H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

¶I. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003

¶While the CIA held detainees from 2002 to 2008, early 2003 was the most active period of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Of the 119 detainees identified by the Committee as held by the CIA, 53 were brought into custody in 2003, and of the 39 detainees the Committee has found to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 17 were subjected to such techniques between January 2003 and August 2003. The CIA's enhanced interrogations during that time were primarily used at DETENTION SITE COBALT and DETENTION SITE BLUE.⁵⁵⁷⁵⁵⁷ For more information, see detainee reviews and reports in Volume III for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah, Abu Khalid, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri, Suleiman Abdullah, Abu Hazim, Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, Laid Ben Dohman Saidi aka Abu Hudhaifa, Majid Khan, Mohd Farik bin Amin aka Abu Zubair, Samr Hilmi Abdul Latif al-Barq, Bashir bin Lap aka Lillie, and Riduan bin Isomuddin aka Hambali.Show full note Other interrogations using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques took place at a CIA [Redacted] in Country [Redacted] at which at least one CIA detainee was submerged in a bathtub filled with ice water.⁵⁵⁸⁵⁵⁸ For example, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to this technique at the safehouse. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTEDj^ubiect^Iemo; d a t e ^ a r c i n 5 ^ 0 0 4 . ) The incident was reported to the CIA inspector general. See email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] c c : [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] s u b j e c t ^ u ^ e l c o n ^ t ^ a r c h 17, 2004, at 11:24 AM. See also claims related to the treatment of Briet in Majid Khan. See [Redacted] " g f ° r the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Implementation of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detention and Interrogation Program, March 14, 2008.Show full note

¶In 2003, CIA interrogators sought and received approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against at least five detainees prior to their arrival at a CIA detention facility.⁵⁵⁹⁵⁵⁹ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] (040049Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] (252003Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] (162224Z MAY 03); HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (102352Z SEP 03) In two of those cases, CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques before they were requested by CIA personnel at the detention sites.⁵⁶⁰⁵⁶⁰ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] (040049Z MAR 03)

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2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [Redacted] and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [Redacted]

[Redacted] ) The CIA entered into an agreement with the [Redacted] [Redacted] in Country [Redacted] to host a CIA detention facility [Redacted] In [Redacted]

¶CIA Headquarters invited the CIA Station in Country [Redacted] to identify ways to support the [Redacted] [Redacted] in Country [Redacted] to "demonstrate to [Redacted] anc* the highest levels of the [Country [Redacted] government that we deeply appreciate their cooperation and support" for the detention rogram.⁵⁶²⁵⁶² HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] The Station responded with an $ [Redacted] million "wish list" [Redacted] ;⁵⁶³⁵⁶³ [REDACTED] 5759 [Redacted] [Redacted] CIA Headquarters provided the Station with $ [Redacted] million more than was requested for the purposes of the [Redacted] subsidy.⁵⁶⁴⁵⁶⁴ HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] CIA detainees were transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [Redacted] in the fall of 2003.⁵⁶⁵⁵⁶⁵ According to a cable from CIA Headquarters, [Redacted] detainees arrived in Country [Redacted] [Redacted] 0 0 3 . HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶In August 2003, the U.S. ambassador in Country [Redacted] sought to contact State Department officials to ensure that the State Department was aware of the CIA detention facility and its "potential impact on our policy vis-a-vis the [Country [Redacted] ] government."⁵⁶⁶⁵⁶⁶ [REDACTED] [Redacted] The U.S. ambassador was told by the CIA Station that this was not possible, and that no one at the State Department, including the secretary of state, was informed about the CIA detention facility in Country [Redacted] Describing the CIA's position as "unacceptable," the ambassador then requested a signed document from "at least the President's National Security Advisor" describing the authorities for the program, including a statement that the CIA's interrogation techniques met "legal and human rights standards," and an explicit order to him not to discuss the program with the secretary of state.⁵⁶⁷⁵⁶⁷ [Redacted] [REDACTED] CIA Headquarters then sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who called the U.S. ambassador. Deputy Secretary Armitage told the CIA to keep him and the secretary of state informed so that they would not be caught unaware when an ambassador raised concerns.⁵⁶⁸⁵⁶⁸ Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] ; subject: Re: DDCI-Armitage call on [Country [Redacted] ] Detention Facility; date: August[Redacted] 2003.

¶Nearly a year later, in May 2004, revelations about U.S. detainee abuses at the U.S. military prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, prompted the same U.S. ambassador in Country [Redacted] to seek information on CIA detention standards and interrogation methods.⁵⁶⁹⁵⁶⁹ [REDACTED] 6762 ( [Redacted] A Y 04 In the fall of 2004, when [Redacted] U.S. ambassador to Country [Redacted] sought documents authorizing the program, the CIA again sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary Armitage, who once again made "strong remarks" to the CIA about how he and the secretary of state were "cut out of the NSC [National Security Council] clearance/coordination process" with regard to the CIA program. According to CIA records, Armitage also questioned the efficacy of the program and the value of the intelligence derived from the program.⁵⁷⁰⁵⁷⁰ Lotus Notes message from Chief of Station [Redacted] to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from: [Redacted] [Redacted]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec Armitage; date: [Redacted] at 7:40:43 PM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "with regard to the Study's claims that the State Department was 'cut out' of information relating to the program, the record shows that the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State... were aware of the sites at the time they were operational." As detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA records indicate the secretary of state was not informed of the CIA detention site locations. During meetings with the CIA in the summer of 2013, the Committee requested, but was not provided, documentary evidence to support the assertion in the CIA's June 2013 Response.Show full note While it is unclear how the [Redacted] f ambassador's concerns were resolved, he later joined the chief of Station in making a presentation to Country [Redacted] s [Redacted] on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The presentation talking points did not describe the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but represented that "[w]ithout the full range of these interrogation measures, we would not have succeeded in overcoming the resistance of [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad] and other equally resistant HVDs." The talking points included many of the same inaccurate representations⁵⁷¹⁵⁷¹ See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II for additional details. made to U.S. policymakers and others, attributing to CIA detainees critical information on the "Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," the "Second Wave Plot," and the "Guraba Cell"; as well as intelligence related to Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Hambali, Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed, Sajid Badat, and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The presentation also noted that the president of the United States had directed that he not be informed of the locations of the CIA detention facilities to ensure he would not accidentally disclose the information.⁵⁷²⁵⁷² HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] l D A C T E D ]

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¶W ^ i [Redacted] N F M r t a separate country, Country [Redacted] the CIA obtained the approval of the [Redacted] and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before informing the U.S. ambassador.⁵⁷³⁵⁷³ [REDACTED] [Redacted] 641051 As the CIA chief of Station stated in his request to CIA Headquarters to brief the ambassador, Country [Redacted] s [Redacted] d the [Redacted] irobably would ask the ambassador about the CIA detention [Redacted] facility.⁵⁷⁴⁵⁷⁴ [REDACTED] 30296 [Redacted] Afterl

(delayed [Redacted] briefing the [Redacted] for [Redacted] months, to the consternation of the CIA Station, which wanted political approval prior to the

¶a m v a U r f C I ^ l e t a i n e e [Redacted] Country [Redacted] official outside of the m t ^ ^ ^ m ^ ^ ^ m m a m a w are of the described as "shocked," but nonetheless approved.⁵⁷⁶⁵⁷⁶ [REDACTED] 4076 [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 32266 [REDACTED]

¶By mid-2003 the CIA had concluded that its completed, but still unused "holding cell" in Country [Redacted] was insufficient, given the growing number of CIA detainees in the program and the CIA's interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention site. The CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the country.⁵⁷⁷⁵⁷⁷ HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] The CIA also offered $ [Redacted] million to the [Redacted] to "show appreciation" for the [Redacted] support for the program.378 According to a CIA cable, however, the [Redacted] [Redacted]

