Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program · 2014
K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court
K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court
/. ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department of Defense Official Informs the CIA that the U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to Disappear"; the CIA Provides Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the Department of Defense
In January 2004, the ICRC sent a letter to [Redacted] [Redacted] indicating that it was aware that the United States Government was holding
¶unacknowledged detainees in several facilities in Country [Redacted] "incommunicado for extensive periods of time, subjected to unacceptable conditions of internment, to ill treatment and torture, while deprived of any possible recourse."706 January 6,2004, Letter from [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] According to the CIA, the letter included a "fairly complete list" of CIA detainees to whom the ICRC had not had access.707 HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] This prompted CIA Headquarters to conclude that it was necessary to reduce the number of detainees in CIA custody.708 HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] The CIA subsequently transferred at least 25 of its detainees in Country [Redacted] to the U.S. military and foreign governments. The CIA also released five detainees.709 [Redacted] See, for example, D I R E C T [Redacted] [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] 1696 [Redacted] I [Redacted] [Redacted]; DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted]; HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] I; HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 123081 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 12335 [Redacted] [Redacted] |1001| [Redacted]
120¶The CIA provided a factually incorrect description to the Department of Defense concerning one of the 18 CIA detainees transferred to U.S. military custody in March 2004. The transfer letter described CIA detainee Ali Jan as "the most trusted bodyguar(U)f Jaluluddin Haqqani (a top AQ target of the USG)" who was captured in the village of [Redacted] orUun^[Redacted] 2002.710 March 4, 2004, Letter from Jose Rodriguez, Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center to Thomas O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. Although there was an individual named Ali Jan captured in the village of [Redacted] June [Redacted] 2002 i 7 ^CIArecords indicate that he was not the detainee being held by the CIA in the Country [Redacted] facility. The Ali Jan in CIA custody was apprehended circa early August 2003, during the U.S. military operation [Redacted] in Zormat Valley, Paktia Province, Afghanistan.712 12296(101709Z [Redacted] CIA records indicate that Ali Jan was transferred to CIA custody after his satellite phone rang while he was in military custody, and the translator indicated the caller was speaking in Arabic.713 [Redacted] 2296(101709Z After his transfer to U.S. military custody, Ah Jan was eventually released on July [Redacted] 2004.714 Details in June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale.
¶In response to the ICRC's formal complaint about detainees being kept in Country [Redacted] without ICRC access, State Department officials met with senior ICRC officials in Geneva, and indicated that it was U.S. policy to encourage all countries to provide ICRC access to detainees, including Country [Redacted] 7 1 5 While the State Department made these official representations to the ICRC, the CIA was repeatedly directing the same country to deny the ICRC access to the CIA detainees. In June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S. ambassador in that countmcMlehverademarche, "in essence demanding [the country] provide full access to all [country [Redacted] detainees," which included detainees being held at the CIA's behest.715 [Redacted] 2348 [Redacted] These conflicting messages from the United States Government, as well as increased ICRC pressure on the country for failing to provide access, created significant tension between the United States and the country in question.717 For more information, see Volume I.
¶Later that year, in advance of a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting on September 14, 2004, officials from the Department of Defense called the CIA to inform the CIA that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz would not support the CIA's position that notifying the ICRC of all detainees in U.S. Government custody would harm U.S. national security. According to an internal CIA email following the call, the deputy secretary of defense had listened to the CIA's arguments for nondisclosure, but believed that it was time for full notification. The email stated that the Department of Defense supported the U.S. Government's position that there should be full disclosure to the ICRC, unless there were compelling reasons of military necessity or national security. The email added that the Department of Defense did not believe an adequate articulation of military necessity or national security reasons warranting nondisclosure existed, that "DoD is tired of 'taking hits' for CIA 'ghost detainees,'" and that the U.S. government "should not be in the position of causing people to 'disappear.'"718 [Redacted] Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] Jose Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD's position on ICRC notification; date: September 13, 2004.
121¶Despite numerous meetings and communications within the executive branch throughout 2004, the United States did not formally respond to the January 6, 2004, ICRC letter until June 13, 2005.719 June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale.
2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program "Imbalanced and Inaccurate, " Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to Limit Further Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General
¶The CIA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was first informed of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in November 2002, nine months after Abu Zubaydah became the CIA's first detainee. As described, the information was conveyed by the DDO, who also informed the OIG of the death of Gul Rahman. In January 2003, the DDO further requested that the OIG investigate allegations of unauthorized interrogation techniques against 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Separately, the OIG "received information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights," according to the OIG's Special Review.720 Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, (DTS #2004-2710).
¶During the course of the OIG's interviews, numerous CIA officers expressed concerns about the CIA's lack of preparedness for the detention and interrogation of Abu Zubaydah.721 The chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site told the OIG that "[t]he Reports Officers did not know what was required of them, analysts were not knowledgeable of the target, translators were not native Arab speakers, and at least one of the [chiefs of Base] had limited fieldexperience/\Sec Interview report of [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 20, 2003. According to [Redacted] of CTC Legal, there was no screening procedure in place for officers assigned to DETENTION SITE GREEN. See interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED, Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003. See also interview of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, March 24,2003. Other CIA officers expressed concern about the analytical assumptions driving interrogations,722 In addition to the statements to the OIG described above, regarding the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, CIA officers expressed more general concerns. As [Redacted] noted, the assumptions at CIA Headquarters that Abu Zubaydah "knew everything about Al-Qa'ida, including details of the next attack" reflected liow "the 'Analyst vs. Interrogator' issue ha[d] been around from 'day one."' {See interview o f [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, February 27, 2003.) According to Chief of InteiTogati[Redacted]ubject matter experts often provided interrogation requirements that were "not valid or well thought out," providing the example of Mustafa al-Hawsawi. (See interview o f [Redacted] f i c ^ ^ h ^ n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , April 7, 2003.) Senior CIA m i 11 i n i [Redacted] i mi inn i Inspector General, May 29, 2003. as well as the lack of language and cultural background among members of the interrogation teams.723 One interviewee noted that several interrogators with whom he had worked insisted on conducting interrogations in English to demonstrate their dominance over the detainee. (See interview report o [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, March 17, 2003.) The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "[t]he program continued to face challenges in identifying sufficient, qualified staff -- particularly language-qualified personnel - as requirements imposedbyAgency involvement in Iraq increased." Some CIA officers described pressure from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which they attributed to faulty analytical assumptions about what detainees should know.724 According t o [Redacted] o f CTC Legal, "[t]he seventh floor [CIA leadership] can complicate the process because of the mindset that interrogations are the silver bullet [and CIA leadership is] expecting immediate results." (Setunterview [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003.) Senior Interrogator [Redacted] [Redacted] provided the example of Khallad bin Attash, who, he told the OIG, was determined by the chief of Base at DETENTIO£^ITEBLUE not to "warrant" the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. According to [Redacted] debriefer [Redacted] called ALEC Station and told them to "go to the mat" in advocating for the use of the CIA's enhancecHntem5gation techniques, claiming that bin Attash was holding back information. (See interview of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.) [Redacted] described the "inherent tension that occasionally exists between officers at the interrogation facilities and those at Headquarters who view the d e t a i n e e ^ r ^ i t h h o l d i n g information." [Redacted] provided the example of Abu Yassir al-Jaza'iri. (See interview o [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, May 8, 2003.) [Redacted] also described disagreements on whether to subject detainees to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a "field versus Headquarters issue." (See interview of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, August 18, 2003.) As described, interviewees also described pressure from CIA Headquarters related to the interrogations of KSM and Abu Zubaydah. As the chief of RDG, [Redacted]
