L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem"

L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem"

¶In the fall of 2004, CIA officers began considering "end games," or the final disposition of detainees in CIA custody. A draft CIA presentation for National Security Council principals dated August 19, 2004, identified the drawbacks of ongoing indefinite detention by the CIA, including: the need for regular relocation of detainees, the "tiny pool of potential host countries" available "due to high risks," the fact that "prolonged detention without legal process increases likelihood of HVD health, psychological problems [and] curtails intel flow," criticism of the U.S. government if legal process were delayed or denied, and the likelihood that the delay would "complicate, and possibly reduce the prospects of successful prosecutions of these detainees."⁸⁶⁷⁸⁶⁷ CIA PowerPoint Presentation, CIA Detainees: Endgame Options and Plans, dated August 19, 2004. CIA draft talking points produced a month later state that transfer to Department of Defense or Department of Justice custody was the "preferred endgame for 13 detainees currently in [CIA] control, none of whom we believe should ever leave USG custody."⁸⁶⁸⁸⁶⁸ September 17, 2004, DRAFT Talking Points for die ADC1: Endgame Options and Plans for CIA Detainees.

¶By the end of 2004, the overwhelming majority of CIA detainees—113 of the 119 identified in the Committee Study—had already entered CIA custody. Most of the detainees remaining in custody were no longer undergoing active interrogations; rather, they were infrequently questioned and awaiting a final disposition. The CIA took custody of only six new detainees between 2005 and January 2009: four detainees in 2005, one in 2006, and one—the CIA's final detainee, Muhammad Rahim—in 2007.⁸⁶⁹⁸⁶⁹ The CIA took custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi Abu Munthir al-Magrebi, Ibrahim Jan, and Abu Ja'far al-lraqi in 2005, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in 2006.

¶In 2004, CIA detainees were being held in three countries: at DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [Redacted] at the [Redacted] i l i t y [Redacted] n Country [Redacted] as well as at detention facilities in Country [Redacted] DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [Redacted] opened in early 2005.⁸⁷⁰⁸⁷⁰ The first detainees arrived in Countr [Redacted] [Redacted] 2003. CIA detainees were held within an existing Country [Redacted] facility in Country [Redacted] from [Redacted] to [Redacted] 2003, and then again beginning in [Redacted] 2004. For additional information, see Volume I. On April 15, 2005, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [Redacted] sent the management of RDG an email expressing his concerns about the detention site and the program in general. He commented that "we have seen clear indications that various Headquarters elements are experiencing mission fatigue vis-a-vis their interaction with the program," resulting in a "decline in the overall quality and level of experience of deployed personnel," and a decline in "level and quality of requirements." He wrote that because of the length of time most of the CIA detainees had been in detention, "[the] detainees have been all but drained of actionable intelligence," and their remaining value was in providing "information that can be incorporated into strategic, analytical think pieces that deal with motivation, structure and goals." The chief of Base observed that, during the course of the year, the detention site transitioned from an intelligence production facility to a long-term detention facility, which raised "a host of new challenges." These challenges included the need to address the "natural and progressive effects of long-term solitary confinement on detainees" and ongoing behavioral problems.⁸⁷¹⁸⁷¹ m a i l f r o m : [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005. £ [Redacted] ) With respect to the personnel at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the chief of Base wrote:

"I am concerned at what appears to be a lack of resolve at Headquarters to deploy to the field the brightest and most qualified officers for service at [the detention site]. Over the course of the last year the quality of personnel (debriefers and [security protective officers]) has declined significantly. With regard to debriefers, most are mediocre, a handfull [sic] are exceptional and more than a few are basically incompetent. From what we can determine there is no established methodology as to the selection of debriefers. Rather than look for their best, managers seem to be selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time. We see no evidence that thought is being given to deploying an 'A-Team.' The result, quite naturally, is the production of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence....

We have seen a similar deterioration in the quality of the security personnel deployed to the site.... If this program truly does represent one of the agency's most secret activities then it defies logic why inexperienced, marginal, underperforming and/or officers with potentially significant [counterintelligence] problems are permitted to deploy to this site. It is also important that we immediately inact [sic] some form of rigorous training program."⁸⁷²⁸⁷² E m a U f r o m : [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005.

¶A CIA OIG audit completed in June 2006 "found that personnel assigned to CIA-controlled detention facilities, for the most part, complied with the standards and guidelines in carrying out their duties and responsibilities." The OIG also found that, "except for the shortage of debriefers, the facilities were staffed with sufficient numbers and types of personnel." The lack of debriefers, however, was described as "an ongoing problem" for the program. According to the audit, there were extended periods in 2005 when the CIA's DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Country [Redacted] had either one or no debriefers. At least twice in the summer of 2005, the chief of Station in that country requested additional debriefers, warning that intelligence collection could suffer. Months later, in January 2006, the chief of Base at the detention site advised CIA Headquarters that "the facility still lacked debriefers to support intelligence collection requirements, that critical requirements were 'stacking up,' and that gaps in the debriefing of detainees were impacting the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting and would make the work of future debriefers more difficult."⁸⁷³⁸⁷³ Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. As further described in the m i i i i iii i [Redacted] i i i i m i i Committee Study, the Inspector General audit described how the CIA's detention facilities were not equipped to provide detainees with medical care. The audit described unhygienic food preparation, including at a facility with a "rodent infestation," and noted that a physician assistant attributed symptoms of acute gastrointestinal illness and giardiasis experienced by six staff and a detainee to food and water contamination. The audit further identified insufficient guidelines covering possible detainee escape or the death of a detainee.Show full note