I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by the CIA; CIA Declines to Answer Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation Program

¶On March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence Authorization bill. President Bush explained his decision to veto the bill in a radio broadcast that repeated CIA representations that the CIA interrogation program produced "critical intelligence" that prevented specific terrorist plots. As described in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, the statement reflected inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the president and other policymakers in CIA briefings.²⁵³¹²⁵³¹ The President's veto message to the House of Representatives stated that "[t]he CIA's ability to conduct a separate and specialized interrogation program for terrorists who possess the most critical information in the war on terror has helped the United States prevent a number of attacks, including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the Library Tower in Los Angeles and into Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London" (Message to the House of Representatives, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). The president also explained his veto in his weekly radio address, in which he referenced the "Library Tower," also known as the "Second Wave" plot, and the Heathrow Airport plot, while representing that the CIA program "helped us stop a plot to strike a U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi...." (See President's Radio Address, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed, CIA representations regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques with regard to the Second Wave, Heathrow Airport, Djibouti, and Karachi plots were inaccurate. [Redacted]Show full note Three days later, the House of Representatives taping interrogations and said he had heard that there were tapes of the Zubaydah interrogations. I told him that tapes were not being made)." See email from: Scott Muller; to: John Rizzo, [Redacted] and [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] subject: Report from Gitmo trip (Not proofread as usual); date: June [Redacted] 2003, at 5:47 PM.

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¶failed to override the veto.²⁵³²²⁵³² U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 117 of the 110,h Congress, Second Session, March 11, 2008, 7:01 PM. On May 22, 2008, the CIA informed the Committee that the vetoed legislation "has had no impact on CIA policies concerning the use of EITs."²⁵³³²⁵³³ CIA Responses to Questions for the Record from the 6 March 2008 SSCI Covert Action Hearing, May 22, 2008 (DTS #2008-2234). As noted, CIA Director Goss had previously testified to the Committee that "we cannot do it by ourselves," and that "[w]e need to have the support of our oversight committee."²⁵³⁴²⁵³⁴ Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308). As further noted, the OLC's 2007 memorandum applying the Military Commissions Act to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on the CIA's representation that "none of the Members expressed the view that the CIA interrogation program should be stopped, or that the techniques at issue were inappropriate."²⁵³⁵²⁵³⁵ Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).Show full note

¶J u n e 2008, the CIA provided information to the Committee in response to a reporting requirement in the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act. The CIA response stated that all of the CIA's interrogation techniques "were evaluated under the applicable U.S. law during the time of their use and were found by the Department of Justice to comply with those legal requirements." This was inaccurate. Diapers, nudity, dietary manipulation, and water dousing were used extensively by the CIA prior to any Department of Justice review. As detailed in the full Committee Study, the response included additional information that was incongruent with the history of the program.²⁵³⁶²⁵³⁶ The CIA response stated that during sleep deprivation, the detainee is "typically... handcuffed in front of his body," and "will not be permitted to hang from [the handcuffs)," despite the practice of detainees being subjected to the technique with their hands above their heads, and reports of detainees hanging from their wrists at DETENTION SITE COBALT. The response stated that "adult diapers and shorts [are] for sanitary purposes," and that "caloric intake will always be at least 1,000 kcal/day," although CIA records indicate that the purpose of die diapers in several cases was humiliation and there were no caloric requirements until May 2004. The response stated that "[n]o sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse are permitted," despite an insinuation that a family member of a detainee would be sexually abused. The response stated diat "[t]he detainee may not be intentionally exposed to detention facility staff," even though detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT were walked around nude by guards. The response stated that during water dousing, water "cannot enter the detainee's nose, mouth, or eyes," but did not acknowledge detainees being immersed in water. Finally, the CIA response described limitations on the use of the waterboard that were exceeded in the case of KSM. (See Response to Congressionally Directed Actions cited in the Compartmented Annex to Report 110-75, June 16,2008 (DTS #2008-2663).) This response was provided notwithstanding the presidential veto of this legislation on March 8, 2008.Show full note