122¶[Redacted] stated to the OIG in a February 2003 interview:
"CTC does not know a lot about al-Qa'ida and as a result, Headquarters analyst^ave constructed 'models' of what al-Qa'ida represents to them, [ [Redacted] noted that the Agency does not have the linguists or subject matter experts it needs. The questions sent from CTC/Usama bin Laden (UBL) to the interrogators are based on SIGINT [signals intelligence] and other intelligence that often times is incomplete or wrong. When the detainee does not respond to the question, the assumption at Headquarters is that the detainee is holding back and 'knows' more, and consequently, Headquarters recommends resumption of EITs. This difference of opinion between the interrogators and Headquarters as to whether the detainee is 'compliant' is the type of ongoing pressure the interrogation team is exposed to. [Redacted] believes the waterboard was used 'recklessly' - 'too many times' on Abu Zubaydah at [DETENTION SITE GREEN], based in part on faulty intelligence."725 [Redacted] Interview of Office of the Inspector General, February 21, 2003. Mil II I I I [Redacted]
¶interrogator [Redacted] told the OIG that interrogators "suffered from a lack of substantive requirements from CIA Headquarters," and that "in every case so far, Headquarters' model of what the detainee should know is flawed." [Redacted] told the OIG that "I do not want to beat a man up based on what Headquarters says he should know," commenting that, "I want my best shotonsomething he (the detainee) knows, not a fishing expedition on things he should know." (See interview of [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.) Two interviewees told the OIG tilaUequiremen ts were sometimes based on inaccurate or improperly translated intercepts, j f c ^ n t e m e w of interrogator [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, March 24, 2003; Interview of [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] [former chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site], Office of the
123¶One senior interrogator, [Redacted] informed the OIG that differences between CIA Headquarters and the interrogators at the CIA detention sites were not part of the official record. According to [Redacted] "all of the fighting and criticism is done over the phone and is not put into cables," and that CIA "[cjables reflect things that are 'all rosy.'"726 Interview [Redacted] Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.
¶As is described elsewhere, and reflected in the final OIG Special Review, CIA officers discussed numerous other topics with the OIG, including conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT, specific interrogations, the video taping of interrogations, the administration of the program, and concerns about the lack of an "end game" for CIA detainees, as well as the impact of possible public revelations concerning the existence and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.727 DDO Pavitt described possible public revelations related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program as "the CIA's worst nightmare." Interview of James Pavitt, Office of the Inspector General, September 21, 2003. According to OIG records of an interview with DCI Tenet, "Tenet believes that if the general public were to find out about this program, many would believe we are torturers." Tenet added, however, that his "only potential moral dilemma would be if more Americans die at the hands of terrorists and we had someone in our custody who possessed information that could have prevented deaths, but we had not obtained such information." See interview of George Tenet, Office of the Inspector General, memorandum dated, September 8,2003.
¶In January 2004, the CIA inspector general circulated for comment to various offices within the CIA a draft of the OIG Special Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Among other matters, the OIG Special Review described divergences between the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as applied and as described to the Department of Justice in 2002, the use of unauthorized techniques, and oversight problems related to DETENTION SITE COBALT. The draft OIG Special Review elicited responses from the CIA's deputy director for operations, the deputy director for science and technology, the Office of General Counsel, and the Office of Medical Services. Several of the responses— particularly those from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller and CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt—were highly critical of the inspector general's draft Special Review. General Counsel Muller wrote that the OIG Special Review presented "an imbalanced and inaccurate picture of the Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," and claimed the OIG Special Review, "[o]n occasion," "quoted or summarized selectively and misleadingly" from CIA documents.728 See CIA Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation Program Special Review, dated February 24, 2004 (2003-7123-IG). 11(11111111 mi 11 iii i [Redacted] Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt wrote that the OIG Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," and that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our successes." Pavitt attached to his response a document describing information the CIA obtained "as a result of the lawful use of EITs" that stated, "[t]he evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties."729 Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. A review of CIA records found that the representations in the Pavitt materials were almost entirely inaccurate.730 p o r a ddit] o n a i information, see Volume II.
124¶Edition to conveying inaccurate information on the operation, management, and effectiveness of the CIA program, CIA leadership continued to impede the OIG in its efforts to oversee the program. In July 2005, Director Goss sent a memorandum to the inspector general to "express several concerns regarding the in-depth, multi-faceted review" of the CIA's CTC. The CIA director wrote that he was "increasingly concerned about the cumulative impact of the OIG's work on CTC's performance," adding that "I believe it makes sense to complete existing reviews... before opening new ones." Director Goss added, "[t]o my knowledge, Congress is satisfied that you are meeting its requirements" with regard to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.731 July 21, 2005, Memorandum for Inspector General from Porter J. Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency re: New IG Work Impacting the CounterTerrorism Center. At the time, however, the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was seeking a Committee investigation of the CIA program, in part because of the aspects of the program that were not being investigated by the Office of Inspector General.732 Transcript of business meeting, April 14, 2005 (DTS #2005-2810). In April 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden had his "Senior Councilor"—an individual within the CIA who was accountable only to the CIA director— conduct a review of the inspector general's practices. Defending the decision to review the OIG, the CIA told the Committee that there were "morale issues that the [CIA] director needs to be mindful of," and that the review had uncovered instances of "bias" among OIG personnel against the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.733 Committee Memorandum for the Record, "Staff Briefing with Bob Deitz on his Inquiry into the Investigative Practices of the CIA Inspector General," October 17, 2007 (DTS #2007-4166); Committee Memorandum for the Record, "Notes from Meetings with John Helgerson and Bob Deitz in late 2007 and early 2008" (DTS #2012-4203); Committee Memorandum for the Record, "Staff Briefing with CIA Inspector General John Helgerson" (DTS #2007- 4165). In 2008, the CIA director announced the results of his review of the OIG to the CIA work force and stated that the inspector general had "chosen to take a number of steps to heighten the efficiency, assure the quality, and increase the transparency of the investigative process."734 Letter from DCIA Michael Hayden to Senator John D. Rockefeller TV, January 29, 2008 (DTS #2008-0606). 111 ( i > ii 11111 [Redacted] "
3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
