G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

1. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techiiques

¶The capture of KSM was attributable to a single CIA source who first came to the CIA's attention in the spring of 2001⁴³²⁴³² For more details, see section of this summary on the capture of KSM and additional information in Volume II. The source [Redacted] [Redacted] led the CIA and Pakistan authorities directly to KSM. KSM was held in Pakistani custody from the time of his capture on March 1, 2003, to March [Redacted] 2003, and was interrogated by CIA officers and Pakistani officials. According to CIA records, while in Pakistani custody, KSM was subjected to some sleep deprivation, but there are no indications of other coercive interrogation techniques being used.⁴³³⁴³³ 141403 (020949Z MAR 03) [Redacted] While KSM denied knowledge of attack plans and the locations of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,⁴³⁴⁴³⁴ 141484 (031315Z MAR 03) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ he did provide limited information on various al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives who had already been captured. KSM's willingness to discuss operatives when confronted with information about their capture—-behavior noted by CIA officers on-site in Pakistan—was a recurring theme throughout KSM's subsequent detention and interrogation in CIA custody.⁴³⁵⁴³⁵ 141564 [Redacted] (041307Z MAR 0 3 ) [Redacted] 5 9 2 (051050Z MAR 03). For details on KSM's detention in Pakistani custody, see the KSM detainee review in Volume III.

Less [Redacted] than two hours after KSM's capture^anticipating KSM's

¶arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, the chief of interrogations, [Redacted] [Redacted] s e n t a n e m a i l to CIA Headquarters with the subject line, "Let's roll with the new guy." The email requested permission to "press [KSM] for threat info right away."⁴³⁶⁴³⁶ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Let's Roll with the new guy; date: March 1,2003, at 03:43:12 AM. Later that day, CIA Headquarters authorized [Redacted] to use a number of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against

¶KSM. The cable from CIA Headquarters did not require that non-coercive interrogation techniques be used first.437 On March [Redacted] 2003, two days before KSM's arrival at the detention site, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan for KSM 438

¶According to CIA records, interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT a "few minutes" after the questioning of KSM began. KSM was subjected to facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, stress positions, standing sleep deprivation (with his hands at or above head level), nudity, and water dousing 439 Chief of Interrogations [Redacted] also ordered the rectal rehydration of KSM without a determination of medical need, a procedure that the chief of interrogations would later characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total control over the detainee."440 At the end of the day, the psychologist on-site concluded that the interrogation team would likely have more success by "avoiding confrontations that allow [KSM] to transform the interrogation into battles of will with the interrogator."⁴⁴¹⁴⁴¹ [Redacted] 34575 [Redacted] KSM's reporting during his first day in CIA custody included an accurate description of a Pakistani/British operative, which was dismissed as having been provided during the initial "'throwaway' stage" of information collection when the CIA believed detainees provided false or worthless information.⁴⁴²⁴⁴² "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3,2003. KSM also named three individuals who, he said, worked on an al-Qa'ida anthrax program that was still in its "earliest stages." They were led, he said, by "Omar" who had been arrested in the country of [Redacted] The group also included Abu Bakr al-Filistini. (See [Redacted] 34475 [Redacted] KSM would later state that "YazidjMedal-Qa'ida's a n t h r a x e f f o r t T ( 5 [Redacted] l 0 7 6 9 (120937Z MAR 03).) Yazid Sufaat, who had been in [Redacted] [foreign government] custody since 2001, had long been suspected ofShow full note

¶DIRECTOR [Redacted] 012240Z MAR 03) •138 34354 [Redacted] MAR 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] MAR 03) 439 [Redacted] 34491 (051400Z MAR 03) 440 34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of [Redacted], by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003.

¶On March 5, 2003, and March 6, 2003, while he was still at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM was subjected to nudity and sleep deprivation. On March 5, 2003, KSM was also subjected to additional rectal rehydration,⁴⁴³⁴⁴³ articipating in al-Qa'ida chemical and biological activities. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: FOR COORD by noon please: Yazid Sufaat PDB; date: March 14, 2003, at 09:05 AM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: [Redacted] RESPONSE - INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO USAMA BINLADINASSOCIATE YAZID SUFAAT; date: March 6, 2003, at 12:50:27 PM; [Redacted] email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; SUBJECT: Re: KSM on WMD; date: March 12, 2003, at 08:28:31 AM.) A draft PDB prepared on March 17, 2003, states that "Sufaat's own claims to [Redacted] [foreign government] authorities and personal background tracks with KSM's assertions." (See "KSM Guarding Most Sensitive Information," labeled "For the President Only 18 March 2003," stamped 0319 ksmupdate.doc 17 March 2003.) On April 3, 2003, an IICT analysis stated that KSM "likely judges that information related to Sufaat already has been compromised since his arrest." (See "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003.) CIA analysis from 2005 stated that [Redacted] [Redacted] [a foreign government holding Sufaat] was likely to have known details of Yazid's involvement in al- Qa'ida's anthrax program by early 2002," although that information was not provided at the time to the CIA. (See CIA Directorate of Intelligence; "Al-Qa"id£^nthraj^ogram^racks Emerge in a Key Reporting Stream; New Insights into Yazid Sufaat's Credibility [Redacted] (DTS #2005-3264).) Al-Filistini was later captured and detained by the CIA. While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques he changed his description of al-Qa'ida's anthrax efforts multiple times. On August 1, 2003, Abu Bakr al-Filistini, also known as Samr al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that "we never made anthrax." At the time, he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he "told the truth." According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said "1 made the anthrax." Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said mi 11 iii i [Redacted] in mShow full note which [Redacted] [Redacted] described as helping to "clear a person's head" and effective in getting KSM to talk.444 On March 6, 2003, [Redacted] adopted a '"softer Mr. Rogers' persona" after the interrogation team concluded that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had caused KSM to "clam up."445 During this session KSM was described as "more cooperative," and the day's interrogation was deemed the "best session held to date" by the interrogation team.445 During this period KSM fabricated information on an individual whom he described as the protector of his children.⁴⁴⁷⁴⁴⁷ In June 2004, KSM described his reporting as "all lies." [Redacted] 3 4 5 6 9 (061722Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 1281 (130801ZJUN 04). That information resulted in the capture and CIA detention of two innocent individuals.⁴⁴⁸⁴⁴⁸ The two individuals, Sayed Habib and Shaistah Habibullali Khan, entered CIA c u s t o d ^ i ^ p n U j n ^ u l y 2003 respectively, and were released in August and February 2004, respectively. (See [Redacted] 57 J 2 [Redacted] email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [REDACTED]JREDACTED]^ubiect: planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; [Redacted] and CIA document, "Additional Details for DCIA on Sayed Habib's Arrest and Detention.") The CIA's June 2013 Response states that die detention of the two individuals "can only be considered 'wrongful' after the fact, not in the light of credible information available at the time and in a context in which plot disruption was deemed an urgent national priority." The CIA's June 2013 Response further states that KSM's reporting on March 6, 2003, was "credible" because, at the time, "[CIA] assessed that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) had moved to a more cooperative posture as his interrogation progressed." A review of CIA records indicates that the CIA subjected KSM to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the following d a y ^ h ^ s e of the techniques continued until March 25, 2003, and included 183 applications of the waterboard. See [Redacted] 1071.1 [Redacted]Show full note