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¶|."⁵⁷⁹⁵⁷⁹ [REDACTED] 4088 [Redacted] [Redacted] While the plan to construct the expanded facility was approved by the [Redacted] of Countr [Redacted] [Redacted]

[Redacted] developed complex mechanisms to [Redacted] [Redacted] in order to provide the $ [Redacted] million [Redacted]

¶[Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] in Country [Redacted] complicated the arrangements. [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] when the Country [Redacted] [Redacted] requested an update on planning for the CIA detention site, he w a s t o [Redacted] a t e l y — t h a t the planninghadbeen discontinued.⁵⁸¹⁵⁸¹ [REDACTED] 5293 [Redacted] [Redacted] In [Redacted] h e n the facility received its first CIA detainees, [Redacted] informed the C l [Redacted] that the [Redacted] [Redacted] of Country [Redacted] "probably has an incomplete notion [regarding the facility's] actual function, i.e., he probably believes that it is some of [Redacted] center, "582

3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA Headquarters Authorization

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] N F ) CIA cables from the spring of 2003 and afterwards describe multiple examples of interrogation practices at CIA detention sites that were inconsistent with the CIA's detention and interrogation guidelines. CIA officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT—led principally by Chief of Interrogations [Redacted] l s o described a number of interrogation activities in cables that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA Headquarters failed to respond, inquire, or investigate:

• Cables revealing that the CIA's chief of interrogations used water dousing against detainees, including with cold water and/or ice water baths, as an interrogation technique without prior approval from CIA Headquarters;⁵⁸³⁵⁸³ [Redacted] 39042 [Redacted] MAY 03 [Redacted] 38596 (201220Z MAY 03); [39582 (041743Z JUN 03) [Redacted] 38557 (191641Z MAY 03); [Redacted] J 38597 (201225Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 39101 [Redacted] MAY 03). Water dousing was categorized as a "standard" interrogation technique in June 2003.

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• Cables and records indicating that CIA detainees who were undergoing or had undergone the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were subjected to rectal rehydration, without evidence of medical necessity, and that others were threatened with it;584
• Cables noting that groups of four or more interrogators, who required practical experience to acquire their CIA interrogation "certification," were allowed to apply the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a group against a single detainee;⁵⁸⁵⁵⁸⁵ See, for example, [Redacted] 38130 (121722Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 38584 (201133Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 38127 (121714Z MAY [Redacted] 38161 and

¶384 [Redacted]

¶See 34491 (051400Z MAR [Redacted] 03). Interview [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General, March 27, [Redacted] 34575 [Redacted]

[Redacted] email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] subject: Re: Update; date: [Redacted] a t 4 : 5 1 : 3 2 P [Redacted] 2 3 8 5 ( 2 2 2 0 4 5 Z J U L [Redacted] H m [Redacted] In

¶addition to the rectal rehydration or feeding of al-Nashiri, KSM and Majid Khan, described elsewhere, there is at leasUm^-ecord of Abt^ubaydahreceiving "rectal fluid resuscitation" for "partially refusing liquids." (See [Redacted] 7 0 [Redacted] Marwan al-Jabbur was subjected to what was originally referred to in a c a b l ^ ^ ^ e n e m a , " but was later acknowledged to be rectal rehydration. (See [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] D A C T E D ] , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING - [Redacted] March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502.) Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khallad bin Attash and Adnan al-Libi were threatened with rectal rehydration. (See [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] 2385 (222045Z JUL 03); from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Medical Evaluation/Update [Redacted] 4 7 ) ; date: March [Redacted] 2004.) CIA medical officers discussed rectal rehydration as a means of behavior control. As one officer wrote, "[w]hile IV infusion is safe and effective, we were impressed_with the ancillary effectiveness of rectal infusion on ending the water refusal in a similar case." (See f r o m [Redacted] to [Redacted] subject: Re: [Redacted] (048); date: February [Redacted] 2004.) The same officer provided a description of the procedure, writing that "[regarding the rectal tube, if you place it and open up the IV tubing, the flow will self regulate, sloshing up the large intestines." Referencing the experience of the medical officer who subjected KSM to rectal rehydration, the officer wrote that, "[w]hat I infer is that you get a tube up as far as you can, then open the IV wide. No need to squeeze the bag - let

t0 the work." (See email from [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] and [REDACTED], February 27,2004, Subject: R e [Redacted] 0 4 8 ) 3 T h e same

¶email exchange included a description of a previous application of the technique, in which "we used the largest Ewal [sicUub^we had." (See email from: [REDACTED]; to [Redacted] E D A C T E D ] , [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: R e [Redacted] (048); date: Febmary [Redacted] 2004, at 11:42:16 PM.) As described in the context of the rectal feeding of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into al- Nashiri "in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso." (See [Redacted] 0 3 (231709Z MAY 04).) Majid Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was "pureed" and rectally infused. (See [Redacted] 4 0 (231839Z SEP 04).) The CIA's June 2013 Response does not address the use of rectal feeding with CIA detainees, but defends the use of rectal rehydration as a "well acknowledged medical technique." CIA leadership, including General Counsel Scott Muller and DDO James Pavitt, was also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with "excessive force" on two detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT. CIA attorney [Redacted] was asked to follow up, although CIA records do not indicate any resolution of the inquiry. CIA records indicate that one of the detainees, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, was later diagnosed with chronic hemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomatic rectal prolapse. See email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Morning, d a t e [Redacted] at 12:15 PM; email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] D A C T E D ] , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this M o r n i n g ^ l a [Redacted] a t 1:23:31 PM; email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] A C T E D ] ; subject: Re: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Moming REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: December![Redacted] 2003, at 10:47:32 AM; [Redacted] [Redacted] 32231 HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted]

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Cables revealing that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used at CIA [Redacted] that were not designated as CIA detention sites.⁵⁸⁶⁵⁸⁶ See, for example, [Redacted] 35341 [Redacted] [Redacted] 39098 [Redacted] [Redacted] 3 9 0 4 2 [Redacted] A Y 0 3 ) ; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: M I I [Redacted] [Redacted] 391011 [Redacted] MAY 0 3 [Redacted] 5 Z M A Y 0 [Redacted] 7 1 9 Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 9 (281101Z MAY 03).

¶In the first half of 2003, the CIA interrogated four detainees with medical complications in their lower extremities: two detainees had a broken foot, one detainee had a sprained ankle, and one detainee had a prosthetic leg⁵⁸⁷⁵⁸⁷ For more details, see detainee reviews for Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah; Abu Hazim al-Libi; Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim; and Khallad bin Attash. CIA interrogators shackled each of these detainees in the standing position for sleep deprivation for extended periods of time until medical personnel assessed that they could not maintain the position. The two detainees that each had a broken foot were also subjected to walling, stress positions, and cramped confinement, despite the note in their interrogation plans that these specific enhanced interrogation techniques were not requested because of the medical condition of the detainees.⁵⁸⁸⁵⁸⁸ The two detainees were Abu Hazim al-Libi and Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim. CIA Headquarters did not react to the site's use of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques despite the lack of approval.