¶The final May 2004 OIG Special Review included a recommendation that the CIA's DDO conduct a study of the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques within 90 days. Prompted by the recommendation, the CIA tasked two senior CIA officers to lead "an informal operational assessment of the CIA detainee program." The reviewers were tasked with responding to 12 specific terms of reference, including an assessment of "the effectiveness of each interrogation technique and environmental deprivation" to determine if any techniques or deprivation should be "added, modified, or discontinued."735 [Redacted] May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee PrograiiL"^^^^ According to a CIA memorandum from the reviewers, their review was based on briefings by CTC personnel, "a discussion with three senior CTC managers who played key roles in running the CIA detainee program," and a review of nine documents, including the OIG Special Review and an article by the CIA contractors who developed the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Hammond DUNBAR and Grayson SWIGERT.736 [^ay 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from [Redacted] Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program." The CIA's June 2013 Response states, "[w]e acknowledge diat die Agency erred in permitting the contractors to assess the effectiveness of enhanced techniques. They should not have been considered for such a role given their financial interest in continued contracts from CIA." As described in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, these documents contained numerous inaccurate representations regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA program. There are no records to indicate the two senior CIA officers reviewed the underlying interrogation cables and intelligence records related to the representations. Their resulting assessment repeated information found in the documents provided to them and reported that the "CIA Detainee Program is a success, providing unique and valuable intelligence at the tactical level for the benefit of policymakers, war fighters, and the CIA's covert action operators." The assessment also reported that regulations and procedures for handling detainees were "adequate and clear," and that the program had responded swiftly, fairly, and completely to deviations from the structured program.737 [Redacted] May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations re Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program. For additional information, see Volume II. Nonetheless, the assessment came to the conclusion that detention and interrogations activities should not be conducted by the CIA, but by "experienced U.S. law enforcement officers," stating:
125"The Directorate of Operations (DO) should not be in the business of running prisons or 'temporary detention facilities.' The DO should focus on its core mission: clandestine intelligence operations. Accordingly, the DO should continue to hunt, capture, and render targets, and then exploit them for intelligence and ops leads once in custody. The management of their incarceration and interrogation should be conducted by appropriately experienced U.S. law enforcement officers, because that is their charter and they have the training and experience."738 May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from [Redacted] Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations re Operational Review of CIA ^ ' ™
¶The assessment noted that the CIA program required significant resources at a time when the CIA was already stretched thin. Finally, the authors wrote that they "strongly believe" that the president and congressional oversight members should receive a comprehensive update on the program, "[g]iven the intense interest and controversy surrounding the detainee issue."739 May 12, 2004 Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from [Redacted] Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations re Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program.
126¶On January 26, 2005, DCI Goss forwarded the senior officer review to Inspector General John Helgerson.740 See Volume I for additional information. The DCI asked whether the review would satisfy the inspector general recommendation for an independent review of the program.741 Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss, [Redacted]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding; OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005. On January 28, 2005, the inspector general responded that the senior officer review would not satisfy the recommendation fo^uUndependent review.742 Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,] [Redacted]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding;OIG Report; January 28, 2005. The inspector general also responded to a concern raised by [Redacted] that studying the results of CIA interrogations would amount to human experimentation, stating:
"1 fear there was a misunderstanding. OIG did not have in mind doing additional, guinea pig research on human beings. What we are recommending is that the Agency undertake a careful review of its experience to date in using the various techniques and that it draw conclusions about their safety, effectiveness, etc., that can guide CIA officers as we move ahead. We make this recommendation because we have found that the Agency over the decades has continued to get itself in messes related to interrogation programs for one overriding reason: we do not document and learn from our experience - each generation of officers is left to improvise anew, with problematic results for our officers as individuals and for our Agency. Wc are not unaware that there are subtleties to this matter, as the effectiveness of techniques varies among individuals, over time, as administered, in combination with one another, and so on. All the more reason to document these important findings."743 Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter [Redacted] Goss,] cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005. The CIA's June 2013 Response maintains that "[a] systematic study over time of the effectiveness of the techniques would have been encumbered by a number of factors," including "Federal policy on the protection of human subjects and the impracticability of establishing an effective control group."
¶[Redacted] 1° November and December 2004, the CIA responded to National Security Advisor Rice's questions about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques by asserting that an effectiveness review was not possible, while highlighting examples of "[k]ey intelligence" the CIA represented was obtained after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The December 2004 memorandum prepared for the national security advisor entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," begins:
127"Action Requested: None. This memorandum responds to your request for an independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation techniques. There is no way to conduct such a study. What we can do, however, if [sic] set forth below the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence [value]."744 December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
¶Under a section of the memorandum entitled, "Results," the CIA memo asserts that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots [and] capture additional terrorists." The memorandum then lists examples of "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," which led to "disruptefed] terrorist plots" and the "capture [of] additional terrorists." The examples include: the "Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," "the 'Second Wave'" plotting, the identification of the "the Guraba Cell," the identification of "Issa al-Hindi," the arrest of Abu Talha al-Pakistani, "Hambali's Capture," information on Jaffar al-Tayyar, the "Dirty Bomb" plot, the arrest of Sajid Badat, and information on Shkai, Pakistan. CIA records do not indicate when, or if, this memorandum was provided to the national security advisor.745 December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." Italics in original.
¶A subsequent CIA memorandum, dated March 5, 2005, concerning an upcoming meeting between the CIA director and the national security advisor on the CIA's progress in completing the OIG recommended review of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques states, "we [CIA] believe this study is much needed and should be headed up by highly respected national-level political figures with widely recognized reputations for independence and fairness."746 March 5,2005, Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor re CIA Proposal for Independent Study of the Effectiveness of CTC Interrogation Program's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques.
¶On March 21, 2005, the director of the CTC formally proposed the "establishment of an independent 'blue ribbon' commission... with a charter to s t u d ^ u ^ ^ ^ ElTs."747 March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI Counterterrorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs. The CIA then began the processofestablishing^ [Redacted]
[Redacted] and [Redacted] [Redacted] Both panelists received briefings and papers from CIA
¶personnel who participated in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. [Redacted] [the first panelist] wrote: "It is clear from our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the program is deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the overall program, are credited with enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of useful intelligence on al-Qa'ida (AQ).... There are accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD interrogations." He also observed, however, that "[n]either my background nor field of expertise particularly lend themselves to judgingtheeffectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken individually or collectively."748 to September 2, 2005 Memorandum from [Redacted] Director Porter Goss, CIA re Assessment of EITs Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II. [Redacted] [the second panelist] concluded that "there is no objective way to answer the question of efficacy," but stated it was possible to "make some general observations" about the program based on CIA personnel assessments of "the quality of the intelligence provided" by CIA detainees. Regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he wrote: "here enters the epistemological problem. We can never know whether or not this intelligence could have been extracted though alternative procedures. Spokesmen from within the organization firmly believe it could not have been."749 September 23, 2005 Memorandum from [Redacted] o the Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency re Response to Request from Director for Assessment of EIT Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II.