2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard Prior to His Arrival

¶Within hours of KSM's capture, ALEC Station successfully argued that CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR should take over the interrogation of KSM upon KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE.⁴⁴⁹⁴⁴⁹ Interview of [Redacted] , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. Email to: [Redacted] [Redacted] ; from: [Redacted] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted], [REDACTED]; subject: KSM planning; date: March 1, 2003, at 07:07:33 AM. On March 3, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan indicating that KSM "will be subjected to immediate interrogation techniques," and that "the interrogation techniques will increase in intensity from standard to that he was. After CIA interrogators "demonstrated the penalty for lying," al-Barq again stated that "I made the anthrax" and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made anthrax. (See [Redacted] 1015 (012057Z AUG 03).) Two days later, al-Barq stated that he had lied about the anthrax production "only because he thought that was what interrogators wanted." [Redacted] (030812Z AUG 03). 443

¶[Redacted] 5 7 5 [Redacted] 444

¶I II [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [Redacted] subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: [Redacted] E D A C T E D ] ; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] e c t ^ R e ^ U p d a t e ; date: March 6,2003, at 4:51:32 PM. M [Redacted] 34573 (O61751Z MAR 03); 34614 (071551Z MAR enhanced techniques commensurate with [KSM's] level of resistance, until he indicates initial cooperation."⁴⁵⁰⁴⁵⁰ [Redacted] 110654 (030904Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] (041444Z MAR 03). The initial approval was for SWIGERT and CIA interrogator [Redacted] [Redacted] 2003. DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] The authorization was extended to DUNBAR on March | , On March [Redacted] 2003, the day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the on-site medical officer described the use of the waterboard on KSM as inevitable:

"[T]he team here apparently looks to use the water board in two different contexts. One is as a tool of regression and control in which it is used up front and aggressively. The second is to vet information on an as needed basis. Given the various pressures from home vs what is happening on the ground, I think the team's expectation is that [KSM] will [be] getting treatment somewhere in between. I don't think they believe that it will be possible to entirely avoid the water board given the high and immediate threat to US and allied interests. It is an interesting dynamic because they are well aware of the toll it will take on the team vs. the detainee. The requirements coming from home are really unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail."⁴⁵¹⁴⁵¹ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 2003, at 3:51:09 AM. cc: |; subject: Technique; date: March

¶Meanwhile, OMS completed draft guidelines on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically addressing the waterboard interrogation technique. These guidelines were sent to the medical personnel at the detention site. The guidelines included a warning that the risk of the waterboard was "directly related to number of exposures and may well accelerate as exposures increase," that concerns about cumulative effects would emerge after three to five days, and that there should be an upper limit on the total number of waterboard exposures, "perhaps 20 in a week." CIA records indicate that, as of the day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the interrogation team had not reviewed the draft OMS guidelines⁴⁵²⁴⁵² Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] March [Redacted] 2003, at 3:22:45 PM |; subject: Re: Technique; date:

¶KSM arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE at approximately 6:00 PM local time on March [Redacted] 2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in the standing sleep deprivation position.⁴⁵³⁴⁵³ [Redacted] 10711 At 6:38 PM, after the medical and psychological personnel who had traveled with KSM from DETENTION SITE COBALT cleared KSM for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the detention site requested CIA Headquarters' approval to begin the interrogation process⁴⁵⁴⁴⁵⁴ [Redacted] [Redacted] 10705 The detention site received the approvals at 7:18 PM⁴⁵⁵⁴⁵⁵ DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] at which point the interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM⁴⁵⁶⁴⁵⁶ [Redacted] 10711 [Redacted]