¶Over the course of the CIA program, at least 39 detainees were subjected to one or more of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.⁵⁸⁹⁵⁸⁹ This is a conservative estimate. CIA records suggest that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques may have also been used against five additional detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT in 2002, which would bring the number of CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to 44. Those additional detainees were [Redacted] [DETAINEE R], who was approved for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but whose records do not refer to the use of the techniques (ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] ) l Ayub Murshid Ali Salih and Ha'il Aziz Ahmad Al-Maythali, whose records refer t^Hacl^)l^jlccpJ)uUioUhe application of sleep deprivation j [Redacted] 2 8 1 3 2 (101143Z OCT 02); [Redacted] 27964 (071949Z OCT 02)); Bashir Nasir Ali al Marwalah, who later told debriefers that, when he was first captured, he "had to stand up for five days straight and answer questions" and "was also forced to strip naked and stand in front of a female interrogator" ( [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 4 3 5 3 ( 2 3 1 5 2 l z A P R 03)); and Sa'id Salih Sa'id, who later told debriefers that he was "mistreated and beaten by Americans while blind-folded and stripped down to his underwear in [Redacted] " S e e [Redacted] 13386 (090154Z JAN 03)). See also detainee reviews in Volume III for more information.Show full note CIA records indicate that there were at least 17 CIA detainees who were subjected to one or more CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without CIA Headquarters approval. This count includes detainees who were approved for the use of some techniques, but were subjected to unapproved techniques, as well as detainees for whom interrogators had no approvals to use any of the techniques. This count also takes into account distinctions between techniques categorized as "enhanced" or "standard" by the CIA at the time they were applied.⁵⁹⁰⁵⁹⁰ The CIA's June 2013 Response objects to the Committee's count, arguing that "[n]o more than seven detainees received enhanced techniques prior to written Headquarters approval." The CIA's June 2013 Response then asserts diat "the Study miscounts because it confuses the use of standard techniques that did not require prior approval at the The 17 detainees who

¶(131326Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 38595 (201216Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 38126 (121709Z MAY 03).

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¶were subjected to techniques without the approval of CIA Headquarters were: Rafiq Bashir al- Hami,⁵⁹¹⁵⁹¹ Rafiq Bashir al-Hami was subjected to 72 hours of sleep deprivation between his arrival at DETENTION SITE 28297 COBALT and his October [Redacted] 2002, interrogation. See [Redacted] [Redacted] Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihandi,⁵⁹²⁵⁹² Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihani was subjected to 72 hours of sleep deprivation between his arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT and his October [Redacted] 2002, interrogation. See [Redacted] 28462 [Redacted] Hikmat Nafi Shaukat,⁵⁹³⁵⁹³ CIA cables from October 2002 noted that Shaukat was "tired from his regimen of limited sleep deprivation." See [Redacted] 29381 [Redacted] Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi,S94 Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani aka Abu Badr,⁵⁹⁵⁵⁹⁵ Abu Badr was subjecte^^orce^tanding^ttention grasps, and cold temperatures without blankets in November See [Redacted] 29963 [Redacted] Gul Rahman,⁵⁹⁶⁵⁹⁶ CIA interrogators used sleep deprivation, facial slap, use of cold (including cold cells and cold showers), "hard takedowns," dietary manipulation, nudity, and light deprivation on Gul Rahman. See [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] of [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER December 2002; [Redacted] r v i e ^ O i a m m o n d DUNBAR, January 9, 2003; Memorandum for Deputy Director of O p e r a t i o n i r f r o [Redacted] January 28, 2003, Subiect^eatMnvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee [Redacted] (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005; and CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), May 7, 2004.Show full note Abd al-Rahim altime they were administered with enhanced techniques that did." This statement in the CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. First, prior to January 2003, the CIA had not yet designated any technique as a "standard" technique. Because sleep deprivation was included in the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum approving the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, the Committee included, among the 17, CIA detainees subjected to sleep deprivation without CIA Headquarters authorization prior to January 2003. In January 2003, sleep deprivation under a specific time limit was categorized as a "standard" CIA interrogation technique. Second, the January 2003 guidelines state that advance CIA Headquarters approval was required for "standard" techniques "whenever feasible." For this reason, the Committee did not include cases where CIA interrogators failed to obtain authorization in advance, but did acquire approval within several days of initiating the use of the "standard" techniques. Finally, water dousing was not characterized as a "standard" technique until June 2003. (See D I R E C T O [Redacted] 2 1 1 5 I 8 Z J I M 0 3 ) ; D I R E C T O [Redacted] 3 0 2 1 2 6 Z J A N 0 3 ) ; D I R E C T [Redacted] (311702Z JAN 03); [Redacted] 39582 (041743Z JUN 03).) In numerous cases prior to June 2003, water dousing was explicitly described in CIA cables as an "enhanced" interrogation technique. (See, for example, DIRECTOR [Redacted] (101700Z FEB 03).) The Committee thus included, among the 17, CIA detainees subjected to water dousing prior to June 2003 without CIA Headquarters authorization. The distinction between standard and enhanced interrogation techniques, which began in January 2003, was eliminated by CIA leadership in 2005. See Volume I and Volume III for additional details.

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¶Nashiri,⁵⁹⁷⁵⁹⁷ Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was subjected to unapproved nudity and approximately two-and-a-half days of sleep deprivation in December 2002, with his arms shackled over his head for as long as 16 hours. See email from: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] to: [Redacted] subject: EYES ONLY - I [Redacted] ONLY - MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003. ^ ^ ^ ^ Ramzi bin al-Shibh,⁵⁹⁸⁵⁹⁸ The facial hold was used against Ramzi bin al-Shibh multiple times without approval. See [Redacted] l 0415 [Redacted] [Redacted] 10429 (101215Z FEB 03); [Redacted] 10S73 (241143Z FEB [Redacted] 10582 10633 (242026Z FEB 0 3 [Redacted] 5 2 0 0 2 Z FEB 03); 10602 (262020Z FEB 03); (011537Z MAR 0 3 ) ; a [Redacted] 10704 (071239Z MAR 03). Asadallah,⁵⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹ Interrogators used water dousing, nudity, and cramped confinement on Asadallah without having sought or received authorization from CIA Headquarters. Bathing detainees did not require authorization by CIA Headquarters; however, as described in CIA cables, the application of "bathing" in the case of Asadallah was done punitively and was used as an interrogation technique. Nudity was also used in conjunction with water dousing/bathing and later as an interrogation technique^vitho^ from CIA Headquarters. See [Redacted] [Redacted] 34241 [Redacted] and [Redacted] [Redacted] 3 4 3 1 0Show full note Mustafa al-Hawsawi,⁶⁰⁰⁶⁰⁰ Mustafa al-Hawsawi was subjected to water dousing without approval from CIA Headquarters. See [Redacted] [Redacted] (08 I207Z APR 03). Abu Khalid,⁶⁰¹⁶⁰¹ Interrogators used sleep deprivation against Abu Khalid prior to seeking authorization from CIA Headquarters, and then failed to obtain such aulimn iliini i i [Redacted] 35193 [Redacted] and [Redacted] 35341 [Redacted] Abu Khalid had been in CIA custody for 17 days prior to the use of the technique. Advance authorization from CIA Headquarters was therefore "feasible," and thus required under the guidelines.Show full note Laid bin Duhman aka Abu Hudliaifa,⁶⁰²⁶⁰² Abu Hudliaifa was subjected to baths in which ice water was used, standing sleep deprivation for 66 hours that was discontinued due to a swollen leg attributedtoprolo:^^ (Se^mail and [Redacted]; to: [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] our telecom; date: March [Redacted] 2004; CIA Office of Inspector General Report; 2005-8085-IG; [Redacted] 39098 [Redacted] [Redacted] 39042 [Redacted] MAY and 139101 [Redacted] MAY 03).). No request or approval for the use of standard or enhanced interrogation techniques could be located in CIA records.Show full note Abd al-Karim,⁶⁰³⁶⁰³ Abd al-Karim, who suffered from a foot injury incurred during his capture, was subjected to cramped confinement, stress positions, and walling despite CIA HeadquartersJiavin^ioUipproved their use. See DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] Y 03); and DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] Abu Hazim,⁶⁰⁴⁶⁰⁴ Abu Hazim, who also had a foot injury incurred during his capture, was subjected to walling, despite CIA Headquarters having not approved its use. (See [Redacted] 36908 [Redacted] and [Redacted] 37410 (291828Z APR 03).) Nudity, dietary manipulation, and facial grasp were used on Abu Hazim at least 13 days prior to receiving approval. [Redacted] 37411 (291829Z APR 03); [Redacted] l O (291828Z APR 03); [Redacted] [Redacted] I III I I 11 II [Redacted] [Redacted] I i 03).Show full note Sayyid Ibrahim,⁶⁰⁵⁶⁰⁵ CIA cables indicate that Sayyid Ibrahim was subjected to sleep deprivation from January 27, 2004, to January 30, 2004, which exceeded the 48 hours approved by CIA Headquarters. See HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (272155Z JAN 04); [Redacted] j [Redacted] 0 4 ) [Redacted] 9 8 [Redacted] [Redacted] N 04); [Redacted] 0 3 [Redacted] jANT)[Redacted]HHn[Redacted] Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri,⁶⁰⁶⁶⁰⁶ During March 2003 interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri was "bathed," a term used to describe water dousing, which was considered at the time to be an enhanced interrogation technique. (See [Redacted] 35558 [Redacted] MAR 03).) Water dousing had not been approved, and the subsequent request, by DETENTION SITE BLUE, to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Jaza'iri, did not [Redacted] include water dousing. See 10990 [Redacted] [Redacted]Show full note and Suleiman Abdullah.⁶⁰⁷⁶⁰⁷ Interrogators requested approvals to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Suleiman Abdullah, including water dousing. CIA Headquarters then approved other techniques, [Redacted]ng. (See [Redacted] 3 6 5 [Redacted] DmECT[Redacted]^HHHBlSu[Redacted] Abdullah was nonetheless subjected to water dousing. See [Redacted] 371171 mi 11 III [Redacted] i i mi him i In every case except al-Nashiri, the unauthorized interrogation techniques were detailed in CIA cables, but CIA Headquarters did not respond or take action against the CIA personnel applying the unauthorized interrogation techniques.⁶⁰⁸⁶⁰⁸ The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA "conducted at least 29 investigations of RDJ-related conduct, plus two wide-ranging reviews of the program... one involved the death of an Afghan national who was beaten by a contractor. The individual involved was prosecuted by the Department of Justice and convicted of a felony charge. Another case involved a contractor who slapped, kicked, and struck detainees while they were in military custody. ... [T]he contractor was terminated from the CIA, had his security clearances revoked, and was placed on a contractor watch list." However, the two specific examples provided in the CIA's June 2013 Response refer to detainees who were never part of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. On November 6, 2013, the CIA provided a list of "IG Investigations Concerning Detention, Interrogations, and Renditions." The list of 29 included 14 investigations that were directly related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Four additional investigations were related to detainees who claimed they had been subjected to abuse in transit from CIA custody to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay. The remaining 11 investigations were unrelated to die CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. See DTS #2013-3250.Show full note