1284. The CIA Wrongfully Detains Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for Officer Involved
¶After the dissemination of the draft CIA Inspector General Spccial Review in early 2004, approvals from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques adhered more closely to the language of the DCI guidelines. Nonetheless, CIA records indicate that officers at CIA Headquarters continued to fail to properly monitor justifications for the capture and detention of detainees, as well as the justification for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on particular detainees.750 For additional information, see Volume III.
For [Redacted] example, on January 2004, the CIA rendered German
¶citizen Khalid al-Masri to a Country [Redacted] facility used by the CIA for detention purposes. The rendition was based on the determination by officers in the CIA's ALEC Station that "al-Masri knows key information that could assist in the capture of other al-Qa'ida operatives that pose a serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning terrorist activities."751 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] The cable did not state that Khalid al-Masri himself posed a serious threat of violence or death, the standard required for detention under the September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON).
¶CIA debriefing cables from Country [Redacted] on January 27, 2004, and January 28, 2004, note that Khalid al-Masri "seemed bewildered on why he has been sent to this particular prison,"752 753 [Redacted] [Redacted] 754 [Redacted] [Redacted] (0223412 APR 04) [Redacted] and was "adamant that [CIA] has the wrong person."753 Despite doubts from CIA officers in Country [Redacted] about Khalid al-Masri's links to terrorists, and RDG's concurrence with those doubts, different components within the CIA disagreed on the process for his release.754 As later described by the CIA inspector general, officers in ALEC Station continued to think that releasing Khalid al-Masri would pose a threat to U.S. interests and that monitoring should be required, while those in the CIA's [Redacted] Division did not want to notify the German government about the rendition of a German citizen.755 CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16,2007. Because of the significance of the dispute, the National Security Council settled the matter, concluding that al-Masri should be repatriated and that the Germans should be told about al-Masri's rendition.756 CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601 IG), July 16,2007.
129¶On May [Redacted] 2004, Khalid al-Masri was transferred from Country [Redacted] to [Redacted] 7 5 7 After al-Masri arrived [Redacted] CIA officers released him and sent him toward a fake border crossing, where the officers told him he would be sent back to Germany because he had entered [Redacted] illegally.758 [Redacted] 25071 [Redacted]655 [Redacted] At the time of his release, al-Masri was provided 14,500 Euros, as well as his belongings.760 [Redacted] 42655 [Redacted]
¶On July 16, 2007, the CIA inspector general issued a Report of Investigation on the rendition and detention of Khalid al-Masri, concluding that "|a]vailable intelligence information did not provide a sufficient basis to render and detain Khalid al-Masri," and that the "Agency's prolonged detention of al-Masri was unjustified."761 CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007. On October 9, 2007, the CIA informed the Committee that it "lacked sufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri," and that the judgment by operations officers that al-Masri was associated with terrorists who posed a threat to U.S. interests "was not supported by available intelligence." The CIA director nonetheless decided that no further action was warranted against [Redacted] then the deputy chief of ALEC Station, who advocated for al-Masri's rendition, because "[t]he Director strongly believes that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty and that, when they result from performance that meets reasonable standards, CIA leadership must stand behind the officers who make them." The notification also stated that "with regard to counterterrorism operations in general and the al-Masri matter in particular, the Director believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those that under connect them."762 Referring to [Redacted] and a second CTC officer named in the OIG's Report of Investigation, the notification to Congress stated that the director "does not believe that... the performance of the two named CTC officers fall below a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence as defined in CIA's Standard for Employee Accountability." The notification also stated that there was a "high threat environment" at the time of die rendition, which "was essentially identical to the one in which CTC employees, including the two in question here, previously had been sharply criticized for not connecting the dots prior to 9/11." The notification acknowledged "an insufficient legal justification, which failed to meet the standard prescribed in the [MON]," and referred to the acting general counsel the task of assessing legal advice and personal accountability. Based on recommendations from the inspector general, the CIA "developed a template for rendition proposals that makes clear what information is required, including the intelligence basis for that information." (See Congressional notification, with the subject, "CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri," dated October 9, 2007 (DTS #2007-4026).) The last CIA detainee, Muhammad Rahim, had already been rendered to CIA custody by the time of this n o t i f i c a t i o r ^ n i ^ I A ^ u n ^ O l ^ e s p o n s e points to a review of analytical 11111 m i 11111 [Redacted]
1305. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL Facilitator—Prior to the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
¶As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, CIA records indicate that the most accurate CIA detainee reporting on the facilitator who led to Usama bin Laden (UBL) was acquired from Hassan Ghul—prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.767 As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was cooperative prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In an interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul's initial interrogations stated, "He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset." (See December 2, 2004, interview with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, [Redacted] CIA records reveal that Ghul's information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was disseminated while Ghul was at DETENTION SITE COBALT, prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On April 16, 2013, die Council on Foreign Relations hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, "Manhunt." The forum included former CIA officer Nada Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided the critical information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to Kurdish officials prior to entering CIA custody. When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in [the] training arising out of the al-Masri rendition, but states that, "[n]onetheless, we concede that it is difficult in hindsight to understand how the Agency could make such a mistake, take too long to correct it, determine that a flawed legal interpretation contributed, and in the end only hold accountable three CTC attorneys, two of whom received only an oral admonition."
131¶Peshawar area," and that "it was well known that he was always with Abu Ahmed [al- Kuwaiti]."768 HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] AN 04) 169 AN 04) [Redacted] [Redacted] Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant,"769 770 AN 04) who couriered messages to al-Qa'ida's chief of operations, and listed al-Kuwaiti as one of three individuals likely with UBL.770 Ghul further speculated that:
"UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan.... Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL's needs, including moving messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]...."771 HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] JAN 04) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
¶During this same period, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Ghul provided information related to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Faraj al-Libi (including his role in delivering messages from UBL), Jaffar al-Tayyar, 'Abd al- Hadi al-Iraqi, Hamza Rabi'a, Shaik Sa'id al-Masri, Sharif al-Masri, Abu 'Abd al-Rahman al- Najdi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives. He also provided information on the locations, movements, operational security, and training of al-Qa'ida leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as on the visits of other leaders and operatives to Shkai.772 772 [Redacted] [Redacted] AN [Redacted] 1654 [Redacted] JAN 04); [Redacted] [Redacted] JAN 04); [Redacted] [Redacted] A N 04) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Ghul's reporting on Shkai, which was included in at least 16 of the 21 intelligence reports,773 [Redacted] [Redacted] AN 1644 AN [Redacted] [Redacted] 04); JAN [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 04); [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 1655 04); 1679 [Redacted] [Redacted] AN 04); JAN 1656 [Redacted] [Redacted] AN 04); AN 1650 [Redacted] AN 04); 1657 AN 04); AN [Redacted] 1690 [Redacted] JAN 04) confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai valley served as al-Qa'ida's command and control center after the group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.774 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date: December 30,2005, at 8:14:04 AM. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Notwithstanding these facts, in March 2005, the CIA represented to the Department of Justice that Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai was acquired "after" the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.775 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Countertenorist Center, re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. Italics in original. For additional representations, see Volume II.