¶Between March [Redacted] 2003, and March 9, 2003, contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, and a CIA interrogator, [Redacted] used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, including nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention grab and insult slap, the facial grab, the abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and walling.⁴⁵⁷⁴⁵⁷ |10711| [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 10725| [Redacted] [Redacted] 10732 [Redacted] [Redacted] |10731| [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 10741 (100917Z MAR 03) There were no debriefers present. According to the CIA interrogator, during KSM's first day at DETENTION SITE BLUE, SWIGERT and DUNBAR first began threatening KSM's children.⁴⁵⁸⁴⁵⁸ Interview of [Redacted], by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003. Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22, 2003. [Redacted] C Legal, [Redacted] later told the inspector general that these threats were legal so long as the threats were "conditional."⁴⁵⁹⁴⁵⁹ CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), January 2004. On March 9, 2003, KSM fabricated information indicating that Jaffar al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together⁴⁶⁰⁴⁶⁰ [Redacted] 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 10741 (100917Z MAR 03) because, as he explained on April 23, 2003, he "felt some pressure to produce information about operations in the United States in the initial phases of his interrogation."⁴⁶¹⁴⁶¹ [Redacted] 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as [Redacted]

[Redacted] i) On March [Redacted] 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] [Redacted], and a second ALEC Station officer, [Redacted] arrived at DETENTION SITE

¶BLUE to serve as debriefers. The detention site also reportedly received a phone call from CIA Headquarters conveying the views of the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt on the interrogation of KSM⁴⁶²⁴⁶² Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 30 April 2003. ' Pavitt later told the inspector general that he "did not recall specifically ordering that a detainee be waterboarded right away," but he "did not discount that possibility." According to records of the interview, "Pavitt did recall saying, 'I want to know what he knows, and I want to know it fast.'"⁴⁶³⁴⁶³ Interview of James Pavitt, by [Redacted] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ The on-site medical officer later wrote in an email that the CIA interrogators "felt that the [waterboard] was the big stick and that HQ was more or less demanding that it be used early and often."⁴⁶⁴⁴⁶⁴ from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted]; subject: More; date: April 10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM.

3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated Information

¶On March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected to the first of his 15 separate waterboarding sessions. The first waterboarding session, which lasted 30 minutes (10 more than anticipated in the Office of Legal Counsel's August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed by the use of a horizontal stress position that had not previously been approved by CIA Headquarters.⁴⁶⁵⁴⁶⁵ 110752 [Redacted] (102320Z MAR 03) The chief of Base, worried about the legal implications, prohibited the on-site medical officer from reporting on the interrogation directly to OMS outside of official CIA cable traffic.⁴⁶⁶⁴⁶⁶ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 11,2003, at 8:10:39 AM.

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] March 12, 2003, KSM provided information on the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting. KSM stated that he showed a sketch in his notebook of a building in Canary Wharf (a major business district in London) to Ammar al-Baluchi.⁴⁶⁷⁴⁶⁷ 110798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] He also provided statements about directing prospective pilots to study at flight schools,⁴⁶⁸⁴⁶⁸ 10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] and stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar was involved in the Heathrow Plot.⁴⁶⁹⁴⁶⁹ 10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] KSM retracted all of this information later in his detention.⁴⁷⁰⁴⁷⁰ 1 1 2 1 4 m 7 2 2 3 1 2 ^ U N 03); [Redacted] 22939 (031541Z JUL 04); [Redacted] 10883(1821272 MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] There are no CIA records indicating that these and other retractions were assessed to be false.

¶The March 12, 2003, reporting from KSM on the Heathrow Airport plotting was deemed at the time by CIA interrogators to be an effort by KSM to avoid discussion of plotting inside the United States and thus contributed to the decision to subject KSM to two waterboarding sessions that day.⁴⁷¹⁴⁷¹ [Redacted] 10787 (130716Z MAR 03). The CIA would later represent that the information KSM provided on the Heathrow plotting was an example of the effectiveness of the waterboard interrogation technique, listing the Heathrow Plot as one of the "plots discovered as a result of EITs" in a briefing on the waterboard for the President in November 2007. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."Show full note During these sessions, KSM ingested a significant amount of water. CIA records state that KSM's "abdomen was somewhat distended and he expressed water when the abdomen was pressed."⁴⁷²⁴⁷² [Redacted] 10800 (131909Z MAR 03) KSM's gastric contents were so diluted by water that the medical officer present was "not concerned about regurgitated gastric acid damaging KSM's esophagus."⁴⁷³⁴⁷³ Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. The officer was, however, concerned about water intoxication and dilution of electrolytes and requested that the interrogators use saline in future waterboarding sessions.⁴⁷⁴⁴⁷⁴ [Redacted] 10800 (131909Z MAR 03); Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. The medical officer later wrote to [Redacted] M S that KSM was "ingesting and aspiration [sic] a LOT of water," and that "[i]n the new technique we are basically doing a series of near drownings."⁴⁷⁵⁴⁷⁵ from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted]; subject: More; date: April 10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM. Emphasis in the original. During the day, KSM was also subjected to the attention grasp, insult slap, abdominal slap, and walling.⁴⁷⁶⁴⁷⁶ 110787 [Redacted] (130716Z MAR 03)

¶On March 13, 2003, after KSM again denied that al-Qa'ida had operations planned for inside the United States, CIA interrogators decided on a "day of intensive waterboard sessions."⁴⁷⁷⁴⁷⁷ [Redacted] 10804 (140710Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10790 (130946Z MAR 03) During the first of three waterboarding sessions that day, interrogators responded to KSM's efforts to breathe during the sessions by holding KSM's lips and directing the water at his mouth⁴⁷⁸⁴⁷⁸ Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003. The interviewee was a CIA interrogator for KSM at the CIA detention site. According to a cable from the detention site, KSM "would begin signaling by pointing upward with his two index fingers as the water pouring approached the established time limit." The cable noted that "[t]his behavior indicates that the subject remains alert and has become familiar with key aspects of the process."⁴⁷⁹⁴⁷⁹ [Redacted] 10790 (130946Z MAR 03) CIA records state that KSM "yelled and twisted" when he was secured to the waterboard for the second session of the day, but "appeared resigned to tolerating the board and stated he had nothing new to say" about terrorist plots inside the United States.⁴⁸⁰⁴⁸⁰ [Redacted] 10791 (131229Z MAR 03) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

