from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program that we found to be both confusing and deeply flawed. Usually, effectiveness is measured by establishing performance metrics that require the collection of pertinent data and the subsequent analysis of such data. For example, in the context of counterterrorism such metrics might include: (1) increased understanding of terrorist networks; (2) identification of terrorists and those providing material support; (3) terrorist captures; (4) terrorist interrogations; (5) disruption of terrorist operations and financing; (6) disruption of terrorist recruitment; (7) reduction in terrorist safe- havens; (8) development of counterterrorism assets; (9) intelligence gathering of documents, computer equipment, communications devices, etc.; (10) improved information sharing; and (11) improved foreign liaison cooperation against terrorism. Such metrics could then be compared against the information provided by CIA detainees to assess the relative effectiveness of the Program.

Instead of performance metrics, the Study's analytical methodology creates artificial categories that are used to exclude certain detainee information from being considered in an effectiveness assessment of the Program. For example, if the Study found that a detainee subjected to enhanced interrogation had provided similar information during an earlier nonenhanced interrogation, then such information could not he used for assessing the effectiveness of the program. This category appears to have been developed in an attempt to exclude much of the intelligence information provided by Abu Zubaydah after he was subjected to enhanced interrogation in August 2002, since some of the information Abu Zubaydah provided during those interrogations was similar to information he had provided prior to August. However, it aims out that this category is largely inapplicable to Abu Zubaydah's case, because he was subjected to enhanced interrogation by the CIA when he was released from the hospital on April 15, 2 0 0 2 . 2 3

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Another category of information that the Study's flawed analytical methodology excludes is corroborative information. If a detainee subjected to enhanced interrogation provided information that was already available to the CIA or other elements of the Intelligence Community from another source, then the methodology dictates that such information cannot be considered to support a CIA effectiveness representation. This result occurs even in situations in which the detainee's information clarified or explained the significance of the prior information. Another exclusion category applies if the Study determined that there was no causal relationship between the information obtained from a detainee after the use of enhanced interrogation and the operational success claimed by the CIA. In these case studies, we often found documentary evidence that supported direct causal links between such detainee information and the operational success represented by the CIA. The final category excludes detainee information about terrorist plots when there was a subsequent assessment by intelligence and law enforcement personnel that such plots were infeasible or never operationalized.

This flawed analytical methodology often forced the Study to use absolute language such as, "no connection," "no indication," "played no role," or "these representations were inaccurate." Our review of the documentary record often found valid counter-examples that disproved such absolute claims. We also found that when we invalidated the claims in the initial case studies, there was often a cascading effect that further undermined claims in the subsequent case studies. Here we summarize the claims for the case studies we examined and our alternate analysis of those claims.

The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as the Mastermind of the 9/11 Attacks and His "Mukhtar" Alias

f F [Redacted] E ) We combined our analysis of these two case studies because they share common facts and analytical issues. The Study claims that "[ojn at least two prominent occasions, the CIA represented, inaccurately, that Abu Zubaydah provided [information identifying KSM as the mastermind of 9/11] after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."24 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 312. We found that neither of the occasions cited with respect to the "Mastermind of 9/11" information were "prominent." The first occasion was not even a CIA representation, but rather a mistake made by the Department of Justice in one of its legal opinions.25 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 313, n.1748. vni The second occasion involved a set of November 2007 documents and talking points for the CTA Director to use in a briefing with the President. Although these briefing materials did contain some erroneous information about KSM's interrogation, the Study fails to demonstrate whether this erroneous information was actually briefed to the President during that timeframe.26 See DCIA Talking.Points: Waterboard, 06 November 2007, pp. 1 -3. This document was sent to DCIA on November 6 in preparation for a meeting with the President.

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The Study also claims that "{ijn at least one instance in November 2007 . . . the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as 'Mukhtar' after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."27 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 315. However, this instance is no more "prominent" than the above "mastermind" occasion, because it was contained in the same November 2007 briefing materials used by the CLA Director to brief the President.28 See DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard, 06 November 2007, pp. 1 -3. Again, the Study fails to demonstrate whether this erroneous information was actually briefed to the President during this timeframe.

