F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition to CIA Custody

¶As early as September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was assessed by the CIA to be a facilitator for the September 11, 2001, attacks and an associate of the 9/11 hijackers.³⁸⁹³⁸⁹ ALEC (222334Z SEP 01); [Redacted] 5 3 7 (15SEP 01) While targeting another terrorist, Hassan Ghul, [Redacted] Pakistani officials unexpectedly captured bin al-Shibh during raids in Pakistan on September 11, 2002.³⁹⁰³⁹⁰ [Redacted] ALEC (292345Z AUG 0 2 ) - A L E [Redacted] (111551Z SEP 02). Tire CIA represented to policymakers and others- inaccurately—that "as a result of the use of EITs" Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh that played a "key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh." See section of this summary on the "Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" and Volume 11 for additional details.Show full note On September [Redacted] 2002, bin al-Shibh was rendered to a foreign government, [Redacted] 3 9 1 Approximately five months later, on February [Redacted] 2003, bin al-Shibh was rendered from the custody of [Redacted] to CIA custody, becoming the 41st CIA detainee.392

¶As with Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, personnel at CIA Headquarters—often in ALEC Station—overestimated the information bin al-Shibh would have access to within al-Qa'ida, writing that bin al-Shibh "likely has critical information on upcoming attacks and locations of senior al-Qa'ida operatives."³⁹³³⁹³ ALEC [Redacted] (130206Z SEP 02); ALEC [Redacted] (222334Z SEP 01); [Redacted] 92557 (15SEP01); ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] 97470 | (270132Z JUL 02); ( 2 8 1 3 1 7 2 M A R 02> Later, after bin al-Shibh was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for an estimated 34 days, the CIA's ALEC Station concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior member of al-Qa'ida and was not in a position to know details about al-Qa'ida's plans for future attacks.³⁹⁴³⁹⁴ ALEC (302240Z JUN 05) In another parallel, officers at CIA Headquarters requested and directed the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh when CIA detention site personnel recommended ending such measures.³⁹⁵³⁹⁵ [Redacted] ALEC I (131444Z FEB 03)

¶Ramzi bin al-Shibh was initially interrogated by a foreign government.³⁹⁶³⁹⁶ ALEC [Redacted] J i 5 5 1 Z S E P i 0 2 ) While officers at CIA Headquarters were dissatisfied with the intelligence production from his five months of detention in foreign government custody, CIA officers in that country were satisfied with bin al-Shibh's reporting.³⁹⁷³⁹⁷ D I R E C T O [Redacted] [Redacted] DEC 02) Those CIA officers wrote that bin al- Shibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow Airport ancUtLNashiri's planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The CIA officers [Redacted] [in-country] also noted that they found bin al-Shibh's information to be generally accurate and that they "found few cases whereheopenly/clearly misstated facts."³⁹⁸³⁹⁸ 122888 (240845Z FEB 03) [Redacted] In a cable to CIA Headquarters, the CIA officers in [Redacted] [the country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was being held] concluded, "overall, he provided what was needed." The same cable stated that bin al-Shibh's interrogation was similar to other interrogations they had participated in, and that the most effective interrogation tool was having information available to confront him when he tried to mislead or provide incomplete information.³⁹⁹³⁹⁹ 122888 (240845Z FEB 03) Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005 that the most significant intelligence derived from bin al-Shibh was obtained during his detention in foreign government custody, which was prior to his rendition to CIA custody and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.⁴⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰ According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the "most significant" reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh on potential future attacks was background information related to al-Qa'ida's plans to attack Heathrow Airport. According to the CIA, Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided "useful intelligence," including an "overview of the plot" that was then used in the inteiTogation of other detainees. (See ALEC [Redacted] (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the majority of this information in mid-October 2002, while in foreign government custody. See CIA [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]Show full note

2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Template for Future Detainees

¶Despite the aforementioned assessments from CIA officers in

¶[Redacted] i mi' i 111111,1 • Inn al-Shibh's cooperation, officers at CIA Headquarters decided the CIA should obtain [Redacted] custody of bin al-Shibh and render him to DETENTION SITE BLUE in