¶Bakos stated: ".. .honestly, Hassan Ghul.. .when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn't locked up in a cell. He wasn't handcuffed to anything. He was—he was having a free flowing conversation. And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish papers about sort of their interpretation of the story and how forthcoming he was." (See www.cfr.org/countei1errorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560.) Given the unusually high number of intelligence reports disseminated in such a short time period, and the statements of former CIA officer Bakos, the Committee requested additional information from the CIA oil Ghul's interrogation prior to entering CIA custody. The CIA wrote on October 25, 2013: "We have not identified any information in our holdings suggesting that Hassan Gul first provided information on Abu Ahmad while in [foreign] custody." No information was provided on Hassan Ghul's intelligence reporting while in U.S. military detention. See DTS #2013-3152.
132¶After two days of questioning at DETENTION SITE COBALT and the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports, Ghul was transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK.776 AN 04) According to CIA records, upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" with plans to lower his hands after two hours.777 [Redacted] [Redacted] AN 04) The CIA interrogators at the detention site then requested to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, writing:
"[the] interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the initial contact, that his al-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift [Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The Jack of these increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner."778 A N 04) [Redacted] [Redacted] JAN 04)
¶CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day.779 JAN 04) Following 59 hours of sleep deprivation,780 JAN 04) [Redacted] [Redacted] Hassan Ghul experienced hallucinations, but was told by a psychologist that his reactions were "consistent with what many others experience in his condition," and that he should calm himself by telling himself his experiences are normal and will subside when he decides to be truthful.781 JAN 04) The sleep deprivation, as well as other enhanced interrogations, continued,782 JAN 04); [Redacted] 1312 [Redacted] JAN 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that when hallucinations occurred during sleep deprivation, "medical personnel intervened to ensure a detainee would be allowed a period of sleep." As described in this summary, and more extensively in Volume III, CIA records indicate that medical personnel did not always intervene and allow detainees to sleep after experiencing hallucinations. as did Ghul's hallucinations.783 Ghul also complained of back pain and asked to see a doctor,784 1299 [Redacted] JAN 04) [Redacted] but interrogators responded that the "pain was normal, and would stop when [Ghul] was confirmed as telling the truth." A cable states that "[interrogators told [Ghul] they did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete and truthful information."785 [ 1299 JAN 04). See Volume III for similar statements made to CIA detainees. A CIA physician assistant later observed that Hassan Ghul was experiencing "notable physiological fatigue," including "abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, 'heaviness' and mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are secondary to his hanging position and extreme degree of sleep deprivation," but that Ghul was clinically stable and had "essentially normal vital signs," despite an "occasional premature heart beat" that the cable linked to Ghul's fatigue.786 [Redacted] 1308 [Redacted] JAN 04) Throughout this period, Ghul provided no actionable threat information, and as detailed later in this summary, much of his reporting on the al-Qa'ida presence in Shkai was repetitive of his reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Ghul also provided no other information of substance on UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.787 See Volume II for additional information. Nonetheless, on May 5, 2011, the CIA provided a document to the Committee entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists Hassan Ghul as a CIA detainee who was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and who provided "Tier One" information "link[ing] Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin."788 See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). Hassan I liul i [Redacted] and later [Redacted] released.789 [Redacted] 2441 [Redacted] HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 1635 [Redacted] [1712 [Redacted] [Redacted] D Q U A R T E R S [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] ^
1336. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Officer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do Anything Like What You Have Seen " in Abu Ghraib Photographs
¶In March 2004, the CLA took custody of an Afghan national who had sought employment at a U.S. military base because he had the same name (Gul Rahman) as an individual believed to be targeting U.S. military forces in Afghanistan.791 The individual detained and the individual believed to be targeting U.S. forces were different from the Gul Rahman who died at DETENTION SITE COBALT. During the period in which the Afghan was detained, the CIA obtained signals intelligence of their true target communicating with his associates. DNA results later showed conclusively that the Afghan in custody was not the target. Nonetheless, the CIA held the detainee in solitary confinement for approximately a month before he was released with a nominal payment.792 [Redacted] 2035 [Redacted]
¶In the spring of 2004, after two detainees were transferred to CIA custody, CIA interrogators proposed, and CIA Headquarters approved, using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on one of the two detainees because it might cause the detainee to provide information that could identify inconsistencies in the other detainee's story.793 ([REDACTED]) After both detainees had spent approximately 24 hours shackled in the standing sleep deprivation position, CIA Headquarters confirmed that the detainees were former CIA sources.794 111 [Redacted] in I II M I Mil II I I [Redacted] The two detainees had tried to contact the CIA on multiple occasions prior to their detention to inform the CIA of their activities and provide intelligence. The messages they had sent to the CIA [Redacted]
134¶[Redacted] were not translated until after the detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.795 HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] ([REDACTED]). For more information on AL-TURKI and AL-MAGREBI, see Volume III.
¶During this same period in early 2004, CIA interrogators interrogated Adnan al-Libi, a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. CIA Headquarters did not approve the use of the CIA's enhanced techniques against al-Libi, but indicated that interrogators could use "standard" interrogation techniques, which included up to 48 hours of sleep deprivation.796 See Volume I and II, including H E A D Q U A R T [Redacted] [Redacted] In November 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller sent an email to [Redacted] e s t i n g "changing the sleep deprivation line a^sicUjetweer^nhanced and standard from 72 to 48 hours." (See November 23, 2003, email from Scott Muller to [Redacted] c c : John Rizzo, Subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident.) On January 10, 2004, CIA Headquarters informed CIA detention sites of the change, stating that sleep deprivation over 48 hours would now be considered an enhanced" interrogation technique. See H E A D Q U A R T E R [Redacted] 1 0 1 7 1 3 Z J A N 04). CIA interrogators subsequently reported subjecting Adnan al-Libi to sleep deprivation sessions of 46.5 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours, with a combined three hours of sleep between sessions.797 [Redacted] 1888 (09.1823Z MAR 04); [Redacted] 1889 (091836Z MAR 04). There is no indication in CIA records that CIA Headquarters addressed the repeated use of "standard" sleep deprivation against Adnan al-Libi. For more information, see Volume III detainee report for Adnan al-Libi.