[Redacted] The Study's third claim in relation to this case study is that "[tjhere is no evidence to support the statement that Abu Zubaydah's information—obtained by FBI interrogators prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and while Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized—was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the 'mastermind' of the 9/11 attacks."29 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3,2014, p. 313. We found considerable evidence that the information Abu Zubaydah provided identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the mastermind of 9/11 was significant to CIA analysts, operators, and FBI interrogators. Both the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 Attacks and the 9/11 Commission discussed the importance of this information to the Intelligence Community in understanding KSM's role in the attacks and in the al-Qa'ida organization.

The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla

[Redacted] The Study falsely claims that "[a] review of CIA operational cables and other CIA records found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of 'Jose Padilla' or the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records indicate that: . . . (3) Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI officers who were using rapport-building techniques, in April 2002, more than three months prior to the CIA's 'use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques,' . . . ."30 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 229-31 (emphasis added). However, CIA records clearly indicate that during the time period when FBI agents and CIA officers were working together in rotating, round-the-clock shifts, some of the interrogation techniques used on Abu Zubaydah included nudity,31 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008, p. 22. (DTS 2008-2411) liquid diet,32 See CIA, 10090, April 21, 2002, p. 5. sensory deprivation,33 See CIA, [Redacted] 10116, April 25. 2002, pp. 3-4; CIA, [Redacted] [10016, April 12, 2002, pp. 4-5. and extended sleep deprivation,34 See CIA, [Redacted] 10094, April 21, 2002, p. 3; CIA, [Redacted] 10071, April 19, 2002, p. 2; CIA, [Redacted] 10091, April 21, 2002, p. 2. Dietary manipulation, nudity, and sleep deprivation (more than 48 hours) were also subsequently authorized as enhanced interrogation techniques by the Department of Justice. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury. Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High value At Qaeda Detainees (DTS 2009-1810, Tab-11) Specifically, sleep deprivation played a significant role in Abu Zubaydah's identification of Jose Padilla as an al-Qa'ida operative tasked to carry out an attack against the United States. Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI agents during an interrogation session that began late at night on April 20, 2002, and ended on April 21, 2002. Between April 1.5, 2002 and April 21, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was deprived of sleep for a total of 126.5 hours (5.27 days) over a 136 hour (5.6 day) period—while only being permitted several brief sleep breaks between April 19, 2002 and April 21, 2002, which totaled 9.5 hours. Thus, all information provided by Abu Zubaydah subsequent to his return from the hospital on April 15, 2002, was obtained during or after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and cannot be excluded from supporting the CIA's effectiveness representations under the Study's flawed analytical methodology. Over the course of his detention, Abu Zubaydah provided 766 sole-source disseminated intelligence reports.35 SSCI Study, Volume III, March 31, 2014, pp. 282-283.

534

The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh f P [Redacted] [Redacted] N ^ The Study claims, "[a] review of CIA records found no connection between Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al-Shibh* s capture While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, there is no indication that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts. Further, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."36 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3,2014, p. 318 (emphasis added).

[Redacted] CIA records demonstrate that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques during two separate periods in April 2002 and August 2002. During these timeframes, Abu Zubaydah made several photographic identifications of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and provided information that bin al-Shibh had been in Kandahar at the end of 2001, but was then working with KSM in Karachi, Pakistan. More important, Abu Zubaydah provided information about how he would go aboutlocating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates in Karachi. This information caused [Redacted] Pakistani authorities to intensify their efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al-Qa'ida associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002.

The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad

[Redacted] The Study claims "there are no CIA records to support the assertion that Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other CIA detainee played any role in the 'the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.';'37 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 327. However, information obtained from CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah was essential to furthering the CIA's understanding of KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and helped lead to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The H H H H H ^ H H i ^ H j n t e r r o g a t i o n s of bin al-Shibh and DETAINEE R provided key insights abom KSMHHHNHI Information produced through detainee interrogation was pivotal to the retention of a key CIA asset whose cooperation led directly to the capture of KSM.

535

The Disruption of the Karachi Hotels Bombing Plot

[Redacted] The Study claims, "[T]he CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—to include the waterboard—played no role in the disruption, of the Karachi Plot(s)."38 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 242. However, CIA documents show that key intelligence collected through the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, including information obtained after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, played a major role in disrupting the Karachi hotels bombing plot. Specifically, Abu Zubaydah provided crucial information that helped lead to the successful [Redacted] raids of the al-Qa'ida safe houses on September 11, 2002—the same raids that yielded the "perfume letter" and disrupted the Karachi hotels plot. Specifically, the [Redacted] raids were the direct result of information provided by Abu Zubaydah on August 20, 2002, during his second period of enhanced interrogation.

The Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots

[Redacted] . The Study asserts that "contrary to CIA representations, information acquired during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in 'alert [ing]' the CIA to the threat to—or the *disrupt[ing]' the plotting against— Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf."39 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 297-298. We found that the CIA interrogation program played a key role in disrupting the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plotting. Specifically, the Study itself twice concedes these plots were "fully disrupted" with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin Attash.40 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3. 2014, pp. 295 and 299. The Study then incorrectly asserts, "There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the detainees were captured as a result of CIA detainee reporting."41 SSCI Study, Executive Summary December 3,2014, p. 299. Information obtained from the CIA interrogation program played a key role in the capture of al-Shibh and KSM.42 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Cobum, December 5, 2014. pp. 37-41. Also, Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided information about Ammar al-Baluchi and Abu Zubaydah provided information about Khallad bin Attash prior to their arrests43 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn, December 5, 2014, pp. [Redacted] and 47. • XI [Redacted] IIIII I I IIII II I ^ ^ M B B M B B B B I mi mill The same detainee information that helped lead to the capture of these terrorists also played a key role in fully disrupting the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plots.

536

The Capture of Hambali

. The Study claims that "[al review of CIA operational cables and other records found that information obtained from KSM during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the capture of Hambali."44 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 305. However, CIA documents show that the interrogation of KSM and al-Qa'ida operative Zubair, during and after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on both individuals, played a key role in the capture of Hambali. Specifically, CIA documents indicate it was the combination of reporting from KSM and Majid Khan that led to the efforts to find Hambali through Zubair. A CIA summary of Hambali's capture timeline states, while "numerous sources had placed Hambali in variou^outheas^sian countries, it was captured al-Qa'ida leader KSM who put [Redacted] [Redacted] o n Hambali's trail"—contradicting the Study's claim that the KSM interrogation played "no role."43

The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plots and Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group [Redacted]

cables and other documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the 'discovery' or thwarting of either 'Second Wave' plot. Likewise, records indicate that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the 'discovery' of a 17-member 'cell tasked with executing the 'Second Wave.""46 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 251. This claim has been modified from the version that appeared in the report that was approved by the Committee at the end of the 112th Congress. For example, it no longer claims that the CIA's interrogation program, excluding the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, did not play a role in the thwarting of the al-Ghuraba Group. It also substitutes the words "discovery or thwarting" in place of the original "identification and disruption." (emphasis added). However, we found that the CIA interrogation program played a key role in disrupting the "Second Wave" plot and led to the capture of the 17-member al-Ghuraba group. Specifically, the Study ignores that KSM, who had also been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, provided information months earlier on this same group of JI students and their location in Karachi—information that helped lead to the capture of Gunawan himself. According to CIA information, while the CIA was already aware of Gunawan, "KSM's identification of his role as Hambali's potential successor prioritized his capture. Information from multiple detainees, including KSM, narrowed down [Gunawan's] location and enabled his capture in September 2003."47 CIA, Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Aeainst Al-Qa'ida, June I, 2005, p 2 (DTS 2009-1387) This information was excluded from t h ^ t u d ^ P a k i s t a n ^ u t l ^ arrested the members of the al- Ghuraba group during raids on [Redacted] A cable describing the arrests said [Redacted] captured this cell based on the debriefings of captured senior al-Qa'ida operatives, who stated that some members of this cell were to be part of senior al-Qa[']ida leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)['s] ['jsecond wavef] operation to attack the United States using the same modus operandi as was used in the September 11, 2001 attacks."48 CIA, CIA CABLE 52981. [Redacted]

537

Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar

The Study asserts that,

CIA representations [about detainee reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar] also omitted key contextual facts, including t h a t . . . (2) CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided a description and information on a KSM associate named Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI Special Agents in May 2002, prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. .. and (5) CIA records indicate that KSM did not know al-Tayyar's true name and that it was Jose Padilla—in military custody and being questioned by the FBI—who provided al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan el- [Redacted] Shukrijumah."49 ' SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 358-359.

provided information on an associate of KSM by the name of Abu Jaffar al-Thayer. Abi/ Zubaydah provided a detailed description of Abu Jaffar ai-Thayer, including that he spoke English well and may have studied in the United States.50 See FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 20, 2002, 5:25 p.m. to 8:40 p.m., p 3. The Study incorrectly claims that this May 20, 2002, interrogation took place prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.51 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 362. Abu Zubaydah had already been subjected to an extended period of sleep deprivation and other enhanced interrogation techniques during his interrogation between April 15, 2002 and April 21, 2002, about one month prior to his May 20 interrogation.52 S e e "»/"»• SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Riseh, Coats, Rubio. and Coburn, December 5, 2014, pp. 33-36.