¶Prior to the third waterboard session of that calendar day, the on-site medical officer raised concerns that the waterboard session—which would be the fourth in 14 hours—would exceed the limits included in draft OMS guidelines that had been distributed the previous afternoon.⁴⁸¹⁴⁸¹ [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] Jose Rodriguez; subject: re: Eyes Only - Legal and Political Quand[]ry; date: March 13,2003, at 11:28:06 AM. Those draft guidelines stated that up to three waterboard sessions in a 24-hour period was acceptable.⁴⁸²⁴⁸² Email from: [Redacted] t o : [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] subject: Re: MEDICAL S1TREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 2:09:47 PM. At the time, KSM had been subjected to more than 65 applications of water during the four waterboarding sessions between the afternoon of March 12, 2003, and the morning of March 13, 2003. In response to a request for approval from the chief of Base, CTC attorney [Redacted] assured detention site personnel that the medical officer "is incorrect that these guidelines have been approved and/or fully [Redacted] coordinated."⁴⁸³⁴⁸³ from: [Redacted] to: cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] J o s e Rodriguez; subject: Re: EYES ONLY - Legal and Political Quandary; date: March 13, 2003, at 8:01:12 AM. sent an email to the detention site authorizing the additional waterboarding session⁴⁸⁴⁴⁸⁴ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] B [Redacted] subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13, 2003, at 08:28 AM. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 485 [Redacted] cc: Despite indications from [Redacted] that the detention site personnel would receive a formal authorizing cable, no such authorization from CIA Headquarters was provided. At the end of the day, the medical officer wrote [Redacted] M S that "[t]hings are slowly evolving form [sic] OMS being viewed as the institutional conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are dedicated to maximizing the benefit in a safe manner and keeping everyone's butt out of trouble." The was no medical officer noted that his communication with [Redacted] longer "viewed with

¶485 suspicion," On the afternoon of March 13, 2003, KSM was subjected to his third waterboard session of that calendar day and fifth in 25 hours. CIA records note that KSM vomited during and after the procedure.485

¶Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters began reevaluating the use of the waterboard interrogation technique. According to a March 14, 2003, email from an interrogator who was not at DETENTION SITE BLUE, but was reviewing cable traffic, the "|o]verall view seems to be" that the waterboard "is not working in gaining KSM['s] compliance."⁴⁸⁷⁴⁸⁷ Email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: re Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - • As of 1000 HRS 14 Mar 03; date: March 14, 2003, at 10:44:12 AM. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ The deputy chief of the CIA interrogation program responded in agreement, adding that "[a]gainst KSM it has proven ineffective," and that "[t]he potential for physical harm is far greater with the waterboard than with the other techniques, bringing into question the issue of risk vs. gain...." The deputy chief further suggested that the waterboard was counterproductive, stating that "[w]e seem to have lost ground" with KSM since progress made at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and as a result, the CIA should "consider the possibility" that the introduction of the waterboard interrogation technique "may poison the well."⁴⁸⁸⁴⁸⁸ m a i H r o n [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] b j e c t : re Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of 1000 HRS 14 MAR 03; date: March 14, 2003, at 02:02:42 PM. The email in which these sentiments were expressed was sent to [Redacted] the CTC attorney overseeing the interrogation of KSM. Despite these reservations and assessments, the waterboarding of KSM continued for another 10 days.⁴⁸⁹⁴⁸⁹ See detailed review of these sessions in Volume III.

¶On March 15, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm references in signals intercepts on al-Qa'ida's efforts to obtain "nuclear suitcases."⁴⁹⁰⁴⁹⁰ [Redacted] 10831 (151510Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10849 (161058Z MAR 03); Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15,2003. Subsequent signals intercepts and information from a foreign government would later indicate that the nuclear suitcase threat was an orchestrated scam⁴⁹¹⁴⁹¹ The original reporting, that al-Qa'ida had purchased nuclear suitcases in Yemen, was later determined to be based on an effort by unknown Yemenis to sell "suitcase weapons" to al-Qa'ida. Al-Qa'ida operatives concluded that the offer was a scam. See [Redacted] 74492 (250843Z JUL 03), disseminated as [Redacted] and HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (092349Z DEC 04) KSM was waterboarded a second time that day after failing to provide information on operations against the United States or on al- Qa'ida nuclear capabilities⁴⁹²⁴⁹² [Redacted] 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10831 (151510ZMAR 03) During the waterboarding sessions that day, the application of the interrogation technique further evolved, with the interrogators now using their hands to maintain a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and mouth in an effort to make it impossible for KSM to ingest all the water being poured.⁴⁹³⁴⁹³ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] c j [Redacted] subject: Re: Sitrep as of AM 3/15; date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 A.M. h i t e r v i e w [Redacted] w R E D A C T E D ] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. See also i n t e r v i e w [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. The descriptions of the use of the waterboard interrogation technique against KSM were provided by these two on-site medical officers.Show full note At one point, SWIGERT and DUNBAR waited for KSM to talk before pouring water over his mouth.⁴⁹⁴⁴⁹⁴ Interview of [Redacted] [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 11 ii 1111 i [Redacted] 'urn

¶[Redacted] ) On the afternoon of March 17, 2003, and into the morning of March 18, 2003, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] M S , exchanged emails with the medical officer at DETENTION SITE BLUE on the waterboarding of KSM. According to [Redacted] the waterboard interrogation technique had "moved even further from the SERE model."⁴⁹⁵⁴⁹⁵ Email to: [REDACTED]; from: [Redacted] subject: Re: Medical limitations of WB - draft thoughts; date: March 17, 2003, at 01:11:35 PM.