¶Beginning in late April 2004, a number of media outlets published photographs of detainee abuse at the Department of Defense-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The media reports caused members of the Committee and individuals in the executive branch to focus on detainee issues. On May 12, 2004, the Committee held a lengthy hearing on detainee issues with Department of Defense and CIA witnesses. The CIA used the Abu Ghraib abuses as a contrasting reference point for its detention and interrogation activities. In a response to a question from a Committee member, CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin said, "we are not authorized in [the CIA program] to do anything like what you have seen in those photographs."798 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332). In response, a member of the Committee said, "I understand," and expressed thc understanding, consistent with past CIA briefings to the Committee, that the "norm" of CIA's interrogations was "transparent law enforcement procedures [that] had developed to such a high level... that you could get pretty much what you wanted." The CIA did not correct the Committee member's misunderstanding that CIA interrogation techniques were similar to techniques used by U.S. law enforcement.799 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332).
7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the Techniques on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information
¶In May 2004, the OLC, then led by Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith, informed the CIA's Office of General Counsel that it had never formally opined on whether the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the CIA's program was consistent with U.S. constitutional standards.800 Goldsmith also raised concerns about divergences between the CIA's proposed enhanced interrogation techniques, as described in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, and their actual application, as described in the CIA Inspector General's Special Review.801 May 27, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith to General Counsel Muller. In late May 2004, DCI Tenet suspended the use of the CIA's "enhanced" and "standard" interrogation techniques, pending updated approvals from the OLC.802 May 24, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from [Redacted] subject: Memorandum of Meeting with the DCI Regarding DOJ's Statement that DOJ has Rendered No Legal Opinion on Whether CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques would meet Constitutional Standards. Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, June 4, 2004, re: Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques. On June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet issued a formal memorandum suspending the use of the CIA's interrogation techniques, pending policy and legal review.803 June 4, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, re: Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques. On June 2, 2004, George Tenet informed the President that he intended to resign from his position on July 11, 2004. The White House announced the resignation on June 3, 2004. The same day, the CIA sought reaffirmation of the program from the National Security Council.804 June 4, 2004, Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI George Tenet, re: Review of CIA Interrogation Program. National Security Advisor Rice responded, noting that the "next logical step is for the Attorney General to complete the relevant legal analysis now in preparation."805 June 2004, Memorandum for the Honorable George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, re: Review of CIA'interrogation Program.
135¶On June [Redacted] 2004, a foreign government captured Janat Gul, an individual believed, based on reporting from a CIA source, to have information about al-Qa'ida plans to attack the United States prior to the 2004 presidential election.806 139254 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 3 1 2 1 1 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] In October 2004, the CIA source who provided the information on the "pre-election" threat and implicated Gul and others admitted to fabricating the information. However, as early as March 2004, CIA officials internally expressed doubts about the validity of the CIA source's information.807 The former chief of the CIA's Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March [Redacted] 2004, email that the reporting was "vague" and "worthless in terms of actionable intelligence." He suggested that the reporting "would be an easy way [for al- Qa'ida] to test" the loyalty of the source, given al-Qa'ida's knowledge thay^edjhreatreporting "causes panic in Wasliington." (See email from: [Redacted] t o : [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [source name REDACTED]?; date: March [Redacted] 2004, at 06:55 AM.) ALE^tatioiMrfficer [Redacted] expresse<Uimilai^loubts i t ^ ^ response to the See email from: [Redacted] i o [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] c c : [Redacted] [ R E D A C T E D [Redacted] j e c t : R e : could AQbetesting [ A S S E ^ Y ^ i n ^ s o u r c e name REDACTED]?; date: March [Redacted] 2004, at 07:52:32 AM). See also [Redacted] 1411 [Redacted] ) .
¶On July 2, 2004, the CIA met with National Security Advisor Rice, other National Security Council officials, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, as well as the attorney general and the deputy attorney general, to seek authorization to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically on Janat Gul,808 July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting with National Adviser Rice in the White House Situation Room, re Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul, July 2, 2004. The CIA represented that CI A soo M a y 25 ; 2004, Talking Points for DCI Telephone Conversation with Attorney General: DOJ's Legal Opinion re CIA's Counter-terrorist Program (CT) Interrogation. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith III to Director Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).
136¶"interrogations have saved American lives," that more than half of the CIA detainees would not cooperate until they were interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,809 At the time of this CIA representation, the CIA had held at least 109 detainees and subjected at least 33 of them (30 percent) to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. and that "unless CIA interrogators can use a full range of enhanced interrogation methods, it is unlikely that CIA will be able to obtain current threat information from Gul in a timely manner."810 July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul. CIA Request for Guidance Regarding Interrogation of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004. Janat Gul was not yet in CIA custody.811 For additional details, see Volume III.
¶On July 6, 2004, National Security Advisor Rice sent a memorandum to DCI Tenet stating that the CIA was "permitted to use previously approved enhanced interrogation methods for Janat Gul, with the exception of the waterboard." Rice offered "to assist [the CIA] in obtaining additional guidance from the Attorney General and NSC Principals on an expedited basis" and noted the CIA's agreement to provide additional information about the waterboard technique in order for the Department of Justice to assess its legality. Rice's memorandum further documented that the CIA had informed her that "Gul likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a result of Gul's close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots."812 July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul.