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¶G F S [Redacted] N F ) This list does not include examples in which CIA interrogators were authorized to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but then implemented the techniques in a manner that diverged from the authorization. Examples include Abu Zubair⁶⁰⁹⁶⁰⁹ CIA chief of interrogations, [Redacted] placed a broomstick behind the knees of Zubair when Zubair was in a stress position on his knees on the floor. Although stress positions had been approved for Zubair, the use of the broomstick was not approved. See April 7,2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel, CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs, at 22. and, as detailed, KSM, whose interrogators developed methods of applying the waterboard in a manner that differed from how the technique had previously been used and how it had been described to the Department of Justice. This count also excludes additional allegations of the unauthorized use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.⁶¹⁰⁶¹⁰ Majid KhajJia^laimecUhaUr^lav 2003, he was subjected to immersion in a tub that was filled with ice and water. (See [Redacted] Briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Implementation of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detention and Interrogation Program, dated March 14, 2008.) While CIA cables do not confirm bathing or water dousing, Chief of Interrogations [Redacted] subjected Abu Hudhaifa to an (unauthorized) "icy water" bath at the same [Redacted] where Majid Khan was held. (See email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] to: [REDACTGDMREDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] our telecon; date: [Redacted] email from: [REDACTED] [Redacted] to: [Redacted] subject: Memo; d a t [Redacted] Ayub Murshid Ali Salih and Ha'il Aziz Ahmad al-Maythali were described a^ioUiavin^lept^lthough it is unclear from CIA records whether CIA interrogators kept them awake. (See 128132 [Redacted] (101143Z OCT 02) and [Redacted] 4 (071949Z OCT 02).) Bashir Nasri Ali al-Marwalah told debriefers at Guantanamo Bay that he was "tortured" at DETENTION SITE COBALT with five days of continual standing and nudity. (See [Redacted] 14353 (231521Z APR 03).) Sa'id Salih Sa'id likewise informed debriefers at Guantanamo that he was "beaten" while blind-folded in CIA custody. (See [Redacted] 13386 (090154Z JAN 03).) Sixteen other detainees were held at DETENTION SITE COBALT between September and December 2002, a period during which exposure to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques such as sleep deprivation and nudity cannot be determined based on the lack of details in CIA cables and related documents.Show full note

¶Over the course of the CTA's Detention and Interrogation Program, numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques by untrained interrogators. As noted, the CIA did not conduct its first training course until November 2002, by which time at least nine detainees had already been subjected to the techniques.⁶¹¹⁶¹¹ December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running). The DCI's January 28, 2003, guidelines, which stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with specific detainees," raised the additional issue of approved techniques used by unapproved interrogators.⁶¹²⁶¹² [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] 0 2 1 2 6 Z J A N 03); DIRECTOR (311702Z JAN 03). For example, on May [Redacted] , 2003, CIA i n t e m i g a [Redacted] applied three facial attention grabs, fiv^aciaHnsul^laps, and three abdominal slaps to Abd al-Karim, under the supervision of CIA interrogator [Redacted] C I A OFFICER 1], [Redacted] 37821 had not been approved by CIA Headquarters to employ the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Karim; approval had only been provided for [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1] to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. (See DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]) On [Redacted] CIA interrog[Redacted] under die supervision of [Redacted] conducted an interrogation of Abd al-Karim in which interrogators used the facial attention grab, facial insult slap, and abdominal slap against al-Karim. (See [Redacted] 38583 [Redacted] [Redacted] h a d been approved by CIA Headquarters to employ the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abd al-Karim. In another example, o n [Redacted] T E N T I O N SITE COBALT requested approval for certified interrogators [Redacted] and [Redacted] fCIA OFFICER 1] to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against [Redacted] [Redacted] t0 Khallad bin Attash, and for three other interrogators, [Redacted] also use the techniques "under the direct supervision of senior certified interrogator [ [Redacted] " (See [Redacted] [Redacted] 38325 [Redacted] Later that day, CIA Headquarters approved the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash, but the approval cable did not include approval for participation hy [Redacted] [Redacted] or [Redacted] under [Redacted]S supervision. (See DIRECTOR [Redacted] (162224Z MAY 03).) On May 17 and 18, 2003, [Redacted] a [Redacted] d the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on bin Attash under the supervision of [Redacted] including facial grabs, facial insult slap^abdomhw and water dousing. See [Redacted] 38557 (191641Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 3g59? (201225Z MAY 03). ____Show full note The January 28, 2003, DCI guidelines did not explicitly require CIA Headquarters to approve who could use the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques, including techniques that were not previously considered "standard" and that would later be reclassified as "enhanced" interrogation techniques. Rather, the DCI guidelines required only that "all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation" be "appropriately screened," that they review the guidelines, and that they receive "appropriate training" in the implementation of the guidelines.⁶¹³⁶¹³ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] (311702Z JAN 03). The DCI guidelines provided no further information, other than to note that the screening should be "from the medical, psychological, and security standpoints." r 1

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4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department of Justice Approval; Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding

¶CIA Headquarters approved requests to use water dousing, nudity, the abdominal slap, and dietary manipulation, despite the fact that the techniques had not been reviewed by the Department of Justice⁶¹⁴⁶¹⁴ See, for example, DIRECTOR [Redacted] (101700Z FEB 03). Interrogators used the water dousing technique in various ways. At DETENTION SITE COBALT, detainees were often held down, naked, on a tarp on the floor, with the tarp pulled up around them to form a makeshift tub, while cold or refrigerated water was poured on them.⁶¹⁵⁶¹⁵ In the case of Abu Hudhaifa, and allegedly Majid Khan, interrogators placed the detainee in an actual tub in a CIA [Redacted] when employing water dousing that included ice water. Others were hosed down repeatedly while they were shackled naked, in the standing sleep deprivation position. These same detainees were subsequently placed in rooms with temperatures ranging from 59 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.⁶¹⁶⁶¹⁶ CIA cable records often describe die detainees as naked after the water dousing, while other records omit such detail. See Volume III for additional information. m i 11111 [Redacted]

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¶Other accounts suggest detainees were water doused while placed on a waterboard.617 Although CIA Headquarters approved the use of the "water dousing" interrogation technique on several detainees, interrogators used it extensively on a number of detainees without seeking or obtaining prior authorization from CIA Headquarters.⁶¹⁸⁶¹⁸ For additional details, see Volume III

¶In interrogation sessions on April 5, 2003, and April 6, 2003, senior CIA interrogator [Redacted] and another interrogator used the water dousing technique on detainee Mustafa al-Hawsawi at DETENTION SITE COBALT. AI-Hawsawi later described the session to a different CIA interrogator, [Redacted] who wrote that al- Hawsawi might have been waterboarded or subjected to treatment that "could be indistinguishable from the waterboard."⁶¹⁹⁶¹⁹ EmaiHrom: [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED] account; [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003. An email from the interrogator stated that:

"We did not prompt al-Hawsawi - he described the process and the table on his own. As you know, I have serious reservations about watering them in a prone position because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the effect of the water board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on the floor, with water poured in his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board.

I have real problems with putting one of them on the water board for 'dousing.' Putting him in a head down attitude and pouring water around his chest and face is just too close to the water board, and if it is continued may lead to problems for us."⁶²⁰⁶²⁰ E m a i ^ o n i : [Redacted] J [Redacted] T E D ] account; [Redacted] [Redacted] a n [Redacted] subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003. Volume III of the Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a wooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed in the full Committee Study, there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard interrogation technique at COBALT. The waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of waterboard. In meetings between the Committee staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at DETENTION SITE COBALT.Show full note

¶Several months later, the incident was referred to the CIA inspector general for investigation. A December 6, 2006, inspector general report summarized the findings of this investigation, indicating that water was poured on al-Hawsawi while he was lying on the floor in a prone position, which, in the opinion of at least one CIA interrogator quoted in the report, "can easily approximate waterboarding."⁶²¹⁶²¹ CIA OIG Disposition Memorandum, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case 2004- 7604-1G, December 6, 2006. The OIG could not corroborate whether al- Hawsawi was strapped to the waterboard when he was interrogated at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Both of the interrogators who subjected al-Hawsawi to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on April 6, 2003, said that al-Hawsawi cried out for God while the

[Redacted] , using [Redacted] [REDACTED] account; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] , [Redacted] subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003.

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¶water was being poured on him and one of the interrogators asserted that this was because of the cold temperature of the water. Both of the interrogators also stated that al-Hawsawi saw the waterboard and that its purpose was made clear to him. The inspector general report also indicates that al-Hawsawi's experience reflected "the way water dousing was done at [DETENTION SITE COBALT]," and that this method was developed with guidance from CIA CTC attorneys and the CIA's Office of Medical Services.⁶²²⁶²² CIA OIG Disposition Memorandum, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case 2004- 7604-1G, December 6, 2006.

¶During the same time that al-Hawsawi claimed he was placed on the waterboard in April 2003, a CIA linguist claimed that CIA detainee Abu Hazim had also been water doused in a way that approximated [Redacted] waterboarding.⁶²³⁶²³ An accusation related to an additional detainee was included in a September 6, 2012, Human Rights Watch report entitled, "Delivered Into Enemy Hands." The report asserts that documents and interviews of former detainees contradict CIA claims that "only three men in US custody had been waterboarded." Specifically, the report states diat Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, "provided detailed and credible testimony that he was waterboarded on repeated occasions during US interrogations in Afghanistan." According to the report, Mohammed Shoroeiya stated that a hood was placed over his head and he was strapped to a "wooden board." The former CIA detainee stated that after being strapped to the waterboard, "then they start with the water pouring... They start to pour water to the point where you feel like you are suffocating." As detailed in the full Committe^tudy, Mohammed 011 A r i l Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE [Redacted] P I [Redacted] 2003. While there are no CIA records of Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, being subjected to the waterboard at DETENTION SITE [Redacted] the full nature of the CIA interrogations at DETENTION SITE [Redacted] remains largely unknown. Detainees at DETENTION SITE [Redacted] were subjected to techniques that were not recorded in cable traffic, including multiple periods of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and "rough treatment." As described^/olume III of tire Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a wooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE [Redacted] As detailed in the full Committee Study, there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard interrogation technique at DETENTION SITE [Redacted] The waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of waterboard. In meetings between the Committee staff and die CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at DETENTION SITE [Redacted] In response to the allegations in the September 2012 Human Rights Watch report, the CIA stated: "The agency has been on the record that there are three substantiated cases in which detainees were subjected to the waterboarding technique under the program." See "Libyan Alleges Waterboarding by CIA, Report Says," New York Times, September 6,2012.Show full note a linguist in C o u n t [Redacted] from [Redacted] 2003, until [Redacted] 2003, told the OIG that:

"when water dousing was used on Abu Hazim, a cloth covered Abu Hazim's face, and [ [Redacted] [ C I A OFFICER 1]] poured cold water directly on Abu Hazim's face to disrupt his breathing. [The linguist] said that when Abu Hazim turned blue, Physician's Assistant [ [Redacted] removed the cloth so that Abu Hazim could breathe."⁶²⁴⁶²⁴ CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717- 16.

¶This allegation was reported to the CIA inspector general on August 18, 2004. The CIA reported this incident as a possible criminal violation on September 10, 2004, to the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Virginia.⁶²⁵⁶²⁵ CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717- 16. The inspector general report concluded that there was no corroboration of the linguist's allegation, stating, "[t]here is no evidence that a cloth was placed over Abu Hazim's face during water dousing or that his breathing was impaired."⁶²⁶⁶²⁶ CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717- 16.

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5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

¶1° the summer of 2003, the CIA captured three Southeast Asian operatives: Zubair,⁶²⁷⁶²⁷ [Redacted] 84854 [Redacted] 87617 [Redacted] [Redacted] 87426 (111223Z AUG 03). Lillie was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques almost immediately upon his arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, on August [Redacted] 2003. H ^ a ^ s t r i p p e ^ n i i ^ I o t h i n g , " and "placed in a cell in the standing sleep deprivation position, in darkness." (See [Redacted] 1242 (151914Z AUG 03).) A day later an interrogation plan for Lillie, including the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, was submitted to CIA Headquarters on August [Redacted] 2003. (See [Redacted] 1243 (152049Z AUG 03).) CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's enhancecUntOTOcationtecliniques on Lillie on the following day, August [Redacted] 2003. (See HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] ( [Redacted] AUG 03).) As described, die Committee's count of detainees subjected to unauthorized techniques did not include detainees such as Lillie, who were subjected to the CIA's "standard" techniques prior to authorization from CIA Headquarters, but for whom authorization from CIA Headquarters was acquired shortly thereafter. As noted, the January 2003 guidelines required advance approval of such techniques "whenever feasible." [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] The cable also noted that CIA contractor Hammond DUNBAR had arrived at the detention site and was participating in Hambali's interrogations as an interrogator. The "psychological assessment" portion of the cable was attributed to a CIA staff psychologist, however, and not to DUNBAR.Show full note Lillie,628 and Hambali. (These captures are discussed later in this summary in the section entitled, "The Capture of Hambali.")629

