H. The CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It Inaccurate; Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to Techniques Authorized by the Army Field Manual

¶On April 12, 2007, CIA Director Hayden testified at a lengthy hearing that was attended by all but one committee member, and for the first time, the CIA allowed most of the Committee's staff to attend. The members stated that the Committee was still seeking access to CIA documents and information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, including Department of Justice memoranda and the location of the CIA's detention facilities.²⁵¹⁵²⁵¹⁵ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). Director Hayden's Statement for the Record included extensive inaccurate information with regard to Abu Zubaydah, CIA interrogators, abuses identified by the ICRC, and the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.²⁵¹⁶²⁵¹⁶ For example, the Statement for the Record claimed that Abu Zubaydah was "an up-and-coming lieutenant of Usarna Bin Ladin (UBL) who had intimate knowledge of al-Qa'ida's current operations, personnel and plans." It also stated that "[a]fter the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most important sources of intelligence on al-Qa'ida, and he himself has stated that he would not have been responsive or told us all he did had he not gone through these techniques." The Statement claimed that CIA interrogators were "carefully chosen and screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity," and that "they must complete more than 250 hours of specialized training before they are allowed to come face-to-face with a terrorist." Claims made in the Statement refuting the abuses identified by the ICRC were repeated by Director Hayden during the hearing, and are described in an appendix to this summary. The Statement for the Record also included inaccurate information about past congressional oversight, claiming that "[ajs CIA's efforts to implement [new interrogation] authorities got underway in 2002, the majority and minority leaders of die Senate, the speaker and the minority leader of the House, and die chairs and ranking members of the intelligence committees were fully briefed on the interrogation program." See Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12,2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).Show full note Director Hayden's Statement for the Record also listed five examples of captures and four examples of plots "thwarted" purportedly resulting from information acquired from CIA detainees, all of which included significant inaccurate information.²⁵¹⁷²⁵¹⁷ The Statement for the Record included claims of effectiveness similar to those made in otiier contexts by die CIA, related to the captures of Hambali (on which Director Hayden elaborated during the hearing), Issa al-Hindi ("KSM also provided the first lead to an operative known as 'Issa al-Hindi'"), Sajid Badat ("[l]eads provided by KSM in November 2003 led directly to the arrest of [Badat]"), Jose Padilla ("Abu Zubaydah provided information leading to the identification of alleged al-Qa'ida operative Jose Padilla"), and Iyman Faris ("[s]oon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-based truck dri ver whom the FBI identified as Iyman Faris, already under suspicion for his contacts with al-Qa'ida operative Majid Khan"). The statement also described the "thwarting" and "disrupting" of the "West Coast Airliner Plot" (aka, the Second Wave plotting), the "Heathrow Airport plot," the "Karachi plots," and "Plots in the Saudi Peninsula." See Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, h e a r i n g ( D T S # 2 0 a M 5 6 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ [Redacted]Show full note Director Hayden's Statement for the Record further included the following representation with regard to the effects of legislation that would limit interrogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual:

"The CIA program has proven to be effective... should our techniques be limited to the [Army] field manual, we are left with very little offense and are relegated to rely primarily on defense. Without the approval of EITs... we have severely restricted our attempts to obtain timely information from HVDs who possess information that will help us save lives and disrupt operations. Limiting our interrogation tools to those detailed in the [Army] field manual

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will increase the probability that a determined, resilient HVD will be able to withhold critical, time-sensitive, actionable intelligence that could prevent an imminent, catastrophic attack."²⁵¹⁸²⁵¹⁸ Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).

¶At the April 12, 2007, hearing, Director Hayden verbally provided extensive inaccurate information on, among other topics: (1) the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, (2) the application of Department of Defense survival school practices to the program, (3) detainees' counterinterrogation training, (4) the backgrounds of CIA interrogators, (5) the role of other members of the interrogation teams, (6) the number of CIA detainees and their intelligence production, (7) the role of CIA detainee reporting in the captures of terrorist suspects, (8) the interrogation process, (9) the use of detainee reporting, (10) the purported relationship between Islam and the need to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (11) threats against detainees' families, (12) the punching and kicking of detainees, (13) detainee hygiene, (14) denial of medical care, (15) dietary manipulation, (16) the use of waterboarding and its effectiveness, and (17) the injury and death of detainees. In addition, the chief of CTC's [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] Department provided inaccurate information on the CIA's use of stress positions, while Acting General Counsel John Rizzo provided inaccurate information on the legal reasons for establishing CIA detention facilities overseas.²⁵¹⁹²⁵¹⁹ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). A detailed comparison of Director Hayden's testimony and information in CIA records related to the program is included in an appendix to this summary.

¶In responses to official Committee Questions for the Record, the CIA provided inaccurate information related to detainees transferred from U.S. military to CIA custody.²⁵²⁰²⁵²⁰ j ] l e Committee had asked for specifics related to the assertion in Director Hayden's written statement that the CIA program was effective in gaining intelligence after detainees successfully resisted interrogation under U.S. military detention. The CIA's response referenced only one detainee, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi, stating that he was "unwilling to become fully cooperative given the limitations of the U.S. military's interrogation and detention regulations." The CIA's response to Committee questions then asserted that "[i]t was not until Abu Jaf'ar was subjected to EITS that he provided detailed information [about] his personal meetings with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and Zarqawi's advisors," and that "[i]n addition, Abu Jaf'ar provided information on al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) finances, travel, and associated facilitation activities." The provided information was inaccurate. CIA records indicate that, while still in U.S. military custody, Abu Ja'far described multiple meetings with al-Zarqawi, other members of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, and individuals who were to serve as al-Zarqawi's connection to senior al-Qa'ida leadership. Abu Ja'far also provided insights into al-Zarqawi's beliefs and plans. See [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] O C T 0 [Redacted] 7 2 6 [Redacted] OCT05[Redacted]2810 j l [Redacted] 9 4 4 ( [Redacted] 0 C T 05 >-Show full note The Committee also requested a timeline connecting intelligence reporting obtained from CIA detainees to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA declined to provide such a timeline, writing that "[t]he value of each intelligence report stands alone, whether it is collected before, during, immediately after or significantly after the use of [the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques]."²⁵²¹²⁵²¹ CIA Response to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for the Record, June 18, 2007 (DTS #2007-2564).