¶[Redacted]01 Country [Redacted] On February [Redacted] 2003, in anticipation of bin al-Shibh's arrival, interrogators at the detention site, led by the CIA's chief interrogator, [Redacted] prepared an interrogation plan for bin al-Shibh.⁴⁰²⁴⁰² 1103611 [Redacted] [Redacted] The plan became a template, and subsequent requests to CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against other detainees relied upon near identical language.⁴⁰³⁴⁰³ This included Khaled Shaykh Mohammed [Redacted] 10654 (030904Z MAR 03)); Hambali [Redacted] [Redacted] 1310 (101825Z SEP 03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri [Redacted] [Redacted] Abd al-Latif al- B a r [Redacted] 3 4 8 [Redacted] ; Hambali and [Redacted] (152049Z A U G Mil M i l l [Redacted] 10361 10361

¶3%

¶The interrogation plan proposed that immediately following the psychological and medical assessments conducted upon his arrival, bin al-Shibh would be subjected to "sensory dislocation."404 The proposed sensory dislocation included shaving bin al- Shibh's head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white lights, keeping him "unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool temperatures," and shackling him "hand and foot with arms outstretched over his head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed to support his weight with his arms)."405 Contrary to CIA representations made later to the Committee that detainees were always offered the opportunity to cooperate before being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the plan stated that bin al-Shibh would be shackled nude with his arms overhead in a cold room prior to any discussion with interrogators or any assessment of his level of cooperation⁴⁰⁶⁴⁰⁶ 10361 [Redacted]. See Volume 11 for detailed information on CIA representations to Con; According to a cable, only after the interrogators determined that his "initial resistance level [had] been diminished by the conditions" would the questioning and interrogation phase begin.⁴⁰⁷⁴⁰⁷ 10361 [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶The interrogation phase described in the plan included near constant interrogations, as well as continued sensory deprivation, a liquid diet, and sleep deprivation. In addition, the interrogation plan stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would be used, including the "attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap... the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh's] level of resistance."⁴⁰⁸⁴⁰⁸ 10361

¶Based on versions of this interrogation plan, at least six detainees were stripped and shackled nude, placed in the standing position for sleep deprivation, or subjected to other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an interrogator in 2003⁴⁰⁹⁴⁰⁹ This included Asadullah (DIRECTOR [Redacted] i [Redacted] FEB 03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri [Redacted] 135558 [Redacted] [Redacted] MAR 03)); Suleiman Abdullali [Redacted] 35787 i [Redacted] MAR 03); [Redacted] |36023 [Redacted] P R 0 3 ) ) ; Abu Hudhaifa [Redacted] 138576 |MAY [Redacted] 03)); Hambali [Redacted] AUG 03)); and Majid Khan [Redacted] 6 4 7 1 ( 2 4 1 2 4 2 Z M A Y [Redacted] 3 9 0 7 7 (271719Z MAY 03)).Show full note Five of these detainees were shackled naked in the standing position with their hands above their head immediately after their medical check⁴¹⁰⁴¹⁰ For additional information, see Volume III. In an April 12,2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, Senator Levin asked the CIA Director if die CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[prolonged stress standing position, naked, armfs] chained above the head..." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs, and nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator." Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing Transcript, dated April 12,2007 (DTS #2007-3158). [Redacted] 11111111111 m i M iii iShow full note These interrogation

03)); Hassan Gliul ( [Redacted] 1267 [Redacted] ; Adnan al-Libi [Redacted] — 1758

¶[Redacted] and AL-TURKI [Redacted] 2179| [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] plans typically made no reference to the information the interrogators sought and why the detainee was believed to possess the information.⁴¹¹⁴¹¹ See Volume IE for additional information.

3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was Cooperative

¶When CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE assessed that bin al-Shibh was cooperative and did not have additional knowledge of future attacks⁴¹²⁴¹² [Redacted] 10452 (121723Z FEB 03) CIA Headquarters disagreed and instructed the interrogators to continue using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which failed to elicit the information sought by CIA Headquarters.⁴¹³⁴¹³ ALEC [Redacted] (131444Z FEB 03) On Febinary 11, 2003, interrogators asked CIA Headquarters for questions that ALEC Station was "85 percent certain [bin al-Shibh ] will be able to answer," in order to verify bin al-Shibh's level of cooperation⁴¹⁴⁴¹⁴ 414 [Redacted] 10446 (111754Z FEB 03). The Committee was informed that the CIA's standard practice during coercive interrogations was to ask questions to which interrogators already knew the answers in order to assess the detainee's level of cooperation. Hie Committee was further informed that only after detainees were assessed to be cooperative did interrogators ask questions whose answers were unknown to the CIA. See, for example, Transcript of SSCHIearing, April 12, 2007 (testimony of CIA Director Michael Hayden) (DTS #2007-3158).Show full note The interrogators stated that information from Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri suggested that bin al-Shibh would not have been given a new assignment or trusted with significant information given his high-profile links to the September 11, 2001, attacks.⁴¹⁵⁴¹⁵ [Redacted] 10452 (121723Z FEB 03). In June 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh participated with KSM in an interview with the al-Jazeera television network on the 9/11 attacks. DIRECTOR [Redacted] (112136Z SEP 02). They further stated that bin al-Shibh had "achieved substantial notoriety after 11 September," but was still unproven in al-Qa'ida circles and may have "been privy to information more as a bystander than as an active participant."⁴¹⁶⁴¹⁶ [Redacted] 10452 (121723Z FEB 03)