¶In August 2003, Hambali was captured and transferred to CIA custody 630 Despite assessments that Hambali was cooperative in the interview process without "the use of more intrusive standard interrogation procedures much less the enhanced measures," CLA interrogators requested and obtained approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Hambali approximately a month after his transfer to CIA custody.631 In late 2003, Hambali recanted most of the significant information he had provided to interrogators during the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, recantations CIA officers assessed to be credible.⁶³²⁶³² CIA officers interrogating Hambali in November 2003 wrote about Hambali's "account of how, through statements read to him and constant repetition of questions, he was made aware of what type of answers his questioners wanted. [Hambali] said he merely gave answers that were similar to what was being asked and what he inferred the interrogator or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure subsided or he was told that the information he gave was okay, [Hambali] knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought." The cable states, "Base assesses [Hainbali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible. [HambaliJ's admission came after threeShow full note According to a CIA cable:

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"he had provided the false information in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself ... and to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed the questioners wanted to hear."⁶³³⁶³³ [Redacted] 4 2 ( 3 0 1 0 5 5 2 NOV 03) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

¶CIA officers later suggested that the misleading answers and resistance to interrogation that CIA interrogators cited in their requests to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali and an associated CIA detainee, Lillie, may not have been resistance to interrogation, but rather the result of issues related to culture and their poor English language skills.⁶³⁴⁶³⁴ [Redacted] 1072 (1106062 OCT 0 3 ) j [Redacted] 7 5 ( 1 1 1 8 2 8 2 OCT 03); [Redacted] 1142 (301055Z NOV 03); [Redacted] (081459Z DEC 03); [Redacted] 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). After an Indonesian speaker was deployed to debrief Hambali, the debriefer "got the distinct impression [Hambali] was just responding 'yes' in the typical Indonesian cultural manner when they [sic] do not comprehend a question." The CIA cable dien noted that, "|j]ust to clarify, [the Indonesian speaking debriefer] then posed the same question in Indonesian," and "[w]ithout pause, [Hambali] replied with a direct contradiction, claiming that on 20 September 2001, he was in Karachi, not Qandahar." (See [Redacted] 1075 (111828Z OCT 03).) A January 2004 cable stated that "Lillie is of limited value," adding that "[h]is English is very poor, and we do not have a Malay linguist." See [Redacted] [Redacted] 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). See also detainee reviews in Volume 111 for additional information.Show full note

6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions Detention of Detainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and Held for An Additional Four Years

¶In October 2003, the CIA interrogated Arsala Khan, an Afghan national in his mid-fifties who was believed to have assisted Usama bin Laden in his escape through the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001⁶³⁵⁶³⁵ WASHINGTON [Redacted] [Redacted] After 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, Arsala Khan was described as barely able to enunciate, and being "visibly shaken by his hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family." According to CIA cables, Arsala Khan "stated that [the interrogator] was responsible for killing them and feeding them to the dogs."⁶³⁶⁶³⁶ [Redacted] 1006Z OCT 03). The information was also released in [Redacted] [Redacted] 4 8 1 [Redacted] CIA records indicate that tire CIA's interrogations of Arsala Khan resulted in one disseminated intelligence report, derived from information Khan provided the day he experienced the hallucinations. See [Redacted] via CIA WASHINGTON DC [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶Arsala Khan was subsequently allowed to sleep.⁶³⁷⁶³⁷ OCT 03) Two days later, however, the interrogators returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to 21 additional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA's enhanced weeks of daily debriefing sessions with [the case officer] carried out almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia. [Hambali] has consistently warmed to [the case officer's] discussions with him, and has provided to [the case officer] additional information that he had avoided in die past... More tellingly, [Hambali] has opened up considerably to [the case officer] about his fears and motivations, and has taken to trusting [the case officer] at his word. [Hambali] looks to [the case officer] as his sole confidant and the one person who has [Hambali]'s interest in mind...." See

¶[Redacted] 1142 (301055Z NOV 03). This cable appears to have been retransmitted the following day as [Redacted] 1144(0108232DEC 03). f 33 interrogation techniques "|d|uc to lack of information from [Arsala Khan| pinning him directly to a recent activity."63'5 Three days after the reporting about Khan's hallucinations, and after the interrogators had already subjected Khan to the additional 21 hours of standing sleep deprivation (beyond the initial 56 hours), CIA Headquarters sent a cablc slating that RDG and the Office of Medical Services believed that Arsala Khan should not be subjected to additional standing sleep deprivation beyond the 56 hours becausc of his hallucinations. 639

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¶After approximately a month of detention and the extensive use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Arsala Khan, the CIA concluded that the "detainee Arsala Khan docs not appear to be the subjcct involved in... current plans or activities against U.S. personnel or facilities," and recommended that he be released to his village with a cash payment. 640 CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT instead transferred him to U.S. military custody, where he was held for an additional four years despite the development of significant intelligence indicating that the source who reported that Arsala Khan had aided Usama bin Laden had a vendetta against Arsala Khan's family.641

7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports "Unsettling Discovery That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little"

¶[Redacted] l[1 t h c fall of 2003, CIA officers began to take a closer look at the CIA detainees being held in Country [Redacted] raising concerns about both thc number and types of detainees being held by thc CIA. CIA officers in Country [Redacted] provided a list of CIA detainees to CIA Headquarters, resulting in thc observation by CIA Headquarters that they had not previously had thc names of all 44 CIA detainees being held in that country. At thc direction of CIA Headquarters, thc Station in Country [Redacted]completed an exhaustive scarch of all available records in an attempt to develop a clearer understanding of thc [CIA | detainees." A December 2003 cable from thc Station in Country [Redacted] to CIA Headquarters stated that:

"In thc proccss of this research, we have made thc unsettling discovery that we arc holding a number of detainees about whom we know very little. Thc majority of |CIA | detainees in [Country [Redacted] have not been debriefed for months and, in some cases, for over a year. Many of them appear to us to have no further intelligence value for (thc C1AJ and should more properly be turned over to the ]U.S. military], to [Country [Redacted] authorities or to third countries for further investigation and possibly prosecution. In a few cases, there docs not appear to be enough evidcncc to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact thc case, thc detainees should be released."642

¶[Redacted] [Redacted]

[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [Redacted]

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¶Records indicate that all of these CIA detainees had been kept in solitary confinement. The vast majority of these detainees were later released, with some receiving CIA payments for having been held in detention.⁶⁴³⁶⁴³ This included Saved Habib [Redacted] Zarmein ("a nominal payment"), Modin Nik Mohammed ( $ [Redacted] , and Ali Saeed Awadh [Redacted] See Volume 111 for additional details.

8. CIA Detention Sites in Country [Redacted] Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support the Interrogations of Detainees

¶Throughout 2003, the CIA lacked sufficient personnel and adequate translators to conduct debriefings and interrogations in Country [Redacted] Because of this personnel shortage, a number of detainees who were transferred to CIA custody were not interrogated or debriefed by anyone for days or weeks after their arrival at CIA detention facilities in Country [Redacted] 6,14 As noted in a cable from the CIA Station in Country [Redacted] in April 2003:

"Station is supporting the debriefing and/or interrogation of a large number of individuals... and is constrained by a lack of personnel which would allow us to fully process them in a timely manner."⁶⁴⁵⁶⁴⁵ [Redacted] 36229 (060943Z APR 03). See also detainee reviews for Lillie, Hambali, Mustafa al- Hawsawi, and Suleiman Abdullah.