[Redacted] The Study also cites as a key contextual fact omitted from. CIA representations that KSM did not know al-Tayyar's true name, and it was Jose Padilla, in military custody and being questioned by the FBI, who provided al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan el-Shukrijumah.53 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3. 2014. p. 359. However, this omission was rendered moot because, as the Study itself notes a few pages later,54 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 365 (emphasis added). the "FBI began participating in the military debriefings [of Padilla] in March 2003, after KSM reported Padilla might know the true name of a US-bound al-Qa 'ida operative known at the time only as Jaffar al-Tayyar. Padilla confirmed Jaffar's true name as Adnan El Shukrijumah."55 See CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, April 15, 2005, p. 3 (emphasis added); See also CIA, ALEC [Redacted] a r c h 21, 2003, p. 6 ("Our service has developed new information, based on leads from detained al- Qa'ida operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), that al-Qa'ida operative Jafar al-Tayyar's true name is Adnan Shukri Jumah and he could be involved in an imminent suicide attack in the United States"). XHI 11 HI ' ii i mi i [Redacted] inn Mum

The Arrest and Prosecution of Saleh al-Marri

[Redacted] The Study correctly asserts, "The CIA represented to the CIA Office of Inspector General that 'as a result of the lawful use of EITs,' KSM 'provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including .. . Saleh ALmari, a sleeper operative in New York.'"56 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 366. As the Study makes clear, al-Marri was not arrested based on information from KSM, and could not have been, because al-Marri was arrested in December 2001, before the detention of KSM in March 2003.57 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,20!14, p. 366.

538

[Redacted] In its response to the Study, the CIA concedes that the agency erred in describing detainee reporting as contributing to al-Marri's arrest. However, the agency stresses that KSM did provide valuable intelligence on al-Marri—intelligence that played a significant role in al-Marri's prosecution.58 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 35. It was KSM who identified a photograph of al- Marri and described him as an al-Qa'ida sleeper operative sent to the United States shortly before 9/11. KSM said he planned for al-Marri, who "had the perfect built-in cover for travel to the United States as a student pursuing his advanced degree in computer studies at a university near New York," to serve as al-Qa'ida's point of contact to settle other operatives in the United States for follow-on attacks after 9/11,59 CIA, WASHINGTON DC[Redacted] KSM also said that al-Marri trained at the al-Faruq camp, had poisons training, and had offered himself as a martyr to bin Ladin.60 See CIA, CIA WASHINGTON DC [Redacted]

[Redacted] Prior to the information from KSM, al-Marri was charged with credit card fraud and false statements. After the information from KSM, al-Marri was designated as an enemy combatant. In 2009, after being transferred to federal court, al-Marri pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qa'ida. In his plea, he admitted that he attended terrorist training camps and met with KSM to offer his services al- Qa'ida, who told him to travel to the United States before 9/11 and await instructions—all information initially provided by KSM.

The Arrest and Prosecution of iyman Faris

The Study claims, "[o]ver a period of years, the CIA provided the 'identification,' 'arrest,' 'capture,' 'investigation,' and 'prosecution' of Iyman Faris as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate."61 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 276-277. The Study correctly points out that CIA statements implying that detainee information led to the "identification" or "investigation" of Iyman Faris were inaccurate. However, CIA, FBI, and Department of Justice documents show that information obtained from KSM after he was waterboarded led directly to Faris's arrest and was key in his prosecution.

[Redacted] On March 17 and 18, 2003, the CIA questioned KSM about Majid Khan's family and KSM stated that another Khan relative, whom he identified from a picture of Faris, was a "track driver in Ohio."62 CIA, CIA CABLE 10886. March 18, 2003, pp 5-6. [Redacted] On March 18, 2003, KSM told interrogators he tasked the truck driver to procure specialized machine tools (hat would be useful to al-Qaida in loosening the nuts and bolts of suspension bridges in the United States. KSM said he was informed by an intermediary that Faris could not find the tools.63 C I A > CIA CABLE 10886, March 18,2003, 5-6. This revelation would turn out to be a key piece of incriminating evidence against Iyman Faris. The Study excluded information found in CIA documents which shows that, immediately after obtaining information from KSM and Majid Khan regarding Faris, the CIA queried the FBI for "additional details" on Faris, "including a readout on his current activities and plans for FBI continued investigation."64 CIA, Information front KSM on Majid Khan. The cable specifically noted that "KSM seems to have accurately identified" Faris from a photograph as the "truck driver in Ohio."65 CIA, [Redacted] from KSM on Majid Khan. ' Phone call from the FBI responding to minority staff questions from a document review, January 25, 2013.