¶The CIA's ALEC Station disagreed with the assessment of the detention site personnel, responding that it did not believe the portrayals of bin al-Shibh offered by Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin al- Shibh must have actionable information due to his proximity to KSM and CIA Headquarters' belief that bin al-Shibh had a history of withholding information from interrogators. ALEC Station wrote:

"As base [DETENTION SITE BLUE] is well aware, Ramzi had long been deliberately withholding and/or providing misleading information to his interrogators in [a foreign government].... From our optic, it is imperative to focus Ramzi exclusively on two issues: 1) What are the next attacks planned for the US and 2) Who and where are the operatives inside the United States."⁴¹⁷⁴¹⁷ ALEC [Redacted] (131444Z FEB 03). Contrary to the statement in the CIA cable, as described, CIA officers in the country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was held prior to being rendered to CIA custody wrote that Ramzi bin al-Shibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential

¶The ALEC Station cable stated that bin al-Shibh had "spent extensive time with [KSM]," and "must have heard discussions of other targets." The cable added that "HQS strongly believes that Binalshibh was involved in efforts on behalf of KSM to identify and place operatives in the West." The February 13, 2003, cable concluded:

"We think Binalshibh is uniquely positioned to give us much needed critical information to help us thwart large-scale attacks inside the United States, and we want to do our utmost to get it as soon as possible. Good luck."⁴¹⁸⁴¹⁸ ALEC [Redacted] (131444Z FEB 03) ^ ^ ^

¶CIA officers at DETENTION SITE BLUE therefore continued to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh for approximately three additional weeks after this exchange, including sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial holds, attention grasps, abdominal slaps, facial slaps, and walling⁴¹⁹⁴¹⁹ See, for example, [Redacted] [Redacted] 10525 (200840Z FEB 03) and [Redacted] 10573 (241143Z FEB 03). For further detail, see the detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III. Bin al-Shibh did not provide the information sought on "operatives inside the United States" or "large-scale attacks inside the United States."⁴²⁰⁴²⁰ See detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume ID for additional information.

4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody of a Foreign Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed As "Sir" and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain

¶c i a r e c o r d s indicate that the CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE questioning Ramzi bin al-Shibh were unaware of the intelligence bin al-Shibh had previously provided in foreign government custody, even though [Redacted] [Redacted] a n d ^ intelligence from those interrogations had been disseminated by the CIA. On multiple occasions, personnel at the detention site drafted intelligence reports that contained information previously disseminated from interrogations of bin al-Shibh while he was in foreign government custody, under the faulty understanding that bin al-Shibh was providing new information.⁴²¹⁴²¹ See, for example, CIA [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] ( d [Redacted] i n g the foreign government's interrogators' "plan to ask Binalshibh to clarify his statements that Mohamed Atta, Marwan el-Shehhi, anc^iadJarrah could not agree on the wisdom of targeting nuclear facilities"); [Redacted] 10568 (231514Z FEB 03); [Redacted] 20817 [Redacted] [Redacted] CIA [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] m i 11111 [Redacted]Show full note future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow airport and al-Nashiri's planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The [Redacted] CIA officers in that country also noted that diey found Ramzi bin al-Sliibh's information to be generally accurate, and that they "found few cases where he openly/clearly misstated facts." The CIA officers in [Redacted] concluded, "overall, [Ramzi bin al-Shibh] provided what was needed." See [Redacted] 22888 (240845Z FEB 03).