¶I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues

7. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care

¶While CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice in July 2002 "that steps will be taken to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these [enhanced interrogation] methods,"⁶⁴⁶⁶⁴⁶ See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative." CIA Headquarters informed CIA interrogators that the interrogation process would take "precedence" over Abu Zubaydah's medical care.⁶⁴⁷⁶⁴⁷ ALEC [Redacted] 1 8 2 3 2 1 Z JUL 02) Beginning on August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was kept naked, fed a "bare bones" liquid diet, and subjected to the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques⁶⁴⁸⁶⁴⁸ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information, as well as email from: [REDACTED], to: [Redacted] and [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 2002, at 06:54 AM. On August 15, 2002, medical personnel described how Abu Zubaydah's interrogation resulted in the "steady deterioration" of his surgical wound from April 2002.⁶⁴⁹⁶⁴⁹ An email to OMS stated: "We are currently providing absolute minimum wound care (as evidenced by the steady deterioration of the wound), [Abu Zubaydah] has no opportunity to practice any form of hygienic self care (he's filthy), the physical nature of this phase dictates multiple physical stresses (Ilia reaction to today's activity is I believe the culprit for the superior edge separation), and nutrition is bare bones (six cans of ensure daily)." See email from: [REDACTED], to: [Redacted] a n d [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 2002, at 06:54 AM.Show full note On August 20, 2002, medical officers wrote that Abu Zubaydah's wound had undergone "significant" deterioration.⁶⁵⁰⁶⁵⁰ [Redacted] 10647 (201331Z AUG 02); [Redacted] 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); [Redacted] 110679 (250932Z AUG 02) Later, after one of Abu Zubaydah's eyes began to deteriorate,⁶⁵¹⁶⁵¹ Records indicate that Abu Zubaydah ultimately lost the eye. See [Redacted] 11026 (070729Z OCT 02). CIA officers requested a test of Abu Zubaydah's other eye, stating that the request was "driven by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian concern for AZ." The cable relayed, "[w]e have a lot riding upon his ability to see, read and write."⁶⁵²⁶⁵² [Redacted] 10679 (250932Z AUG 02); [Redacted] 11026 (070729Z OCT 02)

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¶In April 2003, CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each broke a foot while trying to escape capture and were placed in casts.⁶⁵³⁶⁵³ 144147 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] APR 03) CIA cables requesting the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on the two detainees stated that the interrogators would "forego cramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical shackling (due to [the detainees'] injury)."⁶⁵⁴⁶⁵⁴ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 36862 (181352Z APR To accommodate Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries, the cable stated that, rather than being shackled standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be "seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent disruptions of normal sleeping patterns." For water dousing, the detainees' injured legs would be "wrapped in alas tic." The requests were approved. See DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]Show full note Notwithstanding medical concerns related to the injuries, both of these detainees were subjected to one or more of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to obtaining CIA Headquarters approval.⁶⁵⁵⁶⁵⁵ With regard to Abu Hazim, on April 24, 2003, an additional CIA Headquarters approval cable was sent to DETENTION SITE COBALT authorizing interrogator [Redacted] t o u s e the attention grasp, facial insult slap, abdominal slap, water dousing, and sleep deprivation up to 72 hours; the cable did not approve the use of walling or the facial hold. (See DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] Despite the lack of approval, walling was used against Abu Hazim on April 28-29, 2003, and the facial hold was used on April 27, 2003. (See [Redacted] 37410 37411 (291829Z APR 03); [Redacted] (291828Z APR 03); [Redacted] [Redacted] 37509 ( 0 2 1 3 0 9 Z M A ^ 3 ^ A May 10, 2003, CIA Headquarters cable approved walling and the facial grasp. (See DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] MAY 03).) Abd al-Karim was also subjected to unapproved CIA enhanced interrogation techniques that the detention site initially indicated would not be used due to the detainee's injuries. Without approval from CIA Headquarters, CIA interrogators subjected Abd al-Karim to cramped confinement on April 19-20, 2003; stress positions on April 21, 2003; and walling on April 21, and 29, 2003. (See 37152 37121 (221703Z APR 03); (231424z APR [Redacted] [Redacted] 37202 (250948Z APR 03); 37508 (021305Z MAY 03).) On May 10, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved an expanded list of CIA enhanced interrogation techniques that could be used against Abd al-Karim, including walling and stress positions. See DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] MAY 03).Show full note

¶In the case of Abu Hazim, on May 4, 2003, the CIA regional medical officer examined Abu Hazim and recommended that he avoid all weight bearing activities for an additional five weeks due to his broken foot.⁶⁵⁶⁶⁵⁶ DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] MAY 03) In the case of Abd al-Karim, on April 18, 2003, a CIA physician assistant recommended that al-Karim avoid extended standing for "a couple of weeks."⁶⁵⁷⁶⁵⁷ [Redacted] 36862(181352Z APR 03) Six days later, on April 24, 2003, CIA Headquarters reviewed x-rays of al-Karim's foot, diagnosing him with a broken foot, and recommending no weight bearing and the use of crutches for a total of three months.⁶⁵⁸⁶⁵⁸ DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] Despite these recommendations, on May 10, 2003, CIA interrogators believed that both Hazim and al-Karim were "strong mentally and physically due to [their] ability to sleep in the sitting position."⁶⁵⁹⁶⁵⁹ 38262 (150541Z MAY 03); [Redacted] On May 12, 2003, a different CIA physician assistant, who had not been involved in the previous examinations determining the need for the detainees to avoid weight bearing, stated that it was his "opinion" that Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries were "sufficiently healed to allow being placed in the standing sleep deprivation position."⁶⁶⁰⁶⁶⁰ 660 I [Redacted] 38161 (131326Z MAY 03) 66! 38161 (131326Z MAY 03) He further reported that he had "consulted with [CIA's Office of Medical Services] via secure phone and OMS medical officer concurred in this assessment."⁶⁶¹⁶⁶¹ [Redacted] [Redacted] MAY 03) for [Redacted] CIA Headquarters approved the use of standing sleep deprivation against both detainees shortly thereafter.⁶⁶²⁶⁶² See DIRECTOR | MAY 03) for Abu Hazim; and DIRECTOR [Redacted] Abd al-Karim. As a result, both detainees were placed in standing sleep deprivation. Abu Hazim underwent 52 hours of standing sleep deprivation from June 3-5, 2003,⁶⁶³⁶⁶³ » 39582 (041743Z JUN 03); [Redacted] 139656 (060955Z JUN 03) [Redacted] and Abd al-Karim underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation on May 15, 2003.⁶⁶⁴⁶⁶⁴ 38365 (170652Z MAY 03)

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¶CIA detainee Asadallah was left in the standing sleep deprivation position despite a sprained ankle. Later, when Asadallah was placed in stress positions on his knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit. Asadallah was told he could not sit unless he answered questions truthfully.⁶⁶⁵⁶⁶⁵ Asadallah was also placed in a "small isolation box" for 30 minutes, without authorization and without discussion of how the technique would affect his ankle. (See [Redacted] 34098 [Redacted] [Redacted] 3 4 2 [Redacted] n [Redacted] 343[Redacted]) While CIA records contain information on other detainee medical complaints (see Volume III), those records also suggest that detainee medical complaints could be underreported in CIA medical records. For example, CIA medical records consistently report that CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh had no medical complaints. However, CIA interrogation records indicate that when bin al-Shibh had previously complained of ailments to CIA personnel, he was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and told by CIA interrogators that his medical condition was not of concern to the CIA. (See [Redacted] 10591 (252002Z FEB 03); [Redacted] 10627 (281949Z FEB 03).) In testimony on April 12, 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden referenced medical care of detainees in the context of the ICRC report on CIA detentions. Hayden testified to the Committee: "The medical section of the ICRC report concludes that the association of CIA medical officers with the interrogation program is 'contrary to international standards of medical ethics.' That is just wrong. The role of CIA medical officers in the detainee program is and always has been and always will be to ensure the safety and the well-being of the detainee. The placement of medical officers during the interrogation techniques represents an extra measure of caution. Our medical officers do not recommend the employment or continuation of any procedures or techniques. The allegation in the report that a CIA medical officer threatened a detainee, stating that medical care was conditional on cooperation is blatantly false. Health care has always been administered based upon detainee needs. It's neither policy nor practice to link medical care to any odier aspect of the detainee program." This testimony was incongruent with CIA records.Show full note