539

[Redacted] On March 20, 2003, the FBI picked up Faris for questioning and conducted a consent search of his apartment, seizing his laptop. When our staff asked the FBI why Faris was picked up, they cited the cables from CIA.66 The FBI investigators went into this interview armed with the information revealed by KSM and Majid Khan, which enabled them to explore Faris's ties with KSM and al-Qa'ida plotting in the United States67 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27. 2013, p. 13; FBI WASH 040537Z, April 4, 2003, p. 2. On May 1, 2003, Faris pled guilty to "casing a New York City bridge for al Qaeda, and researching and providing information to al Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible attacks on U.S. targets," the exact terrorist activities described by KSM. Ultimately, the CIA's representation concerning the identification and initial investigation of Faris is much less important than the details that led to his arrest and prosecution.

The Arrest and Prosecution of Uzhair Paracha and the Arrest ofSaifullah Paracha

[Redacted] . The Study asserts,"[t]he CIA represented that information obtained through the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable intelligence that led to the identification and/or arrest of Uzhair Paracha and his father Saifullah Paracha (aka, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha). These CIA representations included inaccurate information and omitted significant material information, specifically a body [of] intelligence reporting—acquired prior to CIA detainee reporting—that linked the Parachas to al- Qa'ida-related terrorist activities."68 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p 352

[Redacted] We found, however, that information obtained from KSM during his enhanced interrogation on March 25, 2003, about alleged explosives smuggling into the United States, attacks on U.S. gas stations, and related material support to al-Qa'ida, motivated the FBI to track down and arrest Uzhair Paracha in New York a few days later on 63

continued its pursuit of Saifullah, who was later [Redacted] 1 u

arrested [Redacted] J 'y 6, 2003. Among other charges, Uzhair was successfully convicted on November 23, 2005, of providing material support to al-Qa'ida and sentenced to 30 years in prison. KSM's description of Uzhair's involvement in the gas station plots and his claim that Uzhair may have provided other logistical support for Majid's entry into the United States was consistent with the press release's description of some of the evidence used during Uzhair's trial.70 See DOJ, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Pakistani Man Convicted of Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison, July 20, 2006, p.2.

540

Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan

This case study is no longer as problematic as the version contained in the appendix to the original Findings and Conclusions section of the Study approved by the Committee during the 112th Congress. That appendix falsely accused the CIA of providing an inaccurate representation about the tactical intelligence acquired on Shkai, Pakistan, during the interrogations of Hassan Ghul after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques.71 SSCI Study, December 13, 2012, Findings and Conclusions, Appendix; Details on CIA's Effectiveness Representations-Conclusion #9, p. 92. Fortunately, that appendix has been dropped from the Study's updated Findings and Conclusions and there is no claim in the updated version of the Study that the representation concerning Shkai, Pakistan, was inaccurate.

Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting

[Redacted] The Study claims, "[t]he CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques thwarted plotting against the U.S. military base, Camp Lemonier, in Djibouti. These representations were inaccurate."72 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3.2014, p. 336. We found, however that representations about the thwarting of an attack against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, specifically President Bush's 2006 comments that "Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti," were accurate and have been mischaracterized by the Study.73 President George W. Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, D C., September 6, 2006. Specifically, contrary to the Study's assertions, the President did not attribute the thwarting of this plot exclusively to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, but information from "[tjerrorists held in CIA custody." Tn addition, the President never stated that the plot was disrupted exclusively because of information from detainees in CIA custody. The President was clear that information from detainees "helped" to stop the planned strike. This idea that detainee reporting builds on and contextualizes previous and subsequent reporting is repeated a few lines later in the speech, when the President makes clear, "[t]he information we get from these detainees is corroborated by intelligence . . . that we've received from other sources, and together this intelligence has helped us connect the dots and stop attacks before they occur."74 President George W. Bush, Tiying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2006.