¶Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA interrogators used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for behavior adjustment purposes, in response to perceived disrespect, and on several occasions, before bin al-Shibh had an opportunity to respond to an interrogator's questions or before a question was asked. The CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were applied when bin al-Shibh failed to address an interrogator as "sir," when interrogators noted bin al-Shibh had a "blank stare" on his face, and when bin al- Shibh complained of stomach pain.⁴²²⁴²² [Redacted] 10582 (242026Z FEB 03); [Redacted] 10627 (281949Z FEB 03) Further, despite CIA policy at the time to keep detainees under constant light for security purposes, bin al-Shibh was kept in total darkness to heighten his sense of fear.⁴²³⁴²³ 10521 (191750Z FEB 03). The cable referred to keeping bin al-Shibh in darkness as a "standard interrogation technique." The same cable states that during the night of February 18, 2003, the light went out in bin al-Shibh's cell and that "[w]hen security personnel arrived to replace the bulb, bin al-Shibh was cowering in the corner, shivering. Security personnel noted that he appeal ed relieved as soon as die light was replaced."Show full note

¶CIA psychological assessments of bin al-Shibh were slow to recognize the onset of psychological problems brought about, according to later CIA assessments, by bin al-Shibh's long-term social isolation and his anxiety that the CIA would return to using its enhanced interrogation techniques against him. The symptoms included visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm⁴²⁴⁴²⁴ [Redacted] 1759 (021319Z OCT 04); H E A D Q U A R T E R [Redacted] 0 4 0 0 2 3 Z NOV 05); [Redacted] 1890 (171225Z NOV 04); [Redacted] (140915Z NOV 04); [Redacted] 3 0 (061620Z DEC 04); [Redacted] 2207 (111319Z APR 0 5 X [Redacted] 0 ( 1 4 1 5 0 7 Z APR 0 5 ) [Redacted] 2535 (051805Z JUL 05); [Redacted] 8 9 ( 1 2 0 8 5 7 Z J U L 0 5 [Redacted] 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); [Redacted] 9 0 (171225Z NOV 0 4 h [Redacted] 9 3 ( 2 0 0 8 3 1 Z NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 4 1 5 0 7 Z APR 05); [Redacted] 1 8 0 5 Z JUL 05); [Redacted] 221Q (141507Z A P R 0 5 ) [Redacted] 5 3 5 (051805Z J U L 0 5 ) [Redacted] 8 3 0 (291304Z A U G 0 5 ) ; [Redacted] 1930 (061620Z DEC [Redacted] 2210 (141507Z APR 05)Show full note In April 2005, a CIA psychologist stated that bin al-Shibh "has remained in social isolation" for as long as two and half years and the isolation was having a "clear and escalating effect on his psychological functioning." The officer continued, "in [bin al-Shibh's] case, it is important to keep in mind that he was previously a relatively high-functioning individual, making his deterioration over the past several months more alarming."⁴²⁵⁴²⁵ 2210 (141507Z APR 05) The psychologist wrote, "significant alterations to RBS'[s] detention environment must occur soon to prevent further and more serious psychological disturbance."⁴²⁶⁴²⁶ [Redacted] 2210 (141507Z APR 05) On September 5, 2006, bin al-Shibh was transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba⁴²⁷⁴²⁷ HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (031945Z SEP 06)_ After his arrival, bin al-Shibh was placed on anti-psychotic medications⁴²⁸⁴²⁸ [Redacted] [Redacted] SITE DAILY REPORT - 24 MAY 07: [Redacted] 18904 (182103Z APR 08)

¶G F S [Redacted] N F ) The CIA disseminated 109 intelligence reports from the CIA interrogations of Ramzi bin al-Shibh⁴²⁹⁴²⁹ See Volume II for additional information. A CIA assessment, which included intelligence from his time in foreign government custody, as well as his reporting in CIA custody before, during, and after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,⁴³⁰⁴³⁰ Ramzi bin al-Shibh was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE BLUE. concluded that:

"Much of [bin al-Shibh's] statements on the 11 September attacks have been speculative, and many of the details could be found in media accounts of the attacks that appeared before he was detained. In the few instances where his reporting was unique and plausible, we cannot verify or refute the information... he has been sketchy on some aspects of the 9/11 plot, perhaps in order to downplay his role in the plot. His information on individuals is non- specific; he has given us nothing on the Saudi hijackers or others who played a role... The overall quality of his reporting has steadily declined since 2003."⁴³¹⁴³¹ ALEC [Redacted] (302240Z JUN 05)