¶[Redacted] also wrote:

"Truthfully, though, I don't recall that the WB [waterboard] produced anything actionable in AZ [Abu Zubaydah] any earlier than another technique might have. This may be different with KSM, but that is still as much a statement of faith as anything else - since we don't seem to study the question as we go... it's been many more days of constant WB repetitions, with the evidence of progress through most of them not being actionable intel but rather that 'he looks like he's weakening.' The WB may actually be the best; just don't like to base it on religion."⁴⁹⁶⁴⁹⁶ Email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] subject: Oct 18; date: March 18, 2003, at 10:52:03 AM.

¶On March 18, 2003, KSM was confronted with the reporting of Majid Khan, who was then in the custody of a foreign government,⁴⁹⁷⁴⁹⁷ Majid Khan, who was arrested on March 5, 2003, provided extensive information prior to being rendered to CIA custody. This included information on lyman Faris, Uzhair (Paracha) and his father, Aafia Sidiqqi, his transfer of al-Qa'ida funds to a Bangkok-based Zubair, and his discussions with KSM regarding various proposed plots. Majid Khan also provided assistance to the CIA in its efforts to locate Ammar al-BaluchiJncluc^^ al- Pakistani. J ^ £ £ [Redacted] 9 7 _ ( 0 S ( ) 7 3 0 Z MAR 03); [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 7 6 5 [Redacted] [Redacted]44244 (161423Z A P R O [Redacted] 4 6 8 4 (250633Z APR 03); [Redacted] 113678 (070724Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 13785 [Redacted] [Redacted] (260251Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 8 2 6 (190715Z MAR 0 3 ) [Redacted] 13833 (200454Z MAR 0 3 ) [Redacted] 3 8 9 0 [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] [Redacted] 113686 (071322Z M A R 0 3 [Redacted] 13932 (271244Z M A R 0 3 ) [Redacted] ] 3 7 1 0 (081218Z MAR 03).) After being rendered to CIA custody, Majid Khan was subjected by the CIA to sleep deprivation, nudity, and dietary manipulation, and may have been subjected to an ice water bath. [Redacted] [39077 [Redacted] (271719Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 39099 (281101Z MAY ( [Redacted] [Redacted] Briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 14, 2008; [Redacted] 141772 [Redacted] (121230Z J U [Redacted] e [Redacted] l 1 [Redacted] [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [ R E D A C T E [Redacted] and [Redacted] subject, hope the approvals for enhanced comes through quickly for this guy... this does not look good"; date: June 30,2003.) A June 2006 CIA email stated that Majid Khan said he "fabricated a lot of his early [CIA] interrogation reporting to stop... what he called 'torture.'" According to the email, Khan stated that he was "hung up" for approximately one day in a sleep deprived position and that he provided "everything they wanted to hear to get out of the situation." (See email from: [REDACTED] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] j e c t ^ l [Redacted] q u e s t for prozac; date: June 16, 2006.) As detailed in this summary and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA inaccurately attributed information provided by Majid Khan in foreign government custody to the CIA interrogations of KSM. 11111111111Show full note regarding plotting against gas stations inside the United States, information that KSM had not previously discussed. In assessing the session, DETENTION SITE BLUE personnel noted that "KSM will selectively lie, provide partial truths, and misdirect when he believes he will not be found out and held accountable." On the other hand, they wrote that "KSM appears more inclined to make accurate disclosures when he believes people, emails, or other source material are available to the USG for checking his responses."⁴⁹⁸⁴⁹⁸ [Redacted] 10884 (182140Z MAR 03) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

¶The same day, KSM provided additional information on the Heathrow Airport plotting, much of which he would recant in 2004⁴⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹ 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 22939 (03I541Z JUL 04). CIA records indicate that CIA officers believed that KSM's recantations were credible. See KSM detainee review in Volume III. KSM also discussed Jaffar al-Tayyar again, prompting the detention site personnel to refer to the "all-purpose" al- Tayyar whom KSM had "woven... into practically every story, each time with a different role."⁵⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰ [Redacted] 10884 (182140Z MAR 03) After KSM had included al-Tayyar in his discussion of Majid Khan's gas station plot, KSM debriefer [Redacted] wrote in an email that "[t]oday [al-Tayyar's] working with Majid Khan, yesterday the London crowd, the day before Padilla - you get the point."⁵⁰¹⁵⁰¹ Email from: [REDACTED], OFFICE: [Redacted] ; to: [REDACTED]; subject: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March 18,2003, at 08:16:07 PM. 5 0 [Redacted] Beginning the evening of March 18, 2003, KSM began a period of sleep deprivation, most of it in the standing position, which would last for seven and a half days, or approximately 180 hours.⁵⁰²⁵⁰² [Redacted] 0 8 8 4 (182140Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10888 (190805Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10999 (260835Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10969 (240950Z MAR 03)

¶On March 19, 2003, the interrogators at the detention site decided to waterboard KSM due to KSM's inconsistent information about Jaffar al-Tayyar's passport.⁵⁰³⁵⁰³ [Redacted] 8 9 2 (191503Z MAR 03);[Redacted] 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) According to CIA cables, after assuming his position on the waterboard, KSM "seemed to lose control" and appeared "somewhat frantic," stating that he "had been forced to lie, and ma[k]e up stories about" Jaffar al-Tayyar because of his interrogators.⁵⁰⁴⁵⁰⁴ 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) KSM then stated that his reporting on al-Tayyar's role in Majid Khan's plotting was a "complete fabrication" and that al- Tayyar had been compromised as an operative and that as a result, al-Tayyar could not be used for a terrorist operation⁵⁰⁵⁵⁰⁵ 10894 (191513Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) In response, the interrogators told KSM that they only wanted to hear hin^peak if he was revealing information on the next attack.⁵⁰⁶⁵⁰⁶ 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) Deputy Chief of ALEC Station