¶In a meeting on July 20, 2004, National Security Council principals, including the vice president, provided their authorization for the CIA to use its enhanced interrogation techniques—again, with the exception of the waterboard—on Janat Gul. They also directed the Department of Justice to prepare a legal opinion on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.813 July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, "Principals Meeting relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004." On July 22, 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent a letter to Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques (those addressed in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did not violate the U.S. Constitution or any statute or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the interrogation of Janat Gul.814 The one-paragraph letter did not provide legal analysis or substantive discussion of the interrogation techniques. Letter from Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22,2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4). For the remainder of 2004, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques on three detainees—Janat Gul, Sharif al-Masri, and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—with individualized approval from the Department of Justice.815 See Volume III for additional details. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶After being rendered to CIA custody on July [Redacted] 2004, Janat Gul was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including continuous sleep deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling,816 until he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations.817 According to a cable, Janat Gul was "not oriented to time or place" and told CIA officers that he saw "his wife and children in the mirror and had heard their voices in the white noise."818 The questioning of Janat Gul continued, although the CIA ceased using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for several days. According to a CIA cable, "[Gul] asked to die, or just be killed."819 After continued interrogation sessions with Gul, on August 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that the interrogation "team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information."820 On August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul "is believed" to possess threat information, and that the "use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that information."821 On that day, August 21, 2004, CIA interrogators resumed using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul.822 Gul continued not to provide any reporting on the pre-election threat described by the CIA source.823 On August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul "may not possess all that [the CIA] believes him to know."824 The interrogators added that "many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida are derived from single source reporting" (the CIA source).825 Nonetheless, CIA interrogators continued to question Gul on the pre-election threat. According to an August 26, 2004, cable, after a 47-hour session of standing sleep deprivation, Janat Gul was returned to his cell, allowed to remove his diaper, given a towel and a meal, and permitted to sleep.826 In October 2004, the CIA conducted a [Redacted] of the CIA source who had identified Gul as having knowledge of attack planning for the pre-election threat. [Redacted] t h e CIA source admitted to fabricating the information.827 Gul was subsequently transferred to a foreign government. On
137¶[Redacted] the CIA that Janat Gul had been released.828
¶Janat Gul never provided the threat information the CIA originally told the National Security Council that Gul possessed. Nor did the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul producc the "immediate threat information that could save American lives," which had been the basis for the CIA to seek authorization to use the techniques. As described elsewhere in this summary, the CIA's justification for employing its enhanced interrogation techniques on Janat Gul—the first detainee to be subjected to the techniques following the May 2004 suspension—changed over time. After having initially cited Gul's knowledge of the pre-election threat, as reported by the CLA's source, the CIA began representing that its enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Gul to deny the existence of the threat, thereby disproving the credibility of the CIA source.829
[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attc ~ ' "' May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
138[Redacted] 0 n August 11, 2004, in the midst of the interrogation of Janat Gul
¶using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA attorney [Redacted] wrote a letter to Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin with "brief biographies" of four individuals whom the CIA hoped to detain. Given the requirement at the time that the CIA seek individual approval from the Department of Justice before using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against a detainee, the CIA letter states, "[w]e are providing these preliminary biographies in preparation for a future request for a legal opinion on their subsequent interrogation in CIA control." Two of the individuals—Abu Faraj al-Libi and Hamza Rabi'a— had not yet been captured, and thus the "biographies" made no reference to their interrogations or the need to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The third individual, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, was in foreign government custody. His debriefings by a foreign government, [Redacted] [Redacted] were described in the letter as "only moderately effective" because Abu Talha was "distracting [those questioning him] with noncritical information that is truthful, but is not related to operational planning." The fourth individual, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, was also inforeign government custody and being debriefed by foreign government officials [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] According to the letter, Ghailani's foreign government debriefings were "ineffective" because Ghailani had "denied knowledge of current threats." The letter described reporting on the pre-election threat—much of which came from the CIA source—in the context of all four individuals.830 Ahmed Ghailani and Abu Faraj al-Libi were eventually rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
¶On September [Redacted] 2004, after the CIA had initiated a counterintelligence review of the CIA source who had reported on the pre-election threat, but prior to the CIA source's [Redacted] the CIA took custody of Sharif al-Masri, whom the CIA source had reported would also have information about the threat.831 Intelligence provided by Sharif al-Masri while he was in foreign government custody resulted in the dissemination of more than 30 CIA intelligence reports.832 After entering CIA custody, Sharif al-Masri expressed his intent to cooperate with the CIA, indicating that he was frightened of interrogations because
¶833 he had been tortured while being interrogated in [Redacted] The CIA nonetheless sought approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Masri because of his failure to provide information on the pre-election threat.834 [Redacted] 3191 [Redacted] |3192| [Redacted]
¶After approximately a week of interrogating al-Masri using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation that coincided with
¶United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value at Qaeda Detainees, at 11. See section of this summary and Volume II entitled, "The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA Sources." 830
¶Letter from [Redacted] |, Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
¶[Redacted] 2004. 831
¶WASHINGTON [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]MAR 04). See HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 832 !
139¶auditory hallucinations, CIA interrogators reported that al-Masri had been "motivated to
¶'" ipate" at the time of his arrival.835 |3194| [Redacted]; [Redacted] HEADQUARTERS] [Redacted] Despite al-Masri's repeated descriptions of torture in [Redacted] , the CIA transferred al-Masri to that government's custody after approximately three months of CIA detention.836 1 [Redacted] 3 [Redacted] r more information, see Volume III, detainee report for Sharif al-Masri. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¶As in the case of Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, the CIA's requests for OLC advice on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani were based on the fabricated reporting on the pre-election threat from the same CIA source.837 See letter from [Redacted] s s o c i a t e General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, ActingAssistant Attorney General, August 25, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). (Note: At various times during this p e r i o [Redacted] s identified as both CIA associate general counsel and [Redacted] T C Legal). See also a letter from [Redacted] Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, September 5, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). A CIA email sent prior to the CIA's request for advice from the OLC indicated that the judgment that Ghailani had knowledge of terrorist plotting was speculative: "Although Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, his respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge about ongoing attack planning against the United States homeland^uidtheoperatives involved." (See email from: [Redacted] C T C / U B L [Redacted] (formerly A L E [Redacted] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004.) Ghailani was rendered to CIA custody on September [Redacted] 0 0 4 . (See [Redacted] 3072 [Redacted] [Redacted] The CIA began using its enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghailani on September 17, 2004, as the CIA was initiating its counterintelligence review of the source who provided the false reporting on the pre-election threat. Sec [Redacted] 3189 (181558Z SEP 04); HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] 04); [Redacted] [Redacted] Like Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, Ghailani also experienced auditory hallucinations following sleep deprivation.838 [REDACTED] [Redacted] 32211 As described in this summary, after having opined on the legality of using the CTA's enhanced interrogation techniques on these three individual detainees, the OLC did not opine again on the CIA's enhanced interrogation program until May 2005.