¶On June 10, 2008, the Committee held a hearing on the Department of Justice memoranda relating to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Programme) which the Committee had recently been provided limited access.²⁵³⁷²⁵³⁷ The Committee had been provided four copies of the memoranda for a limited time. See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of 1 ~ 98). At the hearing, [Redacted] CTC Legal provided inaccurate information on several topics, including the use of sleep deprivation and its effects.²⁵³⁸²⁵³⁸ [Redacted]CTC Legal repeated the representation that during sleep deprivation, detainees' hands were shackled "about chin to chest level," and stated that "[i]f there is any indication, such as the legs begin to swell, or things of that nature, that may terminate the sleep deprivation." [Redacted] Legal also stated, inaccurately, that "we cannot begin to implement any of die measures, absent first attempting to get information from the individual in an up front and non-coercive way." He added, also inaccurately, that "if the individual cooperates and begins to talk to you, you never go into the interrogation program."Show full note Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury also testified, noting that the Department of Justice deferred to the CIA with regard to the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation program.²⁵³⁹²⁵³⁹ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, June 10, 2008 (DTS #2008-2698). The Committee then submitted official Questions for the Record on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and on the effectiveness of the program, including how the CIA assessed the effectiveness of its interrogation techniques for purposes of representations to the Department of Justice.²⁵⁴⁰²⁵⁴⁰ Questions for the Record submitted to CIA Director Michael Hayden, September 8, 2008, with a request for a response by October 10, 2008 (DTS #2008-3522). The CIA prepared responses that included an acknowledgment that [Redacted] Legal, [Redacted] had provided inaccurate information with regard to the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.²⁵⁴¹²⁵⁴¹ See CIA document prepared in response to "Questions for the Record" submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 8, 2008. The Committee had inquired why information provided by Abu Zubaydah about Jose Padilla was included in the CIA's "Effectiveness Memo" for the Department of Justice, given that Abu Zubaydah provided the information to FBI Special Agents prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA response, prepared but never sent to the Committee, stated that the CTC attorney who prepared the CIA "Effectiveness Memo," [Redacted] "simply inadvertently reported this wrong." The unsent CIA response added that "Abu Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by the FBI," and cited a specific CIA cable, [Redacted] 10991. In contrast to the CIA's unsent response to Committee questions in 2008, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "[t]he Study also claims Abu Zubaydah had already provided [Jose Padilla'sJ 'Dirty Bomb' plot information to FBI interrogators prior to undergoing CIA interrogation, but diis is based on an undocumented FBI internal communication and an FBI officer's recollection to the Senate Judiciary Committee seven years later." The CIA's June 2013 Response also represents that "[wjhile we have considerable information from FBI debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, we have no record that FBI debriefers acquired information about such an al-Qa'ida direat." As detailed in this summary, this is inaccurate. The CIA's June 2013 Response further states that "CIA correctly represented Abu Zubaydah's description of Jose Padilla as an example of information provided after an individual had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques." The CIA's unsent response to Committee questions in 2008 acknowledged that "[d]uring the initial timeframe Abu Zubaydah (AZ) was waterboarded the interrogation team believed diat AZ was compliant and was not withholding actionable threat information," but ALEC Station "had additional information they felt linked AZ with more planned attacks," and that "[a]s a result, the interrogation team was instructed to continue with the waterboarding based on ALEC Station's belief." Finally, the unsent responses acknowledged that notwithstanding CIA representations to the Department of Justice regarding amenities available to CIA detainees, "[t]he amenities of today evolved over the first year and a half of the program," and that Abu Zubaydah was not initially provided those amenities.Show full note The prepared responses were never provided to the Committee. Instead, on October 17, 2008, die CIA informed the Committee that it would not respond to the Committee's Questions for the Record and that instead, the CIA was "available to provide additional briefings on this issue to Members as necessary."²⁵⁴²²⁵⁴² CIA Letter to Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV, October 17, 2008 (DTS #2008-4131). In separate letters to Director Hayden, Chairman Rockefeller and Senator Feinstein referred to this refusal to respond to official Committee questions as "unprecedented and... simply unacceptable,"²⁵⁴³²⁵⁴³ Letter from Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV to CIA Director Michael Hayden, October 29, 2008 (DTS #2008- 4217). and "appalling."²⁵⁴⁴²⁵⁴⁴ Letter from Senator Feinstein to CIA DirectorMichaelHayden^ 2008 (DTS #2008-4235). [Redacted]

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¶VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee

Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for Expansive Terms of Reference to Study the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