¶[Redacted] later told the inspector general that it was around this time that contract interrogator DUNBAR stated that "he had not seen a 'resistor' [sic] like KSM, and was 'going to go to school on this guy."'⁵⁰⁷⁵⁰⁷ Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. According to CIA records, the interrogators then "devote[d] all measures to pressuring [KSM] on the single issue of the 'next attack on America,'" including attention grabs, insult slaps, walling, water dousing, and additional waterboard sessions.⁵⁰⁸⁵⁰⁸ [Redacted] 10902 (201037Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 110900 (191907Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10896 (191524Z MAR 03)

¶On March 20, 2003, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques throughout the day, including a period of "intense questioning and walling."⁵⁰⁹⁵⁰⁹ 10916(2108452 MAR 03); [Redacted] 10921 (211046Z MAR 03) KSM was described as "|t|ired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles, shins, and wrists, as well as on the back of his head.⁵¹⁰⁵¹⁰ 10916(2108452 MAR 03) [Redacted] He also suffered from pedal edema resulting from extended standing.⁵¹¹⁵¹¹ 110909 (2019182 MAR 03) After having concluded that there was "no further movement" in the interrogation, the detention site personnel hung a picture of KSM's sons in his cell as a way to "[heighten] his imagination concerning where they are, who has them, [and] what is in store for them."⁵¹²⁵¹² I n t e r v i [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 2 2 , ^ 0 0 3 1 [Redacted] 0 9 1 7 ( 2 1 0 9 0 7 Z MAR 03).

¶The waterboarding of KSM on March 21, 2003, and March 22, 2003, was based on a misreading of intelligence provided by Majid Khan byDcnut^Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] According to a cable from the CIA's [Redacted] Khan, who was in foreign government custody, had stated that KSM wanted to use "two to three unknown Black American Muslim converts who were currently training in Afghanistan," to "conduct attacks" on gas stations in the United States, and that "KSM was interested in u s i m ^ ^ anyone with US status to assist with this operation."⁵¹³⁵¹³ 113839 [Redacted] (201434Z MAR 03) Upon receipt of this reporting, [Redacted] wrote in an email "i love the Black American Muslim at AQ camps in Afghanuistan [sic] ... Mukie [KSM] is going to be hatin' life on this one."⁵¹⁴⁵¹⁴ Email to: [Redacted] from: [REDACTED] O F H C [Redacted] D E T E N T I O N S 1 T E BLUE]; subject: Re: Majid Khan; date: March 20, 2003, at 03:40:17 PM. The [Redacted] b l e w a s formally sent to DETENTION SITE BLUE via ALEC [Redacted] (210015Z MAR 03). However, her subsequent questioning of KSM was not based on Khan's actual reporting, which was about potential operatives already in Afghanistan, but rather something Khan had not said—that KSM directed him to make contact with African-American converts in the United States⁵¹⁵⁵¹⁵ 10932 (212132Z MAR 03) According to CIA records, in a "contentious" session that lasted for hours and involved the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM "flatly denied" any efforts to recruit African-American Muslim converts. KSM was then waterboarded.⁵¹⁶⁵¹⁶ [Redacted] 10932 (212132Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10922 (211256Z MAR 03) Later in the day, facing the threat of a second waterboarding session, KSM "relented and said that maybe he had told Khan that he should see if he could make contact with members of the Black American Muslim convert community." The CIA interrogators then returned KSM to the standing sleep deprivation position without a second waterboarding session.⁵¹⁷⁵¹⁷ 10932 (212132Z MAR 03)

¶The next day, March 22, 2003, interrogators subjected KSM to "intense" questioning and walling, but when KSM provided no new information on African- American Muslim converts or threats inside the United States, he was subjected to additional waterboarding.518 An hour later, KSM stated that he was "ready to talk."519 He told the CIA interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts, a mission he said had been prompted by discussions with a London-based shaykh whose bodyguards had families in Montana.520 KSM also stated that he tasked Majid Khan with attending Muslim conferences in the United States to "spot and assess potential extremists" who would assist in the gas station plot.521 In June 2003, KSM admitted that he fabricated the story about Abu Issa al-Britani and Montana, explaining that he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear."S22 In August 2003, KSM reiterated that he had no plans to recruit or use "black American Muslim" converts operationally.523 In December 2005, he denied ever asking Majid Khan to recruit converts or attend Islamic conferences.524

¶On March 24, 2003, KSM underwent his fifteenth and final documented waterboarding session due to his "intransigence" in failing to identify suspected Abu Bakr al-Azdi operations in the United States, and for having "lied about poison and biological warfare programs."525 KSM was described in the session as being "composed, stoic, and resigned."526

¶That evening, the detention site received two reports. The first recounted the reporting of Majid Khan, who was still in the custody of a foreign government, on Uzhair, who ran the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business, and on Uzhair's father.527 According to Khan, his meetings with the two were facilitated by Ammar al-Baluchi.528 The second report described the reporting of lyman Faris, who was in FBI custody, on a plot to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge and exploration of plans to derail trains and conduct an attack in Washington, D.C.529 KSM, whom detention site personnel described as "boxed in" by the new reporting,530 then stated that Uzhair's father, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha, had agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States.531 As described

¶[Redacted] 10941 (221506Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10950 (222127Z MAR 03). One cable from DETENTION SITE BLUE hypothesized that KSM was lying in order to force the CIA interrogators to apply the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: "[T]he enhanced measures resulting from his lying in [sic] details could be a resistance strategy to keep the interrogation from threatening issues... [KSM's] apparent willingness to provoke and incur the use of enhanced measures may represent a calculated strategy to either: (A) redirect the course of the interrogation; or (B) to attempt to cultivate some doubt that he had knowledge of any current or future operations against the US." See [Redacted] 10950 (222127Z MAR 03).