8. Country^[Redacted]tains Individuals on the CIA's Behalf
¶Consideration of a detention facility in Country [Redacted] began in [Redacted] 2003, when the CIA sought to transfer Ramzi bin al-Shibh from the custody of a foreign government to CIA [Redacted] custody.839 [REDACTED] [Redacted] 22343] which had not yet informed the country'spolitical leadership of the CIA's request to establish a clandestine detention facility in Country [Redacted] surveyed potential sites for the facility, while the CIA set aside $ [Redacted] million for its construction.840 HEADQUARTERS \ [Redacted] In [Redacted] 2003, the CIA arranged for a "temporary patch" involving placing two CIA detainees (Ramzi bin al-Shibh and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) within an already existing Country [Redacted] detention facility, until the CIA's own facility could be built.841 HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] That spring, as the CIA was offering millions of dollars in subsidies to [Redacted] in Countries [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] 8 4 2
140¶CIA Headquarters directed the CIA Station in Country [Redacted] think big" about how CIA
¶843 Headquarters could support Country [Redacted] s [Redacted] After the Station initially submitted relatively modest proposals, CIA Headquarters reiterated the directive, adding that the Station shouk^jrovid^i "wish list."844 ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] h [Redacted] 0 0 3 , the Station proposed a more expansive [Redacted] million in [Redacted] subsidies.843 [Redacted] b s i d y payments, intended in part as compensation for support of the CIA detention program, rose as high as [Redacted] million.846 See DTS #2010-2448. By
¶[Redacted] 2003, after an extension of five months beyond the originally agreed upon timeframe for concluding CIA detention activities in Country [Redacted] both bin al-Shibh and al-Nashiri had been transferred out of Country [Redacted] to the CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.847 [REDACTED] 2498 [Redacted]
9. U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case of Rami r Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Country [Redacted]
¶Beginning in September 2003, the CIA held a number of detainees at CIA facilities on the grounds of, but separate from, the U.S. military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.848 April [Redacted] 2003, Memorandum for Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from [Redacted] Chief Renditions and [Redacted] Counterterrorist Center, Chief of Operations, [Redacted] [Redacted] Chief, [Redacted] Subject: Request to Relocate High-Value Detainees to an Interim Detention Facility at Guantanamo. See also DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] CIA detainees were held at two facilities at Guantanamo Bay, DETENTION SITE MAROON and DETENTION SITE INDIGO. (See Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, Coverage Period: [Redacted] A third CIA detention facility, DETENTION SITE REDl [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 13897 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 3445 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 9754 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] and September 1, 2006, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Concerning the Detention by DOD of Certain Terrorists at a Facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. In early January 2004, the CIA and the Department of Justice began discussing the possibility that a pending U.S. Supreme Court case, Rasul v. Bush, might grant habeas corpus rights to the five CIA detainees then being held at a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.849 Email from: Scott W. Muller; to: [Redacted] [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees in Gitmo; date: January [Redacted] 2004. Shortly after these discussions, CIA officers approached the [Redacted] in Country [Redacted] to determine if it would again be willing to host these CIA detainees, who would remain in CIA custody within an already existing Country [Redacted] facility.850 See HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED] 1845 [Redacted] The CIA's long- term facility in Country [Redacted] which the CIA Station in Country [Redacted] had warned was a drain on the Station's resources, had not yet been completed. See [REDACTED] 1785 [Redacted] By January [Redacted] 2004, the
¶[Redacted] although CIA Headquarters asked the CIA Station to "advise if additional funds may be needed to keep [the facility] viable over the coming year and beyond." CIA Headquarters added, "we cannot have enough blacksite hosts, and we are loathe to let one we have slip away." Country [Redacted] never hosted CIA detainees. See HEADQUAR [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED] 5298 [Redacted] [Redacted] HEADQUARj [Redacted] [Redacted]
141¶[Redacted] in Country [Redacted] had agreed to this arrangement for a limited period of time.851 [REDACTED] [Redacted] 16791
¶Meanwhile, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller asked the Department of Justice, the National Security Council, and the White House Counsel for advice on whether the five CIA detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay should remain at Guantanamo Bay or be moved pending the Supreme Court's decision.852 Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, [Redacted]; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: February [Redacted] 2004. After consultation with the U.S. solicitor general in February 2004, the Department of Justice recommended that the CIA move four detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay pending the Supreme Court's resolution of the case.853 [Redacted] Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: February [Redacted] 2004. The Department of Justice concluded that a fifth detainee, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, did not need to be transferred because he had originally been detained under military authority and had been declared to the ICRC.854 Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, [Redacted] cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], [ R E D A [Redacted] I I I II l l [Redacted] , subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: February [Redacted] 2004. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Nonetheless, by April [Redacted] 2004, all five CIA detainees were transferred from Guantanamo Bay to other CIA detention facilities.855 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 13698 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED] 1 8 9 [Redacted]
¶Shortly after placing CIA detainees within an already existing Country [Redacted] facility fora second time, tensions arose between the CIA and [Redacted] Country [Redacted]
¶|.856 See, for example, [REDACTED] [Redacted] 16791 For additional details of the CIA's interactions with Country [Redacted] see Volume I. [Redacted] In [Redacted] 2004, CIA detainees in a Counti [Redacted] facility claimed to hear cries of pain from other detainees presumed to be in the [Redacted] facility.857 Among the detainees making this claim was Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, who had previousl^eei^endered from CIA custody to [Redacted] A Libyan national, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi reported while i n [Redacted] t o d y that Iraq was supporting al-Qa'ida and providing assistance with chemical and biological weapons. Some of this information was cited by Secretary Powell in his speech to the United Nations, and was used as a justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted the claim after he was rendered to CIA custody on February [Redacted] 2003, claiming that he had been tortured by the [Redacted] and only told them what he assessed they wanted to hear. For more details, see Volume III. While in C o u n f r [Redacted] l ^ ^ i b H o l ^ I ^ e b n r f e r ^ i a t the "sobbing and yelling" he When the CIA chief of Station approached the [Redacted]
142¶[Redacted] about the accounts of the CIA detainees, the [Redacted] stated with "bitter dismay" that the bilateral relationship was being "tested."858 [REDACTED] 20101 There were also counterintelligence concerns relating to CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who had attempted to influence a Country [Redacted] officer.859 [REDACTED] 2010 [Redacted] These concerns contributed to a request from [Redacted] [Redacted] 2004 for the CIA to remove all CIA detainees from Country [Redacted]
¶( T S i [Redacted] N E M i [Redacted] O M ^ w h c n t t a chief of Station in Country [Redacted] again a p p r o a c h e d [Redacted] i t h allegations from CIA detainees about the mistreatment of Country [Redacted] detai n e e [Redacted] in the facility, the chief of Station received an angry response that, as he reported to CIA Headquarters, "starkly illustrated the inherent challenges [ofj [Redacted]
¶[Redacted] According to the ririef of Station, Country [Redacted] saw the CIA as "querulous and unappreciative recipients of their [Redacted] cooperation."861 ' [REDACTED] 2602 [Redacted] By the end of 2004, relations between the CIA and Country [Redacted] deteriorated, particularly with regard to intelligence cooperation.862 [Redacted] [REDACTED] 31281 [Redacted] and [REDACTED] 2783 [Redacted] Country [Redacted] officials refuse^oprovidetheCIA with counterterrorism information, including information obtained through CIA-funded [Redacted] See [REDACTED] [Redacted] 312811 [Redacted] The CIA detainees were transferred out of Country [Redacted] i [Redacted] 2005.863 HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted]
[Redacted] -) Beginning in [Redacted] 2005, the [Redacted] [Redacted] in Country [Redacted] insisted, over the CIA's opposition, to brief Country [Redacted]'s [Redacted] on
¶the effort to establish a more permanent and unilateral CIA detention facility, which was under construction. A proposed phone call to the [Redacted] from Vice President Cheney to solidify support for CIA operations in Country [Redacted] was complicated by the fact that Vice President Cheney had not been told about the locations of the CIA detention facilities. The CIA wrote that there was a "primary need" to "eliminate any possibility that [ [Redacted] could explicitly or implicitly refer to the existence of a black site in [the country]" during the call with the vice president.864 HEADQUARTERS There are no indications that the call occurred. The [Redacted] of Country [Redacted] nonetheless approved the unilateral CIA detention facility, which cost [Redacted] million, but was never used by the CIA.865 [REDACTED] and C T [Redacted] D G , "Evolution of the Program." By [Redacted] 2006, the CTA was working with Country [Redacted] to decommission what was described as the "aborted" project.866 heard reminded him of what he previously endured in [Redacted] and it sounded to him like a prisoner had been tied up and beaten. See [REDACTED] 1989 \ [Redacted]
143