2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues

¶Psychological and behavioral problems experienced by CIA detainees, who were held in austere conditions and in solitary confinement, also posed

¶6591 138161 (131326Z MAY 03) management challenges for the CIA.⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶ For additional details, see Volume III. For example, later in his detention, Ramzi bin al-Shibh exhibited behavioral and psychological problems, including visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm.⁶⁶⁷⁶⁶⁷ [Redacted] 1759 (021319Z OCT 04); H E A D Q U A R T E R [Redacted] 0 4 0 0 2 3 Z NOV 05); [Redacted] (171225Z NOV 04); [Redacted] (140915Z NOV 04); [Redacted] 9 3 p (061620Z DEC 04); [Redacted] 2207 (111319Z APR 0 5 ) i [Redacted] 1 0 ( 1 4 1 5 0 7 Z A P R 0 5 [Redacted] 5 3 5 (051805Z JUL05); 12589 [Redacted] ( 1 2 0 8 5 7 Z J U L 0 5 [Redacted] 8 3 0 ( 2 9 1 3 0 4 Z AUG 05); [Redacted] 1890 (171225Z NOV 04); [Redacted] 1893(200831Z NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, 12 A p r i l 2 0 0 F [Redacted] 1 0 ( 1 4 1 5 0 7 Z APR 05); [Redacted] 3 5 (051805Z JUL 05); [Redacted] 2210 (141507Z A P R 0 5 [Redacted] 5 3 5 (051805Z J U L 0 5 ) [Redacted] 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); [Redacted] 1930 (061620Z DEC [Redacted] 2210 (141507Z APR 05)Show full note CIA psychologists linked bin al-Shibh's deteriorating mental state to his isolation and inability to cope with his long-term detention.⁶⁶⁸⁶⁶⁸ [Redacted] 2210(1415072 APR 05); [Redacted] 2535 (051805Z JUL 05); [Redacted] 12830 (291304Z AUG Similarly, 'Abd al-Rahim al- Nashiri's unpredictable and disruptive behavior in detention made him one of the most difficult detainees for the CIA to manage. Al-Nashiri engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including throwing his food tray,659 attempting to assault detention site personnel⁶⁷⁰⁶⁷⁰ [Redacted] 11029 (291750Z JUN 06); [Redacted] [1142 (0413582 AUG 06); [Redacted] 11543 (111600Z AUG04); 11716(180742Z [Redacted] SEP 04) [Redacted] 3051 (301235Z SEP 05); [Redacted] 11029 (291750Z JUN 06) and trying to damage items in his cell.⁶⁷¹⁶⁷¹ See, for example, [Redacted] 12474 (251622Z JUN 05); [Redacted] 12673 (021451Z AUG 05); [Redacted] 1716 (180742Z SEP 04). Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his food and complained of bodily pain and insomnia.⁶⁷²⁶⁷² See, for example [Redacted] 1356 (011644Z JUL 04); [Redacted] 8 0 (140917Z NOV 04); [Redacted] 1959(1117002 DEC 04); [Redacted] I 'I ll III ' HI I Mil [Redacted] 1959 (111700ZDEC04); [Redacted] 2038 ( 2 1 1 5 5 8 Z J A N [Redacted] 1091 (031835Z NOV 03); [Redacted] 1266 (052309Z JAN 04); [Redacted] MAR 04). 6 7 [Redacted] As noted, at one point, al- Nashiri launched a short-lived hunger strike, and the CIA responded by force feeding him rectally.⁶⁷³⁶⁷³ [Redacted] 0 3 ( 2 3 1 7 0 9 Z M A Y 0 [Redacted] 1202 (231644Z MAY04). CIA records indicate that at least five detainees were subjected to rectal rehydration or rectal feeding: Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Majid Khan, and Marwan al-Jabbur. See Volume III for additional details. An October 2004 psychological assessment of al-Nashiri was used by the CIA to advance its discussions with National Security Council officials on establishing an "endgame" for the program.⁶⁷⁴⁶⁷⁴ Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [DETENTION SITE B L A C [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] j subject: Interrogator Assessments/Request for Endgame Views; date: October 30, 2004. In July 2005, CIA Headquarters expressed concern regarding al-Nashiri's "continued state of depression and uncooperative attitude."⁶⁷⁵⁶⁷⁵ HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (282217Z JUL 05) Days later a CIA psychologist assessed that al-Nashiri was on the "verge of a breakdown."⁶⁷⁶⁶⁷⁶ CIA Sametime exchange, dated 29/JUL/05 08:01:51 - 08:50:13; between [Redacted] and [Redacted] [Redacted]

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¶Beginning in March 2004, and continuing until his rendition to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in September 2006, Majid Khan engaged in a series of hunger strikes and attempts at self-mutilation that required significant attention from CIA detention site personnel. In response to Majid Khan's hunger strikes, medical personnel m i 1111111 [Redacted] i m i i in11 implemented various techniques to provide fluids and nutrients, including the use of a nasogastric tube and the provision of intravenous fluids. CIA records indicate that Majid Khan cooperated with the feedings and was permitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself.⁶⁷⁷⁶⁷⁷ [Redacted] 3183 (161626Z SEP [Redacted] 04)J 3184 (161628Z SEP 04); 13190 (181558ZSEP 04); [Redacted] 3196 (201731Z SEP 04); [Redacted] 3197 (201731Z SEP 04); 3206 (211819Z SEP 04); [3135 (120625Z SEP 04); [Redacted] 3181 (161621Z SEP 04) After approximately three weeks, the CIA developed a more aggressive treatment regimen "without unnecessary conversation."⁶⁷⁸⁶⁷⁸ [Redacted] 3237 (230552Z SEP 04) Majid Khan was then subjected to involuntary rectal feeding and rectal hydration, which included two bottles of Ensure. Later that same day, Majid Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins, was "pureed" and rectally infused.⁶⁷⁹⁶⁷⁹ 3240 (231839Z SEP 04) Additional sessions of rectal feeding and hydration followed.⁶⁸⁰⁶⁸⁰ 13259 (261734Z SEP 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "rectal rehydration" is a "well acknowledged medical technique to address pressing health issues." A follow-up CIA document provided on October 25,2013 (DTS #2013-3152), states that "[fjrom a health perspecti ve, Majid Khan became uncooperative on 31 August 2004, when he initiated a hunger strike and before he underwent rectal rehydration... CIA assesses that the use of rectal rehydration is a medically sound hydration technique...." The assertion that Majid Khan was "uncooperative" prior to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding is inaccurate. As described in CIA records, prior to being subjected to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding, Majid Khan cooperated with the nasogastric feedings and was permitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself.Show full note In addition to his hunger strikes, Majid Khan engaged in acts of self-harm that included attempting to cut his wrist on two occasions,⁶⁸¹⁶⁸¹ \ [Redacted] 3694 (301800Z NOV 04); [Redacted] 4 2 4 2 (191550Z MAR 05); [4250 [Redacted] (221213Z MAR 05) an attempt to chew into his arm at the inner elbow,⁶⁸²⁶⁸² \ 3724 (031723Z DEC 04) an attempt to cut a vein in the top of his foot,⁶⁸³⁶⁸³ [Redacted] 3835 (260659Z DEC 04) and an attempt to cut into his skin at the elbow joint using a filed toothbrush.⁶⁸⁴⁶⁸⁴ |4614 (071358Z JUN 05)

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