[10950 [Redacted] (222127Z MAR 03) ] 10942(2216102^1AR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 10948 (2221017. MAR 03),

¶disseminated as [Redacted]

10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 12095 (222049Z JUN 03) 12558 (041938Z AUG 03) [Redacted] 31148 (171919Z DEC 05); [Redacted] [31147 (171919Z DEC 05), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); 110972 (241122Z MAR 03) [Redacted] 10974 (241834Z MAR 03); 110983 (242321Z MAR 03)

¶' See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifuliah Paracha.

113890 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 10984 (242351Z MAR 03) [Redacted] ( 2 4 2 2 2 6 Z M A R T ) [Redacted] l 0 9 8 3 (24232 IZ MAR 03) [10983 (24232 IZ MAR 03) [Redacted] 10984 (24235IZ MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted]

¶elsewhere in this summary, the purported parties to the agreement denied that such an agreement existed.⁵³²⁵³² According to one cable, KSM did not volunteer the purported smuggling plot, but rather was asked about it by interrogators. (See ALEC [Redacted] (052230Z MAY 03). All parties to the purported plot - Paracha and Ammafal- Baluchi - denied any agreement had been reached. DIRECTOR [Redacted] 8 1 9 2 9 Z JUN 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 39239 (301600Z M A Y 0 3 ) [Redacted] 13588 (171505Z JUL 03); III! II III! [Redacted] r r "9Z JUN 03),disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 39239 (301600Z MAY 03); ALEC [Redacted] (012248Z APR 03).) With regard to the explosives smuggling reporting, the former chief of the Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March 2003 email: "again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable knuckleheads... why 'smuggle' in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks ancUjot everything he needed right here, this may be true, but it just seems damn odd to me." See email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] to: [Redacted] i [Redacted] [Redacted] i [Redacted] subject: see highlight: again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM.Show full note In confirming Faris's reporting, KSM exhibited what the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism would later describe as an effort to "stay obvious/general" and "provide little information that might enable the US to thwart attacks."⁵³³⁵³³ [Redacted] 10985 (242351Z MAR 03). "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3,2003.

¶With the exception of sleep deprivation, which continued for one more day, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM stopped abruptly on March 24, 2003.⁵³⁴⁵³⁴ Sleep deprivation was extended for an additional day, although it was interrupted by "catnapping." See [Redacted] 10999 (260835Z MAR 03). There are no CIA records directing the interrogation team to cease using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, nor any contemporaneous documentation explaining the decision⁵³⁵⁵³⁵ For additional details, see KSM detainee review in Volume III.

4. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information

¶On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding or lying about terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States. It also identified contradictions between KSM's reporting on CBRN and other sources.⁵³⁶⁵³⁶ "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003.

¶On April 24, 2003, FBI Director Robert Mueller began seeking direct FBI access to KSM in order to better understand CIA reporting indicating threats to U.S. cities.⁵³⁷⁵³⁷ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted]; cc: James L. Pavitt; [Redacted] J°h n H. Moseman; Jose Rodriguez; [Redacted] [Redacted] |; subject: Mueller's Interest in FBI Access to KSM; date: April 24,2003, at 10:59:53 AM. Despite personal commitments from DCI Tenet to Director Mueller that access would be forthcoming, the CIA's CTC successfully formulated a CIA position whereby the FBI would not be provided access to KSM until his anticipated transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Neither the CIA nor the FBI knew at the time that the transfer would not occur until September 2006.⁵³⁸⁵³⁸ Memorandum for: James L. Pavitt; [Redacted] Jose Rodriguez; [Redacted] [Redacted] from: [Redacted] subject: Update: Director Mueller - DCI Tenet Conversation on KSM; date: June 4, 2003, at 05:47:32 PM. Note for: James L. Pavitt; from: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] Jose Rodriguez, [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Director Mueller Plans to Call DCI on KSM Issue; date: May 21, 2003, at 08:40:22 PM. In addition to the FBI, senior CIA officers, including CTC's representatives to the FBI, complained about the limitations on the dissemination of intelligence derived from CIA interrogations and the impact those limitations had on counterterrorism analysis. The CTC's representative to the FBI described this to the OIG as a "serious concern." He stated that the compartmentation of interrogation information [Redacted] resulted in delays in dissemination that could result in information being "missed." He also stated that the CIA's compartmentation of information prevented him from providing to the FBI "some insight into the value/credibility of intelligence reports." (See interview of [Redacted] by [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, August 18, 2003.) Among the other CIA officers expressing these concerns were the deputy chief of CTC's Al- Qa'ida Department, who told the OIG that limited access to operational traffic "has had an impact on [analysts'] full knowledge of activities, and thus their analysis." (See [Redacted] Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Center Al-Qa'ida Department; July 28,2003.) The Director of Analysis at CTC described analysts' limited access to information as a "continuing problem." (See August 18, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with Counterterrorism Center, Director of Analysis, Office of the Inspector General.) The CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence told the OIG that limitations on the dissemination of operational information prevented the "full cadre of analysts" from reviewing the intelligence and that, as a result, "we're losing analytic ability to look at [foreign intelligence] in a timely manner." See interview of [Redacted] [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 12,2003.Show full note