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¶In May 2007, the Committee voted to approve the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill, which required reporting on CIA compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act and Military Commissions Act. In September 2007, John Rizzo withdrew his nomination to be CIA general counsel amid Committee concerns related to his role in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. On August 2, 2007, the Committee conducted a hearing that addressed the interrogation of Muhammad Rahim, who would be the CIA's last detainee, as well as the president's new Executive Order, which interpreted the Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow the CIA to use its enhanced interrogation techniques against Muhammad Rahim. At that hearing, the CIA's director of CTC, [Redacted] provided inaccurate information to the Committee on several issues, including how the CIA conducts interrogations.²⁵²²²⁵²² p o r example, the director of CTC, [Redacted] testified that detainees "are given ample opportunity to provide the information without the use of EITs" (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of heating, August 2,2007 (DTS #2007-3641). As detailed in this Study, numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques immediately upon being questioned. Members again requested access to the Department of Justice memoranda related to the CIA program, but were denied this access.²⁵²³²⁵²³ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, August 2, 2007 (DTS #2007-3641).

¶On December 5, 2007, the conference committee considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to restrict the CIA's interrogation techniques to those authorized by the Army Field Manual. Opponents of the provision referenced Director Hayden's testimony on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in acquiring critical information.²⁵²⁴²⁵²⁴ Transcript, Committee of Conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 5, 2007 (DTS #2009-1279). On December 6, 2007, the New York Times revealed that the CIA had destroyed videotapes of CIA interrogations in 2005.²⁵²⁵²⁵²⁵ "c j a Destroyed Tapes of Interrogations," The New York Times, December 6, 2007 (published in the December 7,2007, edition of the newspaper). The CIA claimed that the Committee had been told about the destruction of the videotapes at a hearing in November 2006.²⁵²⁶²⁵²⁶ p r e s s Release, entitled, "Chairman Rockefeller Says Intel Committee Has Begun Investigation Into CIA Detainee Tapes; Senator Expresses Concern that CIA Continues to Withhold Key Information," Office of Senator Rockefeller, December 7, 2007. A review of the Committee's transcript of its November 16, 2006, hearing found that the CIA's claim of notification was inaccurate. In fact, CIA witnesses testified at the hearing that the CIA did not videotape interrogations, while making no mention of past videotaping or the destruction of videotapes.²⁵²⁷²⁵²⁷ Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, November 16,2006 (DTS #2007-1422). The CIA's June 2013 Response states only that "[w]e acknowledge that DCIA did not volunteer past information on CIA's process of videotaping the interrogation sessions or of the destruction of the tapes...." The Committee review found that in testimony to the Committee in November 2006, CIA witnesses responded to questions about videotaping in terms of current practice, while avoiding any reference to past practice. This was similar to what was conveyed in June 2003, to David Addington of the Office of the Vice President, by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller. In June 2003, the CIA's General Counsel Scott Muller traveled to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the Vice President's counsel David Addington, Department of Defense General Counsel Jim Haynes, Patrick Philbin from the Department of Justice, and NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger. According to CIA records, during the trip, White House officials asked CIA General Counsel Muller about the CIA Inspector General's concerns regarding the waterboard technique and whether the CIA videotaped interrogations, as David Addington had heard tapes existed of the CIA's interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. In an email to CIA colleagues providing details on the trip, Muller wrote: "(David Addington, by the way, asked me if were [sic] MI 11 III I [Redacted] 111" M "Show full note

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¶At the CIA briefing to the Committee on December 11, 2007, Director Hayden testified about: (1) the information provided to the White House regarding the videotapes, (2) what the tapes revealed, (3) what was not on the tapes, (4) the reasons for their destruction, (5) the legal basis for the use of the waterboard, and (6) the effectiveness of the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. Much of this testimony was inaccurate or incomplete. Director Hayden also testified that what was on the destroyed videotapes was documented in CIA cables, and that the cables were "a more than adequate representation of the tapes." Director Hayden committed the CIA to providing the Committee with access to the cables.²⁵²⁸²⁵²⁸ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, December 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-4904). In the spring of 2008, after the Committee agreed on a bipartisan basis to continue investigating the destruction of the interrogation tapes, Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond pressed the CIA to provide the operational cables promised by Director Hayden. See April 21, 2008, letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden (DTS #2008-1798). See also May 8, 2008, letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden (DTS #2008-2030).Show full note

¶On February 5, 2008, after the House of Representatives passed the conference report limiting CIA interrogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual, Director Hayden testified in an open Committee hearing against the provision. Director Hayden also stated, inaccurately, that over the life of the CIA program, the CIA had detained fewer than 100 people.²⁵²⁹²⁵²⁹ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, February 5, 2008 (DTS #2008-1140). On February 13, 2008, the Senate passed the conference report.²⁵³⁰²⁵³⁰ U.S. Senate vote to adopt the conference report on February 13, 2008, 4:31 PM. H.R. 2082 (Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008).