¶The Committee's scrutiny of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program continued through the remainder of 2008 and into the 111th Congress, in 2009. On February 11, 2009, the Committee held a business meeting at which Committee staff presented a memorandum on the content of the CIA operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in 2002.²⁵⁴⁵²⁵⁴⁵ See Committee business meeting records and transcript from February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420). CIA Director Hayden had allowed a small number of Committee staff to review the cables at CIA Headquarters, and as noted, had testified that the cables provided "a more than adequate representation" of what was on the destroyed CIA interrogation videotapes.²⁵⁴⁶²⁵⁴⁶ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, December 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-4904). In the spring of 2008, after the Committee agreed on a bipartisan basis to continue investigating the destruction of the interrogation tapes, Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond pressed the CIA to provide the operational cables promised by Director Hayden. See letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden, April 21, 2008 (DTS #2008-1798); letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden, May 8, 2008 (DTS #2008-2030).Show full note The chairman stated that the Committee staff memorandum represented "the most comprehensive statement on the treatment of these two detainees, from the conditions of their detention and the nature of their interrogations to the intelligence produced and the thoughts of CIA officers and contractors in the field and Headquarters."²⁵⁴⁷²⁵⁴⁷ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420) After the staff presentation, the vice chairman expressed his support for an expanded Committee investigation, stating, "we need to compare what was briefed to us by the Agency with what we find out, and we need to determine whether it was within the guidelines of the OLC, the MON, and the guidelines published by the Agency."²⁵⁴⁸²⁵⁴⁸ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February II, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420) Other members of the Committee added their support for an expanded investigation, with one member stating, "these are extraordinarily serious matters and we ought to get to the bottom of it... to look at how it came to be that these techniques were used, what the legal underpinnings of these techniques were all about, and finally what these techniques meant in terms of effectiveness."²⁵⁴⁹²⁵⁴⁹ Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR). Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420).

¶The Committee held two subsequent business meetings to consider and debate the terms of the Committee's proposed expanded review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The first, on February 24, 2009, began with bipartisan support for a draft Terms of Reference.²⁵⁵⁰²⁵⁵⁰ Transcript, business meeting, February 24, 2009 (DTS #2009-1913) The Committee met again on March 5, 2009, to consider a revised Terms of Reference, which was approved by a vote of 14-1.²⁵⁵¹²⁵⁵¹ Transcript, business meeting, March 5, 2 0 0 9 ( D T S # 2 0 0 9 B 1 9 1 ( 5 ) ^ _ ^ _ 2529.

¶On December 13, 2012, after a review of more than six million pages of records, the Committee approved a 6,300-page Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.-552 On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11-3, the Committee agreed to send the revised findings and conclusions, and an updated Executive Summary of the Committee Study to the president for declassification and public release.

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¶After the receipt of the CIA's June 27, 2013, Response to the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and subsequent meetings between the CIA and the Committee in the summer of 2013, the full Committee Study was updated. The final Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program exceeds 6,700 pages and includes approxi ' ' "" """ ''

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¶VIII. Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program

¶Adopted March 5, 2009

¶The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's study of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) detention and interrogation program consists of these terms of reference:

A review of how the CIA created, operated, and maintained its detention and interrogation program, including a review of the locations of the facilities and any arrangements and agreements made by the CIA or other Intelligence Community officials with foreign entities in connection with the program.
A review of Intelligence Community documents and records, including CIA operational cables, relating to the detention and interrogation of CIA detainees.
A review of die CIA's assessments that particular detainees possessed relevant information and how the assessments were made.
An evaluation of the information acquired from the detainees including the periods during which enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were administered.
An evaluation of whether information provided to the Committee by the Intelligence Community adequately and accurately described the CIA's detention and interrogation program as it was carried out in practice, including conditions of detention, such as personal hygiene and medical needs, and their effect on the EITs as applied.
An evaluation of the information provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), including whether it accurately and adequately described: a. the implementation, effectiveness and expected effects of EITs; b. the value of information obtained through the use of EITs; and c. the threat environment at the time the EITs were being used or contemplated for use on CIA detainees.
An evaluation of whether the CIA's detention and interrogation program complied with: a. the authorizations in any relevant Presidential Findings and Memoranda of Notification; b. all relevant policy and legal guidance provided by the CIA; and c. the opinions issued by the OLC in relation to the use of EITs.
A review of the information provided by the CIA or other Intelligence Community officials involved in the program about the CIA detention and interrogation program, including the location of facilities and approved interrogation techniques, to U.S. officials with national security responsibilities.

¶The Committee will use those tools of oversight necessary to complete a thorough review including, but not limited to, document reviews and requests, interviews, testimony at closed and open healings, as appropriate, and preparation of findings and recommendations.

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