¶Between April 2003 and July 2003, KSM frustrated the CIA on a number of fronts. On May 7, 2003, after more than two months of conflicting reporting, ALEC Station concluded that KSM "consistently wavers" on issues of UBL's location, protectors, and hosts, and that his information "conveniently lack[s] sufficient detail [to be] actionable intelligence."⁵³⁹⁵³⁹ ALEC [Redacted] 7 2 0 0 2 Z MAY 03) On June 12, 2003, CIA Headquarters indicated that it "remained] highly suspicious that KSM is withholding, exaggerating, misdirecting, or outright fabricating information on CBRN issues."⁵⁴⁰⁵⁴⁰ D I R E C T O [Redacted] (121550Z JUN 03) At the end of April 2003, KSM was shown pictures of the recently captured Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, after which he provided additional information related to their plotting in Karachi.⁵⁴¹⁵⁴¹ [Redacted] (301710Z APR 03); [Redacted] 11448 (301141Z APR 03) ALEC Station wrote in a May 20, 2003, cable that "[w]e consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] information to be a serious concern, especially as this omission may well have cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been diligent in following up on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, and other probable operatives involved in the attack plans."⁵⁴²⁵⁴² ALE[Redacted] (022012Z MAY 03). See information in this summary and Volume II on the "Karachi Plot" for additional information.

¶I n May and June 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash provided reporting that contradicted KSM's statements about the Heathrow Airport plotting and included information that KSM had not provided.⁵⁴³⁵⁴³ See detainee reviews for Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in Volume III for additional information on the reporting the detainees provided. 11 ii 11111 [Redacted] I ii I II i After KSM was confronted with this reporting, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] wrote in an email, "OK, that's it... yet again he lies and ONLY ADMITS details when he knows we know them from someone else."⁵⁴⁴⁵⁴⁴ Memorandum for: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] from: [Redacted] subject: Action detainee branch; date: June 12, 2003 (emphasis in the original). On April 19, 2003, KSM was questioned for the first time about summer 2002 reporting from Masran bin Arshad, who was in the custody of a foreign government, regarding the "Second Wave" plot. Informed that bin Arshad had been detained, KSM stated, "I have forgotten about him, he is not in my mind at all."⁵⁴⁵⁵⁴⁵ [Redacted] 1319 (191445Z APR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] In response, ALEC Station noted that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."⁵⁴⁶⁵⁴⁶ A L E C [Redacted] 2 2 1 5 3 Z A P R 03) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ In June 2003, almost three months after the CIA had stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, senior ALEC Station and RDG officers met at least twice to discuss concerns about KSM's lack of cooperation.⁵⁴⁷⁵⁴⁷ cc: [Redacted] [Redacted], [REDACTED], Email [Redacted]JoH[Redacted] I [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted], [REDACTED]; subject: Khallad & KSM Detainee Case Discussion; date: June 18, 2003, at 10:09 AM; ALEC [Redacted] 0 2 2 5 8 Z JUN 03). As an ALEC Station cable noted at the time, "KSM's pattern of behavior over the past three months, trying to control his environment, lying and then admitting things only when pressed that others have been caught and have likely admitted the plot, is a cause for concern."⁵⁴⁸⁵⁴⁸ A L E C [Redacted] 0 2 2 5 8 Z J U N 03) In an email, one CIA officer noted that "what KSM's doing is fairly typical of other detainees... KSM, Khallad [bin Attash], and others are doing what makes sense in their situation - pretend cooperation."⁵⁴⁹⁵⁴⁹ [Redacted] Email f r o m [Redacted] to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Re: KSM's passive restraint - please let me know if you have comments for a memo to the DCI; date: June 24,2003, at 1:27:06 PM. the fall of 2003, after KSM's explanations about how to decrypt phone numbers related to British operative Issa al-Britani (KSM did not identify the operative as "Issa al-Hindi," or by his true name, Dhiren Barot) yielded no results, and after KSM misidentified another individual, known not to be Issa, as Issa, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [Redacted] stated in an email that KSM was "obstructing our ability to acquire good information," noting that KSM "misidentifie[s] photos when he knows we are fishing" and "misleads us on telephone numbers."⁵⁵⁰⁵⁵⁰ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Email from: to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [ R E D A C T E D ] ~ [Redacted] subject: KSM and Kliallad Issues; date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM. Later, after KSM's transfer to DETENTION SITE BLACK, ALEC Station wrote that KSM "may never be fully forthcoming and honest" on the topic of UBL's whereabouts.⁵⁵¹⁵⁵¹ A L E C [Redacted] 1 1 9 3 2 Z NOV 03) Despite repeated challenges, KSM maintained that he lacked information on UBL's location.⁵⁵²⁵⁵² [Redacted] 10400 (161754Z NOV 03). KSM, who was with Ayman al-Zawahiri the day before his March 1, 2003, capture, first informed the CIA of this fact more than a month later, on April 3, 2003. See [Redacted] 11139 (051956Z APR 03). 11 II 11111 [Redacted] I II I II

95 96

¶K S M w a s transferred to DETENTION SITE [Redacted] [Redacted] on I

553 [Redacted] — 554

¶[Redacted] 2005, to DETENTION SITE BROWN on March 2006, and to U.S. military detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on September 5, 2006.⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵ [Redacted] [Redacted] 12214 [Redacted] (050539Z SEP 06) The CIA disseminated 831 intelligence reports from the interrogations of KSM over a period of 3.5 years. While KSM provided more intelligence reporting than any other CIA detainee (nearly 15 percent of all CIA detainee intelligence reporting), CIA records indicate that KSM also received the most intelligence requirements and attention from CIA interrogators, debriefers, analysts, and senior CIA leadership. Further, as noted, a significant amount of the disseminated intelligence reporting from KSM that the CIA identified as important threat reporting was later identified as fabricated.⁵⁵⁶⁵⁵⁶ See KSM detainee review in Volume IIL